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**THE HISTORY OF THE
TENTH FOOT.**



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JOHN EARL OF BATH.
1ST COLONEL OF THE TENTH.

The History of the Tenth Foot

(1 - Linch-line Region).

ALBERT LEH,

England's Sea Store
England's Sea Store



"I have not intended such a weight of
responsibility to be placed on me in the field."

—LORD GOWAN.

... it is due to the present 2nd Latin.

VOL. I.

DOCUMENTAL COMMITTEE

W. & A. WATSON WORKS, ALDERSHOT.
10, PATTERSON ROW, LONDON, E.C.
1, NEWTON ROAD, PORTSMOUTH.

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WINDSOR CASTLE.

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OF THE TEND.

The
History of the Tenth Foot
(The Lincolnshire Regiment).

BY ALBERT LEE,
= *Author of*
"The Story of Royal Windsor," "England's Sea Story,"
"The World's Exploration Story," "Famous British Admirals," &c.



"THE TENTH REGIMENT, who have attained such a weight of glory by their brilliant achievements in the field."

—LORD GOUGH.

Speech when presenting their first Colours to the present 2nd Battn.

VOL. I.

PUBLISHED FOR THE REGIMENTAL COMMITTEE
BY
GALE & POLDEN LTD., WELLINGTON WORKS, ALDERSHOT.
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ALBERT LEE.

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THE HISTORY OF THE TENTH FOOT.

CHAPTER I.

THE BEGINNING OF THE STANDING ARMY.

WHEN, after the Restoration of the Monarchy, Charles the Second had firmly seated himself on the throne of England, the new Model Army of the Commonwealth ceased to exist, the Parliament realising the menacing possibilities which lay in its continuance.

It was recognised by the statesmen of the day that the Army might readily overthrow the restored dynasty, or, on the other hand, at any time revive a military dictatorship which would imperil the liberties of the nation. It had mastered the Parliament once, and there were many who feared that it would repeat the undesirable experience. It had "brought a King to justice and to the block, had given laws to England, and held even Cromwell in awe." Consequently, it was deemed that the only possible course, under the new order of things, was to sweep away the Puritan Host, and for all time end the régime of militarism in England.

As soon as Charles the Second had established himself in his palace at Whitehall, he began to follow out the agreement made as one of the conditions of his restoration, namely, the disbanding of the Army. He had, however, to proceed cautiously. The regiments were not broken up

suddenly, but by degrees, and in an order which was decided by lot. A reservation was made in the case of some of the regiments, namely, Monk's Horse and Foot, and two others which had been taken over by the Dukes of York and Gloucester. These were to be retained till the last.*

The disbandment went forward with unexpected rapidity until, on the 6th of January, 1661, it was suddenly checked. On that day Thomas Venner, a crack-brained Puritan preacher, headed a body of men who became known as Millenarians, or Fifth Monarchy men, and began to revile the King. In the stead of Charles, they proclaimed the reign of King Jesus. Their proceedings were not only noisy, they were mischievous, and even murderous. There was no police in those days, and in the face of this dangerous riot the contention of the King that it would be madness to disband all his troops was unanswerable. General Monk's own regiments of Horse and Foot were, therefore, retained. Had Venner remained silent for another week, he and his men would have been in a position to dictate to the sovereign. There was, however, now a general consent to the proposal to retain a sufficiently strong body to sweep the streets of the Fifth Monarchy men, and any other dangerous malcontents who might follow the example set by Venner. Accordingly, the King retained some five thousand men—cavalry and footmen—as his Guards: "gentlemen of quality, and veteran soldiers, excellently clad, mounted and ordered." They were always ready for service about the royal person, and in spite of the scandal which it aroused, the King persisted, steadily but cautiously, in gradually increasing the numbers.†

*Hon. J. W. Fortescue: "History of the Army."

†Green: "Short History."

As soon as the trouble with Venner had passed, Parliament considered the situation, and admitted the necessity of maintaining a force of fighting men, who should act in emergency as a Military Police, or as the King's Body-Guard. The limit of this force was fixed at three thousand men; the nation, moreover, was not called on to maintain it, but his Majesty was to bear the expenses of this establishment out of the State allowance. Consequently, as a matter of form, Monk's regiments of Horse and Foot were called out on parade to be disbanded, as other regiments had already been, and laid down their arms. Within an hour they took them up again.

Monk's new regiment of Foot, thus formed, became the Coldstream Guards. They hold that name to-day. It was given to them from the fact that General Monk had started with them from the Scottish town of Coldstream in 1659, on his famous march into England. There was in addition the King's Own Regiment of Guards, the King's Body-Guard; and since the year 1815 this regiment has borne the name of the Grenadier Guards. The cavalry portion of the small Army became, under the re-formation, the Horse Guards and the Life Guards. Three troops were in the Life Guards, namely, the King's Own, the Duke of York's, and the Duke of Albemarle's, Monk having been raised to a dukedom.

This does not mark the limits of the King's standing Army. The Cavaliers, who formed the garrison at Dunkirk, were called over to England. There was yet a further addition to the Army when Charles II. married Catherine of Braganza at Plymouth in 1663. The town of Tangier was a part of her dowry, and in order to protect the traders there from the "cupidity and bad faith of the Moors" who were in the town and neighbourhood, the

When Supplies were asked for by the King, in order to maintain the Army, the House of Commons deliberately pronounced for the necessity of securing the efficiency of the Militia, but cut down the vote asked for by his Majesty—£1,400,000—to little more than half that sum. Even when making this grant the Commons declined to admit that it was for the special use of the Army.

This reluctance of the Commons to grant Supplies for the Army's maintenance continued up to the day when the Duke of Monmouth raised the standard of rebellion in the West in 1685, and the Tenth Regiment of Foot took its place in the Army of England.

THE EARLY DAYS.

CHAPTER II.

THE RAISING OF THE TENTH.

1685. THE coming of James, Duke of Monmouth, in 1685, called for a force of fighting men adequate to the task of stamping out the dangerous rebellion. The Duke had not undertaken the rash enterprise with eagerness, for he wrote to one who pressed him to cross over from Holland to England, and lay claim to the throne: "To tell you my thoughts without disguise, I am now so much in love with a quiet life, that I am ne'er like to be fond of making a bustle in the world again." Some Protestants, however, who resented the fact that the King was a Catholic, overruled his objections, and he came, landing at Lyme Regis on June the 11th. In a short time the men who rallied round him numbered 5,000—not all of them the mere rabble they have been represented by some historians, but with them many old Cromwellians.

It was a strong and dangerous force to be in the West, and the situation became more serious daily. Men were traversing the roads to Taunton by hundreds, full of enthusiasm, not for the Duke alone, but for the opportunity of striking a blow against an unpopular and Catholic, as well as unconstitutional, Sovereign. The situation was so alarming when it transpired that Monmouth was proclaiming himself King, and had set a price on James the Second's head, that Parliament, apart from

any question of regard for his Majesty, and mainly in view of the nation's security, supported the monarch in a very decisive manner. A Bill was passed without delay, attainting Monmouth of high treason, and a reward of £5,000 was offered for his capture. A Supply of £400,000 was voted to enable the King to cope with "the present extraordinary occasions."

This money permitted the gathering together of a strong fighting force. James levied several troops of Horse, which were later regimented, and formed the Corps called the Queen Dowager's Horse, which is now so well known as the Carabiniers, or Sixth Dragoon Guards. Two regiments of Dragoons were also raised: one the Queen's Dragoons—now the Third, or King's Own Hussars—the other the Princess Anne of Denmark's, now Fourth Hussars. Nine regiments of infantry were raised in a very short time, and the Tenth among them, a regiment destined to obtain a splendid record, and to be known as the Tenth Regiment of Foot, or more distinctly, the Tenth, or North Lincolnshire Regiment of Foot. In the present day the name attached to it is that of the Lincolnshire Regiment.

The regiment was to consist of twelve companies, each numbering a hundred private soldiers, but only ten appear to have been raised in 1685. An additional company was raised on the 17th of March in the following year. The districts drawn upon for recruits were the counties of Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, and in accordance with the Commission which bore date the 20th of June, 1685, the rendezvous was the town of Derby. No information is available as to the date of the assembly of the recruits in that town. The Colonel named in the Commission was John Granville, or Grenville, Earl of Bath. The newly-formed regiment bore the name of its Colonel,

in accordance with the usages of the time. Until the middle of the 18th century regiments were invariably designated by the names of their Colonels. When Lord Bath received his commission he was fifty-seven years of age, and had already achieved considerable distinction as a soldier. This was in the Civil War, when Charles the First was fighting with the Parliament. Serving in his father's regiment, he was knighted when he was only fifteen years old. At the age of sixteen he was his father's successor in the command, and in the second battle of Newbury in that same year was desperately wounded. Charles had appointed him Governor of the Scilly Islands, and when the Cromwellian forces planned their capture and his own murder, his defence was so stubborn that terms had to be made by Parliament before he would surrender. He received special leave "to pass up and down in England without doing anything prejudicial to the State."

At the Restoration he was created "Earl of Bath, Viscount Lansdowne, and Baron Grenville of Kilkhampton and Bideford, with permission to use the titles of Earl of Corboile, Thorigny, and Grenville, as his ancestors had done." The honours were granted to him because, while sharing in the exile of Charles the Second, he was chosen to carry the King's letters from Breda to both Houses of Parliament. The part, therefore, which he played in the Restoration was one which called for such a reward. There were, however, other recognitions of services, doubtless welcome to a man who had practically spent his all on the King, to whom, from time to time, he had sent great sums of money. Not only was he made Colonel of a foot regiment, and Captain and Governor of Plymouth and St. Nicholas Island, but had a grant of "£2,000 a year and all other fees due to him as groom of the Stole and first

gentleman usher of the bedchamber." There was a further large grant made to him of "felon's goods, deodands, and treasure trove in certain manors in Cornwall and Devonshire." Certain other concessions were made to him, but it was later agreed to pay £3,000 a year "out of the tin revenue to him and his heirs for ever."

The Earl could certainly not complain of ingratitude on the King's part for services rendered to the Royal Family, for whom he had fought so finely, and whom he had befriended in their necessity.

His services as a soldier and military administrator were inestimable. When Charles the Second involved the nation in a war with the Dutch, the Earl of Bath organised the Militia of Cornwall and Devonshire with a skill which won the commendation even of his enemies. At the same time, he proved his worth as an engineer in "strengthening and enlarging the fortifications of Plymouth."

Such was the man who was chosen to be Colonel of the Tenth on its formation—an officer of whom the regiment might well be proud, bearing in mind his fighting record; yet Burnet said that he was "a mean-minded man, who thought of nothing but of getting and spending money." In the "Dartmouth Papers" we find that the Earl of Bath wrote to Lord Dartmouth to say that his regiment being completed, he, having received the King's orders to draw some of the companies on duty immediately, now desired the needful arms to be supplied to his officers and men. That letter bore the date of July 23rd, 1685.

When Monmouth was made prisoner, and entered London in sorry plight, and as a captive—whereas he had promised to ride into the capital as a conqueror—some of the regiments were disbanded, much as the King desired to maintain a large Army. The Tenth was one of those

that were continued, but the twelve companies which concentrated at Plymouth, with a hundred men in each, were reduced to ten, and instructions were issued that the number of private soldiers in each company was not to exceed fifty.

The names of the Officers in the Commission Register stand as follows :—

John, Earl of Bath, Colonel.

Sir Nicholas Richard Slanning, Lieut.-Colonel.

Charles Carney, Major.

| | | |
|----------|---|---|
| Captains | { | Michael Bourke. |
| | | Sir Thomas Wyndham, Bart. |
| | | Sir Bevil Grenville (or Bevil Granville). |
| | | Edward Scott. |
| | | Bernard Strobe. |
| | | Charles Morgan. |
| | | Sidney Godolphin. |
| | | Francis Vivian. |
| | | Joseph Drake. |

The Tenth must have been picturesque in appearance, especially to men of modern days who are accustomed to khaki. The records give the following description of the soldiers' clothing: The uniform was blue; indeed, the Tenth was the only infantry regiment wearing that colour. The coats, which were single-breasted, with long full skirts, were lined with red, the edges were turned up. The waistcoats, breeches, which were very full knickerbockers, and the stockings were all red, of the same colour as the coat-linings. The garter ribbons were also red. The broad-rimmed, black beaver hats were soft and round, the hat bands being of red ribbon, and the edges of the brims trimmed with white lace. The brims were turned up on one side, indiscriminately on the right or left, judging

from the illustrations, unless, as we have reason to believe, the upturning on the right indicated the pikemen, who also wore red worsted sashes. The musketeers of Bath's Regiment also wore across the left shoulder a leathern belt, known as a bandolier, in the wooden tubes of which were kept the separate charges of powder for the musket. The soldier also carried in the bandolier belt a ball-bag, which contained a supply of twenty-five bullets.

The accuracy of this description is borne out by an extract from the "London Gazette," of the 25th of August, 1687, describing a deserter:—

"Earl of Bath's Regiment (Captain Granville's Company of Granadiers): Short, curling yellow hair, large red whiskers, old blue coat lined red, with red and white loops. Red breeches, red stockings, an old white hat."

A further description of the Tenth soldier for 1687 adds these details:—"Black leather gaiters with silver buckles; shirt sleeves visible." The coats of the drummers of regiments other than Royal were of the colour of the regimental facings. The uniforms of the Tenth drummers would probably have been red coats and blue facings.* The coats of the Grenadiers were ornamented with loops, and embroidered button-holes in worsted lace, with tufts at the other ends. There was some slight difference in the uniform of a serjeant of the Tenth, the bows on the shoes being red (vermillion). The sash had crimson-tasselled ends, the same as the sash of to-day.†

The equipment of the soldiers of Bath's Regiment was the same as that of the other foot regiments. They were armed—some with pikes, and some with muskets, or a

* Walton.

† *London Gazette*.

sword, which was straight-bladed. The sword was thrust into a scabbard of black leather with steel mountings.

The pike was a formidable weapon in the hands of a skilled soldier. The head was flat and pointed, and the staff on which it was mounted varied in length from 13 to 18 feet, and was shod with a pointed iron foot. When the Tenth were embodied the pike was being superseded by the bayonet, which had been invented in 1640. It was adopted in this country in the simple plug-form in 1675, but in 1689, just after the Revolution, General Mackay introduced an improved method, by attaching it to the barrel by two rings. The socketed bayonet did not come into use until 1703, and then in the French, and not the English, Army. The Foot Guards received the bayonet in 1686, a year after the formation of the Tenth. Necessarily the pikemen disappeared from the regiment very early in its history.

One notices in the print which displays the equipment of the soldiers of the Tenth, that the Grenadiers carried a hatchet, fastened to the belt. The hatchet was issued for the hewing down of the palisades at the attack of a fortified place. The Grenadiers were established first in 1678, and took their name from the grenade. . . . a small shell of from one to two inches in diameter, kindled by a fuse, and thrown by the hand. Hence, it was entrusted to the tallest and finest men of the regiment, who might reasonably be expected to throw it farthest.* Consequently, these were nearly always told off for the assault of a fortress. The Grenadiers wore tall caps, in order to sling and unsling their muskets without knocking them off. The cap was of the same colour as the facings.

* Portescue.

The musket was a cumbersome weapon—an improvement on the matchlock, which was so heavy that it was impossible to use it without the aid of a spiked fork, the pointed end of which was thrust into the ground to form a rest for it. It had to go, and in the early days of the Tenth the soldiers were provided with the flint-lock musket. This was not an effective weapon, for its range was not more than 100 or 200 yards. A piece of flint was held in a vice by a screw, and when the trigger was pulled the flint struck on a piece of steel, and the spark produced by the blow fired a small quantity of powder in a pan alongside the barrel, which in turn fired the charge within.

The colours of the regiment when the Earl of Bath undertook the command are shown in a manuscript now in the Library in Windsor Castle, thus:

THE EARL OF BATH'S REGIMENT OF FOOT.

Colonel's colour: Plain yellow throughout.

Gilt spike on the colour shaft. Gold and silver cords and tassels. Gilt ferrule.

Lieutenant-Colonel's colour. The same as that of the Colonel's, but with the red cross of St. George edged white. Spike and tassels, cords, etc., are the same as that of the Colonel's.

Major's colour: The same as that of the Lieut.-Colonel's, but with a red flame.

The eldest Captain's colour: The same as that of the Lieut.-Colonel's, but there is in the centre an "organ rest" in gold, a charge in the coat armour of Granville, Earl of Bath. "No roundells or figures are shown on the Captain's colour, as was the case in some regiments, and possibly two, three, four, etc., of these family heraldic devices may have been placed in successive captain's colours. Whatever

the regimental custom was, we have now no power of discovering. . . . It is well known that each Captain had his own colour, and what is more, that the colours were all of yellow ground, with the red cross of St. George.*

Although the regiment, when on parade or in the field, bore an appearance which was picturesque, the soldier's life was not in those days a happy one. He had work in abundance, but ample cause for dissatisfaction in the matter of pay. It was neither sufficient nor certain. One has but to examine the table, which gives the statement of the numbers and rates of pay to the staff and others, as shown under date January 1st, 1686:—

THE EARL OF BATH'S REGIMENT.

Staff:

| | | | £ | s | d |
|------------------------------|-----|-------------|----|----|---|
| 1 Colonel, as Colonel | ... | Pay per day | 0 | 12 | 0 |
| 1 Lt-Col., as Lt-Col. | ... | " " " | 0 | 7 | 0 |
| 1 Major, as Major | ... | " " " | 0 | 5 | 0 |
| 1 Chaplain | ... | " " " | 0 | 6 | 8 |
| 1 Chirurgeon 4/-, 1 Mate 2/6 | ... | " " " | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| 1 Adjutant | ... | " " " | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| 1 Quarter-Master and Marshal | ... | " " " | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Total for Staff | | | £2 | 5 | 2 |

* From Major E. B. Wilkinson's MSS.


The Colonel's Disbursement

| | £ | s | d |
|--------------------------------|----|----|---|
| The Colonel as Captain | 0 | 8 | 0 |
| 1 Lieutenant | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| 1 Ensign | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| 2 Serjeants 1/6 each | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| 2 Corporals 1/- each | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| 1 Drummer | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 50 Private Soldiers at 6s each | 1 | 13 | 4 |
| Total for one Company per day | 2 | 15 | 4 |
| Nine Companies more | 24 | 18 | 0 |
| Total | 26 | 18 | 6 |

Per annum £10,022 12 6

This in some degree looks satisfactory on paper; but neither the men of the Tenth, nor of any other regiment, had as much as this tabulated statement would indicate. There were many things which made for reduction. There was what Fortescue calls an organised system of robbery in the Army under Charles the Second and James the Second. When an officer purchased a commission the Secretary at War required a fee; another fee went to one of the Secretaries of State. Five per cent. of the purchase money had to be paid to the Treasurer of the Chelsea Hospital. "He then became entitled to the pay of his rank, but this by no means implied that it was regularly paid to him. In the first place, the pay was divided into two parts, termed respectively his subsistence and his arrears, or clearings. The former sum was a proportion of the full pay, which varied according to the grade of the officer, it being obvious that an ensign, for instance, could not subsist if any large fraction was deducted from his daily pittance, whereas a major could be more heavily

COLLONELL



THE Earle of Bath's Regmt of Foot.


F.W. BARRY del.

not to be paid, and yet not starve. This subsistence was therefore paid, or supposed to be issued, in advance from the pay office, and to be subject to no stoppage. The balance of the full pay, or arrears, was paid yearly after it became due, and after considerable deductions had been made from it. First of these deductions came the poundage, or payment of one shilling in the pound, to the Paymaster-General, and the discharge of one day's full pay to Chelsea Hospital. The stoppages were more or less legitimate. The first was the salary-General of the master steped in to the officer, as from everyone else in the Army, a tax which caused much discontent, and was reduced to one-third of a day's pay. Then came a number of irregular exactions. Every commander of the musters claimed a fee, amounting sometimes as much as two guineas for every troop or company and each muster which, as musters were taken six times a year, was sufficiently exorbitant. Next the fee amounted thirty shillings, or eight times their fee, for each troop and company on passing the muster to the Paymaster General. Finally, fees to the Treasury, fees for the issue of pay-books, in a word, to every greedy clerk who could find himself disagreeable, brought the tale of the "end" to a close.

The officers, so fleeced, endeavoured to recoup themselves to some degree at the expense of the non-commissioned officers and men, so that the pay mentioned by no means what the soldiers received. Doubtless the Tenth—like the officers—suffered as the soldiers in any of the other regiments of the army would be absurd to suppose otherwise. The

* Fortescue's "History of the Army."

COLLONELL



THE Earle of Baths Regmt of Foot.



F. H. B. 1787

mulcted, and yet not starve. This subsistence was therefore paid, or supposed to be issued, in advance from the pay office, and to be subject to no stoppage. The balance of the full pay, or arrears, was paid yearly after it became due, and after considerable deductions had been made from it. First of these deductions came the poundage, or payment of one shilling in the pound, to the Paymaster-General, and the discharge of one day's full pay to Chelsea Hospital. These stoppages were more or less legitimate. Then the Commissary-General of the muster stepped in to claim from the officer, as from everyone else in the Army, one day's pay, a tax which caused much discontent, and was in 1680 reduced to one-third of a day's pay. Then came a vast number of irregular exactions. Every commissary of the musters claimed a fee, amounting sometimes to as much as two guineas for every troop or company passed at each muster, which, as musters were taken six times a year, was sufficiently exorbitant. Next the auditors demanded thirty shillings, or eight times their legal fee, for each troop and company on passing the accounts of the Paymaster-General. Finally, fees to the Exchequer, fees to the Treasury, fees for the issue of pay-warrants—fees, in a word, to every greedy clerk who could make himself disagreeable, brought the tale of extortion to an end.”*

The officers, so fleeced, endeavoured to recoup themselves in some degree at the expense of the non-commissioned officers and men, so that the pay mentioned above was by no means what the soldiers received. Doubtless the men of the Tenth—like the officers—suffered as much as the soldiers in any of the other regiments of the Line. It would be absurd to suppose otherwise. The

* Fortescue: "History of the Army."

soldier's grievance, therefore, came in this form: The private, for example, was supposed to draw 8d. a day; 6d. was set apart for subsistence. The 2d. was termed "gross off-reckonings." On this there was a deduction of five per cent. for the Paymaster-General—12s. 2d. in the year. The balance went to the Colonel "for the clothing of the regiment, an item which included the actual garments, but also the sword and belt, and as time went on the bayonet and cartridge box."

The Colonel could not possibly pay for all this out of the money, which was so insufficient. He looked to the contractors for commission, and necessarily in this case the soldier did not get his money's worth in his clothing. Even the sixpence per day, which had to come through the Colonel's hands, was not certain. There were "pretexts for plunder." The captain of the company imitated his superior officer. If a man in the ranks died between the musters, the captain drew the full pay of the interval, and Fortescue suggests that not infrequently men who had dropped out came back on muster days, so that the money for the vacancy was not stopped. The King himself gave countenance after a manner to this fraud by reviving the practice of allowing officers so many imaginary men or permanent vacancies in each troop or company, in order to increase their emoluments.*

James the Second was supposed to insist on a slackening of these abuses, and in such a case the soldier benefited, always presuming that no fraud was resorted to—which is too much to assume. An order from the King, and the actual carrying out of that order, were two very different things. The "rascality and corruption" did not end. The wonder is that any of the regiments of the Line

* Fortescue: *Ibid.*

maintained even a respectable show in the matter of numbers. In reality, recruits were hard to get, and service in the Army was the reverse of popular. When one considers the quality of the soldier's food, it is significant that this sentence should occur in one of the records: "It is not to be supposed that Commissariat officers were the only clean-handed officers under Government."

One wonders how the men contrived to live, for the subsistence money—sixpence a day—was all that the soldier had to live on, but it must not be forgotten that sixpence in those days had more purchasing power than now. Rations were not issued except when it was found absolutely necessary on the field in time of war,* but the sixpence was stopped to pay for them.

These men of the Tenth, moreover, like their fellows, in the new standing Army, were not only abominably treated in the matter of food, receiving in their bread purchases, for example, only fourteen ounces to the pound, but they were without barracks, and were accordingly billeted where it was possible. First, they were quartered in "victualling houses, taverns, and ale-houses," and when these were full, private houses were used, if the tenants did not refuse, as was their right at the time. The soldier had then to pay "fair prices, but not exceeding his subsistence money." What he received for his money comprised quarters, fuel, light, and provisions; but these were "only according to the ordinary condition of the house, and after the manner of the ordinary domestics." Later the law was more definite on these points, for in William the Third's reign it was declared lawful to quarter "the officers and soldiers of their Majesties' Service in inns, livery-stables, ale-houses, victualling-houses, and all the houses selling brandy, strong

* Walton: "History of British Standing Army."

waters, cider, or metheglin by retail to be drank in their houses and no other, and in no private house whatever."

The regiment thus raised for service in the south, and face to face with all the possibilities of war, was in many senses a raw one. It was by no means a splendidly disciplined force, infinitely superior to the men who rallied round the standard of the Duke of Monmouth, for the methods pursued in the early days of the Standing Army differed immensely from the practice observed in the Army of England in the 20th Century. It was little more than a regiment of men with arms and uniform, who had yet to learn the intricacies of drill, and discover the full force of discipline.

"The manufacture of the raw material into a soldier was by no means so protracted a process in the seventeenth century as it is in the nineteenth; recruits were regimented as soon as raised, and, once with their uniform upon them, were supposed to be fit for anything; they were even shipped off for active service and left to pick up their drill in front of the enemy. The drill, moreover, used to begin where it now ends—with the 'postures' or handling of arms. The Manual and Platoon Exercises were supposed to be at once the least difficult and the most essential of all the soldier's acquirements, and were therefore treated as the rudiments of the art of war, while the figures of drill and field exercises were regarded as the higher branches of regimental military science."* Walton's statement here quoted may not be altogether correct. The manufacture of the raw material took quite as long; but, as Fortescue suggests, the time was not always given to the recruits to learn the business. The same thing was true in 1793-4 and again in 1900.

* Walton.

Without going too far into details, one may note the fact, stated by the same authority, that there was very little *individual drill*. The recruit of the Tenth, like all others, was told to "hold his head up, to 'look lively,' and not to swing his arms. The directions for the facings were equally simple; the soldier was to turn upon the left foot, and to move only his right foot from the ground. In marching the men were to step off with the left foot, and to set their 'feet down altogether, so that they may be heard,' and were to 'march very slowly.'"

The man who ventured to offer himself as a recruit—in face of the general knowledge of the experiences just referred to—had to learn, among many things, that "obedience is the mainspring of an army, the essence of discipline." Judging from the splendid war record, begun within seven years of the formation of the regiment, the men of the Tenth were ready alike in what makes a successful soldier, and in that patriotism which would not allow an English regiment or a brigade to make anything less than a fine display before the enemy.

The rules for English discipline at the time when the Tenth were called into existence are interesting to soldiers of the present day. An old MS., entitled "An Abridgment of ye English Military Discipline," contains the following concerning "ye exercise of foot" at the time when the first recruits of the Tenth were being pulled into shape:

When a body of men are drawn upp to Exercise, The distance of their Ranks must be at six ffoot, and their files at three foot, that they may have liberty to use their Armes. The Officers of the Body (he only excepted that is to give ye words of Comand) are to draw off to ye Right and left, forming a Ranck on each wing opposite ye one to ye other. The Officer Comanding is to place

himselfe before ye middle of the Pikes, about ten foot Distance from them The better to observe what is done, and to be ye more easily understood by ye whole Body. The words of Comand must be given Leisurely, that the Souldiers may performe their postures without confusion.

The Officer must first Comand Silence, and then proceed (as follows) to the—

(Then follow directions as to the Exercise of the Musquett, the Pike, Closings and Openings, Doublings of half files, ffirings, etc.)

As to marching the MS. runs as follows :—

In Marching ye Officers are to observe that the Rancks be at twelve foot distance, and that ye ffiles be closed Shoulder to Shoulder, unless when a Battalion Marches in a Body, in w^{ch} case the files must keepe suche a Distance that they may have ye Liberty of their Armes.

The Souldiers must always begin to March with their Right foot first, w^{ch} is observed to Conduce most to keepe the Rancks even. The Captains are to March with their Pikes Shouldered, A Lieutenant to March with a Partizan, An Ensigne to March with his Pike Comported, which is to be ye Distinction between the Captains and other Officers.

Serjeants have no place assigned to them in Marching, but are to bee moving upp and downe, to observe that ye Rancks and files be at their due distance.

Of SALUTES.

When a Regiment is drawn upp, the Officers are to Salute one after another, as ye Person passes by whome they are to Salute.

If the Regiment march in Division, ye Officer yt Comands must begin first to Salute, and ye Captains

that March in a Ranck behind him, must not Salute, till he hath done, and then they must observe all one Motion—The Lieutenants likewise, when they Salute must keepe ye same time, as also ye Ensigns; which is much more Gracefull than doing it one after another.

The Ensigns must further observe in their Salutes, to bring their Colours all ye same way, otherwise they will be apt to meet and Entangle.

In making a Guard when ye King or Queen passes by, the Pikes must be advanced, otherwise only ye Drums Beate, ye Musquetts are Shouldered, and ye Pike Ordered.

When ye King or Generall comes in ye Reere, the Colours or Officers are not to March through ye Rancks, but to keepe Still at ye ffront, If it be in ye field, and ye whole Army drawn up, then as ye King Marches by, every Battalion is to charge their Pikes, and Rest their Musquetts, which is a posture of more Guard.

A breakdown in the matter of discipline was a serious thing to the soldier four years after Sedgemoor. Until that time, however, there was no statutory authority for the enforcement of discipline. The necessity for such authority was recognised, and in consequence the Mutiny Act of 1689 was passed. This Act introduced punishments of an extreme character. Henceforth, to join in mutiny or sedition meant death, if nine out of thirteen officers, who constituted the Court Martial, assented. Hanging was the penalty for "desertion in the field, acting as a spy, rape, theft from a comrade, and unauthorised plunder," at the time of the formation of the Tenth. Whipping was not carried so far as in later years. "It was of so comparatively mild a character that it can scarcely be classed" with what has been known as "flogging." The number of

strokes varied, but forty was the limit, and thirty-nine was the usual number "to avoid the risk of excess." It was evident that the authorities had in mind the Jewish usage, as recorded in the Pentateuch, where not more than forty stripes should be given. The Roman custom was, "forty stripes save one"—in other words, thirteen strokes with a treble lash.

One may readily gather from such facts as these the roughness of the experiences of the men of the Tenth when on the march through the country from Derby, in order to take the field against the rebel Duke of Monmouth in the West. As to the part Bath's Regiment played in this rebellion, there is nothing known that may be taken with certainty. This we know—that at the time when the Tenth came into being, and Bath was made Colonel, the Earl was Lord-Lieutenant of Cornwall, and received orders to concentrate in Exeter all the Devonshire Militia not with the Duke of Albemarle. He would naturally call for his regiment to join him. As the event proved, by the time the Tenth came into the country occupied by the insurgents the fighting was over. Monmouth, after the slaughter of his forces at Sedgemoor, was a fugitive, disguised in the garb of a countryman, hopelessly endeavouring to avoid capture, and consequent death.

In the Army in the early days of James the Second's reign there was considerable discussion as to the precedence of the various regiments, so much so that an order was issued by his Majesty, which ran as follows:—

"For the preventing of all Questions and disputes that might arise for or concerning the Ranks of the Severall Regiments and Companies of Foot which now are or at any time hereafter shall be employed in Our

Service and of the several Officers and Commanders in the same as well upon Service and in the Field as in all Councils of War and other Military Occasions where they are called to appear in their respective Qualities, We have thought fitt to issue out these following Rules and Directions, viz. :—

“ That Our First Regiment of Foot Guards take place of all other Regiments of Foot, and that the Colonell be alwaies reckoned and take place as the first Foot Colonell.”

(Other Regiments follow in the order stated here :—

The Coldstream.

The Queen Dowager's Regiment.

The Regiment of Prince George.

The Holland Regiment.

Royal Regiment of Fusileers.

Princess Anne of Denmark's Regiment.

Regiment under Henry Cornwall.

The Earl of Bath's Regiment,

and so on.)

The Order concludes in the following manner.—

“ And all other Regiments of Foot are to take place according to their respective Seniorities from the time they were raised, So as that no regiment is to lose its Precedency by the Death of their Colonell, And all Captains are to take place within their respective Regiments according to the dates of their Commissions.”

This Order, which was dated from Whitehall, August 3rd, 1685, was subsequently cancelled, and another instruction followed as to this important question of precedence.

CHAPTER III.

THE TENTH AND THE GREAT REVOLUTION.

FOR some time the Tenth were not called upon to take part in any active service, but at the crisis of the great Revolution of 1688 they counted for much in what was likely to be a trial of strength between opposing Princes. In the interval between the disastrous enterprise of Monmouth and the coming of the Prince of Orange, we find the Earl of Bath's Regiment at Hounslow, forming a portion of a camp which contained 4,000 horse and 12,000 foot. The King's purpose in massing all his available troops on the Heath in May, 1686, was not for the mere pleasure of looking upon a grand military spectacle, but to put the soldiers through a severe course of training. The term officially applied declared it to be a "camp of instruction."

The Regiments present in addition to the Tenth on Hounslow Heath were: Horse Guards (Blues), 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Dragoon Guards, Worthen's and Scarsdale's Horse, the 1st and 3rd Dragoons, the Princess of Denmark's Dragoons, the three regiments of Foot Guards, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 11th, 12th, and 13th Foot, and Littleton's Marines.

In the first encampment on Hounslow Heath the Earl of Bath's Regiment was credited with 550 men besides Officers. The same number was in the second encampment. The position of the Tenth was in the centre.

The presence of this great force so near the capital had a great fascination for the King who came to the camp again and again, "dining sometimes with one Colonel, sometimes with another." Doubtless knowing that his subjects were openly complaining of his unconstitutional methods of government, he anticipated a day when he would only maintain himself on the throne by the aid of his Army. Consequently, he witnessed the regiments as they were exercised, "singly and in bodies," and also watched "mock sieges and battles" as they were rehearsed by the whole force. He could not, however, have been altogether satisfied, for his complaint was that "there was an absence of soldier-like simplicity among the officers; the regiments vied with each other in the magnificence of their tents and accommodation, and in the expense of the Officers' entertainments to their London friends."

Among the rules for the camp we find the following, dated May 28th, 1686:—

By His Majesty's Command.

1. That each Regiment of foot, Horse and Dragoones have Bread every Day of the Weight and Goodness follg, that is to say, One pound and a half avoirdupois weight of good wholesome well baked Wheaten Bread to each man a day with two Days Bread in each loaf for every Soldier Excepting only the Servants allowed by us for the Officers.
2. That the Said Bread be fetched by the Soldier from Our Bakehouse upon Hounslow Heath with an Officer from each regiment to give receipts for the same from time to time.
3. The Paymaster-General of the Forces shall defalk out of the Subsistance and pay of the Soldiers,

Three half Pence a Man a day for the Numbers of ffoot which are to take Bread.

(Arts. 4, 5 and 6 relate to the Cavalry.)

7. That both the Horse, ffoot, and Dragoones have straw for their Tents at the Allowance of two Trusses for each Tent to be chang'd for new every ten Days.

10. That Captain John Grant, appointed to brew for the Camp this Summer and his Assignes shall give security by Bond to us with considerable penalty to brew good, sound, and wholesome Beer for the Soldiers, and seasonably to provide for the Soldiers at the Rates to be agreed upon for this Summer's Encampment.

The officers of the regiment at the breaking up of the camp were as follows:—

| CAPTAINS. | LIEUTENANTS. | ENSIGNS. |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Earl of Bath (Col.). | Maurice Roch. | James Mohun. |
| Sir Charles Carney (Lt.-Col.). | John Prideaux. | Richard Nagle. |
| Sir Bevil Granville (Major). | D. Bradshaw. | James Granville. |
| Sir Thomas Windham. | Charles Harbin. | Jacob Breams. |
| Edward Scott. | Richard Scott. | James Steukley. |
| Sydney Godolphin. | William Morgan. | John Granville. |
| John, Lord Arundel. | Thomas Trevanion. | Edward Chard. |
| Bernard Strode. | Thomas Lamb. | Thomas Cary. |
| Ranald Graham. | John Long. | Hercules Low. |
| John Sydenham. | Henry Hook. | John Jacob. |
| John Granville. | { Roger Elliot. | { Grenadier Company |
| | { Roger Evans. | |

CHAPLAIN—Thomas Nixon.

ADJUTANT—R. Elliot.

CHIRURGEON—James Young.

QUARTERMASTER—John Freeman.

The Second Foot—then the Queen Dowager's Regiment—which had returned to England from Tangier, in 1684, had been quartered at Plymouth; but when the camp at Hounslow broke up, the Earl of Bath's Regiment marched to the West to relieve it, and remained there for a few months. The King once more concentrated his

troops at Hounslow, and the Tenth (using this term indiscriminately with the other name) marched first to Guildford, then to Godalming, and on the 24th of May once more pitched their tents on Hounslow Heath.

The fact has already been mentioned, that a company of Grenadiers was added to every regiment. It was here on Hounslow Heath, in the May of 1686, that the Tenth received its Grenadiers for the first time.

1687.—Garrison work was the Tenth's experience for the next year or two. The regiment left Plymouth in April, 1687, and was quartered for a while in Winchester. It was then ordered West, to Taunton. Again it came up for the annual camp at Hounslow Heath in June, and after remaining there until August, was brought on to London. The movements of the regiment appear to have been incessant; changes of quarters were numerous, probably to convince the complaining people in districts remote from the metropolis that the King had some fine soldiers at his call; but at last the Tenth settled down to garrison life in Plymouth.

1688.—When James the Second grew nervous concerning the attitude of the nation in regard to the Prince of Orange—afterwards William the Third—he issued orders for the strengthening of some of his regiments, and among them came this one concerning the Tenth, and addressed to the Earl of Bath:—

Our Will and Pleasure is that by Beat of Drumm or otherwise you cause all the Companys of Our Regiment of foot under your Command to be forthwith filled up and Recruited with Ten Private Soldiers, one Serjeant and One Drummer in each Company more than the present Complement. And for so Doing this shall be your Warrant.

Given at Our Court at Whitehall, the 22d day of September, 1688, etc.

To our T. and W. The
Earle of Bathe, Col.
of One of Our
Regiments Of ffoot.

By His Maj^y* Command.
W. B.*

On the following day a further order was issued by the King to the Colonel of the Tenth:—

These are to Authorise by Beat of Drumm, or otherwise to Raise Volunteers for a Company of ffoot under your Command in the Regiment whereof Our Right T. and Rt. W. Cousin and Councillor, John, Earl of Bath, is Colonel, which is to consist of Sixty Private Soldiers, three Serjeants, three Corporalls, and Two Drummers, to be Mustered according to Our Directions signified to Our Commissary Generals of the Musters in that Behalf. And you are to Appoint such Person or Persons as you shall think fitt to receive Arms for the said Voluntiers out of the Stores of Our Ordnance. And We do hereby require all Magistrates, Justices of the Peace, Constables and other Our Officers, whom it may concern to be Assisting therein, as there shall be Occasion.

Given at Our Court at Whitehall the 23d day of September, 1688, etc.

By His Maj^y* Command.
W. B.

To Our Trusty and Wel-
beloved The Earl of
Bath, Col. of One of
Our Regts. of ffoot.

* "W.B." was undoubtedly William Blathwayt, Secretary at War.

If the King thought that he could rule as an unconstitutional monarch because he had a great army within his realm wherewith to overawe the Parliament and the people, there were those in England who knew otherwise. It was stated by Edward Russell, who went to the Hague to urge the Prince of Orange to make a descent on England, thus to vindicate English liberties and the Protestant religion, that the Army was worthless to James, great though it was. His statement was explicit concerning his Majesty's soldiers: that "though bad Englishmen and worse Christians," they were yet "such good Protestants that neither were they attached to his Majesty, nor could his Majesty depend on them."

James the Second had strained the patience of the people to the utmost. From the day when he had crushed the Monmouth Rebellion, and had suffered Judge Jeffreys to give birth to the "English Reign of Terror," the King proceeded to carry out his cherished scheme—the restoration of Catholicism to England. Where possible, he placed Catholics in the Army, which now numbered about 20,000 men, and pursued the same course with regard to the Navy, the Council, and the Courts. It is said that Catholics filled the civil offices, and swarmed about the Court. Monks of all orders, dressed in their peculiar garb, publicly paraded the streets of London, and Jesuits were allowed to establish a school in the Savoy. Opposition was aroused at last. Parliament, hitherto the tool of the King, realising his purpose, and becoming alarmed, refused a vote of Supplies. The King retorted by an instant prorogation, and ruled arbitrarily. Various violations of the Constitution followed, until pulpit and Press alike protested violently. The King's maddest act was the arraignment of the seven Bishops for protesting against the Declaration of Indulgence to Roman Catholics. He had issued it in

spite of the entreaties of the Pope and his Catholic friends.


When the Bishops were acquitted, amid the most remarkable outburst of public approval, the King realised that his Army was unreliable. It numbered some 40,000 men, and had been brought up to a fine state of efficiency; yet the soldiers were among those who shouted the loudest for the Bishops in the King's own presence on Hounslow Heath. Presumably his Majesty felt this to be the strongest reminder that he was engaged in a losing cause.

The discontent was general, but Macaulay tells us in his forceful manner that the Army on which James relied was scarcely less disaffected than the clergy or the gentry. "The garrison of the Tower had drunk the health of the imprisoned Bishops. The Foot Guards stationed at Lambeth had, with every mark of reverence, welcomed the Primate back to his palace. Nowhere had the news of the acquittal been received with more clamorous delight than at Hounslow Heath. In truth, the great force which the King had assembled for the purpose of overawing his mutinous capital had become more mutinous than the capital itself, and was more dreaded by the Court than by the citizens. Early in August the camp was broken up, and the troops were sent to quarters in different parts of the country."

Here, then, is the explanation of the constant movements of the Tenth, as one of the uncertain regiments, likely to be mischievous if quartered too near London.

James added to the grievances of the nation—and more to the Army than to any—when, on remodelling his military establishment, he called in the Roman Catholic soldiers of Scotland and Ireland, to take the places of the regiments which were kept incessantly on the move in

LEIV^T. COLLONELL.



districts as far away from the capital as possible. There was unbounded indignation when battalion after battalion came up from the distant parts of the island and from Ireland, after having been trained by the most trusted servants of his Majesty, and pledged to fight for him, whatever course he might elect to take.

The association which had been formed to treat with the Prince of Orange, moved in what might well be termed the psychological moment. An invitation, signed by its members—the Earls of Devonshire, Danby, and Shrewsbury, Lord Lumley, the Bishop of London, Admiral Russell, and Henry Sidney—was drawn up and forwarded to the prince. They and the prince alike realised the favourable conditions. As for William, he felt confident in his own genius and resources; he would be followed by his own veteran troops, considered among the bravest and best disciplined in Europe; disaffection was alive in every quarter of England; the allegiance neither of his Army nor Navy could be relied upon by the unhappy King; and, moreover, while it would be in the power of the invader to concentrate his whole force, and to march, if it suited his views, even into the metropolis itself, the troops of his father-in-law could be counted on as in a large degree available and ready to augment the army he would take across the sea.*

When the Prince of Orange landed at Torbay, the Tenth had again gone into garrison at Plymouth. The position in the town at the time was critical in the extreme. News came on the 5th of November that William had just landed at Torbay, and was disembarking, having brought with him 10,000 foot, and 4,000 cavalry, with stores and ammunition in great quantity.

* Jesse: "Memoirs of the Court of England."

The Earl of Bath's regiment was not the only one in garrison, for the Thirteenth, under the Earl of Huntingdon, was also there. Bath's attitude was a decided one, for he not only kept away from Court, but it became known to James that he had been one of the assentors to the invitation which was given to the Prince of Orange. Huntingdon's position was one of decisive loyalty to the King, so that there was every reason to anticipate a conflict between the two regiments at a time when feeling ran intensely strong. The Earl of Bath had a difficulty before him in his own regiment, which made him anxious as to the issue. His Lieutenant-Colonel, Sir Charles Carney, was a loyal supporter of the King, and Bath was not sure as to how many of his men would go with his colleague. On the other hand, Huntingdon was equally uncertain as to the attitude of the Thirteenth, which he commanded. He was for the King, but his Lieutenant-Colonel, Ferdinando Hastings, was as strongly in favour of the Prince. Thus, "the interest of the superior officers of the two regiments was equally divided." It was a complicated situation. For some time, however, the Earl of Bath had taken secret steps to discover the feeling of his men, so that when word came that the Prince had landed, he knew that, but for Sir Charles Carney, the Tenth to a man were for the Revolution.

In the meantime, some who were with the Prince were anxious as to the attitude of the Tenth. Burnet says that the Prince was sure as to the people of the town, and as to his reception by the garrison in Plymouth. "The Earl of Bath, who was Governor, had sent, by Russell, a promise to the Prince to come and join him; yet it was not likely that he would be as forward as to receive us at our first coming." The explanation was that unfortunate uncertainty concerning the Thirteenth.

Bath, when information came to him that the regiment under Huntingdon was as keen for William as his own men, decided on a *coup d'état*. Going from the citadel, where the Tenth were quartered, he, as senior officer, and governor of the fortress, crossed over to confer with Huntingdon. He found with the Colonel of the Thirteenth four officers—Captain Owen Macarty, Lieutenants William Rhodesby and Talbot Lascelles, and Ensign Ambrose John. Each of these were Roman Catholics, and all were pledged to James the Second. When the Earl of Bath entered the room Huntingdon sprang to his feet in anger, and demanded the reason for the intrusion. The answer from Lord Bath was, that he had discovered the plot devised by Huntingdon and the Papists of the town to poison him and seize the citadel. Before Huntingdon could make answer, Bath called in his men and ordered the arrest of his lordship and those who were with him. He then assembled the two regiments on parade, and almost without demur the men of each declared for the Prince of Orange.

Assured now of his position in Plymouth, the Earl of Bath wrote the following letter to the Prince :

May it please your Royal Highness,

I do with all possible gratitude acknowledge the great honour of your most gracious letter with so many signal marks of favour and goodness towards me, which I shall endeavour to deserve by all the faithful services and actions of my life. Having now fully discoursed with my most worthy friend the bearer, and particularly imparted to him the methods and measures that I have presumed to think fittest to be taken in this juncture, with my resolution to submit all things to your pleasure and great wisdom, I crave leave most humbly to refer

D 2

myself to his relation, and shall ever yield perfect obedience to your commands, and improve my utmost interest with all zeal for your service, who am, with all duty and respect, may it please your Royal Highness, your Royal Highness's

Most humble and most faithful, and most obedient servant,

B.

Nov. 18, 1688.

The Colonel of the Tenth had thus definitely committed himself and his men to the service of the Prince of Orange against King James, and held Plymouth for the Prince. For a few hours after writing this letter Bath was troubled as to the disposal of his prisoners, but when he was reassured that the two regiments were enthusiastic for the proposal to dethrone the King, he permitted them to quit Plymouth that same evening.

Pepys did not know that Bath had set Huntingdon at liberty, for on the 28th of November he wrote to Lord Dartmouth as follows:—"Mr. Frowd stopped me in my way to tell me that my Lord of Bath had seized Plymouth for the Prince, seizing many officers and soldiers as prisoners, and confineing even my Lord Huntingdon himself to his chamber." Dartmouth, when he replied to this news as to the action of the Colonel of the Tenth, referred to it as "surprizeing newes," but felt it was useless to interfere. The regiment had gone over bodily to Prince William, and all protests would be unavailing.

James was intensely mortified when he heard of Bath's desertion, and the consequent loss of Plymouth. In his Memoirs the King wrote thus: "The Earl of Bath, whose defection was most wondered at by the King than any which had happened, his obligations were so great, and his

family always esteemed so loyal." A few days later Bath found himself superseded by Sir Charles Carney, whom James had appointed Colonel of the Tenth. Papers were handed to the Colonel of the deserting regiment by the King's messenger, which informed him that in consequence of his treachery all the commissions he held at his Majesty's hands were cancelled. The deprivation in no sense altered matters. James had the right to do this thing, being still the constitutional monarch; but in actual fact Carney took over the command of a regiment which performed the usual services in garrison, but in all matters of moment would have looked to its old Colonel as to how far it should be obedient to Carney.

The position at the time was peculiar, if the statement in Clarke's "Life of James the Second" is reliable. It is certainly somewhat puzzling to think of the Tenth being at Plymouth, and yet to read thus: "There were seven companies of the Earl of Bath's Regiment at Rochester in 1688 (December) when James the Second was there (60 men in a company)." Clarke goes on to say that many of the officers of this regiment resigned their commissions to the King 20th December, 1688, and that when the regiment marched out of Rochester a few days afterwards only 150 men could be mustered. It may be assumed that a portion of the Tenth was at Plymouth, the other part, possibly with Carney, at Rochester, where the King was. The officers, declining to serve under Carney, resigned. This, however, is an open question.

Carney's Colonelcy lasted a few weeks only. News came to James from every quarter of his realm that soldiers and civilians alike were declaring for the Prince. One after another of his great men left him—Lord Churchill and the Duke of Grafton among them—and

joined the Prince of Orange. His family were among the deserters later, and as for the Army, it had altogether fallen away. In a few days it was made known throughout the country that the King, feeling that all was lost, had fled, disguised as a servant of Sir Edward Hales, that while crossing the Thames he tossed the Great Seal of England into it, and escaped in a wretched fishing boat to France.

Carney's position under such conditions was an impossible one. In point of fact, he was no more Colonel of the Tenth than Bath, since it became known that the King, before his flight, had told the Earl of Feversham to do certain things, which his lordship interpreted as an order to disband the Army. That he so understood may be concluded from the following letter, which Feversham wrote to the Prince of Orange, under date, December the 11th, 1688:—

SIR,

Having received this morning a letter from his Majesty, with the unfortunate news of his resolution to go out of England, I thought myself obliged, being at the head of his army, and having received orders to make no opposition to anybody, to let your Highness know it, with the advice of the officers here so soon as it was possible (in order) to hinder the effusion of blood. I have ordered already for that purpose all the troops that are under my command, which shall be the last order they shall receive from

FEVERSHAM.

The only army recognised was that which gathered under the Prince's standard, and in all the affairs which concerned the Tenth the Prince of Orange would not, naturally, acknowledge Carney.

On the last day of the famous year—1688—the Prince formally reinstated Bath as Colonel of the Tenth, and Carney, probably not reluctant to be relieved from a disagreeable position, dropped out, not merely from the Tenth, but from army life altogether. It was in many ways unfortunate, for he was a gallant soldier. He had seen service on the Continent, playing a capable part in the war between France, Germany and the United Provinces. Strange to say, James did not use him in his Irish campaigns later on. Whether the offer of service was made and declined one does not know.

1689-1690. The Tenth were unhappy in having no opportunity of displaying their fighting capacity in any of those exciting times. They were in the citadel of Plymouth for the next two years, the men obtaining no break in the monotony of garrison duty throughout that time, with the exception of six of the companies who were sent over to Jersey and Guernsey. It was known that the accession of William the Third to the throne of England was a blow to Louis the Fourteenth of France, and the presence of a strong force in the Channel Islands was necessary, in order to oppose as far as possible French aggression in that direction. The Tenth, or part of it, were thus on dangerous but honourable outpost duty, and continued there until a call came for active service.

In the second year of William the Third's reign an order was sent to the Earl of Bath to incorporate the "Independent Companies of foot at Plymouth" with those of his regiment stationed at Jersey and Guernsey.

Whereas we have Ordered the Companys, whereof you and Sir Nicholas Stanning Burge are Captains, now at Plymouth, to be transported to Our Islands of Jersey and Guernsey; Our Will and Plesure is that from the

arrival of the said Companys in those Islands, you cause them to be incorporated into the Companys of Our regt. of ffoot under your Command now there.

Given at Our Court at
Whitehall this 28th day
of March 1690, in the 2d
year of Our Reign.

By His Ma^{ty}s Command.

W. B.

To our Rt. Hon. and Rt.
Welbeloved Cousin and
Councillor, John, Earl of
Bath, Colonel of One of
Our Regts. of ffoot.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FIRST TIME UNDER FIRE.

1691. WHEN, after the Battle of the Boyne, on June 30th, 1690, William the Third had broken down the Jacobite organisation in Ireland, he was free to turn his attention elsewhere.

On leaving the country for the Continent, in March, 1691, he was greatly concerned to discover that many in the kingdom were alarmed at his demands in the matter of a war establishment—especially those who were repugnant to the maintenance of a standing Army. At the opening of Parliament he declared that an Army of 65,000 men was required, and in response to his representations, and in view of the fact that a war with France was imminent, the vote for which he asked was granted. The King's proposal of allocation was as follows:—

| | | | | |
|------------------------|-----|-----|-----|--------|
| For service in England | ... | ... | ... | 11,000 |
| " " Ireland | ... | ... | ... | 13,000 |
| " " Scotland | ... | ... | ... | 2,000 |
| " " On the Continent | ... | ... | ... | 38,000 |

England was not dependent in case of invasion or insurrection on the force just named. Arrangements were made for calling out the Militia, and especial reliance was placed on the Westminster and London regiments. The vote went through at once, for the country felt that the King had reason for his great demand alike on the purse and the enthusiasm of the nation. The ex-King had issued a Declaration which threatened the incoming of a French army with James the Second at its head, to wreak vengeance

on certain nobles and prelates who were named, and the punishment of whole classes as guilty rebels. It was also known that a camp was formed at La Hogue, ready for a descent on England, while James was candid enough to say in the declaration that the Most Gracious King, Louis the Fourteenth, had "lent us so many troops as may be abundantly sufficient to untie the hands of Our subjects, and make it safe for them to return to duty, and repair to Our standard."

The Tenth, stationed in the Channel Islands, had need to be alert, when so much was near that threatened the safety of the kingdom. There was coming a day when the Regiment—destined to achieve fame—was to have an opportunity of displaying its fighting capacity.

Louis the Fourteenth was a menace to the whole of Europe. At home his system of government was "a feudalism as oppressive to the poor as that of the Middle Ages." Despotism, extortion, and extravagance under this so-called "Superb Monarch," resulted in the French people—all save the nobles—being ground down with taxation, and a wanton waste of the public money accompanied this. But as for his foreign policy, the preponderance of France was insisted on by him. Louis coveted the possession of the Spanish Provinces in the Netherlands, and his armies invaded that territory with the intention of achieving their conquest. Now that William, his most strenuous opponent, was King of England, and was strengthened accordingly, able to control its fleet, and its army also, Louis recognised the increasing difficulties of his own position, and the positive check which had been given to French aggression. William the Third succeeded in forming a coalition, known as the Grand Alliance. Holland, Germany, Spain and England were the nations so allied. When the Alliance became a

reality, he sent an English brigade at once to the Netherlands to play their part in the war which had begun. He was detained in England because of the unsettled condition of the Government, but in 1691 he crossed over to Holland.

William arrived at the Hague early in May, and assumed the command of the Allies. He was acknowledged one of the finest, if not the most capable, soldiers of the day, and this, together with the fact that English gold enabled the Allies to carry on the war, gave him an almost prescriptive right to the leadership. When he went over to Flanders it was the first time since the days of Henry the Eighth that an English King had appeared on the Continent at the head of an English Army.*

The Army carried over from England was not a large one, for it numbered not more than 23,000 men. Had there been a loyal response on the part of the other members of the Grand Alliance, a fine army would have been under William's control. Unfortunately, there was a lack of good faith, a want of cohesion, and, it must be added, a jealousy and a selfishness which made combined and effective action impossible. William, with his 23,000 troops, and the doubtful others, was no match for Louis, whose army was without an equal in the world at the time, "well equipped, well trained, well organised, and inured to work by countless campaigns." The Organisation was complete; the Commissariat or "Intendance," the Engineers, and the Artillery were each in an efficient condition, and were all so blended with the whole body of the army as to secure harmonious and prompt execution of the General's plans.† Still more, Louis had some fine generals, and the result was an unsatisfactory campaign for the Allies in every way. Louis was the better pleased since William dared not attack

* Green.

† Walton: "History of the Standing Army."

the army of Frenchmen which took possession of Mons, the greatest fortress of the Netherlands.

William had cause for discontent when he reached the Hague and reviewed the army of which he was to take command. Many of the contingents were badly equipped, and there was a deplorable want of money.

To a soldier-statesman of William's capacity, his first experiences with the forces at his disposal were irritating in the extreme. The army was made up of contingents from several states independent of one another, and much difficulty was experienced in this and every year of the war from want of exactitude on the part of the different allied Governments. If the Spanish and Dutch troops rendezvoused in good time, the Bavarians and Brandenburgers were tardy. If the English and Wirtembergers furnished their full quota the Hanoverians and Spaniards were a third below their promised strength. If the Dutch infantry and Bavarian cavalry were fine, serviceable soldiers, many of the others would be but civilians with arms in their hands, lads fresh from the shop or the farm. Walton, who thus criticises the Allies, goes on to say that owing to the unpunctuality of the several armies comprised in the Allied force, the French were invariably enabled to take the lead in the campaigns, while the Allies could neither form nor execute any scheme until after the arrival of the various contingents.

Such were the conditions and such the army with which the Tenth were destined to have their first taste of war—their "baptism of fire." The English contingent was thus composed :—

| BRIGADE. | CORPS. | COLONELS. |
|-----------------|---|---|
| Duke of Ormonde | { Life Guards, 1st Troop " " 3rd " | { Earl of Scarborough. Earl of Marlborough. |
| Douglas | { 1st Foot Guards, 2nd Bn. 2nd " " 1st Bn. 3rd " " 1st and 2nd Bns. A Bn. of Dutch Guards. | { Warcup. Bridgman. James Douglas. |
| Ramsay | { 1st Foot " Royals," 2 Bns. 21st " " Scots Fus ^{ry} ." 26th " Cameronians Mackey's Regt. Ramsay's Regt. | { Sir Robert Douglas. O'Farrell. Earl of Angus. Mackay. Ramsay. |
| Churchill | { 7th Foot, " Royal Fus ." 10th Foot 16th Foot Fitzpatrick's Regt. of Fusiliers | { John Earl of Marlborough. Earl of Bath. Hodges. Fitzpatrick. |

The Tenth still had the Earl of Bath as its Colonel, but the Regiment was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Bevil Granville, the Earl's nephew, a young officer, who, two years later, became the Tenth's Colonel. The absence of Bath at this time is significant. In a letter to the Earl, written from the seat of war, D'Auvergne said, "Those important Governments you have in the Kingdom at this juncture of time do not only dispense but even oblige your Lordship not to be present with your Regiment in the Low Countries." D'Auvergne, who served throughout the campaign as chaplain to the Scots Guards* flattered the Earl of Bath by this, for in the English Army List is the following note concerning the Colonel of the regiment:—

"His anxiety to be on the winning side at the Revolution lost him the confidence of the two masters he pretended to serve, and though reinstated in the Colonelcy on the abdication of James, he only retained the command of

* Or Scots Fusilier Guards.

Plymouth Garrison until 1691." Presumably he was put on half-pay, being considered an unsafe man on the Continent where he might have intrigued with the friends of James the Second in Louis' army.

As for the Regiment's appearance, now that it was in the field, it differed from that which distinguished it in previous years. Red uniforms were adopted in place of the blue, with red linings, red waistcoats, breeches, and stockings.

As soon as the Tenth had landed at Ostend, orders came for the regiment to proceed at once to Anderlecht, where the King, who had arrived there on May 23rd, had his headquarters. Their smart appearance and their fine efficiency caused William to single them out to form a portion of what he called the "Corps de Reserve." The Corps consisted of twelve squadrons, Dragoons and Horse, and six battalions, Bath's Tenth, Churchill's Seventh, and four foreign battalions. The "Corps de Reserve" was ordered to encamp in the rear of the line which at that time covered his Majesty's quarters. This body was put under the command of Count de Lippe, the Landgrave of Hesse's general.

1692. There was no fighting for the Tenth during the first year, but in 1692, when the regiment left its winter quarters, it had some thrilling experiences, and did some splendid work. D'Auvergne, referring to this campaign, says that in its commencement it resembled the last. "The same for thought, activity, union, and promptitude, on the part of the French; the exact reverse on the part of the Allied Army; the same unsettled tardiness and disunion, and the same consequent inactivity."

The campaign opened with the investment of Namur on all sides by the Duc de Luxembourg. For this and other

purposes in the projected enterprise, the French general had an army of 115,000 men, so splendidly equipped that Louis the Fourteenth came to review it "for the delectation of his Court," who saw a front which "covered nine miles of country." When William knew of the investment of the fortress, he determined, if possible, to raise the siege. But he had previously decided to surprise Mons. For this purpose a company was detailed from each battalion of the Allied Army, but the characteristic dilatoriness of the Allies necessarily ensured failure.

Meanwhile the call for the relief of Namur was persistent, but the fortress surrendered before William could arrive, and the French troops hitherto occupied in the investment had joined the main army of France. Fortescue, referring to the bold attempt of William, in spite of immense discouragements, due to the indolence of his Allies, shows how the relief of Namur was almost impossible because of the difficulties of the march. "The best of luck was essential to William's success, and instead of the best came the worst." He goes on to say that "heavy rain swelled the narrow stream"—the Meuse—"into a broad flood, and the building of bridges became impossible. There was beautiful fencing, skilful feint, and more skilful parry, between the two generals, but William could not get under Luxembourg's guard." On the 5th of June, after a discreditable short defence, Namur fell, almost before William's eyes, into the hands of the French.

It was by no means a light task for the famous French general to cope with William, in spite of the latter's disadvantages. The French army was customarily spoken of as splendidly equipped and well found; yet deserters came over to William by hundreds, Swiss, Germans, and even French, "all complaining of a general want of forage and


provisions in the French camp." Luxembourg had been so long before Namur that his army had consumed most of their forage. They found it supremely difficult to obtain further supplies, for what had been sent from Mons, Maubeuge, Philippsville, and Dinant, was seriously raided by William's troops while on the way.

During the operations which followed the fall of Namur, William found that the Corps de Reserve was in danger, being within musket shot of the enemy's right. When his Majesty came to this part of the camp at night, and found how they were exposed not merely to the musket fire but the cannon of the enemy, he changed their position. Brigadier Churchill's and the Earl of Bath's regiments were more exposed than any, they "being encamped on the very river's side." He ordered them, night though it was, to decamp at once, and march to the other side of the Grand Causey. Here for the first time the troops had some respite from incessant annoyance and danger.

When Namur had fallen, the Corps de Reserve was ordered to march to Genappe, its work being to guard the train of artillery. This train had been sent on ahead, the rainy weather having rendered the roads so bad, that, as Auvergne tells us, it was impossible for the army and artillery to march together on the same day. The army came on a day behind, and encamped in the plain of Genappe, "a very difficult and therefore strong ground, by reason of the woods that are on the right and left, and the Bois de Sogne in the rear."

On the 21st of July the army left Genappe, and "made a great march, as far as Nostre dame de Hall." The rain began in the early morning when the start was made, and it poured the whole day long. The roads, in consequence, with the passing of so many thousands of men and horses,

MAIOR.



F. H. Barry del.

Copied by permission of H.M. King Edward VII from a MS at Windsor Castle.
Temp. JAMES II.



became nothing but quagmires, and horsemen were freed from steer fatigue. It was night when Hal was re-joined by the main body of the army. On their arrival the King ordered the Tenth and Churchill's regiment to join the other English troops, dispensing with their service since for the present, it was no longer needed.

This movement of the army of the Allies was due to the fact that on the fall of Namur, Luxembourg withdrew his main army, in order to place himself more advantageously. While withdrawing, he threatened Louvain, and William started in pursuit, although numerically inferior. When the French army reached Steenkirk, and found a strong position, Luxembourg, thinking to rest his exhausted soldiers, waited for the Allies to come up. The French general had not been out of William's sight for many days, and often in that trying march nothing but the river—the Sambre or Senette—separated them.

Eventually the forces met on August 3rd, 1692, and a terrible conflict followed, in which the Tenth played the part with singular gallantry.

Steenkirk is a small village about three miles from Louvain. Between the village and the river lay some level and broken ground, and here Luxembourg awaited the coming of the Allies. William, however, encamped at Hal, from whence he saw that the French army had Steenkirk on its right, with Hoves on its extreme left. Between the English King and the enemy a long ravine stretched, and in its narrowest portion lay a dense wood known as the Bois de Feully. Other woods and small ravines were between the opposing armies. Luxembourg imagined that no general would advance through this broken, wooded country with the idea of effecting a surprise. There was, moreover, no scope for cavalry movements, except on the

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became nothing but quagmires, and horses dropped from sheer fatigue. It was night when Hal was reached by the main body of the army. On their arrival the King ordered the Tenth and Churchill's regiment to join the other English troops, dispensing with their service, since, for the present, it was no longer needed.

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Eventually the forces met on August 3rd, 1692, and a terrible conflict followed, in which the Tenth played their part with singular gallantry.

Steenkirk is a small village about three miles from Enghien. Between the village and the river lay some high and broken ground, and here Luxembourg awaited the coming of the Allies. William, however, encamped at Hal, from whence he saw that the French army had Steenkirk on its right, with Hoves on its extreme left. Between the English King and the enemy a long ravine stretched, and in its narrowest portion lay a dense wood known as the Bois de Feuilly. Other woods and small ravines were between the opposing armies. Luxembourg imagined that no general would advance through this broken, wooded country with the idea of effecting a surprise. There was, moreover, no scope for cavalry movements, except on the

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rising ground towards Enghien, on Luxembourg's left. He counted on this, that "the few plateaux between the numerous ravines were so covered with fences, cottages and wood, that any action in that vicinity would be a combat of infantry alone."

The advantage lay with Luxembourg, but a fortunate circumstance assisted William considerably. A Frenchman named Jacquet, who was at the time Secretary to the Elector of Bavaria, discovering William's plans, wrote to the French general. He entrusted the letter to a peasant, whom he paid to carry it to Luxembourg. Suspecting treachery, the man carried it to William's pavilion, and the traitorous part the Secretary was playing thus came to the King's knowledge. Jacquet, being sent for, was charged with having had communication with the French commander, and was condemned to be shot unless he wrote a letter which the King dictated. Luxembourg was thus told that he would see extensive movements in the Allies' camp on the following day, but since it meant nothing more than that the General was sending out a foraging expedition on an extensive scale, there was no need that he should feel disturbed. This letter was carried by the peasant to the French camp, and Luxembourg, knowing the handwriting of Jacquet, was altogether deceived.

Meanwhile, William made his dispositions, and placed his British soldiers at those spots where the brunt of the battle would be felt. Throughout the wars conducted by our Dutch King, it is a prominent fact that wherever our hardest fighting was to be expected, wherever the most enduring courage or the most dashing gallantry would be required, thither William sent Englishmen. If the post of danger be the post of honour, the English troops assuredly occupied

both at Steenkirk, as well as in most of the general actions of this war.*

Bath's regiment and the Third, that had been encamped at Hal, received orders during the night of August the 2nd to advance to a position in the Bois de Xoulmont, which could only be reached by a laborious march through some narrow and difficult defiles. It was daybreak before they approached the wood.

The position assigned to Sir Bevil Granville was at the left extremity of the Bois de Xoulmont. On his right were other battalions of the vanguard, while on the left, in the Bois de Feuilly, were the English Guards and two battalions of Danes. A ravine separated the two woods, and here some of William's guns were posted.

When at daydawn the French patrols saw William's army in motion, in two columns, "without sound of drum or trumpet," moving straight on the Army of France, which lay between the Allies' camp and Steenkirk, they turned and galloped to the camp with the startling news; but Luxembourg, with Jacquet's letter in mind, concluded that this was the "extensive foraging expedition" to which the Secretary had referred.

He was taken by complete surprise. He had made no preparation to ward off an attack, and there was nothing in position to check the Allies but a single brigade of infantry, famous under the name of Bourbonnois, which was quartered in advance of the cavalry's camp on his extreme right. Moreover, nothing was ready, not a horse was bridled, not a man standing to his arms.† Under every circumstance, even with Jacquet's letter to excuse him, Luxembourg deserved to be decisively beaten for his incom-

* Walton.

† Fortescue.

prehensible carelessness, when patrol after patrol came in with news. He had been ignorant of the fact that some pioneers of Churchill's brigade had been busy during the greater part of the night in the woods, cutting away the brushwood and felling trees, thus clearing a road for the advance of a column without difficulty. Such work was looked upon in the army as degrading, but Churchill's men undertook this pioneer task cheerfully when explanations were made, and a ducat was promised to every man.

Luxembourg's unreadiness was amazing. He had himself to gallop hither and thither to get his troops into order, and it is said that while the French soldiers stood hurriedly to their arms, "powder horns were shaken, and *gibécieres* felt to make sure that they were full. Grass and rubbish were hastily pocketed to serve for wadding." One does not feel surprise at reading that all was hurry and anxiety.

William had planned an infantry fight: the generals either wilfully misunderstood him, or were fearful when they saw how rapidly Luxembourg was forming his splendid army in the order of battle. Incomprehensibly, the left wing of the cavalry was brought to the front, and into ground that was only fit for infantry movements. D'Auvergne tells us how the King had sought an engagement at this particular spot because of the fact that it lent itself to an infantry engagement. "Yet now that the time for action had arrived, the infantry could not get to the front because the narrow ways were blocked up with masses of cavalry; the main body of infantry was a mile off when the battle began."

The cavalry, after a time, drew back to allow some English foot regiments to come forward, and then, as if by some concerted arrangement—which William had never designed—the front was almost exclusively English.

All the advantage of the contemplated surprise was gone. When the English line advanced—with some support from the Danes—the combating forces were so near, that it was a frightful duel at ten paces on a multiplied scale. When the Royals and two Fusilier regiments had reached the slope, “a thick fence only separated the combatants, who fired at one another through it.” It was the same elsewhere. The French fired at the attacking line of Englishmen point blank, while, because Luxembourg had put his men behind fallen trees, they were able to do this while in shelter.

The standing scandal of the campaign was the conduct of Count Solmes during this battle. The English line was growing fearfully thin under the awful fire, yet not one of the battalions would yield an inch. Some reinforcements would have enabled them to get into the French camp; but when appealed to for support, the Dutchman said savagely: “Damn the English! If they are so fond of fighting, let them have a bellyful.” Not a company was advanced to support that dauntless line of English red-coats. It was a brutal indifference and lack of loyalty which doubtless robbed William of a splendid victory. “The army was indignant that Solmes, a foreigner, should have been placed in the command of English troops, and then look on while they were slaughtered.” Later still the House of Commons expressed its indignation, after a hot debate as to the employment of foreign officers to command English troops.

In the early part of this tremendous fight the Tenth were compelled to stand and watch. But their opportunity came, and they accepted it with splendid gallantry. The Lunenbergers, farther on to the right, under the command of the Baron of Pibrack, were engaged with

two battalions of the enemy, and were making such headway that the French were being thrown into confusion. Pibrack's men were robbed of victory by the arrival of reinforcements for the enemy at the critical moment, and so great was the force then brought against them that Lord Colchester, who saw it all, said later, the French had been defeated, but their very weight of men bore the Lunenbergers down, and threw them into disorder.

The Tenth and the Third were sent to their support, and advancing under the lead of Sir Bevil Granville, they walked down the slope, literally to the cannon's mouth. Sir Bevil had given orders that not a shot should be fired "until they were muzzle to muzzle with the Frenchmen." The Tenth might have been veterans, so steadily did they make their advance in company with the equally gallant Third. The musketeers and grenadiers were on either flank, and the pikemen in the centre, and when they emerged from the wood they were sorely put to it in the stress of battle to regard the orders Granville gave them; for as they went down the slope, they saw the Baron of Pibrack fall. Sir Bevil's order came again, and the fire was reserved.

It was a fearful advance. The enemy's artillery was making great gaps in that gallant line, and the infantry of the French in front were sending a murderous fire up the slope. But on went the Tenth, "as coolly as if on parade." They went forward with such splendid courage that the French scarcely waited for Sir Bevil's word. The fire came, and the enemy, shattered by it, fell back in confusion. The Lunenbergers were saved when destruction seemed inevitable.

Then followed one of the most heroic incidents of the battle. The Baron of Pibrack lay wounded, close up to the French line, unable to move. Two serjeants of the

Tenth sprang forward, unheeding the shots that swept the intervening space, and brought back the wounded general, carrying him out of the range of fire. It was a gallant deed, worthy of the reputation of the Army of England, to which these two fine fellows belonged. All who saw it, friend and foe, cheered this splendid exhibition of English pluck. No sooner had the Baron been taken to the rear, than the regiment, responding to the call of its gallant Lieutenant-Colonel, swept across the open space, reserving their fire as before, until they came to the trench on the skirt of a wood. There they poured in some deadly volleys, and maintained their stand until they were called away by the Prince of Nassau.

The vanguard, of which the Tenth formed a part, is said to have behaved in this engagement in a manner which created wonder, and called forth admiration alike from Luxembourg's men and the Allies. They received the charge of several battalions of the enemy repeatedly, and finally, standing on the defensive no longer, drove the French in that part of the field back to their camp. In that furious charge the First Regiment of Guards captured a battery, but having no horses to bring away the guns, had to abandon them. The French, marking the dauntless advance, and realising that the English were coming on irresistibly, cut the traces, and took the horses with them in their retreat. The historian who was on the field, and took part in the fight, says that all the English regiments behaved with the same bravery, "beating their enemies from the hedges so far, that in this hedge fighting their fire was generally muzzle to muzzle, we on the one side, the enemy on the other." It was a terrible yet glorious day for the Tenth, and the chronicler of the Granville Family says that the ground where the conflict had raged was piled with corpses. Those who buried the slain

remarked that almost all the wounds had been given in close fighting by the sword or the bayonet.

The losses on both sides were heavy. The Allies lost several pieces of cannon. Some, it is said, were taken by the enemy, some were abandoned because the horses were so worn out that they could not bring them away, while some powder waggons were blown up in the retirement which followed. It was no flight, however. It was, as one put it, an inch to inch recoil before such odds that human strength could not resist effectually. Officers and men went down in heaps on the stubbornly-contested field. Darkness only ended the slaughter. It was a drawn battle. Fortescue says that British troops never fought a finer action than Steenkirk. William ordered a retreat, in which the English brought up the rear, "halting and turning about continually"; but so shaken were the enemy, that Luxembourg was glad to fall off, and cross the Scheldt.

The roll-call revealed the loss of 2,000 killed, and 3,000 wounded or missing. The loss was chiefly with the English, who were under fire from the moment when the first shot was fired, but they were furious when it transpired that two colours had been lost.

As for the Tenth, it is impossible to say what their losses were, the returns of the losses of men not being furnished in those days, only the loss of officers; but many private soldiers were killed or wounded, while Captain Elliot, Lieutenant James Granville, and Lieutenant John Granville were among these last. Writing after the battle to the Earl of Bath, D'Auvergne said to his lordship: "This is an impartial account of the business of that day, of which the French, notwithstanding their *Te Deum*, have no great reason to brag. All that impartial men can say of their advantage is, that we attacked them in their own camp, and that they

repulsed us, though with greater loss both of soldiers and considerable officers on their side." This statement is followed by another to the effect that the French officers owed to their English prisoners that they lost 9,000 in killed and wounded.

The Tenth were commended by the Prince of Nassau for the gallant part they played when under fire for the first time. Their "bearing proved a presage of future renown."

To all intents the campaign was over, but there was some hard work yet before the army went to winter quarters. Six regiments were sent towards the Canal of Bruges, five of them being English and Scotch. They were Bath's, Castleton's, Graham's and Leven's, all under the command of Brigadier Ramsey. After encamping by the canal a short time, they moved on towards Bruges, where four other English battalions joined them. Strengthened thus, they marched into the town, going through it to the beat of drum, with colours flying, and passing alongside the canal of Ostend, they ultimately met the Duke of Leinster, who had just landed at Ostend. Under his command they marched to Furnes, which offered no opposition.

At Furnes Leinster's army had a startling experience. An earthquake, felt all over Flanders, and in many parts of France and England, was so violent that the garrison thought the French had undermined the town and were in ambuscade to blow up the mines. The mischief done to the fortifications was so extensive that a hundred men were taken from each battalion to repair the damage. On the 12th of September, two days after the earthquake, the ordinary detachments of the Earl of Bath's Regiment, and Fusiliers, being at work at the bastion by Iypres, in enlarging the ditch, found an old hidden treasure, "which quickly stopt the soldiers working, who all fell a scrambling

in a heap, one upon another, some bringing off a good booty, some gold, and some silver, several Jacobus's and sovereigns being found by the soldiers, and a great many old pieces of silver of Henry the Second, Charles the Ninth, Henry the Third, Henry the Fourth, Coyn, which are now hardly to be found in France."

The value of this treasure-trove was considerable, having regard to the greater worth of money in the Stuart period. Commenting on this "lucky find" for the Tenth and the Royal Fusiliers, one writer remarks that "there was little chance of any Court of Law recovering the money for the heirs; in every likelihood it all found its way that same night into the sutlers' shops, and equally probably purchased for the lucky treasure-trover a night in the provost-guard, and a morning ride on the wooden horse."

In October the Earl of Bath's regiment was ordered to Damme for winter quarters. Damme was described as a little garrison town between Bruges and Sluys, but strong. Other regiments went to various places in Flanders.

Note on the establishment of the Tenth in 1692:—

In Flanders: 13 Companies—780 men.

Charges for the year: £16,145 3s. 4d.

CHAPTER V.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1693.

1693. IT has been pointed out as a remarkable fact that the Tenth, and other British regiments who played so splendid a part in the campaign of 1692 in Flanders against the flower of the Army of France, and covered themselves with glory, although they had in the end to own defeat, had had but little military training. But for those who had served at Tangiers against the Moors, none among them all had seen any active service. Not one could be called a veteran. They were troops called out who had fought against Monmouth, or were held in readiness to fight him if he triumphed at Sedgemoor. Most of these regiments had been disbanded when the rebellion was crushed, but when necessity demanded it, they were called upon again, and hastily trained; but "even then not by officers who had seen service."*

When William the Third called the Tenth out from their winter quarters at Damme, they were no longer raw recruits, but veterans, although soldiers of short standing. Already the Tenth had been the war school of at least one distinguished officer. In the Earl of Bath's regiment in 1690 there was one young officer, Ensign to Captain Richard Trevanion, who was later to be known in the military world as Field Marshal Wade. The Tenth were destined to serve under him in Scotland.

The French King set his army in motion with unusual confidence. In the previous campaign he had captured

* Fortescue.

Walton.

within the lines. The enemy, when the Tenth rushed in, turned and fled.

The full force of this achievement may be judged from the fact that the defenders numbered 10,000 men—infantry and horse. It is said that the men found a cask of brandy among the stores left by the retreating Frenchmen, and they appreciated the prize greatly after their trying experiences for more than a week of incessant rain. One shrinks from telling of what followed, especially after the heroic doings of the day of battle; yet, being a part of the story, it cannot be passed by.

Each attack had proved successful, and the French were in full retreat, the horse regarding safety before duty, and leaving the infantry to shift for themselves. Then came the madness of war, so common in those days. Walton has drawn the picture—terrible though it is—with a master hand. It is not the picture of the Tenth alone, but of all the army under Würtemberg's command. "The very men who in the morning would have risked their lives for a comrade, who would have endured all, and dared all for a point of honour, were in the evening plundering inoffensive cottagers, insulting helpless women, and wantonly destroying property unprotected except by females and children, or at most by unarmed men.

"The village of D'Otignies and every cottage and farm in the district was in flames. Soldiers ran wildly from house to house, damning, cursing, and robbing, mad with drink, and with the intoxication of blood. Throughout the summer night the shrieks of miserable women and the cries of frightened children were to be heard mingling with the hoarse voices of the shouting soldiers. The darkness was scared away by the flames of burning homesteads and churches; a lurid reflection was cast upwards on the

were 1,560. These comprised two battalions, and were made up of 26 companies.

William selected a position which was deemed impregnable at Parck, near to Louvain. There "the two armies stood looking at each other for a whole month, neither venturing to move, neither daring to attack, both ill-supplied, both discontented, and, as a natural consequence, both losing scores, hundreds, and even thousands of men through desertion."*

The Tenth were brigaded with the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Seventh, under Churchill, and encamped in a field adjoining the defiles of Berbeck, being so placed in order to guard that avenue to the camp. Owing to the scarcity of forage, it was found necessary to send out the horses to graze. But it was accompanied by immense risks, for small parties of the French were in the habit of concealing themselves in the Bois de Merdal and stealing the horses whenever the opportunity offered. This resulted in a serious loss of animals. On the 25th of June the grazing party consisted of a serjeant and ten men of the Tenth, and these were suddenly surprised by a number of French soldiers, who dashed out from the wood. The Englishmen were greatly outnumbered; some of them were severely wounded, and all the horses were captured.

Some brilliant service followed this annoying incident. Hoping to benefit the Meuse fortresses, which Luxembourg was unexpectedly threatening, William ordered a detachment of 8,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry to move westwards, and attack the lines of the enemy between the Scheldt and the Lys. The Duke of Würtemberg was in command, and carried out his instructions admirably. The British regiments which went with him were the

* Fortescue: "History of the Army."

Tenth, Argyle's (Argyle Highlanders), Castletons, and the Seventh Dragoon Guards—a picked body, which the Duke declared himself proud to lead. Twelve guns were with this force, which left the camp on July the 1st. Oudenarde was reached on the 3rd. Würtemberg encamped in the presence of the enemy on the 7th, before D'Otignies, but every man and horse in the force was absolutely worn out.

The march had been full of misery, the men having been on the move for seven days in incessant rain. One who took part in it said: "We were forced to lye that night"—the night of the little army's arrival before D'Otignies—"in the dirt by the Waterside, without any shelter for want of our Baggage, and of convenient ground to incamp upon." The same writer goes on to say that the ground was so "deep that we went almost to the knees in dirt in our Camp; which likewise hinder'd our Artillery and Ammunition from coming by the badness of the Ways, till late in the Evening. The Weather was so very bad that it almost dash'd the hopes we had in this Undertaking." The misery of the march was such that "where the camp lay low the tents were set swimming, the baggage was ruined, and the stores of the sutlers were swept away or spoiled."

Walton, describing the position, says that the lines of the Scheldt and Lys ran from the village of Espierre to Menin, and thence to the sea, and consisted of a long earthen rampart, with an outer ditch, connecting redoubt and smaller redans. The stream of the Espierrette flowed along the front of the lines, and formed a second ditch.

In spite of the weariness of so many days of hard marching, the force had to fight hard on the following morning, for Würtemberg, on the 8th of July, attacked the French lines at three points. He disposed his troops thus:

"The Grenadiers formed the van of each attack. The right column was composed of Danes; the *Legion Étrangère* headed the centre column and the Tenth Foot took the rear of the column on the left."

Württemberg commanded the left attack and was therefore with the Tenth, who, when the signal was given, rushed forward with a great huzza, "according to the custom of our country." The Earl of Bath's regiment was sustained by Torsay's regiment, and Count Hume's upon the left. The Tenth was thus the only English regiment in this part of the field. On arriving at the Esqueroire, the pikemen tossed a number of fascines into the water, with the idea of making a passage over the stream and ditch. Unfortunately, the pelting rains of the night had swollen the stream into a rushing torrent, so that the fascines were carried away.


The necessary halt brought the Tenth under a hot fire, and early in the attack it looked as if failure for the time was inevitable. The grenadiers, "accustomed to regard themselves as the *élite* of their regiment, and to consider it their duty to set an example," plunged into the stream with a loud huzza, the musketeers, meanwhile, at the water's edge, pouring in a continuous fire on the French who guarded the farther bank. The passage was achieved in spite of the fact that many of the grenadiers, tall though they were, had the water up to their necks. Many of them, of shorter stature, were carried off their feet; some were shot and floated, dead or wounded, down the turbulent current, while many were drowned. Yet, with comparatively little loss the other bank was gained, and fighting began at close quarters. A rush was made for the ditch by those who had crossed, the palisades were torn down, and the men of the regiment found themselves

within the lines. The enemy, when the Tenth rushed in, turned and fled.

The full force of this achievement may be judged from the fact that the defenders numbered 10,000 men—infantry and horse. It is said that the men found a cask of brandy among the stores left by the retreating Frenchmen, and they appreciated the prize greatly after their trying experiences for more than a week of incessant rain. One shrinks from telling of what followed, especially after the heroic doings of the day of battle; yet, being a part of the story, it cannot be passed by.

Each attack had proved successful, and the French were in full retreat, the horse regarding safety before duty, and leaving the infantry to shift for themselves. Then came the madness of war, so common in those days. Walton has drawn the picture—terrible though it is—with a master hand. It is not the picture of the Tenth alone, but of all the army under Würtemberg's command. "The very men who in the morning would have risked their lives for a comrade, who would have endured all, and dared all for a point of honour, were in the evening plundering inoffensive cottagers, insulting helpless women, and wantonly destroying property unprotected except by females and children, or at most by unarmed men.

"The village of D'Otignies and every cottage and farm in the district was in flames. Soldiers ran wildly from house to house, damning, cursing, and robbing, mad with drink, and with the intoxication of blood. Throughout the summer night the shrieks of miserable women and the cries of frightened children were to be heard mingling with the hoarse voices of the shouting soldiers. The darkness was scared away by the flames of burning homesteads and churches; a lurid reflection was cast upwards on the



dreary night, and the whole country for thirty miles round was in a state of alarm and wonder. At the little village of Evergnies every house was gutted; the people had in the morning removed their stores of flax and other goods to the church, their propinquity to the lines causing them to take timely measures. The soldiers entered the church, and after taking all they wished and more than they could possibly carry, set fire to the building. The most daring and the most desperate among the unfortunate took refuge in the church; an effort to save their little property; the church became choked, and they were burned to death. They were only more miserable in their death than when they were living, thus bereft of all their property, their prospects ruined for life, and in many cases their very subsistence taken from them in one day.

It is, that among these soldiers drenched with wine, and heated with such brutalities, were to be seen, mingled with the foreign troops, the red coats of Argyle's Scots—the purple-faced grey of Castleton's men, and the red coats of the Tenth."

It is the story as the historian has told it—a story which I should have wished impossible when it concerned men who proved such heroes in the heat of conflict.

On the 10th, William's main army met with disaster at the battle of the Boyne, but not until one of the most desperate battles the King had ever fought had jeopardised the safety of the English army—had almost assured its annihilation. The French army on this night found themselves victorious at the battle of the Boyne against overwhelming numbers. At one o'clock in the morning the French General advised him to retreat, but the King would not hear them. The English at last ran out of ammunition without a cartridge, and for that reason were obliged to fall back.



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“Alas, that among these soldiers drenched with wine, and glutted with such brutalities, were to be seen, mingled with the foreign troops, the red coats of Argyle’s Scotsmen, the purple-faced grey of Castleton’s men, and the blue coats of the Tenth.”

Such is the story as the historian has told it—a story one could have wished impossible when it concerned men who had proved such heroes in the heat of conflict.

Meanwhile, William’s main army met with disaster at Landen, but not until one of the most desperate battles the English King had ever fought had jeopardised the safety of the French army—had almost assured its annihilation. The English in this fight found themselves victorious at several points against overwhelming numbers. At one time the officers about the French General advised him to retire, but he would not hear them. The English at last found themselves without a cartridge, and for that reason they were compelled to fall back.

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The disaster induced William to call in the Tenth. When, in obedience to this order, they joined the main body, the Duke of Würtemberg expressed his satisfaction not merely with the fighting qualities of the regiment, but with their fine all-round conduct. He signalised this by giving every man in the regiment a ducat.

When, in October, the Tenth went into winter quarters at Bruges, they heard that the Earl of Bath had resigned the Colonelcy, which was now conferred on his nephew, Sir Bevil Granville. Sir Bevil had proved himself an officer of considerable capacity while commanding the Tenth during his uncle's almost unaccountable absence from the war. William had a very high opinion of Granville as a soldier, and readily listened to the suggestion that he should be the Colonel now that the post was vacant. The promotion was the natural one, for he had been in the regiment from the time of its first embodiment. Apart from all thought of favouritism, which some have suggested, his splendid conduct at Steenkirk marked him as a soldier deserving of promotion, not merely for valour's sake, but for the many fine qualities which go to the making of a successful Commander.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1694-5-6.

1694. IT has been said that Milton had discovered that war moved by two main nerves, one of iron, and the other of gold : and Louis of France had declared in the midst of his victories that the Power with the last gold piece would win. Hence the same writer goes on to say, that it is as much to the superiority of organisation and method in developing their economic resources, as to their superiority in their great fighting machines—the Army and Navy—that the English Kingdom and the Dutch Republic owed their eventual triumph over France. Napoleon, later on, realised to the full the power of gold in determining the issue of a great war. “First money, and second *money*, and third MONEY.” In measuring his strength with the Powers of Europe, Louis the Fourteenth discovered that he was not only fighting a great general when he fought with William the Third, but that if the King could command England’s wealth, he was certain in the long run to triumph over France. He felt the force of this yet more when he marked the repeated displays of English valour on those battlefields in Flanders.

He still continued to menace Europe, and the English Parliament, realising the danger if he became paramount, took steps to provide the money William required in order to prosecute the new campaign of 1694.

William had recognised his opportunity. It had come to his knowledge that France was distressed by the great wars in which Louis engaged, and that the French treasury was

empty. "Even at the beginning of the war, in 1689, the kingdom was so exhausted by Louis's wars, by the money spent in bribing foreign princes and ministers, and by his own profusion and extravagance, that recourse had to be made to the disgraceful expedient of recasting the specie, and re-issuing it at an advance of ten per cent. on its normal value ; while at the same time, such was the scarcity of the precious metals, that private individuals were compelled to send their silver plate and utensils, above a certain weight, to the mint. Louis himself set the example by melting some of his finest sculptured vases and other articles."* Even this could not suffice. Nor were the "absurd taxes" on trade and agriculture sufficient to provide the war materiel and raise the pay of the French soldiers, whose money was many months in arrears. Louis's credit failed so absolutely that he was unable to raise his regiments to their full complement, and was, moreover, unable to supply clothing and food for the army.

This question of money was serious to the King of France, and was known to the Allies, and not to Frenchmen only. One named Richard Wolseley, writing to Sir John Trenchard from Brussels, January 14th, 1693, says in his letter which came in pursuance of his secret service :—

"Letters from Namur say, yt ye Garrison there is soe much lessened, yt ye French have bin forc'd to shut up two of ye gates, the Troupes that belong to it, being canton'd in ye villages along ye Maese and ye Sambre to hinder any considerable Body of ye Allyes from passing those two Rivers, and obligeing ye Countrey to pay Contribution ; ye French have alsoe drawne ye greatest parte of ye Garrisons of Dinant and Charlemont for ye same reason and in order to ye same End.

* See Forbonnais, "Recherches sur les Finances."

All Accounts from ye Frontiers agree, yt ye French are not in a condition to make any attempt upon us ; but yt on ye contrary there is such a Want both of Bread and Mony amongue 'em as is scarce credible ; ye very Officers of their Troupes, except such as are of ye first Rancke, being reduced to allmost an equall Misery with ye common Souldiers.

“Men of good Credit, who are lately come from Charleroy, assure us, yt since ye Towne has been in ye French Hands, ye Garrison has received but three Payments, two Pence per Souldier att one Payment, and Six Farthings per Souldier a time att two other payments ; ye same persons say, yt ye Inhabitants of ye Towne are all preparing to leave it as fast as they can, not being able to live with ye French, Who have noe mony to pay for any thing they pretend to buy.

I am allwayes

Sr

Yr most humble and most obedient servant

Sr John Trenchard.

RD. WOLSELEY.

The French were equally hard pressed for recruits with which to replenish their depleted battalions, and this is likewise shown by the same writer, who says in a letter to the Earl of Nottingham, dated from Brussels, February 1, 1693 :

“ My Lord,

The French continue to force all ye younge men they can find in ye townes and villages of ye conquer'd Countries to list themselves for Souldiers to Compleat their Recruits they have very lately sent an order to ye inhabitants of Hall to furnish a Quota for their Levies, which has occasioned ye running away of all ye younge men in that Place to this Towne, to avoid being forc'd to

Serve aggt their lawfull King, for a Government they have an aversion to ; ye French being angry att this dis-appointment, resolve, as I am assur'd from good Hands, to oblige ye Fathers of such as have taken Shelter here to serve in their Roome, or att least pay a good Summe of Mony to be excus'd."

This enforced service continued, the French taking old and young, married and unmarried, whoever came their way.

One result of the crippled state of French finances was that the campaign could only be one of manœuvres, and that the whole endeavour of the French Commander was to avoid a battle. Consequently the year's doings were exceedingly uninteresting from the soldier's point of view, and excessively wearisome. None the less, however, the Tenth were by no means idle, nor were they free from danger.

During the winter Louis thought to bring about peace largely on his own terms by making concessions in various directions—to the Empire, to Spain, to Savoy, and others ; but since William remained unacknowledged as King of England by the French monarch, neither England nor the Dutch Republic would hear of peace, nor would the Allies withdraw from their obligations, since Louis, in spite of his proposals, would hold too commanding and dangerous a position in Europe.

As early as possible William was in the field. Yet on the whole, Luxembourg, by remaining on the defensive, was able, through skilful manœuvres, to avoid a great battle. The military returns show that William's army was the finest he had ever commanded. The infantry numbered 58,000 men, and the cavalry were 31,800, and as for those who rallied round the English King, they comprised "all the

best-known generals who had hitherto taken part in the wars of Western Europe."

For two whole months these armies confronted each other, the one general eager to fight at the earliest opportunity, the other resolute not to be drawn to battle, but to tire his antagonist by perpetual feints which were intended to come to nothing. "The French maxim, 'a battle lost loses more than a gained battle gains,' was now adopted by the English also; the English ministers reminded the King of it." The campaign was useless therefore on nearly every count—a mere squandering of time and money, and nothing to show at the end, except as one sneeringly remarks, "the recovery by the Allies of that important place, Huy."

The Tenth were not idle. They had been in winter quarters at Bruges, and no order came until May the 17th, when Major-General Bellasis was told to march on the following day with the garrisons of Bruges, Ostend, and those who were quartered on the Canal of Nieuport, to Ghent, and form a camp there. On the 18th, the Tenth, two battalions of the Scots Guards, the first battalion of the Royal Regiment, and the regiments commanded by Tidcomb, Castleton, Ingolsby, Mackay, Graham, O'ffarell, and Maitland marched out of Bruges. The second battalion of the Royal Regiment was left in garrison.

This force, combined with four battalions from Nieuport, two from Ostend, and two from Sluys and elsewhere, numbered nineteen battalions in all, and was under the command of Major-General Sir Henry Bellasis and Major-General Ramsay. The first day's march took them half way on the road to Ghent, with the idea of watching the French Lines of the Scheldt. They went in consequence along the canal of Bruges. On the 10th of May they were met at Ghent by the Duke of Würtemberg and Count de Nassau,

who rode out of the town to meet them. Here they halted until the 21st.

The train of English artillery, which had remained all the winter in Ghent, was not yet ready for want of horses, and in consequence Sir David Collier was left in the town with the Tenth, and other regiments—Selwyn's, Tidcomb's, Castleton's, Graham's, O'ffarell's, Ferguson's, and La Meloniere's—to guard the train until the main body of William's army was overtaken. This fine brigade of foot encamped near the town, close to the road to Dendermonde.

When the artillery was ready, the brigade started, on the 27th May, for Vilvorde, and halted for the night near the canal, midway between Vilvorde and Grimberg. The cannon were sent on from this point by water to Malines, it having been arranged that horses should be waiting there. The brigade arrived on the following day at Stannokezeel, and having been joined there by Stanley's and Collingwood's regiments, the next march took this strong body of troops to the general rendezvous at Louvain. It here encamped so that its Right was near the King's quarters at Bethlehem, while its Left was towards Louvain. On the 31st of May His Majesty came to review the English Infantry, and declared them to be "in good order, cloaths, and accoutrements."

Then came the weary and almost exasperating waiting for the opening of the campaign. In order to induce Luxembourg to fight, William manœuvred with all his proverbial skill, but in vain. There were endless marches, of which the Tenth had almost more than their share; and during these the country afforded no sustenance. One reads that there was hardly any corn on the ground; "here and there may be half an acre;" but it is asserted by one who was with the army, that "the Boers had left the country so

bare that they boasted of starving both armies into a peace." If this were so, it was scurvy treatment towards the forces that were fighting their battles for them.

There were skirmishes in plenty to relieve the monotony of those endless and exhausting marches. Deserters came over from the enemy daily, and apparently were drafted into the ranks and fought under the commanders of the Allies.

There was not much glory to be won in a campaign which was apparently nothing but marches and counter marches, with never any fighting on a large scale. So far as the Tenth were concerned, they formed part of Brigadier Stuart's command, which was made up thus:—

| | | |
|---------------------|---|------------------------------|
| Brigadier Stuart | { | Granville <i>olim</i> Bathe. |
| | | Tidcomb. |
| | | Leslie. |
| | | Castleton. |
| | | Lauder. |
| | | St. George. |

On the 16th of July, Stuart's Brigade was detached out of the line to encamp near the Abbey of Bonef, on the Meheigne. There they entrenched themselves strongly, and the guard of the post was committed to the charge of Count de Nassau.

Following the movements as given by D'Auvergne, the Army, on the 8th of August, decamped very early from Mont St. André, and directed its march to the spring of the Meheigne, passing by the defile of Perwys. "My Lord Portland had the Rear Guard, composed of a good body of Horse and the Brigade of Stuart, and some field pieces," says the historian. He goes on to say that "the King kept with the Rear Guard till he saw it free from the attempts of the Enemy. We made a long march this day,

and the Weather being warm made the Soldiers faint under their armes."

On the 16th of August, Stuart's Brigade, with two battalions of Scots Guards and three others, were ordered to leave their tents and march to join the Duke of Würtemberg. The high ground between Poteghem and Oudenarde was taken up by the augmented brigade. D'Auvergne, whose statement of details may be taken as reliable, says, under date September 1st, 1694, that "the Campagne being now far spent, and this being like to be the last Camp before we separated into Winter Quarters, the Army had orders to put down their tents, and to make Baracques or Huts of Straw which at this time was to be found in great abundance." When, on the 11th of September, William reviewed the infantry, his Majesty was keen in his inspection. He was gratified with what he saw, and the report was, that the regiments were not only very full and in very good order, but were "in a better condition than they have been at this time of the year since the beginning of the War, notwithstanding the great marches we had for so many days together, from the Meuse to the Scheldt." Fortunately, the weather had been good and free from the great heat that had been expected. The soldiers "rather marched better the last days than the first."

During this fruitless campaign, which cost the English nation £2,530,581, a Royal Warrant was issued, which settled the precedence of the various regiments serving in the Low Countries. It was signed at Roosbeck on June 10th, 1694, and set down the list in the following order:—

The Royal Regiment.
Colonel W. Selwyn's Regiment.
Major-General Churchill's Regiment.
Colonel Trelawney's Regiment.
Colonel Edward Lloyd's Regiment.
Royal Regiment of Fusileers.
Sir Bevil Granville's Regiment (Tenth).
etc. etc. etc.

The high and honourable place taken by the Tenth is thus indicated officially, and the names of twenty-four regiments follow in the list.

On the 6th of October the campaign was at an end, and the Army retired into winter quarters. The men went willingly enough, for although the campaign on the whole had been favourable to the Allies, there was nothing satisfactory to look back on—nothing to convince the British public that they had money's worth in the way of great achievements. Yet few at home grumbled. The money was spent by the country with a certain willingness, because it was felt that through her Army England was "assisting in freeing Christendom from slavery." The nation expected, moreover, to gain "such a credit, renown and reputation abroad as will make England flourish more than it has ever done hitherto, and it will abundantly repay our present charges with interest." Such is the contemporary opinion on these events.

The Tenth went into winter quarters at Malines, and with them were Churchill's, Trelawney's and Erle's Regiments.

1695. When the Allies placed their armies in the field for the campaign of 1695, William's great purpose was to regain Namur. Possibly he had considerable hope of success when news came that the Duke of Luxembourg was dead, and

that his successor had yet to be found. It was said of this truly great general that he had by no means a handsome face, and that his figure was deformed. "Upon its being reported to him that William had once exclaimed: 'What! am I never to beat this humpbacked fellow?' de Luxembourg observed, 'How should he know the shape of my back, for it is certain that I never turned it to him?'" His death was equivalent to a disaster for France, and raised corresponding hopes in the minds of the leaders of the Allied Army. Had he but the means required at his disposal, Louis must have overwhelmed all his opponents with this great soldier in his service.

There were vigorous preparations for the continuation of the war, and England heard the King's demand with mingled feelings, alike because of the call for men, and the request for money. The cost of the campaign of 1695, in the estimates alone, was considerable for a country which could not be esteemed to possess anything more than limited resources.

From the soldier's point of view this new campaign promised well for the Allies. Marshal Villeroy was evidently the best choice the King of France had, and it was felt in the ranks, as well as among the officers, that William was now matched against a general to whom he was as much superior as Luxembourg had been to him, and this reversal of conditions told speedily and signally on the fortunes of the year's campaign.*

William was early in the field, landing in Holland on the 14th of May. He had found a month before, while the Army was in winter quarters, that the French, handicapped by the want of money, had determined on a defensive policy. Having realised how difficult it had been to defend

* Traill: "William the Third."

their conquests by reason of William's skilful manœuvres in 1694, the French called for the services of 20,000 navvies, and threw up a line of entrenchments extending on the right from Bossut on the Scheldt, through Courtray and Commynes on the Lys, thence to Ypres, Fort Knock, and Furnes, to Dunkirk on their left.*

This step led to special duty for the Tenth. William feared an attack on this side, and thinking to interrupt the works, he called for 500 men from each regiment in the Flanders garrisons to go to camp between Deynse and Ghent. This resulted in a fine Army of 35,000 men assembling at the spot named, the command being given to the Elector of Bavaria. William's coming, however, led to a change of plans. The Elector's camp was broken up, and the men of the Tenth joined their regiment at Marykirk, where they waited for further orders. Ultimately, they were included in one of two forces which the King formed on his arrival. This Army was under the command of William himself, and included nearly all the British regiments. Its strength was:—

| | | | |
|----------|-----|-----|--------|
| Cavalry | ... | ... | 11,000 |
| Infantry | ... | ... | 42,000 |
| <hr/> | | | |
| Total | ... | ... | 53,000 |

The Tenth served in Collier's Brigade, which was composed as follows:—

6th Foot.
 10th Foot.
 Seymour's.
 Saunderson's.
 Collier's.
 With one Battalion of the Royals.

* Sir F. W. Hamilton.

The strength of the British contingent in the Army of the Allies was:—

| | | Cavalry | Infty. | |
|----------------------------------|-----|---------|--------|------------------|
| | | Sqdns. | Bns. | Men. |
| In William's Army | ... | 38 | 29 | |
| In the Elector's Army | ... | 8 | 10 | |
| | | — | | |
| | | 46 | | |
| At 150 each and 100 for Dragoons | ... | | | { 3,300 2,400 |
| | | | — | |
| | | | 39 | |
| At 600 each | ... | ... | ... | 23,400 |
| | | | | — |
| Total British Contingent | ... | ... | ... | 29,100 |

The total strength of the Allied Army was 124,000.

William found it almost obligatory to threaten Kenoque, a fortress at the junction of the Dixmude and Loo canals, where the French had a garrison. This was necessary in order to render the Allied Army free to invest Namur, where 15,000 of the French were in garrison. The force sent to Kenoque, under the command of the Duke of Würtemberg, consisted of eight battalions, under Major-General Churchill, and among these were the Tenth, the Third, and the Twenty-third. There were some artillery, also, and a pontoon train.

The Duke began operations on the 8th of June, and on the following day some severe fighting took place. An attack was ordered on some houses on the right, near to the Loo canal, and the Tenth were told to drive the French out of the entrenchments, since their presence there was a source of considerable inconvenience to the Army. Colonel Tiffany was in command as Brigadier. The Tenth were met by a heavy fire. The grenadiers suffered greatly,

but, as the report ran, the men did what was required of them with all the success and conduct that could be wished. They advanced with a great deal of courage, and drove the enemy from their post, which they endeavoured to recover two or three times, "coming on sword in hand." The success was dearly purchased, for the losses that day in the general assault amounted to 587 killed and wounded, the greater share falling to the Tenth, who came under the hottest fire. The Colonel was among the wounded. D'Auvergne says, with some sarcasm, that these hundreds grew to thousands by the time they came into the Paris Gazette.

The Duke of Würtemberg did not succeed in capturing Kenoque, and during the night of the 16th of June drew off in silence to Dixmude. Possibly he had received instructions to create a diversion here to enable William to close in on Namur, on the recapture of which the King was determined. With his own division his Majesty effected a junction with the forces of the Elector of Bavaria, and was joined also by the Brandenburg contingent.

The fighting that followed was of a terrific character. On the 17th of July, "after a fierce conflict in which the attacking forces were thrice beaten back and thrice returned, the first counterscarp of the town was carried." On the 20th, another portion of the outworks was captured. The second line of fortifications fell into the hands of William a few days later. Then arrangements were made for a general assault. Bouffleurs, however, found himself unable to defend the town with the forces at his disposal, and offered to surrender it on condition that he should be allowed to retire into the citadel. Namur was thus in possession of the Allies, but then followed the renewal of

the struggle to determine the fate of the citadel. Villeroy sought to draw off William's Army, and thus save Bouffleurs, by bombarding Brussels, but the siege was persisted in. One hundred and sixty cannon and sixty mortars were turned on the place, which seemed to be doomed under such a fearful fire.

On the 15th of August William saw Villeroy approaching with 80,000 men, but the bombardment did not cease, nor did the French Army strike, although it was close at hand, for three whole days. To the amazement alike of the Allies and the besieged, Villeroy withdrew on the 18th, and left Bouffleurs to his fate. In response to William's demand for the general's surrender, the answer was, that no French Marshal had ever capitulated; but during the days that followed his dead were so many, that in spite of a forty-eight hours' truce to bury them, he was compelled to capitulate. He made such terms, however, that the garrison marched out with the honours of war.

During these operations the British troops were assigned the "post of most danger, and, therefore, of most honour." The losses were heavy—29 officers were killed and 55 wounded, and among the men 475 were dead, and 790 received wounds.

Throughout this experience, which ended so gloriously for the British contingent in Flanders, the Tenth were with the covering Army, under the Prince of Vaudemont. Whilst this army was retreating to Ghent, because of the approach of Villeroy with 80,000 men, an alarming adventure befel some of the Tenth. The Army was at the time halting at Nevel. Major-General Churchill, chancing to be near the house where he had his quarters in the spring of the preceding year, entered and flung himself down to rest. He had called out a serjeant and twelve men of the Tenth



Copied by permission of H.M. George V.] [From a print in Windsor Castle.

LIEUT.-GENERAL WILLIAM LORD NORTH AND GREY,
COLONEL OF THE TENTH, 1703—1715.

to serve as a guard. Unexpectedly the army moved on, and no word was sent to Churchill, who slept on, undisturbed. In the morning, when he awoke, he was amazed at his predicament.

While Churchill and Major Negus and Captain Lloyd were quickly dressing, to hurry on after the disappearing army, a sentry brought in word that a French party was approaching the house. The serjeant was called in at once, with the six men who were not on sentry, and preparations were made for a determined resistance; later it transpired that the Frenchmen were not of the army, but marauders, who were bent on plunder. Barricading the windows and doors, those who were shut in, like rats in a trap, fired at the advancing party, and caused them to retreat.

In the meantime, Major-General Churchill endeavoured to escape, in order to take his place with his brigade. Unfortunately he fell into the hands of some of the Frenchmen, who saw him leave the house. They plundered him of his money, his watch, his coat, and cravat, and then, "jealous of one another," desired to divide the spoil. They bade Churchill sit down under the hedge, and told him that if he stirred they would shoot him. The moment they passed the corner of the house, where they could quietly carry out the division, he slipped away to the other side of the hedge. There he found a French sentry, who, taking him for one of his own officers, answered his question as to which way the Allies had marched. Passing on in that direction, he eventually overtook the army at Marykirk.

The others were not so fortunate. The Frenchmen had meanwhile surrounded the house, and this time they came with a drum, intending to make those who were within believe that they brought an officer with them. Against

such odds, resistance was futile, and consequently they surrendered themselves prisoners of war, only to discover how they had been deceived. They were disgracefully treated. The marauders went through the house and plundered it; then they turned their attention to their prisoners. They were stripped nearly naked, Colonel Godolphin altogether so—and in this condition were taken to Marshal de Villeroy. The French general was intensely annoyed at the indignity which had been shown to the Englishmen, and set them at liberty without ransom, after having fed the privates and invited the officers to dinner.

The fighting experiences of the Tenth after their heroic conduct at Kenoque were almost nil during the remainder of the campaign. There was the repetition of the weary marches from place to place to protect the seaports of Flanders and other towns, and to act as a covering force to the army that was besieging Namur.

In August the regiment encamped between Genappe and Waterloo. With the fall of Namur the campaign ended, and the Tenth went into winter quarters in some of the villages between Nieuport and Ostend. The encampment at Waterloo gave the Tenth great hope of further fighting, but they were disappointed. All Europe expected a great battle here, for William was behind the forest of St. Denys, waiting for Villeroy to attack him. The French general, however, when he saw how William's forces lay, declined to hazard an engagement.

1696. So far as Flanders was concerned, the fighting days of the Tenth with William the Third as Commander were over. It was rumoured that Louis the Fourteenth contemplated an invasion of England in the interests of James the Second, the only English monarch the King of France would recognise. In such a case England was in consider-

able peril—almost army-less, since the largest part of the nation's forces lay in Flanders. The alarm in the country was well-founded when it was discovered that Louis was collecting an army for the purpose of bringing the war into actual English territory. He proposed to keep these preparations secret, but men in the pay of the French Secret Service sent word to the English Government that eighteen regiments of foot and five of horse were actually under the command of the Marquis d'Harcourt, and that five hundred transports were in various French harbours, waiting to concentrate and carry this army over the Channel. They also told of James the Second travelling to Calais to accompany the army when all was ready, and of his having pawned some of his jewels to obtain the necessary money. The Jacobites were active in this country, and were prepared to rise in arms "against the usurper of the throne, William of Orange, and to begin open war on him."

Undoubtedly the intention of Louis was to induce William to withdraw his English troops from Flanders, in order to defend his realm, and by this removal of the finest regiments from the army of the Allies, to enable the French monarch to carry out his policy of aggrandisement. His purpose succeeded in part, seeing that William withdrew some of his men. The Tenth were called out of their winter quarters, and proceeding to Ostend, in March, they embarked with all speed. In the course of a few days they landed at Gravesend, in company with nineteen other battalions. The King thus had an army on English soil of thirty-four battalions, besides a considerable force of cavalry and the Militia. When the returning troops landed it transpired that the plans for the invasion had been cancelled. The Jacobites in England, seeing that William had such a force at his command, and realising that public

opinion was altogether on the King's side, were afraid to take any part in the contemplated rising.

On being assured that England was no longer menaced with invasion, and discovering also that Louis had named almost impossible conditions to James the Second, the King sent back the greater number of the battalions to the Continent, to be in readiness for the campaign of 1696. The Tenth, however, were among the regiments that were retained for garrison duty in England, to be available in case of emergency. Remaining in London for a short time only, they were eventually quartered in cantonments in Suffolk and Essex, where they stayed until the following year, when they were once more sent over to the Low Countries.

The routine of garrison life was possibly welcome to a regiment that had seen such hard service in those endless marches and counter-marches in Flanders. In view of the fact that the Colonel of the Tenth, alert as a soldier, and jealous for the honour of his regiment, maintained the battalion in fine efficiency, it was somewhat surprising when he received a communication which ran as follows:—

Whitehall, 19th Febr. 1696.

Sr,

His Ma^y commands me to signify his Pleasure that you take Care that the Acc^t of what is due in the Respective Quarters of the Regiment under your Command be forthwith made up and signed and Delivered by your Officers to the Persons concerned (in the several Quarters upon pain of his Ma^y's highest Displeasure) and his Ma^y further directs you forthwith to settle and dispatch ye Cloathing of the Regiment in the best possible manner wherewith his Ma^y expects a speedy compliance.

I am, Yours, etc.,

W. B.

Sir Bevil Granville was somewhat nettled at the implied slackness, but explanations came that a similar letter had been forwarded to other Colonels, on the plea that prevention of neglect, by timely warning, was better than cure. The retort was given by one or two who could afford to be so daring, that it would be quite possible for the Army to call those who were in official life to mark that there was considerable slackness in regard to the comfort of the soldiers when serving on campaign duty.

On May the 8th, 1697, an order came to Sir Bevil Granville to make up and sign accounts, and to be in readiness to march as soon as he should receive instructions to that effect. These came almost immediately, and Granville was instructed to proceed to Flanders with all speed, and join the army at Brussels. Accompanied by the King, the troops that were taken over from this country found that the Allies were assembled in force—100,000 strong. Ath was invested at the time by the French, and the King, with his English battalions, in whom he had such supreme confidence, marched from Brussels with the intention of relieving the place. He was too late. Bouffleurs and Villars barred the way, and before William could force his army through, Ath had capitulated, the garrison marching out with all the honours of war.

Now that there was no necessity to break through the formidable lines of the enemy, the King drew away, to cover Namur and Huy. Taking his army to Gemblours, he halted there, to divide his forces into two corps, one under his own command, the other, which was to move on to Deynse on the Lys, having the Elector of Bavaria for its Commander.

There was no fighting beyond mere skirmishing, owing to the fact that proposals were made for peace. The war

was exhausting every Power engaged in it, the armies being large beyond precedent. William remarked to the French Plenipotentiaries who came to the Hague to discuss the possibilities of peace, that he had fought in longer wars, but none so bloody as this had been ; such large armies had never before been seen opposed in the field ; the army which the great Condé commanded at Senef would in this war have only formed a division. The French representatives acquiesced. Peace followed. The Treaty of Ryswick was signed. William was acknowledged as King of England, and James the Second was no longer esteemed a reigning Sovereign by Louis.

The consequences of the peace to the Tenth were, that the regiment shipped back to England, and in a short time crossed over to Ireland for garrison duty. They remained there from July, 1698, to 1700. A country that had been reduced by force of arms necessarily called for a strong military establishment, and when the Tenth went to Ireland there was the possibility at any time of an outburst of rebellion, which would require all the skill and valour of a regiment that had already won so high a place for itself in one of the greatest wars which modern Europe had experienced.

MARLBOROUGH'S CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR.

THE "Soldier King"'s Continental policy not only laid the foundation of England's National Debt, but led the nation into a yearly expenditure of no less than £30,000,000. There were complaints on all hands, because it was the general belief that these wars were not for the benefit of England to the same extent that they were for the defence of William's Dutch dominion, for which the English people had not the slightest regard.

The real cause of the wars, however, was undoubtedly the conviction on the part of a statesman like the King of England that it was necessary to maintain the so-called Balance of Power; in other words, to maintain "such a disposition of things as that no one Potentate or State shall be able absolutely to predominate and prescribe laws to the others . . . and that it was the interest, the right, and the duty of every Power to interfere, even by force of arms, when any of the conditions of this settlement were infringed or assailed." Consequently England was brought into the contest.

The taxpayers were restless under the increased financial burden; the officers acquired a very sincere dislike for William, "the asthmatic skeleton," as they called him; and as for the rank and file of the English Army, the

soldiers abused him roundly for the introduction of flogging.

Yet those days, when William's policy centred round the great international question of the Balance of Power, were glorious, inasmuch as the English soldiers won the respect of the military leaders on the Continent, who now esteemed them the finest fighting men in the world—second-best to none. Those days, moreover, were training days for "the greatest soldier that this country has produced, and who was to carry the glory of the British Army to the highest point." This was John Churchill, who ultimately became the Duke of Marlborough.

Before European attention was turned to Churchill, public opinion was expressed unmistakably on the all-important question of the Standing Army. The old cry of "No Standing Army!" was heard again when the Peace of Ryswick was signed, and many encouraged it on the plea that it might readily be made by the Sovereign an instrument of despotism. "Reams of puerile and pedantic nonsense had been written to prove that the Militia was amply sufficient for England's needs." The Commons were disposed to listen, for they were harassed beyond measure by the want of money. More than two million pounds were needed to pay commissariat bills and meet arrears of pay; so that when a resolution was proposed in the House, in December, 1697, to disband, with exceptions, the forces that had been raised since September, 1680, it was carried, without regard to the need of England at that time for an adequate military force. The vote which followed early in the next month—January, 1698—was a piece of folly. It provided only £350,000 for the maintenance of troops for the coming year! Reduction in a time of peace was reasonable, but not on such a sweeping scale as that.

Resolutions and votes in the Commons did not get rid of the grievances of the remaining soldiers, who had no pay for so long a period that many of them were reduced to starvation, or came perilously near to it. The parsimonious conduct of the House in reducing the Army to such small proportions as 7,000 men for the English establishment—all to be English born—and 12,000 for Ireland, left England exposed to the attacks of her enemies. It was "an act of criminal imbecility, the most mischievous work of the most mischievous Parliament that has ever sat at Westminster,"* which is saying a great deal. Equally ungracious was the action of Parliament in insisting that William's Dutch Bodyguard should be sent back to Holland. So incensed was the King that he contemplated abdication, which, under existing circumstances, would have been a disastrous thing for England.

The Tenth were among the comparatively few regiments that were retained, and, without doubt, their admirable record and fine efficiency were factors in the decision not to disband them. Naturally the question comes: What regiments remained when there were such sweeping reductions from more than 70,000 to less than 20,000 men? The strength is shown by Fortescue in his "Army History," as follows:—

"In England: Three troops of Life Guards, and one of Horse Grenadier Guards. Two regiments of Horse (Blues, 1st D.G.). Five regiments of Horse (3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th D.G., Macclesfield's). Three regiments of Dragoons (Royals, 3rd and 4th Hussars). First Guards and Coldstream Guards, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Foot.

"In Ireland: Two regiments of Horse (2nd D.G. and 4th D.G.). Three regiments of Dragoons (5th and 6th

* Fortescue.

D., 8th H.). Twenty-one battalions of Foot, 1st Royals (two battalions), 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, and 27th.

"In Scotland: One troop of Horse Guards. Two regiments of Dragoons (Greys and 7th H.), Scots Guards, Collier's, 21st, 25th, 26th, George Hamilton's, Strathnaver's."

The effects were mischievous. The reduction of the Army was followed by acts of aggression on the part of Louis the Fourteenth, which once more plunged Europe into a devastating war. In 1700 the King of Spain died, and Louis, without consulting the wishes of other nations, placed his grandson, Philip, Duke of Anjou, on the throne. England might have kept clear of war even then, but it was impossible when James the Second died, in 1701, and the French King at once proclaimed the Pretender King as James the Third. It was a violation of the Treaty of Ryswick, which contained a clause wherein Louis acknowledged William the Third as King of England, and had promised, "neither directly or indirectly, to interfere to the prejudice of King William's peaceful possession of the throne." This proclamation of James the Third came as a declaration that France esteemed William a usurping monarch. The Jacobites were more than pleased, but the nation as a whole indignantly resented the action of the French Sovereign, and declared it a wanton insult alike to the King and his subjects. The news of the proclamation of James the Third galvanised the nation into activity. All party feeling gave place before the universal indignation. Whig and Tory clamoured alike for war, while business men, in the interests of commerce, voted for a War-Parliament, since the action of Louis, in passing

ordinances against English manufactures, was likely to lead to widespread ruin in England.

A War-Parliament was returned in September, 1701, and it furnished the King at once with 40,000 soldiers, to enable him to play his part in the war of the Spanish Succession. Both parties vied with each other in the endeavour to put the King in the best possible position for the prosecution of the war, on which depended the maintenance of the Constitution as settled by the Revolution.* The soldiers, however, who had been disbanded, were slow to offer themselves. Arrears of pay, and bad treatment generally, had rendered them unwilling to subject themselves to a repetition of the old experience, and they held back until levy money to the extent of £3 was paid to each man. Eventually the Army was brought up to a war footing, and the campaign begun.

* Ranke.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN—1702.

1701. WHEN war was determined on, although not yet declared, a force of about 10,000 British soldiers was sent across to Holland, to hold the Low Countries against the Army of France. The Tenth were among those named for this service. A letter conveying the King's desire was received in Ireland, which ran thus:—

MOST REVEREND FATHER IN GOD. Our right intirely Beloved Councillor, and Our Right Trusty and Right Well Beloved Cousins and Councillors.

We greet y^e well.

Whereas it is necessary for Our service that the regiments hereafter mentioned be forthwith sent to Holland for the succour of the States of the United Provinces, to wit, Our Royal Regt. of Foot, and our Regiments commanded by Colonels Webb and Stewart, Sir Bevil Granville, Jacobs, Emmanuel, How, Stanley, Brydges, Frederick Hamilton, Ingolsby, and William Seymour:

Our Will and pleasure is that you give immediate orders for the march of those Regiments from their respective quarters to the city of Cork, the regiments of Col. Stanley and Col. Ingolsby excepted, which are to go to Belfast, where, upon the arrival of the Naval Squadron, under Admiral Hopson, and other ships, appointed by Our Commissioners of the Admiralty, yo. cause the said Regiments to embark for Holland.

Given at Our Court at Kensington the sixteenth day of May, in the year one thousand seven hundred and one, in the thirteenth of our Reign.

By His Majesty's Command.

In obedience to this royal warrant, the Tenth and others embarked at Cork on the 15th of June, but did not sail until the 24th. On the 8th of July Helvoetsluys was reached, and the men having landed, were carried by canal boat to Breda, arriving there on the 11th. They were then sent to one of the frontier strongholds, admittedly a post of considerable danger at a time when the French Army might at any hour cross the border into the Netherlands, and either assault the place or isolate it. Before the Tenth had been long in garrison they were called on to join the main army at Breda Heath, to be reviewed by the King, and one who wrote from the camp on September 20th, 1701, says that His Majesty, in spite of suffering from asthma, came out to see the troops. "After passing along the line in front and rear, he saw each battalion file off in single companies, and being well satisfied with the good condition they were in, gave orders for their decamping and returning to their respective quarters." In consequence, the Tenth went back to the garrison town to await further instructions, none coming, however, which entailed any further movements until the winter had gone.

The infantry so reviewed were as follows, and the mere mention of their names shows that the regiments were the most reliable at the King's disposal:—

First Battalion First Guards.

| | | | | | | |
|----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------|------|
| Orkney's | ... | ... | ... | ... | now the | 1st |
| Webb's | ... | ... | ... | ... | " " | 8th |
| Stewart's | ... | ... | ... | ... | " " | 9th |
| Lord North and Grey* | ... | ... | ... | ... | " " | 10th |
| Earl of Barrimore's | ... | ... | ... | ... | " " | 13th |
| Howe's | ... | ... | ... | ... | " " | 15th |

* The *Chronicle* should have inserted Sir Bevil Granville's name.

| | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-----|-----|-----|---------|------|
| Earl of Derby's | ... | ... | ... | now the | 16th |
| Sir Matthew Bridge's | ... | ... | " " | | 17th |
| Frederick Hamilton's | ... | ... | " " | | 18th |
| Brig.-Genl. Archd. Rowe's | ... | ... | " " | | 21st |
| Ingolsby's Welsh Fusileers | ... | ... | " " | | 23rd |
| Duke of Marlborough's | ... | ... | " " | | 24th |
| Colonel J. Ferguson's | ... | ... | " " | | 26th |
| Earl of Huntingdon's | ... | ... | " " | | 33rd |

Then came the rush necessitated by the false policy of disbandment. Fifteen regiments were raised in a hurry, some of the men in them being veterans who had served in the previous campaigns, and many raw recruits, who had to be licked into shape with all the speed that was possible.

The position of the British regiments reviewed by William at Breda was one of preparation for immediate hostilities, and the Tenth were brought up to their full complement, and clothed and provided, ready to march the moment war was declared between England and France. The Army, as sanctioned by Parliament, was practically ready at last, and William was preparing to join it in Flanders when death came. The nation had another Sovereign—Queen Anne—and the Army required another general.

The man on whom the choice fell was John, Earl of Marlborough, who, at the time, was in command of the battalions already in the Low Countries. Queen Anne at once made him "Captain-General of all the English Forces at home and in Holland, and in addition, Master-General of the Ordnance." When war was declared, and a Commander-in-Chief was to be appointed in place of the dead King, he was chosen by the members of the Coalition, but not until a very hot discussion had taken

place. The choice, as every soldier knows, was the most fortunate that could have been made. "Marlborough was always resourceful, always ready for the unexpected, quick to perceive and utilise his enemies' errors, careful of his men, but prepared to demand necessary sacrifices from them."*

1702. Throughout the war no regiment found that demand so extreme as the Tenth, and certainly no regiment responded more nobly. In the spring of 1702 they received orders to quit their garrison quarters and join the army of the German Emperor, to serve him as auxiliaries, and while they were at Rosandael the disquieting news came that William was dead. That was on the 8th of March. They were at once sent forward to Cleve, where Lord Athlone was in command of the Allied Army during the absence of Marlborough, who was detained. This force, which lay on the Meuse, numbered 25,000 men, Cleve, where Athlone had his head-quarters, being "in the centre of the crescent formed by Grave, Nimeguen, and Fort Schenk." He was watching, under the shelter of these three fortresses, the army of Bouffleurs, which was encamped some twenty miles to the south-east of him at Uden and Xanten.† The Tenth were at Cranenburg, placed in a position whence they could be called upon, if necessary, to take part in the siege of Keyserwerth.

Throughout these operations, the forces of which the Tenth formed a part were in a precarious position. The French army was within reach, and numbered 60,000 men. Bouffleurs, who was acting as adviser to the Duke of Burgundy, suddenly swept through the forest of Cleves, and came to Goch, which lay on one of the tributaries of the Maas. His idea was to get between Athlone's army and the fortresses of Nimeguen and Grave. Had Bouffleurs

*Cambridge Modern History.

† Fortescue.

been successful, Athlone must have surrendered, or had he fought, must have risked annihilation. His only course was a hasty retreat, and in great disorder he contrived to reach Nimeguen. News came to him just before sunset. By eight o'clock the next morning, just as Athlone reached the fortress with his army, he espied the gleaming arms of the pursuing and disappointed forces of France. This was on the 10th of June.

It was during this retreat, which Fortescue has called "almost discreditably precipitate," that the Tenth experienced the first real fighting of this campaign. Their post was one of honour, for they formed part of the rear-guard, and had to fight nearly every foot of the way, coming under the constant heavy fire of the French. They behaved with such signal gallantry in the great rear-guard fight, that their action called for especial notice. The conduct of those who played their part in the tremendous struggle saved Athlone, for the Tenth and their comrades, who were all Englishmen, held back Bouffleurs' forces until the Allied army got within the fortress, and averted disaster.

Athlone was superseded a few days later. The Allies were haggling at the Hague over the question of the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, but this sudden swoop of the French through the forest of Cleves hastened their decision, and Marlborough took the field. He moved on at once to Nimeguen, accompanied by "two Dutch deputies, civilians, whose duty it was to see that he did nothing imprudent." When he reached Nimeguen he had 60,000 men in his camp, 12,000 of them being British. Taking the numbers in detail, it transpires that Marlborough was inferior in almost every particular.* Finding

* The Allied Army, which Marlborough reviewed at Duckenbourg, was made up of 76 battalions, 120 squadrons and 60 guns. At Koch and Genappe the enemy had 80 battalions, 150 squadrons, and more than 100 guns and mortars.



No Monument of Brass or Stone
No Obelisk nor Shrine nor Tomb
Fictitious MARLBOROUGH, Needs
Venter Ruinment and Leige
Limburg Schellenberg, Hohenheim
Ramelles Audenard, Boucharin

Engraved by F. Cole



Scheld Hildesheim Bethune Denay
Mons. Ben. Huy. Lille. Tournay
Nell. Tillall. Eyes yet to Come.
Thou TOWN HE took those Batails Men
BRIANLAS. Bawm is. The Heroes Veng

that the French were six miles away from Grave, the General marched in that direction, hampered at every turn by the deputies, so that many valuable days were lost. He got across the Meuse, but the enemy did not advance to interrupt his passage. Indeed, the French decamped during the night.

This march of Marlborough was shared by the Tenth, who took their part in demolishing the walls around Peer during the night of August 9th. The army left the camp next morning, and pressed on after the retreating enemy, who seemed to have a wholesome dread of the English General. At last the armies were face to face, both continuing under arms the whole night through. To the chagrin of the British troops, when Marlborough meant to force on a fight, and made all preparations for an attack in the morning, it was found at daybreak that the French were gone in great disorder, so far, indeed, that only the rear-guard could be overtaken and broken up by the British cavalry. It was due to the interference of the Dutch deputies that Marlborough missed them. He had desired to fight before the night came on, for the French, famishing and worn out, were in his hands, but the deputies objected to his plans, and a splendid opportunity was lost.

The Tenth played their part in the pursuit, or, as some have chosen to put it, "the movements by which the French were driven from their menacing position near the confines of Holland." During these operations they were in Stanley's Brigade, with the 1st Royals, the 16th and 24th. Stanley's part was to cover the siege operations at Venloo, these being undertaken by the Prince of Nassau-Saarbruck. The place was stormed on the 21st of September, when the castle was carried, and the town capitulated four days later.

The Tenth, when Venloo fell, went forward with Stanley to Stevenswart, on the Maas, where the fire from the British batteries was so effective, and so continuously served, that the besieged, abandoning the counterscarp, and seeing the infantry prepared to mount the breach, "beat the chamade, and desired to capitulate." A few days later — October 6th — the Tenth and another battalion, accompanied by six squadrons, marched back to Roermond, which lay on the river between Stevenswart and Venloo, and, joined by a greater force, took part in the assault on the garrison, which numbered 2,000 men. The resistance was in vain, for the place was taken, with "thirty pieces of cannon, two mortars, and a great store of ammunition and provision of all sorts."

The closing event of the campaign, and in many senses the most important, was the capture of Liege. Marlborough says, in his despatch, that when his army appeared before the town, he found that the French garrison had put the suburb of St. Walburg to the flames and then retired—eight battalions into the citadel, and four into the Chartreuse. The chapter and magistracy desired to give up the town to Marlborough, and this was done, but the citadel had to be captured. The General lost no time in attacking the place, but the task was great, since the artillery had to be brought up the hill. With 50 battering pieces, besides 12 six-pounders, and 48 great mortars, with 200 lesser for double grenades in position, the assault began on the Friday morning.

"At each attack," says the despatch, "were 500 workmen, sustained by four battalions of foot, commanded at the English attack on the right by Lieut-General Somerfeldt, Major-General Ingolsby, and Brigadier Stanley." When a considerable breach had been made, the assault

followed. Stanley's part in the fight shows where the Tenth were engaged. "Though it was intended to make a lodgment, yet our men went on with so much courage, that being masters of the breach, they entered the citadel, and took it sword in hand, having, after the first fury, been very merciful to the enemy." When Marlborough next turned his attention to Chartreuse, the garrison, after the first volley, "hung out all their colours round their works, and desired to capitulate."

The mad policy of the Allies in restraining Marlborough by saddling him with the Dutch deputies, prevented him from annihilating Bouffleurs, who came unwittingly towards Liège, and got into a veritable trap. The deputies forbade the attack, and Bouffleurs contrived to get away. But apart from that, since Liège fell, and other places had been compelled to yield, the first campaign, "in spite of four great opportunities marred by the Dutch," ended brilliantly. There was never a policy so insane, yet the brilliant soldiery triumphed.

Fortescue tells a story of Marlborough's narrow escape. "At the close of operations the Earl, together with the Dutch deputies, had taken ship down the Meuse, with a guard of twenty-five men on board and an escort of fifty Horse on the bank. In the night the Horse lost their way, and the boat was surprised and overpowered by a French partisan with a following of marauders. The Dutch deputies produced French passes, but Marlborough had none, and was therefore a prisoner. Fortunately his servant slipped into his hand an old pass that had been made out for his brother, Charles Churchill. With perfect serenity Marlborough presented it as genuine, and was allowed to go on his way, the French contenting themselves with the capture of the guard and the plunder of the

vessel, and never dreaming of the prize they had let slip." Gill, the servant, was rewarded by Marlborough with an annual pension of £50.

The Commander-in-Chief, referring to the capture of Liège, did not fail to speak of the bravery of the Tenth and their British comrades who had played their part in the attack which brought about the fall of this important stronghold. The letter referred to ran as follows:—

"The post not being gone, I could not but open this letter to let you know that, by the extraordinary bravery of the officers and soldiers, the citadel has been carried by storm, and for the honour of her Majesty's subjects, the English were the first that got upon the breach."

The Tenth marched back to Breda, where it went into winter quarters.

CHAPTER IX.

EXASPERATING COLLEAGUES.

1703. THE Tenth entered on the campaign of 1703 with another Colonel, Sir Bevil Granville having been appointed Governor of Barbados at a salary of £2,000 a year. Men who knew Granville spoke of him as a man of "courage, candour, and generosity." He had won his way to the colonelcy, not because he was nephew of the Earl of Bath, in whose regiment he had served with distinction in Flanders and Ireland, but by reason of his capacity as a soldier. James the Second singled him out as a promising officer, and on May 22nd, 1686, knighted him at the head of the Tenth, in which he was a captain, on Hounslow Heath. When the Revolution of 1688 was accomplished, it was deemed necessary to disarm the Papists in Jersey, and secure the island, and Sir Bevil was sent over to do this. Later on he took his part in William's campaigns in Flanders, and it has already been shown how he behaved at Steenkirk with conspicuous bravery. His services as Colonel were worthy of the recognition they received, and it was felt that his acceptance of the Governorship in the West Indies was a distinct loss to the fighting strength of the Tenth.

The new Colonel, whose commission was dated January 15th, 1703, proved himself a soldier of conspicuous ability. He was William Lord North and Grey. The appointment must be looked upon as a remarkable one. Lord North and Grey was born in 1678, and was therefore not more than twenty-five years old when he was appointed to the

colonelcy of the Tenth. Only in the previous March had William signed his commission as captain of foot guards in the new levies. The Army List for 1702 shows his name among the captains of the First Regiment of Foot Guards, and the record of that famous regiment pointed to him as one of the most promising soldiers of the army.

The campaign of 1703 began early, Lord North and Grey marching with the Tenth at the end of April to Maeswyck.

Marking how the Allies' troops were scattered, and were nowhere in strong force, the French generals—Bouffleurs and Villeroy—determined to surprise the regiments in their various quarters, and were successful in some instances. Two English regiments, the 2nd Foot and Elst's Corps, which were at Tongres, found themselves unexpectedly surrounded by an overwhelming body of the enemy, whose presence in the neighbourhood was not suspected. Their gallant defence lasted for four and twenty hours, and they only surrendered to save themselves from annihilation.

The Tenth and others stood in danger of a similar fate to that which overtook the troops at Tongres, but word was brought in of the approach of a strong body of the enemy. Consequently those who were encamped at Maeswyck struck their tents in the evening, and reached Maestricht after a night's forced march. The delay before Tongres prevented the French from reducing the Allies piecemeal, as they designed. The enemy were, however, in such force that they marched on Maestricht, where the Tenth and other regiments were formed in order of battle, the location of the Tenth being at Lonakin. Realising the strength of Marlborough's army here, the French retired to Tongres again after some smart skirmishing.

On the 24th of May, Marlborough, who had been created a Duke during the winter, came to the camp near Maestricht,

and reviewed the horse and foot. All told, the force amounted to 130 squadrons and 59 battalions, which, says the Bulletin, "his Grace found generally complete, and in very good condition." It was Marlborough's design, now that he had captured Bonn, to drive the French out of Flanders. He made a sudden advance on Tongres, but the enemy on his approach struck their tents and retired, after lying under arms during the night towards Borcworm (Warhem). The advance of Marlborough was so persistent that the French fell back "with great precipitation, leaving two battalions at Tongres to blow up the gates and works they had no time to demolish." This, according to Marlborough's despatch, they did as soon as the Allies appeared in sight. But in spite of all the Duke's endeavours, he could not bring on a general engagement.

The Tenth, in this march on Tongres, were brigaded with the 16th, 21st, and 26th regiments, and the 2nd battalion of the Royals, the Brigadier-General being the Earl of Derby. Owing to the contrariness of the Allies—which may very well be interpreted as jealousy—Marlborough was repeatedly frustrated in his schemes, so that this brigade, like too many others under the Duke's command, was occupied almost exclusively during the summer with minor engagements and fruitless marches.

Eventually Marlborough determined to abandon his idea of sweeping down successively on Ostend and Antwerp, and turned his attention to Huy, on the Meuse. Among the regiments selected for this work were the Tenth, who took an active and gallant part in an avowedly difficult enterprise. On hearing of the advance of the Allies, the French garrison broke down the bridge between the two separate parts of the town, and retired into the castle and forts, resolute to make a desperate resistance.

Among the instructions given by Marlborough at the time we find one thus addressed to one of the commanding officers :—

Au Camp de Val Notre Dame,
ce 20 Août, 1703.

Monsieur,

My Lord North m'ayant mandé qu'il ne saurait avec son régiment seul fournir à toutes les gardes nécessaires dans la ville de l'autre côté sans trop fatiguer ses gens, je vous écris celle-ci pour vous prier de faire passer aujourd'hui votre bataillon par bateaux ou par le pont de la Taverne, comme vous jugerez le plus à propos, pour le joindre, laissant seulement dans la ville en deçà un détachement de cent hommes avec des officiers en proportion.

Je suis, &c.

M.

This letter concerning the reinforcement of Lord North and Grey by another battalion, was, of course, an order to support the Tenth, who had been set a task of considerable danger and difficulty. The regiment, two days before, had taken possession of that part of the town which the French had vacated, but they were exposed to a continuous fire of cannon and mortars, which fortunately were not very effectually served; here the Tenth and the reinforcing battalion remained when Marlborough began an assault on a large scale. The capitulation was somewhat unexpected, since there were ammunition and supplies in abundance, but the commander of the garrison explained that his men refused to fight, and compelled him to take this course.

Before September was out, the whole of the Spanish Guelderland was in Marlborough's hands, Limburg, which had been laid siege to, surrendering when the Tenth, in con-

junction with other regiments, stormed the place. This was on the 27th of September. The siege had lasted from the 10th to the 27th, the garrison of the town and castle being even stronger than at Huy. This brought the campaign, which had been disastrous to the French, to an end. Marlborough, in spite of the hindrances put in his way, freed the Netherlands from the fear of invasion, and succeeded in his endeavour to drive the enemy across the frontier. For the Tenth the campaign had been hard but successful. Placed again and again in positions of danger, they did all that Marlborough demanded, and in a manner which built up his confidence. The young and gallant Colonel of the regiment, moreover, had amply justified his promotion at so early an age. The British regiments—the Tenth among them—marched back to Holland for the purpose of going into winter quarters, proceeding thither by way of Peer and Orschot.

The Duke of Marlborough was discontented throughout the campaign of 1703. The misfortune was that while the Commander-in-Chief achieved victory whenever he confronted the enemy, the French so often dealt out defeat to the other armies of the Allies. Circumstances, moreover, confined Marlborough to a campaign of sieges, much to his dissatisfaction, for “he conceived that to bring his enemy to action and beat him was worth the capture of twenty petty fortresses.” By the time the troops went into winter quarters he was so disgusted that he made up his mind to throw up his command. He went so far as to return to England, where, however, her Majesty and her Ministers persuaded him to resume. He thereupon spent his time in planning out a great campaign for 1704, the aim he had in view being “to commit the Low Countries to the protection of the Dutch, and leaving the old seat of war, with

all its armies and fortresses in the rear, to carry the campaign into the heart of Germany." When Marlborough laid his plans before Prince Eugene, that fine general concurred, and the two began their preparations, being careful, however, not to reveal their scheme.

The coming campaign was to add to the fame of the Tenth.

CHAPTER X.

A FAMOUS CAMPAIGN: SCHELLENBERG AND BLENHEIM.

1704. THE third campaign—1704—destined to be one of the most famous in history, began by the withdrawal of the Dutch from Flanders to Coblenz. They were not taken into confidence, and probably it was in Marlborough's mind to treat them as a negligible quantity, since they were a positive menace to him with their exasperating policy of procrastination.

Orders came to the Tenth to come out of winter quarters, march to the Rhine, and proceed to Bedburg. The regiment required recruits, like many another in the Netherlands, to make up for the wear and tear of the preceding campaign, but the Colonel had to be content with only a few. They had been secured in a strange way. "The Captain Plumes and Serjeant Kites, with their drums, and ribbons, and strong ale, were unable to fill the ranks of the Army with the 'youth of England, all on fire.'" As we have already seen, the soldier's lot was too uninviting under existing conditions, so that it was suggested to have recourse to something similar to the "Press Gang," which provided the Navy with able seamen. Ministers proposed a bill in 1704, for "a forced levy from every parish," but Parliament would not hear of it. What was agreed to eventually was, a Statute for raising recruits by empowering justices of the peace and mayors or other head officers of boroughs, "to raise and levy such able-bodied men as have not any lawful calling or employment, or visible means for their maintenance and livelihood, to

serve as soldiers." The constables were stimulated by the payment of ten shillings for every man they brought to the justices, who passed them on in scores to fill the depleted ranks.* The Tenth were thus brought up to full numbers; but concerning these "tattered prodigals," it is said, "if such recruits were ready for plunder, they were also ready to fight," and the story of the old Tenth shows that the regiment fought as finely as before "in this splendid enterprise, which elevated the reputation of the British arms, and immortalised the name of Marlborough for the conception of the movement, and the secrecy and rapidity with which it was executed."†

At Bedburg the infantry strength—before the start was made—amounted to 51 battalions. Fortescue puts down the number at 16,000 men, and says that "not a man of them knew whither he was bound, for it was only within the last fortnight that the Duke had so much as hinted his destination even to the Emperor or to Prince Louis of Baden."

The Tenth began their march on the first Monday in May, under the command of General Churchill, towards Ruermonde, where they were to cross the Meuse by a bridge which the Duke ordered to be thrown across the river. On the 10th of May the troops were all there, and his Grace reviewed the two lines of his army.

While Marlborough was marching to Coblenz, word came that Villeroy, with 36 battalions and 55 squadrons, had crossed the Meuse, and was marching in haste towards the Moselle. The ground to be covered by the Tenth and the other infantry battalions, as well as the artillery, proving difficult and mountainous, there was a necessity for easy marches when the enemy left Coblenz. The despatches show that Marlborough advanced with untold labour, for

* See Knight's History of England.

† Cannon.

so terrible were the roads, and so difficult the mountain paths, that "the ascent of a single hill. . . . often cost the artillery a whole day's work." Fortescue, who sets forth the Duke's movements in detail, points to one fine precedent established by the great English general which had never been known in German campaigns, namely, his insistence on his men paying for everything they took, and supplying them with money so that they might be able to do so. The idea amazed all who heard of it.

After this terrible march through the hilly country of Würtemberg, Marlborough joined his forces to those of Prince Louis of Baden. At Schellenberg, on the 2nd of July, he found the Bavarians occupying an entrenched camp on "a bell-shaped hill, some two miles in circumference at the base, and with a flat top about half a mile wide." This camp stood between the Allies and the town of Donauwörth. The difficulties were apparently insuperable, but there was no time to be lost, since it was known that Villeroy and Tallard had despatched troops to reinforce the Bavarians, and stop the advance of Marlborough's army.

The main body of the Allies was far behind, but the Duke, knowing that to wait would be fatal, decided upon an advance with what troops he had about him. The Tenth were among the five British battalions, and waited for orders to support the Foot Guards, Royals, and 23rd, who advanced under cover of a heavy cannonade. The advance was terrible in its consequences to these, for as they mounted the hill they were met with a murderous fire of musketry and grape, and out of fifty grenadiers all were killed save ten.

The assault was continued in spite of the slaughter. "The English Guards, though they had suffered terribly,

stood immovable as rocks, the Royal Scots and the Welshmen of the Twenty-third stood by them." It seemed at one time that the infantry must retreat before the fierce charges of the enemy down the hill, but the British regiments drove them back.

It was then that the Tenth, joined by other battalions, advanced, only to meet with like fearful experiences, which tested their courage and determination. They had to march up a hill which was strewn with the dead and the dying, but on they went, dauntless as those brave soldiers who had gone before. "Arriving within range of the enemy's fire, an iron tempest smote the ranks, and the firm order of the regiment was shaken." Men were falling on all sides, and as for the Guards, most of the officers were at this time either killed or wounded.

It seemed impossible to carry the hill. "The enemy's shot came so thick as was by no means to be withstood, insomuch that some of our men began to double," says Dr. Hare. Then came the final charge. The cavalry coming to the support of the infantry, and the Germans assailing the enemy in the rear, the place was carried.

The loss on both sides was fearful, for the enemy, although they fought behind entrenchments, suffered heavily. They lost immensely in the flight which followed, and Marlborough, writing on the following day to Mr. Secretary Harley, says: "According to the report of the prisoners, we are informed that there were sixteen battalions of Bavarians, five of French, and, as some say, nine, others fifteen, squadrons, all of their best troops on the Schellenberg, most of which have been killed, drowned, or made prisoners, and it is evident that the Elector must have received a very great blow to oblige him to retire into his own country, and quit a place of so great consequence

to him and so necessary to carry on our designs, besides that it puts him under greater difficulties of receiving the succours promised him from the Rhine, which he seemed so much to depend upon."

The losses of the Tenth, considering how hot the fire which they faced so fearlessly was, was surprisingly small. Fifteen of the rank and file lay dead when the fight was ended, and Captain Croye was also among the slain, while thirty-six of the men and three serjeants were wounded, more or less seriously.

Marlborough now crossed the Danube and isolated the Elector's army, cutting off all his supplies. So perilous was his position that he began to treat with the Duke; when news came, however, that the French army of 35,000 men, under Count Tallard, was moving on rapidly, he broke off negotiations, thinking to hold out until he was reinforced. In order to bring him to terms, Marlborough ravaged the country as far as Munich, the Tenth being actively employed in these operations. Strange to say, Marlborough had so veiled his movements that Marshal Villeroy had no positive idea as to where he was. He seemed to have vanished, and nothing certain was known of his whereabouts until the unwelcome news reached Villeroy of the disastrous defeat of the Elector at Schellenberg. He had so confused the enemy that the French commanders had not ventured to concentrate their armies, but kept them apart as isolated units, not knowing where the great English general might suddenly appear—a matter which speaks ill for the French Intelligence Department.

The news of the defeat brought Marshal Tallard across the Rhine. Had Marlborough's colleagues—Prince Eugene excepted—been more capable, the French army would not have had a clear and undisputed passage through

the Black Forest; but it was the English general's ill-fortune to be repeatedly hampered by jealous or incapable allies, who put their own interpretation on the Commander-in-Chief's explicit instructions. It was well that he had such a colleague as Prince Eugene of Savoy to co-operate with him, and that he was dependable, and eager to follow up the daring scheme that had been determined on. Consequently, on the 11th of August, the Prince's army and Marlborough's met on the Kessel, near Hochstadt, and not far from Donauwörth.

The Tenth formed part of the force which passed the Danube in the night, under Churchill, in order to reinforce Eugene, this strong body amounting to 3,000 cavalry and twenty battalions of foot. The main army followed later. Row commanded the brigade of British troops in this advance, and on reaching Munster, found his soldiers so exhausted that he was forced to rest them. The following day the enemy's Hussars swept down on the picquets, and the Tenth, called on for this duty, advanced rapidly to their support, and drove off the attacking horse with considerable loss.

The distance which separated the Allies from the French Army, which had now joined the Elector, was not great. Marlborough was on the Kessel, and the enemy encamped on ground lying between Lutzingen and Blenheim. Nothing separated the Armies but a strip of country through which a narrow stream called the Nebel flowed. When Marlborough and Eugene reconnoitred they estimated, and rightly, that Tallard, who now assumed the command, had 60,000 men at his disposal, and Artillery to the number of 61 pieces. The enemy, therefore, were superior numerically, since the Allies possessed not more than 56,000 men and 52 guns. In every way Marlborough was at a dis-

advantage. Villeroy was not so far away but he might by forced marches join Tallard, and threaten the Allies in overwhelming numbers. Marlborough did not disregard this, especially when he considered the character of his own troops, and compared them with those under Tallard's command. Green says of the Allied Army, that in it "the whole of the Teutonic race was represented in the strange medley of Englishmen, Dutchmen, Hanoverians, Danes, Würtembergers, and Austrians." Again and again the Allies had failed Marlborough, and he realised that if the odds increased they were not to be relied on, whereas Tallard had 45,000 French veterans, to say nothing of the Bavarians, who were some of the best fighting men in Europe. The fight at Schellenberg had given proof of their quality.

Tallard was not likely to attack, being anxious to put off the battle until Villeroy could come up. The burden of attack therefore lay with Marlborough, who saw the splendid entrenchments which Tallard had made, and marked the strength afforded to the enemy by a number of villages which dotted the plain.

A Council of War was called, but the majority were against the General's proposal to attack at once. Marlborough's reply was: "I know the danger, yet a battle is absolutely necessary; and I rely on the bravery and discipline of the troops, which will make amends for our disadvantages." It would seem that the men were more ready to take the risks than those who represented them at the Council of War, for the greatest enthusiasm was displayed when it was known in camp that the attack was decided on.

Marlborough had thrown bridges over the Kessel, and his men were marching across at two o'clock in the morning of the 13th of August. His army was in eight columns, and "for this day the stereotyped formation was to be reversed ;

the cavalry was to form the centre, and the infantry the wings." The plan of battle shows that Prince Eugene was on the right, facing the Elector. Marsin had command of the French centre. Marlborough himself commanded the Allies' left, and faced Tallard, who had Blenheim on his extreme right. This village was strongly garrisoned, for there were not only twelve squadrons of French cavalry stationed there, but no less than twenty-six battalions of the enemy's infantry—an astounding display of bad generalship, since the massing of so large a body of foot in such a place was absolutely useless. Tallard also made a mistake in leaving his centre comparatively weak, thinking that Marsin would not be seriously assailed, because of the swampy nature of the valley.

Marlborough had taken advantage of the fog, and was so close on Tallard when it lifted, that the French Marshal was completely surprised. He knew that the Allies were moving, but thought that they were on the way towards Nördlingen, and so assured was he of this that his cavalry was actually not on the field, but dispersed for foraging. His consternation was great when he found Marlborough within striking distance, and his dispositions had to be made in haste. "All was hurry and confusion in the French camp. Staff officers flew off in all directions with orders, signal guns brought the foragers galloping back, drums beat the assembly from end to end of the line, and the troops fell in hastily before their tents."*

An unexpected check came which enabled Tallard to make his dispositions more carefully, and to strengthen Blenheim. Marlborough had counted on a combined advance, but when the mist had cleared Eugene was not in the position assigned to him. The ground over which

* Fortescue.

he had to pass was of such a difficult character, what with wood and ravine, that it took the Prince several hours, and Marlborough had to curb his impatience and wait until half-past twelve.

Then the battle began, Cutts, with a strong infantry brigade, advancing to attack Blenheim, where he was to meet "the finest troops of France." Marlborough's main body marched down to the valley of the Nebel, and crossed the stream, but while his men were doing so, he saw that Cutts, in spite of the valour of his men, was not able to carry the place. The soldiers dropped by scores, and he had to fall back to escape annihilation.

It was here that the Tenth were fighting. Cutts, wishing to re-form his broken lines, retired to a spot where he was still exposed to a storm of grape. But at his call his men went forward with a cheer. Brigadier Row had in his brigade the Tenth, the 1st Guards, the 21st, the 23rd, and the 24th, and with these British soldiers under his command, he advanced to Blenheim. Under their Colonel, Lord North and Grey, the Tenth went on in spite of the fact that they were received "at thirty paces distance by a deadly fire from the French; but Row's orders were, that until he struck the palisades not a shot must be fired, and that the village must be carried with the steel." The Brigadier's instructions were obeyed to the letter, although a man fell at every stride. A more murderous fire than that which greeted the men of the Tenth and their comrades could scarcely be, but at last the palisades were reached, and Row struck his sword into them. It was the signal for which the brave soldiers had waited through such terrible minutes. They had gone forward almost in silence, but now with a shout they poured in their volley, and rushing forward, strove to remove the fence. The bravest men might quail

at such a moment, exposed as they were to so deadly a fire. The men were at "the very muzzles of the enemy's muskets, and some of the officers exchanged thrusts of swords with the French through the palisades."* To advance was impossible. Row was killed at the palisade, and many another man as brave. There was no alternative but to withdraw, and when for a brief space the broken lines halted just outside the range of the enemy, more than a third of the brigade had gone; dead and dying men lay in that awful space which came between.

No time was given them for breathing or to re-form the broken lines. The French cavalry swept round on their flank, thinking to annihilate them, but the Hessians, who were in reserve, poured in such a fire that after the first volley many a French saddle was empty. A further volley compelled the cavalry to halt, and then retreat in confusion.

Again Cutts ordered an attack on Blenheim, and the Brigade responded. But it was in vain. So terribly did the Tenth and other regiments suffer, that when Marlborough saw what was going on at that point, he sent word to Cutts to take his men into a more sheltered position. They had done enough for valour's sake, and he knew that with the force at Cutts' disposal, the column could not carry Blenheim, since the enemy at that point was in such overwhelming force.

It was plain that with the present disposition of his Army Marlborough could not hope to capture the village. He therefore crossed the Nebel, where, however, he found himself in marshy ground, which was swept by French Artillery. He secured his footing there after some fierce fighting, and was able to turn his attention to the centre,

* Bowyers: "Annals of Queen Anne."

where the Hanoverians were being driven back with slaughter by the Irish Brigade in Tallard's army. The onslaught of the Irish was so fierce and irresistible that not only were two battalions of infantry cut to pieces, but Marlborough's line was broken up in the centre, and Eugene was in danger of being isolated. Marlborough went forward with the British cavalry, and the Irish Brigade was assailed with such spirit that it beat a confused retreat, losing fearfully in the onslaught.

The lines were thus restored, and Marlborough was able to discover how Eugene was faring. There, on the extreme right, the fighting was of the most bloody character. Three times the Elector's troops drove Eugene back, but as often the gallant Prince returned, and eventually more than regained his lost ground.

It was now late afternoon, and it was difficult to say on which side the advantage lay. One thing was certain—that Marlborough was advancing, and when five o'clock came his lines were unbroken. Tallard had not been able to advance on the Blenheim side where the Tenth and other regiments, fighting splendidly, and refusing to give way, held the French battalions in check. Their valour and their dauntless resolution to gain ground rather than lose it, enabled Marlborough to make the advance he hoped for. So finely had the Allies fought, that not only was there a great unbroken line, ranging from Blenheim on the extreme left, where the Tenth were, to Eugene's farthest right, and all the reserves intact, but Marlborough had two lines of cavalry "in most perfect order," waiting the General's command.

The infantry were behind to keep in check any of the French who might sweep down from Blenheim, and thus Marlborough's cavalry were free to move. But they were

led—8,000 of them—to meet 10,000 strong, and over ground where the enemy's artillery was keeping up a fierce fire. Saddles emptied quickly, and for a while it seemed as though the charge would fail; but on they went, knowing how victory hung in the balance. Defeat meant disaster for Marlborough's army; success for him meant ruin for the battalions of France. The one recoil was but the precursor of a charge so determined that when the French cavalry saw Marlborough coming on with his horse, they only waited to fire their carbines, then turned and fled, not even thinking to fight while doing so. On came Marlborough's horse, "like an avalanche," cutting down and slaying flying horsemen by hundreds, and trampling through the lines of infantry that had been drawn up to support the French cavalry if required.

The consequence of that onslaught on the French centre, led in person by the Allies' General, was the breaking up of the whole of the enemy's line. The retreating column was followed to the banks of the Danube, into which hundreds of panic-stricken soldiers flung themselves, and such as were on the banks, huddled together in absolute confusion, threw down their arms and became prisoners of war. The centre broken thus, the Tenth and their comrades, still holding the enemy in Blenheim, made an irresistible rush on the place, heedless of the awful fire from behind the palisades where Row and his dead comrades lay. Lord North and Grey, with his right hand shot off, took his place at the head of his men, and hurled himself on the entrenchments. The fighting for a time was terrible, and when news came that Marlborough in the centre had overwhelmed Marsin and Tallard, and that Eugene had cleared the Bavarians out of his path, the enemy in Blenheim sought to retreat. It was too late. The Tenth and their comrades enveloped

them, and there was no alternative but surrender. "Thrice," says Cannon, "they endeavoured to escape, but were forced back. They took shelter behind the houses and enclosures; but they were soon surrounded, and twelve squadrons of cavalry, with twenty-four battalions of infantry, surrendered prisoners of war."

No regiment in that glorious fight acquitted itself more nobly than the gallant Tenth, and its losses were heavy during so many long hours of fearful fighting. The regiment remained on the field during the night which followed the battle, amid the heaps of slain, to guard against surprise. When the roll was called the tale of the dead and wounded was a serious one. The casualties among the officers will be found in the extract from the Blenheim Bounty Roll given in the next chapter. The number of non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the regiment, killed and wounded, has not been ascertained.

Marlborough's own account of the battle tells how complete was the disaster to the French Army. He wrote to the Queen as follows:—

It was one of the clock before the battle began. It lasted with great vigour till sunset, when the enemy were obliged to retire, and by the blessing of God we obtained a complete victory. We have cut off great numbers of them, as well in the action as in the retreat, besides upwards of thirty squadrons of the French which I pushed into the Danube, where we saw the greatest part of them perish. Monsieur de Tallard, with several of his general officers, being taken prisoners at the same time; and in the village of Blenheim, which the enemy had entrenched and fortified, and where they made the greatest opposition I obliged twenty-six entire battalions and twelve Squadrons of Dragoons to surrender themselves prisoners

at discretion. We took likewise all their tents standing, with their cannon and ammunition, as also a great number of standards, kettle drums, and colours in the action, so that I reckon the greater part of Mons. de Tallard's Army is taken or destroyed. The bravery of all our troops on this occasion cannot be expressed, the Generals, as well as the officers and soldiers, behaving themselves with the greatest courage and resolution. The Horse and Dragoons were obliged to charge four or five times.

The sweeping character of the victory is realised by consideration of the fact that besides M. de Tallard, thirteen generals and *marechaux de corps*, ten colonels, and several others, all of whom bore the title of marquis, were among the prisoners. The roll of the dead was a long one. The losses of the French and their allies in killed, wounded, and prisoners, on the day of battle and during the subsequent pursuit, fell little short of forty thousand men. Marlborough and Eugene divided 11,000 prisoners, while the trophies included 100 guns of various calibre, 24 mortars, 129 colours, 171 standards, and other less important items, together with the whole of the French camp. Fortescue gives these numbers, and adds some words as to the horrors of the pursuit, which was entrusted by Marlborough to the Hussars. They "hung restlessly round (the Elector's) skirts, cutting off every straggler, and bringing back multitudes of deserters." The same writer also says of the retreat through the Black Forest, that there was not a village on the line of march that had not its churchyard choked with the graves of those that had succumbed.

Creasy assigns the Battle of Blenheim a place in the Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, and the consequences of the encounter warrant the importance that is given to it. "Bavaria submitted to the Emperor, and the

Hungarians laid down their arms. Germany was completely delivered from France; and the military ascendancy of the arms of the Allies was completely established." A limit had been set once for all to the supremacy of France on the Continent, and for the remainder of the war Louis the Fourteenth could only fight on the defensive.* "Blenheim had dissipated for ever his once proud visions of almost universal conquest."

The night which followed the battle gave little rest to the worn-out men of the Tenth. In spite of their weariness they had some arduous duty set for them. There were thousands of prisoners to guard, countless trophies to take care of, the human vultures to drive off the field where the dead were lying, and the wounded to care for. But they and their comrades who had fought the long day through with splendid emulation took up the duty cheerfully, proud to have played their part in "'one of the most glorious' battles in the military annals of England."

The prisoners were so many that five British battalions were chosen to guard them while they marched to Holland, and the Tenth formed part of the escort. In a letter to Mr. Secretary Harley, dated from the "Camp at Weissenberg, 12th September, 1704," Marlborough wrote:—

"I have sent Brigadier Ferguson with five of our weakest battalions through the late actions, viz., one of the royal regiment, General Churchill's, the Lord North and Grey's, Brigadier Row's, and Brigadier Meredyth's, to Mayence, to embark with the French prisoners in order to conduct them to Holland, and have ordered that, as soon as the regiments come to garrison, a complete number of officers be immediately sent over for recruits.

"I am, with great truth, Sir,

"Yours, etc.,

"M——."

* Ranke.

The army of prisoners first went to Mayence, and from thence were taken by ship down the Rhine to The Hague. By the time this duty was completed it was too late for the shattered Tenth to return to Marlborough, and in accordance with the General's instructions they went into winter quarters, waiting for recruits to fill the gaps in their ranks.

ADDENDUM TO CHAPTER X.

THE BLENHEIM BOUNTY LIST.

A BOARD was formed consisting of the Duke of Marlborough and the General Officers who served under him in Germany during the memorable campaign of 1704. This Board had to determine the scale of Blood-money due to all the British soldiers and officers in the Queen's pay, who shared in the victories of Schellenberg (2nd July), and Blenheim (13th August), which thereby entitled them to participate in the bounty money Queen Anne bestowed on her victorious troops in March, 1705. The royal bounty included grants to the widows of officers and soldiers killed during the campaign of 1704, or who died from their wounds prior to the preparation of the bounty lists.

In this division of money the payments ranged from £1 for every private and drummer, to £600 allotted to the Duke of Marlborough. The Duke, however, surrendered his money to increase the Bounty Fund. Wounded officers received double the amount granted to those who escaped unhurt; and all Staff Officers whose regiments took part in the campaign were entitled to two shares.

Dalton, from whose work—"The Blenheim Roll"—this statement is taken, explains the reason for the association of the two battles, when the apportionment was considered. "It must be remembered that the same regiments which fought at Schellenberg took part in the battle of Blenheim, and that the completeness of the latter victory was due, to some extent, to the severe defeat of

the French and Bavarians in the former sanguinary contest."

One cannot speak too highly of those veterans who broke the spell which had hitherto held France to be invincible. Dalton reminds us that many of the officers had served nearly a score of years in the British Army, and had earned fame and distinction on several hard-fought battlefields. He goes on to say: "There were grey-haired subalterns at Blenheim who had received commissions from the ranks for former acts of gallantry. As drill-instructors these veterans were invaluable, and their presence did much to steady the ranks at Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet." The Tenth had its full quota of these veterans, and hence the regiment did its share towards winning "the famous victory."

Take the record of the Tenth and note the bounty due to each. The officers were as follows:—

| | | | | | | £ | s. | d. |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|--------------------|-----|-----|---|----|----|
| Col. William Lord North and Grey | | | | | | | | |
| (wounded) | ... | ... | ... | ... | 144 | 0 | 0 | |
| Lieut.-Col. Henry Grove | ... | ... | ... | ... | 51 | 0 | 0 | |
| Major John Granville (wounded) | ... | ... | ... | ... | 90 | 0 | 0 | |
| Captains | John Ligonier | ... | ... | ... | 30 | 0 | 0 | |
| | George Green | ... | ... | ... | 30 | 0 | 0 | |
| | Alex. Spottiswood (wounded) | ... | ... | ... | 60 | 0 | 0 | |
| | Sir John Sandys | } | These were killed. | | | | | |
| | George Cavendish | | | | | | | |
| | Thomas Burton | | | | | | | |
| | Warner Dawes | | | | | | | |
| | Charles Astley | | | | | | | |
| | John Cunningham | | | | | | | |
| | Peter Croye | | | | | | | |
| Capt.-Lieut. William Middleton | ... | ... | ... | 14 | 0 | 0 | | |

| | | | £ | s. | d. |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|----|----|----|
| Lieutenants | Thomas Preston | ... | 14 | 0 | 0 |
| | Giles Stephens | ... | 14 | 0 | 0 |
| | Henry Poilblanc (wounded) | | 28 | 0 | 0 |
| | Samuel Buller (wounded) | ... | 28 | 0 | 0 |
| | James Southerland (wounded) | | 28 | 0 | 0 |
| | Granville Raleigh (wounded) | | 28 | 0 | 0 |
| | — Gay | ... | 14 | 0 | 0 |
| | Charles Legge | ... | 14 | 0 | 0 |
| | John Weekes | } Killed. | | | |
| | Arthur Hornby | | | | |
| Jeremy Freere | | | | | |
| | Gideon Ribier | ... | 14 | 0 | 0 |
| Ensigns | William Lane | ... | 11 | 0 | 0 |
| | John Rossington | ... | 11 | 0 | 0 |
| | Constantine Burton | ... | 11 | 0 | 0 |
| | William Daniel | ... | 11 | 0 | 0 |
| | John Hellows | ... | 11 | 0 | 0 |
| | James Scott | ... | 11 | 0 | 0 |
| | Daniel Croye (wounded) | ... | 22 | 0 | 0 |
| | Robt. Rossington (wounded) | | 22 | 0 | 0 |
| | Walter Breams | } Killed. | | | |
| Thomas Dawson | | | | | |
| Chaplain—Smith | | | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| Adjutant Samuel Buller (wounded) | | | 24 | 0 | 0 |
| Qr.-Master Thomas Preston | | | 14 | 0 | 0 |
| Surgeon David Debize | | | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| Surgeon's Mate John White | | | 7 | 10 | 0 |

The non-commissioned officers and men who received bounty money were :—

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----|-----|------|---|----|---|
| 30 serjeants | ... | ... | each | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 24 corporals | ... | ... | " | 1 | 10 | 0 |
| 476 privates and drummers | ... | ... | " | 1 | 0 | 0 |

Three serjeants and 36 privates were wounded at Schellenberg, and 13 privates killed.

One of the officers named in the foregoing list had a remarkable career — Captain John Ligonier. He afterwards became the celebrated Sir John Ligonier, K.B., Field Marshal and Commander-in-Chief, who was created an Irish Viscount in 1757, and then advanced to an English Earldom in 1766. He was wounded in 22 places at Malplaquet, and yet went unscathed through Blenheim and Schellenberg, and the other engagements of Marlborough's campaigns. "At Laffeld he preserved the Allied army from destruction and enabled it to withdraw in good order by charging the whole line of French cavalry at the head of the British Dragoons, in which charge his horse was killed, and he himself taken prisoner." The Tenth had reason to be proud of this officer.

CHAPTER XI.

A FRUITLESS CAMPAIGN—1705.

1705. UP to this point the record of the regiment had covered twenty years, and gave the Tenth a place and name for valour second to none in the British Army. They had played their part in the fiercest fighting throughout the Continental campaigns of William the Third, and the greatest victories of Marlborough were fought on fields where officers and men of the Tenth had alike won the admiration of their commanders.

When they once more marched to the seat of war, their depleted companies strengthened by fine recruits, there was a determination in the ranks to maintain the fame already won. The call from winter quarters was hailed with enthusiasm, and, as Cannon remarks, when, in May, 1705, the regiment took the field, "its appearance was much admired." By the 13th of May all the British troops were in the neighbourhood of Maestricht, in readiness for review by Marlborough. On the 14th the Tenth and other British regiments, brought up to full strength by the readiness with which recruits had been obtained from home, were reviewed. The winter drills and their fresh equipments resulted in so fine a body of men passing the great soldier's eye, that it was said by one: "I never knew the Duke of Marlborough . . . so full of hopes as in the beginning of this campaign." The soldiers from his own country were all that he desired; but when he came to look on the Allies' troops he was displeased. Writing to Lord Godolphin, he said: "The enclosed from Prince Louis of Baden I received

by Estafette yesterday ; I send it that you may see what a miserable thing a German army is ! ” He was disappointed in every way. The Allies could not appreciate the great and daring schemes suggested by the General and Prince Eugene, and made proposals which would once more have given Louis XIV. the mastery in Europe. When it was time to take the field, the Allies’ troops were not ready ; their regiments were incomplete, and ill-equipped in almost every particular.

None the less the Duke and the Prince pressed on, and the Tenth marched to Juliers, to join the other British regiments. The stay in camp at this place was but a brief one, and once more the men were on the move, the ancient city of Treves being their destination. It was a hard march, thus described by one who accompanied the troops : “ After we had quitted Juliers, you never saw so wretched a country. The soil barren, mountainous, fruitful in nothing but iron, and the air strangely cold, as if it had been in the midst of winter. The towns have all the marks of poverty that French oppression or government can give ; and to make the little accommodation an army could meet with in so wretched a country still less, there was not a soul to be seen in the villages, the peasants flying as we came, either into places of defence or to the woods, and conveying what they could of the little they had, along with them, which left us in want of everything. In short, all together made both officers and soldiers pass their time ill enough. I will only add that the Scots think an army in their highlands could shift better.”

But the great and dazzling success of the previous campaign made the men of the Tenth anticipate future victories, and caused them largely to ignore the discomforts of such a march. So far as great battles were concerned,



1685.



1742.



1751.

REGIMENTAL UNIFORMS.

they were to be disappointed. They came to Treves, where Marlborough was able to mark the quality of the troops at his disposal. He was annoyed to find that the Prince of Baden had brought up not more than a dozen battalions and 28 squadrons, while the Prussians could not arrive until the 10th of June. This meant the loss of so much time, since he was not in sufficiently strong force to move. Yet Marlborough said, when referring to the British soldiers on whom he relied so greatly, "Our men are in great heart, so that with the blessing of God we may expect good success." But all through the campaign the circumstances—it would be more just to say the Allies—were exasperating, while "the preparations of the enemy were as mature and prompt as those of the Allies were tardy and imperfect." They apparently imagined that Louis XIV. would be too disheartened by the blow at Blenheim, whereas, when Madame de Maintenon was bold enough to tell him of the disaster, which others feared to do, he made unusual efforts to repair it. All told, Marlborough found himself in every way weaker than the enemy.

News came when Marlborough was at Treves that Villars had a large army at Sirk, "a strong defensive position for covering the broken country between the Moselle and the Saar." Thereupon, at two o'clock in the morning, without beat of drum, the English and Dutch troops crossed the Moselle, and then the Saar, after which the army traversed the difficult defile of Tavernan. This was on the 4th of June, and the French were so taken by surprise that they retired from Elft, near to Sirk, and encamped at Rhetel. Marlborough was disappointed that the enemy, vastly superior in numbers, did not accept the offer of battle. Nothing that he did would bring him to an engagement.

It was now deemed necessary to march back to the Netherlands with all possible speed, since great alarm was felt there at the news of the progress of the French along the Maese. The march was of the most trying nature, as may be judged from extracts taken from the journal of "that worthy old Puritan, Major Blackader, of the Cameronians":—

"June 5th: Getting account this day that we are to march back again the same way as we came up.

"June 21st: Crossing the Meuse. This day hath been a fatiguing long march, continuing from three in the morning till eleven at night. A great many of the army fell by with weariness, and some died, it being a scorching hot day.

"July 16th: When I came home I found that the whole army had orders to march immediately. We guessed it was to attack the French lines; accordingly we marched at nine o'clock, and marched all night.

"July 17th: We attacked the French lines this morning, and got in much easier and cheaper than we expected. The lines were partly forced and partly surprised, for the French had a part of their army there, but not sufficient to make head against us, not knowing that we were to attack them at that place, for there was made a feint against them in another place, which made them draw their forces that way. Our Horse had some action with them, and beat them wherever they encountered them. Our Foot had nothing to do, for the enemy fled before they came up.

"July 19th: Resting this day over against the enemy. The town (Louvain) between us is firing upon us, and them, it appears we are masters of them, and could beat them as easy as a mastiff worries a cur dog; but at the

same time, I observe that we are, as it were, chained down and cannot get them soundly beat. It is currently believed here, both at the time and now, it is the States and their generals that hinder us to fight and improve our advantages as we might.

"August 7th: This day there was a great preparation, and all the appearances and dispositions for a battle. We were to attack the enemy—20 battalions of us—through the wood of Soignies. The action threatened to be a very bloody one, for they were well fortified, and occupied a strong position at Waterloo. . . . If it had come to a battle, in all probability it had been one of the bloodiest most of us ever saw. . . . There was also a stratagem used, which, had it taken effect, would probably have decided the battle in our favour. There were twenty battalions, ours, Ferguson's as one . . . that were to march through the wood, and post themselves quietly in the wood till we should hear the battle was fairly gained, then we were to come out and attack them in the rear. Accordingly, we marched at three in the morning, and posted ourselves in the wood, and stayed there until three in the afternoon; General Churchill commanded us, but the Duke finding it impossible to attack them, as I said, we came off.

"August 20th: We have been here six weeks, marching and counter marching and seeking all occasions of coming on the enemy, yet our prospects have been blasted, and we have been kept as a lion in chains and cannot get out; there seems to be a spirit of division sown among our generals, and as long as it continues I never expect we shall do great things. I confess I began to turn more dull than when the prospects of death and danger were more frequent."

Throughout this long and wearisome marching, interspersed with trying spells of idleness, the Tenth had some exciting experiences, full of danger, but of a nature which added to the renown of a regiment that had won so much credit in previous campaigns. Many of the men had succumbed in the trying marches noticed by Major Blackader; but when the Maese was reached there was some heavy fighting for the regiment. Villeroy was there with 70,000 men. To pass a barrier, strengthened with all the resources of art, covered by rivers and marshes, and defended by an army superior in numbers, was an enterprise of the boldest and most critical kind. The General, therefore, employed all the powers of his inventive genius, to distract the attention and baffle the combinations of the enemy.*

The Tenth formed a part of the Brigade that was to create the diversion, and on the evening of July 17th, they marched towards Heilisheim and Lenwe, "where the abrupt and slippery banks of the Little Gheet, combined with the artificial defences, seemed to present a double obstacle" to the Commander of the Allies. As the Tenth and their comrades moved forward, Marlborough menaced the lines to the south of the Mehaigne. The French did not observe that in the meantime, while concentrating 40,000 men at the threatened trenches, the main body followed the Tenth by a forced march. The French guards, at four o'clock on the following morning, were amazed to see the Tenth coming out of the fog, close on them. Looking in other directions, they saw other regiments emerging, attacking the various villages. The capture by the Tenth of Neerwender and Neer-Hespen, followed. Another body of three battalions took possession of the village of Helixem and the bridge;

* Coxe: "Memoirs of Marlborough."

while a third captured the Castle of Wange, which commanded the passage over the Little Gheet. Orders were given to throw bridges across the stream, but the soldiers would not wait. Rushing through the enclosures and marshy ground, they traversed the Gheet in spite of its steep and slippery banks, and crowded across the line although it was covered by a deep trench. In a few minutes their numbers so rapidly increased that a French detachment of Dragoons posted at Oostmal, galloped away in panic.* In a brief space "the Tenth stood triumphant on the captured works, where the Cross of St. George, floating in the air, served as a beacon to impart a knowledge of this splendid success to the main body of the army, still at some distance."

The French cavalry, followed by the infantry, endeavoured to retrieve this disaster, but Marlborough, bringing up his horse, led an impetuous charge and broke the enemy. Again the French returned, but again they were charged, routed, and dispersed. The infantry of the enemy at once retreated, and Marlborough was master of the lines. Fifteen hundred prisoners were brought in, and more than four score officers, while hundreds more arrived later. If the Dutch generals had not protested, Marlborough would have pursued the panic-stricken army, and probably the greatest of all his victories would have been recorded. As it was, the French received ample opportunity to nullify the splendid advantage Marlborough had gained. None the less, in that great struggle the British troops merited unstinted praise, and Marlborough in his dispatch declared that they "acquitted themselves with a bravery surpassing all that could have been hoped of them." Unfortunately, owing to "the malice and perverse-

* Fortescue: "History of the Army."

ness" of some who were among the Allies, the General was unable, during the remainder of the campaign, to force the enemy to an engagement.

When winter came, the Tenth went into garrison in Holland. Every man among them was restive under the knowledge that "for the third time a brilliant campaign was spoilt by the Dutch generals and Deputies." "Jealousy, timidity, ignorance, treachery, and flat imbecility seem to have been the motives that inspired these men, whose conduct has never been reprobated according to its merit. It was they who were responsible for the prolongation of the war, for the burden that it laid on England, and for the untold misery that it wrought in France. Left to himself, Marlborough would have forced the French to peace in three campaigns, and the war would not have been ended in shame and disgrace by the Treaty of Utrecht."

ORDER OF BATTLE FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1705.*

| LEFT. | RIGHT WING ONLY. | RIGHT. |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| 1ST LINE. Foreign Troops. | <div data-bbox="366 868 515 1125"> 3rd Buffs. 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers. 37th Foot. Macarney's Foot. Evans's Foot. 24th Foot. 15th Foot. </div> <div data-bbox="536 868 705 1125"> 1st Battalion 1st Guards. 18th Royal Irish. 23rd Royal Welsh. 28th Foot. Stringer's Foot. 26th Cameronians. 16th Foot. </div> | <div data-bbox="733 868 847 1197"> 1st Dragoon Guards, 3 Squadrons. 5th Dragoons, 3 Squadrons. 5th " " " 2 7th " " " 2 6th " " " 2 3rd " " " 2 </div> <div data-bbox="868 868 909 1135"> Scots Greys, 3 Squadrons. </div> |
| 2ND LINE. EXTREME RIGHT OF CENTRE | <div data-bbox="270 1161 381 1392"> 2nd Batt. Royal Scots. 10th Foot. 29th Foot. Temple's Foot. 8th Foot. </div> | Foreign Troops. |

* From Portescue.

CHAPTER XII.

RAMILLIES—1706.

1706. "EACH successive victory had inspired the troops with additional confidence in their commander, and in their own prowess: to besiege a town, to fight a battle, and not conquer, when the Duke of Marlborough commanded, appeared impossible. With a bold assurance that fresh triumphs awaited them, the soldiers took the field in May, 1706, and the Tenth foot joined the camp near Tongres on the 19th of that month."*

Unfortunately one cannot give a confident description of the soldier of the Tenth during the Marlborough campaigns, because particulars are not forthcoming which show how they differed from other regiments in the army. But in February, 1706, there were two meetings of the General Officers in the Great Room at the Horse-Guards, when the following proposals were agreed to, regarding the clothing to be provided for the foot regiments:—

FOR THE FIRST YEAR: A good cloth coat, well-lined, which may serve for the waistcoat the second year; a pair of good thick kersey breeches; a pair of good strong stockings, a pair of good strong shoes; a good shirt, and neck-cloth; a good hat well laced.

FOR THE SECOND YEAR: A good cloth coat, well-lined, as for the first year; a waistcoat made of the former year's coat; a pair of strong kersey new breeches; a pair of good strong stockings; a pair of good strong shoes; a good shirt and neck-cloth; a good hat well laced. That

* Cameron: "Records."

all the accoutrements, as swords, belts, patron-ashes, and drum carriages, be made good as they are wanted ; that recruits be supplied with a new waistcoat and one shirt ; and one neckcloth more than the old soldiers, who have some linen in hand. That the serjeants and drums be clothed after the same manner, but everything of its better kind.

When Marlborough met his British regiments at Tongres he had little hope of carrying the campaign through in greater harmony with his colleagues. Yet when he saw these soldiers he felt that with men so equipped he could achieve much, and that was more than he could hope for with the men whom the Allies brought into the field. The conduct of the Allies was exasperating in the extreme ; the soldiers were slovenly in their appearance, and promised poorly in the way of achievement in the field.

As for the co-operation of the generals, his hope almost died. Prince Louis had not learnt to be more active, nor was he more amenable to reason. It is declared that instead of adopting effectual measures for opening the campaign, he cavilled at every project which was submitted for his judgment, and in his turn persisted in proposing schemes which were inefficient or impracticable.

Marlborough, in consequence, determined to throw him over, and leave him to preserve his own dominions, while he and Eugene, who were in accord, formulated a plan for a descent into Italy. The Emperor of Germany suggested that the General should pursue his former scheme on the Moselle, which others had done their best to ruin. At a conference held by these three—Marlborough, Eugene, and the Emperor—it was decided to leave Prince Louis in ignorance, while the Duke was to command the offensive

force to be assembled on the Moselle. The arrangements were made with the utmost secrecy.

When Marlborough arrived at Tongres, he expected to find the army in a condition to march, but was greatly chagrined when he discovered that neither the artillery horses nor the bread waggons had come, and that the foreign troops were not as good as in the preceding campaign. When the British soldiers joined the army he had 122 squadrons and 74 battalions in his command. Assuming these to be at their full complement, his forces numbered 60,000 men, but information revealed the fact that the enemy had at least 62,000. Further news came that the enemy had crossed the Great Gheet, and was moving on Indoigne, resolved to take the risk of battle for the safety of Namur.

Before the Duke made his advance he again reviewed his troops, and was especially pleased with those which had come over from England. He had, all through the winter, expressed his anxiety to have ample numbers of his own countrymen in the army, to be the less dependent on the Allies. He believed that "with 10,000 well-fed Englishmen, 10,000 half-starved Scotsmen, and 10,000 Irishmen charged with usquebaugh, he could march from Boulogne to Bayonne in spite of Le Grand Monarque." So Cooper King said, and Fortescue follows that up by remarking that the Duke had a prejudice in favour of English horses and of English men, considering them superior to any other. The urgency of Marlborough in this regard was taken notice of by the authorities at home, consequently the preceding winter had been well spent. Take for an example the manner in which the recruits for the Tenth were called for. The warrant ran as follows:—

These are to authorise you by Beat of Drum or otherwise to raise and receive so many Volunteers as shall be wanting to Recruit and fill up the respective Companys of Our Regiment of ffoot under your Command for Our Service, and for the more speedy Recruiting Our Said Regiment to receive any such able bodydd Men as shall be raised and Levydd to Serve as Soldiers by any of Our Justices of the Peace or other Magistrates and by them or their Order delivered over to you or otherwise Listed by you in pursuance of the Acts of Parliament for the Better Recruiting Our Land fforces and Marines and for discharging out of Prison such Insolvent Debtors as Should Serve or procure a Person to serve in Our Army Conformable to Our Proclamations in that behalf. And all Magistrates, Justices of the Peace, Constables, and other Our officers whom it may Concern are hereby required to be assisting to you in providing Quarters, impressing Carriages, and otherwise as there shall be Occasion.

Given at Our Court at Kensington the 29th Day of
ffbruary, 1708, In the sixth Year of Our Reigne.

By Her Majestyes Command

Sunderland.

These calls and instructions had their effect in furnishing Marlborough with a British force to his liking. The British contingent was certainly a fine one, and with these soldiers at his disposal he was immensely satisfied to hear that Villeroy was leaving his lines at Dyle, and marching to Judoigne.

The fight came off on Whitsunday, May 23rd. In the mist the French Marshal was marching unexpectedly straight on the Allies' lines, and at 10 o'clock he saw where he was. He saw also that he would be compelled to fight a day

earlier than he intended. In numbers, however, he was superior, and rather than evade the challenge, he threw his army into battle order—"in two lines facing due east," covering a front of about four miles, and presenting to Marlborough the hollow of a crescent.

There were four villages in Villeroy's front, and these he made full use of. Tavers was on his right flank, and here he placed a strong body of infantry, and also cannon. Towards the centre of the crescent was Ramillies, into which he flung twenty battalions, and twenty-four guns. The place was strong, and the ground solid, whereas the marshes elsewhere interfered with the movement alike of the French and Allies. A ditch, moreover, added to the strength of this post. The French centre, which was composed of infantry, extended from Ramillies to Offuz, and the left ranged on to Autréglise. Here were cavalry and infantry. The right was exceptionally strong in cavalry, 120 squadrons being there in addition to the infantry.

Marlborough saw where Villeroy's weaknesses lay. To begin with, his left was behind a marsh which the French could not easily pass, so that the Duke might treat that portion of the enemy's army as unlikely to give great trouble. He realised that he could concentrate his attack on the right, where the solid ground gave the troops and cavalry free movement. Here Marlborough's advantage was great, for while he might attack Ramillies, Tavers was so far away that he did not anticipate much inconvenience from a cross-fire of the artillery stationed there.

He speedily prepared for a fight, in which the Tenth were destined to play their part. All the plans of the battle in the British Museum—of which there are several—represent Lord North and Grey's regiment in brigade with a battalion of Orkney's (1st Royals), Tatton's (24th Foot),

Ingolsby's (18th Royal Irish), Farrington's (29th Foot), and Meredith's (37th Foot), under Brigadier Meredith in the Dutch General Pallant's division; Meredith's brigade formed the right of the second line.

Marlborough began his attack on the enemy's left, designing to deceive Villeroy, who, seeing that the British were there in great force, brought a number of battalions away from his centre and right. It was what the Duke hoped for. Marlborough then quietly withdrew his infantry to the heights, a long line of British Redcoats remaining in sight—the Tenth among them—while others, hidden from Villeroy, quickly marched behind the hills, and came sweeping down on the weakened right and centre of the French.

The presence of the Tenth and their comrades kept Villeroy expectant continuously of attack, "paralysing the French left wing." Then came the sudden and unexpected advance on Tavers, which was soon taken. The fight was terrible, notwithstanding. The Dutch, who had broken the first French line, were driven back by the second, and the slaughter was fearful. At this juncture Marlborough came up with his squadrons, and leading them in person, was unhorsed, and barely escaped capture in the *mêlée* by French dragoons. While he was mounting a horse which his A.D.C. (Captain Molesworth) gave up to him, his equerry, who held the stirrup, had his head blown off by a cannon ball. In a short space Marlborough restored order among his broken up cavalry, and saw what was being done at Ramillies.

There the infantry were in full action, while the Allied cavalry rode down on the French centre with an awful rush which broke it up completely. Some of the famous horse regiments of France were cut to pieces, and none waited

after that terrible charge, but fled to the rear, "leaving the battalions of infantry helpless and alone, to be ridden over and trampled out of existence."

Then came the turn of the Tenth and the other redcoats who had been looking on eagerly and restlessly. They swept down with a mighty cheer on Ramillies, supported by the 3rd and 6th Dragoons, and came on the confused soldiers there. The sight of the British redcoats caused a panic, and a wild retreat began among those who had been rallying for a last desperate resistance. The retreat soon developed into a rout, with the British cavalry in pursuit amid a confusion that has been termed "appalling." "Not until two o'clock in the morning did the cavalry pause," when they found themselves fifteen miles from the battlefield.

The loss to France was terrible, for 13,000 men were either prisoners or lay dead or wounded on the field, some of them battered out of recognition in the fearful cavalry charges of that disastrous day. "The trophies of the victors were 80 standards and colours, 50 guns, and a vast quantity of baggage."

Famous as the fight at Blenheim was, it is doubtful whether it was more effective than Ramillies. Louvain, Brussels, Malines, Lierre, and many another place fell into Marlborough's hand. Fortress after fortress abandoned by Villeroy, became his, and the French army had to cross its own frontier in a panic-stricken flight, owing to the masterly manner in which the Duke continually threatened it. Even Villars had to be recalled, lest his army should be compelled to capitulate, or be exposed to annihilation. Whenever fighting came, the once-victorious army of France fought with so little spirit that defeat was inevitable, and the chief question was rather as to how a retreat could be secured without destruction following.

In recognition of the splendid service rendered by the Tenth, their Colonel, Lord North and Grey, was advanced to the rank of Brigadier-General, and placed at the head of three battalions of infantry.*

There was much marching after the fight at Ramillies. The Tenth accompanied Marlborough to the camp at Aerzeele, from whence the Duke sent a demand for the surrender of Ostend and Dendermonde. The answer was a refusal, whereupon the latter was blockaded, and the former place was to be besieged as soon as the artillery could be brought up. The siege began at an early date, and the Tenth were in the covering force, which consisted of 50 battalions of foot, and 99 squadrons of horse. So large an army was necessary since the garrison, which consisted of 5,000 men, knew that they might look for great reinforcements. Marlborough sent the Tenth to Rousselaer, where they threatened Menin and Ypres. The attack on Ostend was then made, and the garrison quickly beating a parley, surrendered, quitting the place "without military honours, under promise not to bear arms against the Allies for six months."

The Tenth and some other regiments that had been held back for so many hours at Ramillies, were given the post of honour when Menin was besieged, since the capture of the place would secure the line of the Lys, protect Marlborough's conquests, and afford the means of pushing his attacks with effect when he began the next campaign. Marlborough considered Menin one of the strongest towns the enemy held, but owing to the activity of Villeroy, he could not spare more than 32 battalions for the siege. Of this place Coxe says that it was looked upon as one of the masterpieces of the celebrated Vauban. The defences were low,

* Cannon.

without being commanded, the approaches were rendered difficult by inundations, while the garrison were sufficiently numerous, and well provided with means of resistance.

On the 23rd of July the place was invested by General Salisch. The British regiments regularly employed in the besieging operations under his command were the Tenth, the 8th, the 18th, and Evans's Foot; the Scots Greys, the 3rd and the 6th Dragoon Guards.

There was considerable delay because of the non-arrival of the heavy artillery from Ghent, but it came on the 30th of July. On the night of the 4th of August the attacks began. On the 18th all was in readiness for the storming of the covered way and counterscarp, and Marlborough, drawing his army near, came to superintend the operations.

The character of the fighting in which the Tenth engaged can be understood by reading the account given by the writer of Marlborough's Memoirs. He says that at seven the same evening the signal was given by the explosion of two mines which had been formed on the salient angles of the work called the Half Moon at Ypres. The assailants instantly advanced to the palisades, threw grenades into the covert way, and entering amidst the confusion, swept everything before them. For two hours they withstood a heavy fire from the ravelins, and other works commanding their position; but at length the establishment was effected and stretched to the palisades of the four angles. The Tenth suffered terribly in that night's fighting, and the total loss of the attacking force was 1,400 men. The outcome of that awful struggle was, that the besieged made signals of distress. "Their artillery was dismounted, and their whole strength scarcely sufficed to occupy the three half moons fronting the attack."

Meanwhile the Duke of Vendome created a diversion, and compelled Marlborough to change his position by stretching his right to Lauwe. The siege, however, was persisted in. Again and again the Tenth took part in storming the place, and ultimately the defences were in such a state of ruin that the garrison capitulated on the 22nd of August. The success was gained at a great cost, for the killed among the besiegers numbered 32 officers and 551 men. The wounded were 83 officers and 1,941 men.* "Four pieces of cannon with the arms of England, which were taken by the enemy at the battle of Landen, fought on the 29th of July, 1693, were found on taking possession of Menin, and were, by the order of the Duke of Marlborough, sent to London."

There was yet more fighting for the Tenth before the campaign ended. Under General Churchill they went to Hendermond, and so skilfully were the siege operations carried on, and so valorous were the assailants, that in less than a week the place was captured. Then Aeth was taken, as soon as Marlborough fell back across the Scheldt to secure the line of the Dender. Here, again, the Tenth played a leading part.

For a little while the army had hopes of another great battle, since Vendome boasted that he would attack the rearguard of the Allies. To the disappointment of all, he failed to carry out his threat, and the Tenth went into winter quarters at Ghent.

* Fortescue.

CHAPTER XIII.

"THIS EXTRAORDINARY CAMPAIGN."

1707. FOR the Tenth the year 1707 was uneventful. The regiment was not in Lord North and Grey's Brigade for the contemplated yet abortive campaign, but formed part of Temple's Brigade, which also included the 24th Foot, Temple's Foot, the 18th Royal Irish, and the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Scots. It ought, however to be pointed out that there is some doubt as to how the Tenth was brigaded. The *Postboy* of June 26th, 1707, shows this arrangement just given, whereas others say that the Tenth were in the Brigade commanded by their Colonel, Lord North and Grey, which seems reasonable.

There was the prospect every day of a conflict on as great a scale as Blenheim or Ramillies, for Marlborough kept his army within sight of the French host throughout the campaign, but never was able to force an engagement. The explanations given were manifold: (1) That the superiority of the French army curbed the enterprising spirit of the British General; but no one would believe that Marlborough would be so influenced, whatever the odds. These, moreover, were not great, for while his own command comprised 97 battalions and 164 squadrons, Vendome's army numbered 102 battalions and 168 squadrons. (2) It is stated that Vendome, "though anxious to signalise his military reputation, may rather be said to have been awed by the skill of his antagonist." One is ready to accept this, but is equally prepared for the third explanation, namely, "the timid policy of the Dutch, and the renewal of that system

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of control and restraint which had before palsied his—Marlborough's—efforts."

This year witnessed the death of a general who had been a troublesome colleague of the Duke—Prince Louis of Baden; and when that is recorded, nearly all has been said that could be told of a most unsatisfactory campaign. An army in the field, "eating its head off," and "spoiling for a fight"; the English nation irritated at the wasting of its resources in maintaining an idle army; the authorities at The Hague talking, but doing nothing, and placing endless obstacles in the way of a General who had times out of number displayed tokens of his matchless skill as a soldier: these were so many points in an irritating campaign. It was a campaign wantonly wasted. The only point of interest in the story of dreary and wearisome marches, and long spells of sullen watching, was, that when Marlborough asked for recruits, the English Government sent them without delay. Nothing hung fire because of supineness in England. Something like disgust filled the minds of the men when orders came to go into winter quarters.

1708. Events in 1708 led to the return of the Tenth to England, where some consternation was experienced, owing to the arrival of news that the Pretender contemplated an invasion of the country with the idea of dethroning Anne, and reinstating the Stuarts. The Tenth were called out of their winter quarters before the month of March was out, and going to Ostend, found several regiments awaiting orders to embark for England, to repel the threatened invasion.

The troops sailed to Tynemouth, and that place was reached on the 1st of April. Apparently they did not land, for in the meanwhile the French fleet, which conducted the Pretender and his troops, were dispersed in a terrific storm,

so that the idea of invasion was abandoned. When it was known that the Pretender had returned to France, orders came to the regiments to return at once to Ostend, and rejoin Marlborough. The storm, however, hindered them. Short of food and water, and suffering from seasickness, the soldiers spent days of misery on board the transports off Tynemouth, and it was not until the 30th of April that the Tenth landed at Ostend, and began the journey in boats to Ghent, where they had spent the winter.

In May, the Tenth were called out to take part in the new campaign which began inauspiciously for Ghent and Bruges. The inhabitants of these cities were aggrieved at the heavy levies made on them for the war, and threw open the gates to the French general. Thus "the keys to the navigation of the Scheldt and Lys were lost." The people's contentions for a sudden peace had been disregarded, and they took this course in consequence when the French appeared before the cities on July 5th.

The French plan was to invest Oudenarde, a fortress strongly placed on the left bank of the Scheldt. If they could possess themselves of it they would be able to secure their recent conquests, and maintain communications between Brabant and their own frontier.

This serious position determined Marlborough to forego all his previous plans, and relieve Oudenarde. He was aware of the danger of the undertaking, for Vendome was in command of no less than 100,000 men, whereas his own army did not exceed 80,000. He called on Eugene to reinforce him, but while willing enough to do so, the Prince's army was too far away to come up in time. Even the delay of a week would not have availed, for Eugene was hindered by "some petty formalities which were judged by the Imperial Court to be far more important than military

operations." Marlborough waited a month, but Eugene was still detained, and the Duke went on without him when he saw the French army striking its camp and commencing the march on Oudenarde.

Mile for mile Marlborough followed, always so disposing his own troops that if the French halted for battle he should be ready. What the order of battle was none can say. Even Fortescue, the most painstaking Army historian we have, has failed to discover it, but he gives us the regiments that bear the name of Oudenarde on their appointments, and the Tenth is one. The others are the 1st, the 3rd, 5th, 6th and 7th Dragoon Guards, the 2nd Dragoons, 5th Lancers, Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, 1st, 3rd, 8th, 15th, 16th, 18th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 26th, and 37th Foot.

Lord North and Grey's brigade in the campaign consisted of:—

1 battalion of Royal Militia (1st Foot).

1 battalion of Lalo (21st Foot).

1 battalion of Preston (26th Foot).

1 battalion of North and Grey (10th Foot).

Sometimes the armies drew so near that there were skirmishes between Marlborough's cavalry and the French rearguard. When the Allies reached Alost, Eugene arrived. He had come on without his army, which was advancing with all speed, and to his great concern found the Duke ill with fever. But he had conducted his march with such marvellous skill—worthy in every way of his reputation—that although the French had invested Oudenarde a day or two before by an advance column, Vendome discovered, when his own main army came up, that Marlborough had outmarched him, that General Cadogan had seized upon Lessines, that the Duke had crossed the Dender by bridges which Cadogan had laid, and was actually between the

French frontier and the army of France. The siege of Oudenarde was instantly raised, and Vendome was compelled, in spite of his superiority, to fall back on Gavre, lower down the Scheldt.*

Cadogan, in charge of the vanguard, which numbered 11,000 men and 24 guns, went forward "to prepare the roads, construct bridges, and make dispositions to cover the passage of the Scheldt below Oudenarde." He did all that he was told to do, and by noon on the 11th of July the army was crossing the river. Marlborough found the French there in a "good defensive position a little to the north of Oudenarde, protected by some swelling uplands, which in that part of the country are called 'Couters.' One of these, the Bosen Couter, was especially strong.†

The French lead had given the enemy the choice of position, but Marlborough, although his soldiers were tired after a march of fifteen miles, and were at a disadvantage in point of numbers and place, prepared for battle. The Tenth, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Grove, crossed the river by a pontoon thrown over between the Abbey of Eename and Oudenarde, and when the signal was given for the fight to begin, they marched up the heights of Bever. Here, however, they were too far from the field to be effective. Thereupon they were ordered to take up a position near the village of Eyne, with the village of Heurne on their right. This was the second position of the whole of the infantry of the advanced guard. Cadogan and Rantzan had already engaged the enemy here, and now the Tenth were in the midst of some hot fighting, supporting these brigades. This was on the Allies' right, and such was the Duke's confidence in Eugene, that he placed him in command here, where the troops were all British. The

* Stanhope: "Reign of Queen Anne."

† Ibid.

Duke commanded the Dutch, Hanoverians, and Prussians on the left.

The stress of the action was on the right, where the Tenth were, and seeing this, Marlborough sent twenty of his battalions to reinforce Eugene, reserving only twenty for himself. The fighting was by this time of the most strenuous character. Cadogan's force was falling back, but the Tenth and other battalions went forward and turned the compulsory retreat into an advance, breaking the first line of the enemy. Before long the Tenth were engaging the second line, where the fighting was of the most deadly nature.

Simultaneously with this resolute advance of Eugene, Marlborough was moving forward, and in spite of desperate cavalry charges the French were deprived of all their advantage of position. They were driven back to Diepenbeck, where a stand was made. On into the summer night the fighting continued, but when darkness began to fall it seemed as though the French would recover themselves. The fighting where the Tenth were was of that character which showed how desperate were the efforts of the French to hold back the British battalions, and save the field.

Marlborough, as the evening wore on, saw that the French right could be turned and cut off from the main body. He sent to Marshal Overkirk, who was in the rear, and told him to go round with his battalions of Dutch and Danes. Overkirk was old and ill, but he did his work splendidly. He flung his footmen on the flank, and the Duke ordered his cavalry "to the rear of the unsuspecting Frenchmen," who suddenly found themselves surrounded on all sides. Nothing that Vendome did could save them. He dared not send his cavalry there, for they were watched by an

immense body of British horse who would be on them the moment they began their advance. Thus Marlborough slowly tightened his grip on the encompassed French right.

The Tenth were among those who engaged the enemy's left, which was being beaten into confusion. Seeing how hopeless everything was at nightfall—how impossible it was to hold back Lord North and Grey's brigade; how Eugene got in his British troops everywhere, and could not be driven back—Vendome ordered the retreat to be sounded, and the movement began in terrible confusion. Darkness came on, and "the positions were discernible only by the flashes of musketry which rolled round the narrowing circle of the devoted army, till the right of Eugene," where the Tenth were, "and the left of the Prince of Orange, approached the same point. They mistook each other for enemies, and their conflict might have produced the most deplorable effects amidst the victorious ranks, had not the generals exerted themselves with unusual activity to put a timely stop to the fire." The troops were kept at the halt, and Vendome, discovering this, drew off such of his battalions as were not surrounded, in full retreat.

When the roll was called by the French general it was found that his losses amounted to 20,000 men. In his despatch announcing the victory, Marlborough said: "We took between six and seven thousand prisoners, besides about seven hundred officers, of whom several are of note, and a great number of standards and colours. Our army lay on their arms that night, and on Thursday encamped on the field of battle." Strange to say, the Duke, when writing to his Duchess, said: "I thank God the English suffered less than any of the other troops." Yet it was in that part of the field that the conflict was so sanguinary, and where, when the next morning came, it was seen that "among

several thousand corpses lay a prodigious number of wounded of different nations."

The victory of Oudenarde was followed by the siege of Lille, and here again the Tenth played a conspicuous part. Lille, which was situated in a swampy plain watered by several streams, had been fortified by Vauban. It became the key of the country watered by the Lys and the Scheldt, and Vendome, realising its importance, threw into it a garrison of 15,000 men. Bouffleurs was placed in command, and began at once to strengthen the place. "New works were constructed on the weakest points, the hedges and trees were cut down to a distance of 800 paces, and fascines and palisades in abundance, were furnished by the district. Several mines were also formed under the covert way, in parts which appeared the most threatened; and every arrangement was made for maintaining a constant supply of arms and artillery, for the subsistence of the garrison, and for the regular distribution of the ammunition and stores."

Consulting with Eugene, the Duke resolved on the siege of Lille, and an immense train of stores was brought up in face of untold difficulties, with the enemy alert to capture them. The siege operations were entrusted to Prince Eugene, and the Tenth formed part of the covering army under Marlborough.

The fighting that ensued was of a desperate character, the Frenchmen making heroic efforts to hold the place, while the assailants went again and again to the assaults which almost decimated the attacking parties.

The duties of the Tenth were arduous, and as some of the men declared, inglorious, since Marlborough deputed them to escort supplies, furnish outposts, and be in readiness to prevent the advance of a French army to raise the siege.

The necessity for a covering army was apparent from the first, for Vendome was bringing up a great train of artillery, and an army which would probably make a desperate effort to break through the lines. But the battle did not come off, it being evident that the French Marshal judged Marlborough to be too strongly entrenched to hope for success. Meanwhile the siege proceeded slowly, the engineers coming in for a large share of blame for their supposed tardiness.

Eventually the grenadiers of the Tenth were sent to take part in the siege, and sanguinary conflicts followed, in one of which the assailants lost 2,000 men. It was the cause of much mortification to Marlborough that the siege was so prolonged, and he had ample grounds later for believing that treachery was at work. It was well on into December before the besieged capitulated. Eugene had captured the counterscarp of the citadel, and then got on to the glacis of the second covered way, but for three weeks after that Lille held out. The siege ended at last, "one of the most arduous and difficult, as well as one of the longest and most sanguinary in modern warfare"; for 8,000 men were killed or wounded within the citadel, while Marlborough's roll call showed a loss of 14,000 in killed, wounded, sick, or incapable.

The Tenth, before the citadel fell, were called away to play their part in raising the siege of Brussels. The Elector of Bavaria had invested the place, having thought in the first instance to take the city by surprise. M. Paschal, the Governor, with his garrison of 7,000 men, rejected the proposals for capitulation, although the besieging army was an overwhelming one. The Tenth, when Marlborough saw the city's danger, were chosen to form a portion of the relieving army, and jubilant at the prospect of heavy

fighting, advanced on Brussels by forced marches. On the morning of the 26th of November, Marlborough forced the passage of the Scheldt at three points, the men anticipating "to engage in the bloodiest day they had ever yet experienced." By skilful feinting the Duke had made the enemy believe that he was going to attack in the vicinity of Ghent, and when the crossing of the river took place under cover of a fog, the Elector of Bavaria was taken by surprise. The Tenth and their comrades were on him from a quarter whence he expected none but friends. Something like a panic ensued, no less than 1,200 men being lost in the flight. Brussels was saved by this successful march.

When Lille fell it was anticipated that the Allied army would go into winter quarters, but the Tenth were sent to Ghent, which was in the hands of the enemy. Marlborough decided on a siege of the place, although, as he said, he trembled every day for fear of ill weather. By his unexpected determination he hoped to take the city by surprise, and thus force Louis to a peace advantageous to the Alliance.

The Tenth were in the midst of the hottest fighting. On the 18th of December, the Duke moved forward in four columns, and invested Ghent on all sides. The regiment, under the command of Count Lottum, opened the trenches between the Scheldt and the Lys. This was done with terrific fighting, and so splendidly did Lord North and Grey and his men conduct themselves, that the Colonel was promoted Major-General. Two days later ten companies of French grenadiers sallied from the town, and engaged a regiment with such spirit, that the Tenth were sent to reinforce their comrades. The fight ended in the enemy being beaten back, but not without the loss of thirty men, "which," said Marlborough in his dispatch, "were all of

Lord North's regiment." It was serious to discover that among their losses were Brigadier Evans and Colonel Grove, who were taken prisoners, and carried into Ghent. On the 2nd of January the garrison evacuated the city with the usual honours of war, and the Tenth marched in, to remain in the place for the winter, after having played so great a part in its reduction.

Thus ended, says Coxe, this extraordinary campaign, perhaps one of the most scientific occurring in the annals of military history. From the commencement to the close, the confederates had to struggle against a force far superior in numbers, to attack an army posted in a position considered as impregnable, to besiege a place of the first magnitude, at the very moment when they were in a manner invested, to open and maintain their communications in spite of innumerable obstacles, both of nature and art, and finally to reduce, in the depth of winter, two fortresses defended by garrisons, which, in other circumstances, would have been considered as forming an army of no common magnitude.

CHAPTER XIV.

TOURNAY AND MALPLAQUET.

1709. THE winter's rest for an army that had undergone so arduous a campaign was not a long one. It had been hoped that Louis would have embraced the opportunity which offered for agreeing to a peace which would allow him time to recover from his heavy losses and enormous expenditure of money and life. Undoubtedly he would have done so if the terms were in any sense possible, but the conditions proposed were of such an extravagant nature that he could not accept them, and war was renewed in the spring of 1709.

The Tenth marched out of Ghent in June, having been delayed by heavy rains, which made it impossible for the troops to advance until the wretched roads were mended, and the weather became more settled. Marlborough went forward on June 16th, leaving orders for the Tenth and other regiments to assemble on the plains of Lille "as fast as the unseasonable weather and continual rains would permit."

Marlborough's tactics greatly harassed Marshal Villars, and induced him to withdraw from his garrison towns so many of his troops as to leave some of the places practically defenceless. He anticipated a combined attack on his own army, and it was necessary for him to strengthen himself in the field to the utmost. "To cover Arras, the north-western gate of France, Villars had thrown up a strong line of entrenchments from Scarpe at Douay to the Lys. . . . There he lay, entrenched to the teeth, while

Marlborough and Eugene, after long delay, owing to the lateness of the spring, encamped with 110,000 men to the south of Lille, between the villages—Lincelles and Fontenoy.”*

The Tenth joined the main army here, going later to a post on the Upper Dyle, where they remained until the Duke made a sudden sweep to Tournay, which he invested.

Villars was disconcerted. When the advance began, and word came that the Allied Army was marching straight down on him, he prepared for a tremendous battle, calling in troops from every possible quarter. The Allies' artillery was hurried up the Scheldt from Ghent, and Tournay seemed to be at Marlborough's mercy. Villars endeavoured to throw reinforcements into the town, which, through the genius of Vauban, was one of the strongest fortresses in France, but now it was weakened because Villars, in his alarm, had drawn away so great a portion of the garrison. The fortifications, however, were in the best state, and the magazines filled with ammunition and military stores.† It only wanted men in sufficient numbers.

During the early operations, when Marlborough had to prepare for an attempt on Villars' part to raise the siege, the Tenth were with the covering army; but so gallant was the defence that, since Villars continued behind his lines, they were sent to augment the forces about the fortress.

Cannon's description of the place runs as follows: "The citadel of Tournay was situated on some high ground, with a gentle ascent from the town, and the siege proved a service of the most difficult character. The peculiarities arose not so much from the strength of the fortifications, as from the multiplicity of the subterranean works, which

* Fortescue: "History of the British Army."

† Coxe: "Memoirs of Marlborough."

were more numerous than those above ground; the approaches were carried on by sinking pits, several fathoms deep, and working from them underground, until the troops arrived at the casemates and mines."

In view of the strength of the place, the attack on such a stronghold, if properly provided and garrisoned, must have been an act of extreme rashness, which could only terminate in disgrace. Dauntless and resolute, the besiegers began. Three grand attacks were made, and the French were driven back in all their sallies. Outwork after outwork was successively carried, and on the 21st of July the besiegers established themselves on the exterior covert way.* It was then that other regiments were called for, and the Tenth, among these, began an experience which has been described as "an appalling service." It was their lot to take part in the awful conflicts in the mines, in conjunction with three other English regiments—the 8th, the 15th, and the 16th.

In the *Daily Courant*, dated August 20th, 1709, a writer speaks of the character of the subterranean works: "Now, as to our fighting underground, blowing up like kites in the air, not being sure of a foot of ground we stand on while in the trenches. Our miners and the enemy very often meet each other, when they have sharp combats until one side gives way. We have got into three or four of the enemy's great galleries, which are thirty or forty feet underground, and lead to several of their chambers; and in these we fight in armour by lanthorn and candle, they disputing every inch of the gallery with us to hinder our finding their great mines. Yesternight we found one which was placed just under our bomb batteries, in which were eighteen hundredweight of powder besides many bombs; and if we had not been so lucky as to find it, in a

* Cox.

very few hours our batteries and some hundreds of men had taken a flight into the air."

The subterranean works were referred to in the army as "this infernal labyrinth," and, indeed, it was such. Mines were always dangerous, but at the period of the siege of Tournay this species of service was the most horrible which imagination can conceive. The Tenth were called on to play their part in it, and sometimes whole companies entered the mines at the very moment when they were ready primed for explosion. They were often inundated with water, suffocated with smoke, or buried alive in the cavities, and left to perish.*

If the Tenth sometimes quailed when they were sent to the mines, it is not to be wondered at. The records run, that many of the soldiers, who had bravely faced visible dangers, recoiled from these subterranean attacks "with that feeling of horror which is naturally augmented by uncertainty and darkness." None the less, they responded to the call of duty, and finally, on September 3rd, the garrison, after an heroic defence, surrendered.

Marlborough now turned his attention to Mons, and the shattered Tenth marched in that direction in rain that was torrential. The anxiety of Villars was to prevent the fall of the fortress, and consequently he moved thither with all speed, arriving, on the 7th of September, on the Heath of Malplaquet. The Allies had come up after toiling through what has been called "a sea of mud." They found that Bouffleurs had joined Villars, and although he was the latter's senior, he was patriotically ready to serve under him as second in command. Marlborough and Eugene decided at once to draw away the forces that were investing Mons, and caused the army to bivouac on the Plain of Mons, between Ciply and Quévy.

* Coxe. Also Cannon's "Historical Records."

The battle began on the morning of September the 10th. The previous day had been spent in an artillery duel, which served the purpose of telling Marlborough how Villars was disposing his army. The Duke prepared his plans accordingly, spending much of the day in marking the formidable entrenchments which Villars was throwing up.

The Tenth passed the night in a meadow, but went to parade at three o'clock in the morning, joining the army at prayers. Neither army could see the other, because of a thick mist, "but the din of hostile preparation was heard, and the soldiers, having confidence in their leaders, were anxious to acquire new laurels under their favourite chiefs." When the sun dispersed the mist Marlborough saw the French army. Villars took command of the left French wing, and was confronted by Eugene. Marlborough took the centre and left of his army, being faced by Bouffleurs. The British troops were in the centre under Lord Orkney, "ready to advance against the (French) centre as soon as Schulemberg and Lottum should have done their work."

The Tenth were brigaded thus, and in the centre of the British troops:—

One battalion 1st Guards (towards the right).


One battalion Coldstream Guards.


One battalion Royal Scots.

37th Foot.

10th Foot (on the left).

Lottum was in command of the column designed to clear the wood of Taisniere, where the enemy were strongly entrenched, and it was known that this could not be done without great carnage. If he could succeed in this, then he would attack the enemy in the flank of his entrenchments in the open ground. When the Duke rode





Colours of the Regiment in 1743.

down the English line, he saw how eager the men were, how splendidly fit, and how implicitly he could trust them to do the work, if humanly possible.

Marlborough began the battle by sending "two dense columns up the glade"—the divisions of Orange and of Lottum. Thus the Tenth advanced. Before long, however, the two armies, in each of which were 90,000 men, were engaged along the whole line; the Allies not merely with men in the field, but with strong bodies of Frenchmen within entrenchments "which might remind them of a siege rather than a battle."

So terrible was the fire of small arms from these that Eugene's soldiers on the right recoiled, and the same thing occurred in the centre, where the Tenth were. Marlborough, seeing that in spite of their persistency the foot were driven back, charged at the head of D'Auvergne's 3,000 cavalry, and saved Lottum's men, who suddenly found themselves not only under a terrific fire, but in a swamp. He thus gave the redcoats time to re-form, and go forward, once more to endeavour to drive the French out of the wood. "The Royals seconded the Foot-Guards, and the Buffs being at the head of the next brigade, prolonged the attack to the left. The Tenth penetrated beyond the Royals and the Buffs, and the whole rushing forward with determined resolution, forced the entrenchments, when the French fell back fighting, but halted and renewed the contest in the wood. The Tenth and other corps at this point penetrated among the trees, and a sharp fire of musketry was kept up. The foliage was thick, every tree was disputed, and the wood re-echoed the din of battle."

All along the line the conduct of the Allies was heroic, for the difficulties seemed to be insuperable, and the fire at every step murderous. More than one regiment was

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practically annihilated. But in the wood, where Lottum's men were, the fighting was terrific. The soldiers were "tripping over felled trunks, bursting through tangled foliage, panting through quagmires, loading and firing and cursing, guided only by the flashes before them in the cloud of foul, blinding smoke."* Withers was farther on to the right, and by splendid courage, unmatched anywhere in that day's field, he was co-operating with the men of the Tenth in that never-to-be-forgotten wood, and driving out the enemy by his turning movement. Villars was compelled to send down his Irish Brigade to clear Lottum out, and in part the fierce onslaught succeeded, until Withers, with Eugene coming up to support him, broke up the Irish Brigade, inflicting on it terrible loss.

By this movement Villars had weakened his centre, and Marlborough, seizing the opportunity, moved up his guns, captured the entrenchments, and so reached the open where the French cavalry had been compelled to remain idle. The Allied horse were close behind the foot, and coming into the open, drove Bouffleurs back disastrously. The fight was so desperate that when Bouffleurs charged again he broke up the two first lines of Marlborough's cavalry, and even came into contact with the third. Eugene saw what was taking place, and brought up his horse and charged, just as the Prince of Hesse with his squadrons came up, and rode down on the infantry on the French right. Hesse isolated such portions of it as he had not destroyed.

That was the finishing stroke. The French had lost the day. Villars having been wounded, Bouffleurs, who now commanded, sounded a retreat. His centre had been broken, and his right beaten in, while the entrenchments were in Marlborough's hands. But it was not a rout. The

* Portescue.

French soldiers left the field not scattered nor singly, nor as men defeated, but in serried and compact masses as men ready any moment, if need were, to renew the conflict. In the whole action, which had lasted seven hours, they had lost less than 500 prisoners, and very few pieces of cannon. Of standards and colours they had taken full as many as the Allies had taken from them.*

It was a victory bought at a fearful price, for while the vanquished had a death roll of 12,000, those who fell on the victors' side were as many as 20,000. It was to be expected, when one thinks of the strength of the entrenchments which the Tenth and their comrades had to capture.

When the battle ended, Marlborough returned to Mons, and completed his investment, placing the Tenth in the covering army. Hearing of the defeat of Villars, and knowing that relief could never come, after a short but resolute resistance the Governor beat a parley, and surrendered on the 20th of October.

A few days later the Tenth went into winter quarters in Ghent, the campaign for 1709 having ended. Many of the men in Marlborough's army were sick or worn out. These causes, and the scarcity of forage, compelled the General to forego his wish to attack Maubeuge.

Note 1. Cannon gives the 20th of October for the fall of Mons. Some writers fix the 9th as the date. Marlborough, however, in his despatch, dated the 21st, says October 20th. "The garrison beat the chamade yesterday noon, and desired to capitulate."

Note 2. As Malplaquet was the last great battle in which the Tenth fought for many years, it may be of

* Stanhope: "Reign of Queen Anne."

interest to give the list of officers serving in the Regiment at the time :—

COLONEL : William Lord North and Grey (Major-General).*

LT.-COLONEL : Henry Grove (Bt.-Col.).*

MAJOR : John Granville (Bt.-Lt.-Col.).*

CAPTAINS :

Richard Trevanion.

John Ligonier (Bt.-Major).*

Alexander Spottiswood
(Bt.-Lt.-Col.)*

George Green.*

Charles Legge.*

Samuel Buller.*

William Middleton.*

Charles North (Bt.-Major).*

Cuthbert Morland.*

Henry Poilblanc.*

CAPT.-LIEUT. : Manus O'Cahan.*

LIEUTENANTS :

Granville Raleigh.*

Thomas Preston (Qr.-Mr.).*

William Daniel.*

John Hellowes.*

Daniel Croye.*

Robert Pyott.*

John Coghill.

Giles Peacock.*

James Scott.*

Anthony Ligonier.*

Edward Hanbury.*

LIEUTENANTS :

Henry Brownjohn (Adjt.).

Joseph Stisted.*

James Littlejohn.*

ENSIGNS :

Isaac Teale.*

James Cuninghame.*

Edward Clarke.

Henry Rogers.*

Peter Darcy.*

Charles Midford.

Henry Andrews.

Arthur Taylor.

Richard Legge.*

William Walker.*

Thomas Nicholas.*

Barnaby Hughes.*

John Slingsby.*

Charles Toning.*

George Langley.*

Robert Granville.

Edmund Tichborne.*

CHAPLAIN : Joseph Forster.*

CHIRURGEON : David Debize.

Those marked * were present at the battle of Malplaquet.

CHAPTER XV.

MARLBOROUGH'S LAST CAMPAIGNS.

1710. TOURNAI was the rendezvous for the troops of the Allies when they came out of their winter quarters in the spring of 1710. Then a campaign began which was essentially one of sieges, for throughout the year no battle of importance was fought. The opposing armies kept in touch, but made no approach to each other. All that was done in the way of actual operations was the capture of Douai, Béthune, St. Venant, and Aire by the Allies. There was the constant gradual approach to the French frontier, much to the alarm of the French, who, however, seemed to be afraid to challenge Marlborough to another big battle, lest, losing it, he should threaten Paris. These strongholds were only taken after some fierce fighting, and it was said that the loss to the Allies in killed and wounded was not less than 15,000 men. From the soldiers' standpoint it was a wasted campaign.

France was becoming anxious for peace. She was, says Lecky, reduced to extreme and abject wretchedness. Her finances were in a deplorable state, while the people were at starvation point. Lecky goes on to say that France was becoming exhausted, in spite of the fact that Louis XIV. put great armies into the field. "All the old dreams of French conquests in the Spanish Netherlands, in Italy, and in Germany, were dispelled, and the French generals were now struggling desperately and skilfully to defend their own frontier." Louis was ready to make great concessions—to grant to the Dutch nearly all the fortresses of the French

and Spanish Netherlands, to destroy the fortifications of Dunkirk, and those on the Rhine from Basle to Philipsburg ; but when the demand was made to drive Philip out of Spain, there was a general outcry in France against the abandonment of the King's grandson.

Hence the campaigns of 1710 and 1711.

It had been supposed by the English troops in winter quarters that a peace would be arranged, and the English soldiers confidently expected to be sent home ; but orders came for the Tenth and those who were quartered with them in Ghent to march to Tournay. They arrived there about the middle of April. Soon after the Tenth reached the place the Allied Army numbered 60,000 men, but Marlborough was at his wits' end to find supplies. His only satisfaction was, that the French Commander was in yet greater difficulties. In consultation with Eugene, he decided to attack Douai, but first recaptured Mortagne, a small post which the French had snatched a few days before.

Douai promised as desperate a resistance as Tournay, "the place being protected by one of those powerful combinations of nature and art which so frequently occur in the Netherlands. On one hand ran the Haine and the Scarpe, in the centre was the canal of Douai, and on the other the lines of La Bassée, which had been strengthened with additional works, since the close of the previous campaign." These lines were guarded by 40 battalions and 20 squadrons under Marshal Montesquieu.

Every day's delay enabled the garrison to strengthen its defences, and consequently no time was lost. When the Allies assembled at Tournay, Marlborough marched forward rapidly. The Prince of Würtemberg went on in advance with 15,000 men, going by way of Pont à Tressin, and

thence to Pont à Vendin, "where the lines abutted on the Dyle and the canal of Douay." Count Fels was sent with a strong force towards Pont Auby on the same canal. "The whole army followed by wings in four columns, the right commanded by Marlborough, and the left by Eugene." Würtemberg secured the passage at Pont à Vendin, and Marlborough's men crossed as speedily as possible. Eugene, finding the passage at Pont Auby impracticable, crossed by the bridges of Saut and Courières, and the whole army met that night in the plains of Lens, near Montigny. Montesquieu had retreated in haste when he heard of the advance of the Allies.

The Tenth, worn out with the march, slept on their arms throughout the night, but went on with Marlborough next morning towards the Scarpe. The enemy were in retreat. Coming to Gouelzin, the General sent Cadogan round to Pont à Rache, to surround the northern side of Douai. Eugene was on the west of the fortress, and Marlborough with the remainder of his troops completed the investment. It was a success he had not hoped for, since the *Maréchal d'Artagnan* was in the neighbourhood in force. This was on April the 24th.

The Duke had to wait for his cannon, but meanwhile he completed the lines of circumvallation, doing so in four days. Inside Douai was a garrison of 8,000 men, "well supplied with ammunition and arms," and ready for an obstinate defence under the command of the *Marquis of Albergotti*.

On the 5th of May, Marlborough, without waiting for his cannon, opened his trenches. Assault after assault was repelled with slaughter, and a lull followed until the great train of artillery—200 pieces—came up. From that time the attack was furious and continuous, and the approaches to the covert way were carried. The actual command of

the Tenth during the operations was with Lieutenant-Colonel Grove, but although the regiment was within the lines of circumvallation, it was not called upon to take part in the fighting. Apparently the duty of the Tenth was to watch the road along which it was reported that Villars was to come with an immense army in order to raise the siege.

Villars came up on the 1st of June, and the Tenth being in his line of march, were under severe fire, which resulted in many of the men being killed or wounded. The French army, however, made no further advance, for at this point Villars, seeing Marlborough's preparations, and finding the lines unassailable, drew back and left Douai to its fate, although his army was greatly superior to that of the Allies. When the French retreated, Marlborough pressed the siege so vigorously that on the 25th of June the Garrison beat a parley, and on the following day the place was surrendered.

Marlborough now turned his attention towards Bethune, the works of which were very strong, and the garrison consisted of 9,000 men. Again the Tenth were placed in the army of observation, since it was known that Villars contemplated the raising of the siege; but the most the French Marshal attempted was to carry on a war of outposts upon the flanks of the Allies, behind his new position. Bethune capitulated on the 28th of August, and the Allies proceeded to Aire and St. Venant, "which towns," says Cannon, "were so situated as to admit of a simultaneous investment. As the capture of these fortresses would secure the navigation of the Lys, and open a water communication with Tournay, Lisle, and Ghent, the skill of the generals and the valour of the troops were called forth to insure their reduction." The Tenth, serving under the Prince of Anhalt, took part in the investment of Aire, a force of 40 battalions and 40 squadrons being so employed.

Aire was much stronger than St. Venant, "being fortified with regular bastions, half-moons, and horn-works, and the ditches being inundated by the waters of the Lys." General de Guebriant, who defended, had a strong garrison at his disposal, and made an heroic stand. Marlborough was greatly handicapped by want of ammunition, for during the siege the convoy of 1,200 foot and 450 horse, who were bringing up powder and other stores, were beaten, and everything destroyed. For a little time the Duke feared that he would be compelled to raise the siege in consequence. He pressed the place, however, and some tremendous fighting took place, the Tenth experiencing many and unpreventable hardships. The General wrote to his Duchess, saying, "Our poor men are up to the knees in mud and water, which is a most grievous sight, and will occasion great sickness."

The fighting resulted in considerable loss, the Tenth suffering as greatly as any while storming the outworks. They fought so gallantly that they were singled out for commendation by the Prince of Anhalt. The loss to the Allies, exclusive of the sick, was no less than 7,000 men, but at last, on the 9th of November, the place capitulated. The Tenth, after such arduous service, were greatly shattered. The men were worn out by the hardships, and the fierce fighting had so depleted the companies, that it was an immense relief when they marched by easy stages along the bank of the Lys to Courtrai, beyond Menin, where they halted for the winter. Many of them were ill, for, in addition to their hard experiences when under fire, they had been doing so much in the most wretched weather, which tried the strongest men.

1711. The campaign of 1711 was commenced early, and the Tenth were accordingly called out of their quarters in

April. Marlborough had anticipated a brilliant closing to the war, but he was disconcerted when news came of the death of the Emperor Joseph. Coxe, dealing with this event, says that the energies of the House of Austria were palsied at the commencement of a new reign, and the immediate exertions for securing the elevation of Charles to the throne of the Empire suspended the military operations in the Netherlands, and frustrated the projects of Marlborough and Eugene, because it required the presence of the German troops with the Prince in the Empire, while many of the minor princes of the Germanic body were likely to withdraw their contingents who had already joined, or withhold those who were on the march.

The Tenth, recruited during the winter, went to Warde, full of hope that a campaign was before them which would witness fights worthy to rank with those of Malplaquet and Blenheim. The regiment that marched out of Courtrai, smart in its appearance, and splendidly disciplined, bore little resemblance to the worn-out companies that entered the town towards the end of the previous November. They were elated at the news that Villars was assembling his army at Arras, and when they reached the camp at Warde, they were full of enthusiasm. But for nearly two months the Allied army waited there, uncertain as to the attitude of some who had engaged in the preceding campaigns. There seemed to be no occupation for the men but the dull routine of camp duty, save the guarding of the grazers who watched the horses feeding. Now and again there was an exciting brush with the enemy, and Marlborough was compelled to set apart as many as 1,600 foot and 800 horse for their safety, since it was too much labour to gather green forage and bring it into camp. The Tenth bore its full share of this duty, and consequently there were many casualties.

When the Duke reviewed the British troops, he expressed his admiration for the appearance and discipline of the Tenth. Three days later the whole army was on the move towards the plains of Lens, because of the scarcity of forage at Warde. Marlborough had in view the investment of Bouvain, but in order to reach that fortress it was necessary to break through the French lines, and traverse the Scarpe and Sanzet, or Sensee. He proposed to do this secretly, but knew how dangerous the undertaking was, and how "retreat would be hazardous." Coxe says that in the execution of this design he developed that sublimity of military talent which has justly stamped this campaign as not the least scientific and glorious in his career. It was necessary to deceive Villars by menacing his left, and making ostentatious preparations for storming the works at that point, thus to call off the French army from the route he intended to pass with the greater body of his troops. The Tenth, with other troops, were chosen, when this was done, to make a dash on Arleux, and some sharp fighting followed, the regiment suffering seriously in the night attack. They had swept round and came on the camp in front of the place from the Bouchain side, taking the French by complete surprise.

Various skilful manœuvres followed, wherein Marlborough so completely deceived Villars that the latter drew in all his distant garrisons, and concentrated his forces, anticipating a great battle. This was exactly the opposite of Marlborough's intention. He further deceived Villars by pretending to lay great value on Arleux and strengthening its fortifications, as if he meant to hold it at all hazards; but he only put in a small garrison of 400 men under Colonel Savary, and moved away, leaving this force to hold the post as long as possible against what he knew must be overwhelming odds.

Villars came at once, and Savary sent, asking for help, which Cadogan was to pretend to lend; but, according to instructions, was slow to do. Consequently Villars, as Marlborough had designed, captured the place and destroyed it. Then it was that Marlborough made Villars believe that he meant to offer battle in order to wipe out the disgrace. The Allies were amazed. It seemed to be madness even for Marlborough to attack an entrenched army so superior in numbers, but none knew that Cadogan was galloping away with a force to join Hompesch, and with their united strength to cross the causeway at Arleux, and take the French lines. The news came that this had been done at nightfall, and then in silence Marlborough drew off his army, marching as quickly as the infantry could move.

Marlborough was now engaged in a neck and neck race to get through the lines before Villars could come up. The Tenth had played their part in forcing the lines, which the Allies passed through while Villars, barely escaping capture in a mad ride to hinder it, witnessed a masterly movement—one of the finest in military annals. In eighteen hours the infantry had covered forty miles, and what Villars had thought impossible by reason of his precautions, was accomplished. Marlborough felt that the Tenth had done their full share towards enabling the whole army to get through the fortified lines, and encamp within striking distance of Arras, Cambrai, and Bouchain. Worn out as the army was after so long a march, each man "with a kit of fifty pounds weight" on his back, the soldiers responded to the call, and formed in line of battle, awaiting a threatened fight with the French army. Marlborough refused it, since it did not fall in with his plans. He designed with his inferior army to besiege Bouchain in face of a greatly superior force in point of numbers.

The date of the culmination of these remarkable achievements, and the halt between the Scheldt and Oisy, is set down by Marlborough in his despatches as August 5th, 1711.

On the 10th of August the siege of Bouchain began, and with it some hard days for the Tenth, who never failed to meet expectations, whether in facing danger, or in undergoing the drudgery incidental to an investment. It was their reliability which served to win so much of the credit which has accrued to the regiment. The siege began under the most wretched conditions, and the men were continually drenched with rain.

To follow the doings of the Tenth in detail is not possible, but constantly with their Colonel, Major-General Lord North and Grey, they were engaged in some of the most important and dangerous operations. Villars sought to establish himself on the farther bank of the Sauzet, and thus obtain a double communication with the town. If he could succeed in his purpose, he would sweep the intermediate ground, where Marlborough was, with a cross fire. The Duke determined to hinder him, and accordingly sent Lord North and Grey with the Tenth, 29 other battalions, and 42 squadrons, across the Scheldt to interrupt the operations of the French. The force started in the night and went silently, going in a thick fog. By seven in the morning they were within a cannon shot of the enemy's entrenchments, and North and Grey was about to attack when the Duke rode up and stopped the movement. He had unexpectedly heard that Montesquieu, with 60 battalions of infantry, was concealed behind the heights, treachery having apprised Villars of this night march. Knowing how strong Lord North and Grey's force was, Villars realised that the army investing Bouchain was very much weakened. He threatened it so seriously that the Tenth,

with other regiments, were marched back with all possible speed. Villars, seeing that he had forced Marlborough to retire in order to save the Allies from destruction, resumed his old position.

Marlborough found it necessary to do yet more, for his camp beyond the Scheldt was too exposed. He therefore made various dispositions, placing the Tenth and other battalions under North and Grey and Collier at a spot where they might protect those who were working in the line of circumvallation. It was a hazardous post for the Tenth. The troops thus located were incessantly threatened by the superior forces of France, but so well were they disposed, and so strongly fortified were their lines, that even with his greater numbers Villars was afraid to attack them. From time to time the Tenth joined in the assaults on Bouchain, whereby the first counterscarp was captured, and the enemy driven away from the two principal bastions; but in this fighting their loss was very heavy in killed and wounded. On the 14th of September the garrison surrendered, and when Marlborough had repaired and strengthened the place, the Tenth went into winter quarters. They had fought their last fight under their idolised General, for this was the last of Marlborough's campaigns.

1712. The Tenth came out of winter quarters in April, 1712, numbering 623 men, besides officers; but it is doubtful whether they anticipated the campaign with the confidence they had always felt when Marlborough was in command. It was known throughout the army that the great Duke's enemies had been working against him incessantly, and that when he returned to England at the close of the campaign of 1711, he was not only in disgrace politically, but his position was intolerable by reason of the Queen's coolness, not to mention the open enmity and criminal intrigues of men like Harley and Bolingbroke. "The victorious soldier,

whose career for so many years had been an unbroken tale of triumph in marches, sieges, battles, and negotiations, was dismissed from his commands, as if he were the worst of public offenders, instead of being the deliverer of Europe, and the glory of his country.* He would not stay in England, but found a home on the Continent, "to all intents a banished man," and he did not return until Queen Anne died in 1714.

The Tenth, coming out of winter quarters to proceed to the camp at Tournay, found that the new commander was the Duke of Ormonde. Then, to their disgust, it leaked out that instructions had been given him "to engage neither in a battle nor a siege, but virtually to open communications with Villars with a view to peace." It is true that there were some operations, but the Tenth had not any important work assigned to them in the siege of Quesnoy, which surrendered on the 4th of July. Everything was done in a half-hearted way, for the Allies were pressing hard for peace. Word came from England to Ormonde bidding him "to suspend hostilities for two months, and to withdraw his forces from Eugene."

The Tenth heard of this with an amazement that was general throughout the army. Those of the Allies who were in English pay refused to leave Eugene, who was the only general in whom they had confidence; the English, however, had no alternative but to go. They marched out of the camp of Cambresis after what Fortescue calls "one of the most remarkable scenes ever witnessed. The British fell in, silent, shamefaced, and miserable; the auxiliaries"—who had been in British pay, but would not march—"gathered in knots opposite to them, and both parties gazed at each other mournfully without saying a word. Then the drums beat the march, and regiment after

* Morley: "Walpole."

regiment tramped away with full hearts and downcast eyes, till at length the whole column was under way, and the mass of scarlet grew slowly less and less till it vanished out of sight."

Coxe also tells the wretched story which enables us to imagine the feelings which must have filled the breasts of all, and not of the Tenth alone, in that miserable march. Ormonde, when the troops halted for the night, caused the suspension of hostilities to be proclaimed at the head of every regiment, but a remarkable scene followed. The Duke had expected to hear huzzas; but, sitting in his pavilion, he heard a "general hiss and murmur throughout the camp." One who was present says: "The British soldiers were so enraged at this unworthy conduct that they were observed tearing their hair, and rending their cloathes, with furious exclamations and execrable curses against the Duke of Ormonde, as a stupid fool and general of straw. The colonels, captains, and other brave officers, were so overwhelmed with vexation that they sat apart in their tents, looking on the ground through very shame, with downcast eyes, and for several days shrunk from the sight even of their fellow-soldiers, for it grieved them to the heart to submit to the disgrace of laying down their arms after so many splendid victories. Some left their colours to serve among the Allies, and others withdrew; but, whenever they recollected the Duke of Marlborough, and the late glorious times, their eyes flowed with tears."*

It seemed during the march as if the Tenth and their comrades would turn their arms against their Allies, for in the march the Dutch, who felt that England was shamefully deserting them, refused in various places—at Bouchain, Tournay, and Douai—to open their gates. Wanting food

* Cunningham.

and shelter, Ormonde seized Ghent and Bruges for this purpose, and here in turn the men of the Tenth found both.

The regiment remained at Ghent, awaiting further orders, while the greater portion of the British forces marched on to Dunkirk. It was a long and irksome stay. The men were, as one put it, "lusting for war," and they had to stay in Ghent, inactive, on mere garrison duty, while the plenipotentiaries slowly spelt their way through the treaty of peace at Utrecht.

The year 1713 was spent thus, and in 1714, the Tenth, glad to be on the move once more, marched to Nieuport, where they were detained on garrison duty, until news came that Queen Anne had died, and that she was succeeded by George I. The Tenth were again disappointed. They had hoped to be called to England, but, instead of returning home, they were detained on garrison duty in Flanders until the Barrier Treaty was signed.

CHAPTER XVI

THE ARMY IN QUEEN ANNE'S DAYS.

WHILE the Tenth and their comrades were winning great glory under Marlborough, they were enduring untold hardships, and justifiably complained of being ill-fed, and that their payments were shamefully in arrears. As an example of this, Clode, in his book, "Military Forces of the Crown," shows how the garrison of Portsmouth were reduced by death or desertion to half their former number in less than a year and a half, through sickness, want of firing, and bad barracks. The few new barracks that were built were erected with the most scandalous parsimony, and crowded to excess.

Such was the disregard for the comfort of the men who were doing so much to advance the prestige of England. What the accommodation on the field must have been when that of the barracks at home was so shameful, one can scarcely conceive. The pretence was that, if the barracks were built, it was providing for a permanent army; consequently, everything seemed to be of a make-shift character. The Board of Ordnance made no secret of the fact that when they built barracks about this time, they did so in as little space as could be well allowed, five beds for ten men being put into a room 18 by 17 feet square. Houses such as these were built three stories high, not counting the garrets in which men were placed, with little regard to overcrowding. Clode tells us it was not parsimony which led to this, "but a strong feeling then entertained against a Standing Army." The barrack accommodation even as late as 1792 would only house

20,847 men. All above this number were under canvas, regardless of the weather. Often in Marlborough's time the men were put into "barns or empty houses, whereby the soldiers may be kept from perishing, through the severity of the weather, until her Majesty's further orders shall be given concerning them."

Barrack accommodation proving so inadequate, billeting was resorted to, the soldiers being quartered in the houses of the Sovereign's subjects without their consent being asked for. This billeting system was dangerous and odious, and such was the disgraceful conduct of some of the men quartered on the citizens that one of the Articles of War runs thus:—"If any shall presume to beat or abuse his host, or the wife, child, or servant of his host, where he is quartered or billeted, he shall be put in irons for it; and if he do it a second time, he shall be further punished." The abuses of the system were intolerable in many ways, and citizens had to buy out the troops, if they did not want them in their homes, at the rate of fivepence to sixpence a day for each man, and this in addition to the usual contribution in the way of taxes for Army maintenance. One of the rooted objections to a Standing Army may be found here.

James II. had been absolutely indifferent to the wishes of the people in this regard. When, for instance, the Tenth were on the march in 1688, going from place to place, with the idea of displaying his Majesty's military force, the same orders applied to them as to other regiments. The King quartered the men, two in a bed, refusing to pay for their quartering, except under certain circumstances, such as excess beyond the required number, when eightpence a day was allowed for necessaries.*

* Clode: "Military Forces of the Crown."

William III. had realised the mischief accruing from such a system, and issued a proclamation in 1689, "prohibiting any to quarter in a private house without the free and full consent of the owner; and that all houses should be deemed private houses except victualling houses, houses of public entertainment, and such as sell wine or other liquor by retail." War, however, led to the suspension of these prohibitions. Great bodies of troops had to move across the country on the way to the coast, and Parliament, passing the Mutiny Act of 1690, inserted a clause which permitted billeting under this emergency, but not as a permanency. Payment was arranged for, and what the householder was expected to provide for the money, was set forth with the utmost precision. It was the insertion of the thin end of the wedge, so that by the year 1741 billeting was tending to become a permanent thing.

The billeting system was the more serious because the War of the Spanish Succession led to a great increase in the Standing Army of England. The increase was what Fortescue calls "portentously rapid." When Charles II. died, the Army numbered 8,000 men. When William and Mary were on the throne 64,000 men were under arms. When Marlborough was winning his magnificent victories on the Continent, the numbers went up amazingly, and in 1711 totalled 201,000 men. But Clode points to the fact that that vast host was made up of foreign, rather than of native, troops. Fortescue, in his history of the Army, says that, "speaking generally, the highest strength actually attained by British troops at home and abroad during the war may be set down at 70,000 men."

Doubtless, one of the objections to the billeting system arose because of the strange methods pursued in recruiting the Army. The men who enlisted were not of the best. Three thousand men were wanted yearly in William III.'s

reign to make up for the loss in wear and tear in such regiments as the Tenth, which bore the brunt of battle in war time. Volunteers would not come forward when it was known that army work involved suffering, and abominable treatment by reason of the lack of common care, proper housing, and feeding. The ranks were recruited in Queen Anne's days from those who were liberated from jail, on condition that they should be drafted into the Army. Men enlisted in order to defraud their creditors, and gave the recruiting officer money in order to say nothing. The debtor prisons contributed their share, and men under sentence of death were reprieved from execution with a promise of ultimate pardon if they went into the ranks. The reminder is given, that this was not so bad a thing as it seems at first sight, for it must be remembered that many a man was then condemned to death who would now be released under the First Offender's Act; but apart from this, criminals were welcome to the recruiting officer, first, because they cost nothing, and secondly, because they were men of fine physique. In the later years of the war the sweepings of the jails were in particular request; footpads, pickpockets, house-breakers, the scum of the country were included, and were willing to go—to do anything rather than endure the horrors of jail, or die at the gallows.*

Such were some of the recruits who found their way into the Tenth during the time when they were resting in winter quarters. But all were not of that character. Many fine young fellows went to Ghent, or wherever the British soldiers were quartered during the interval between the campaigns. Some volunteered to serve on their fathers' behalf, when the father was released from the debtors' jail, and must find a substitute, or go off to the wars. Men who

* Fortescue: "History of the Army."

had no lawful calling or employment, or visible means for their maintenance and their livelihood, could, under an Act of Parliament, be impressed into military service, but in that case the recruit received 20s., and the constable who brought him to the Justices got 10s. for his trouble. A volunteer received a special bounty of £2, but when the fearful losses at Blenheim and Ramillies depleted the ranks, the bounty was increased to £4, and the churchwardens of the parish where the volunteer resided received £3 to aid the poor rates, but with special reference to the poor relations of the soldier.*

Great abuses crept in, and some in the way of enforced impressment—the equivalent of the later Press Gang—when Impressment Officers and constables made money on each recruit, no matter in what manner he was obtained. Fortescue points to the discreditable fact that sham Press Gangs established themselves, with the object of levying blackmail.

Although the Short Service system was in vogue, men enlisting in the Tenth or other regiments for three years only, desertions were frequent, and the monthly returns of the Tenth show numerous instances. The fact was, that the soldier's life was not a happy one. The food was inadequate and bad, as may be seen when a week's allowance for the soldier of the Tenth is taken into consideration. For the seven days the man in garrison received:—

7lbs. of bread, or a pint of wheat.

2½lbs. of beef.

1lb. of pork.

4 pints of pease.

3 pints of oatmeal.

6 ounces of butter.

8 ounces of cheese.

* Clode "Military Forces of the Crown."

The soldier necessarily had to supplement this beggarly allowance out of his scanty pay. Marlborough was careful over the well-being of the men in his army. "He took care to feed him well, pay him regularly, to give him plenty of work, and to keep him under the strictest discipline." It was more than could be said of other generals.

There was little under the conditions which prevailed to make soldier-life attractive; yet year after year the ranks of the Tenth were kept up, and the men of the regiment emulated the glory their predecessors had won. The disabilities were not for the rank and file only. Take the case of the officers in the Tenth. Endless liabilities were heaped on them. They had to contribute to pensions and regimental debts; and while they received a bounty for every man they enlisted, they had no allowance "for recruits lost through desertion, sickness, or other misfortunes over which they had no control." Losses such as these often left the officer without a penny, and charges that were made upon him in rendering him responsible for bringing his recruits to camp, scores dying in the fever-stricken transports, entailed losses which sometimes brought financial ruin to him.*

Marlborough was obliged to take cognizance of this state of affairs, and writing from the camp at Lens in 1711, advised her Majesty on the matter. She had been recommended to refuse permission to any officer to sell his commission without her consent, but the Duke wrote: "There are so many occasions where it would be a hardship to refuse this liberty to subalterns who, by misfortune in their recruits or otherwise, have run themselves so far behindhand, as not to be able to continue in the service, so that unless they have liberty to dispose of their

* Fortescue: "History of the Army."

commissions, the debt must fall on the regiment." It was a vicious and mischievous state of things. Many an officer in the Tenth was "eating his head off" with anxiety.

One wonders what the state of the Army would have been but for the preponderating influence of Marlborough. When he was deprived of his immense power, it was seen that he had done great things to advance, not merely the prestige of the Army of England, but its actual efficiency as a fighting force. He looked to its welfare in every particular. Taking the army as a necessary adjunct of the national life, as safeguarding the kingdom's weal, no one did so much for it as the Duke of Marlborough. In the Council of the nation much was done of which he disapproved—much which indicated the dabbling of laymen in the special work of war of which they were absolutely ignorant, and which, but for the presence of a master-spirit, such as his, would have led to irretrievable disgrace, if not to national ruin. As a statesman, Marlborough was an egregious failure, and it was a thousand pities that he ever entered on the path of politics, but he was without a peer in matters that were military, and England's debt to him is incalculable.

The Tenth and their comrades knew this, and Marlborough became their idol. Their confidence in him was unbounded. Whenever it was known that a great battle was to be fought, they counted on the victory, and fought as men who had already half won.

RESTING TIME.

CHAPTER XVII.

ON GARRISON DUTY.

1714. WHEN George I. came to the throne, the Duke of Marlborough was reinstated in all the offices from which Queen Anne had abruptly, and almost brutally, dismissed the most able soldier she had in her service. His Majesty made no reservations. Like every far-seeing man in Europe, he recognised the worth of the general who had done so much to advance the honour and prestige of England, and, accordingly, he instructed Viscount Townshend to prepare a Bill for his signature, restoring Marlborough as Captain-General, and extending to him "all Powers, Authoritys, Rights, Privileges, Preheminences, Perquisites, Profits, Allowances, Advantages and Emoluments as were granted with the same office," in the days when the Duke enjoyed the favour of his Royal Mistress. This was done on the 23rd of September, 1714. As George became King on the 1st of August—the day of Queen Anne's death—little time was lost in recognising Marlborough's merits.

Under the new King the Tenth were officered as follows,* the Commissions being signed at St. James's on the 11th of January, 1714:—

* If these names are compared with those given in Vol. ii., many discrepancies will be found owing to the carelessness which prevailed at the time in the spelling of proper names. It has been thought of interest to print the above list *literatim*, as it shows the distribution of the Officers by Companies, but Capt. Chamier's Roll of Officers, taken as it is from the contemporary Army Lists, is probably the more reliable as to the orthography of the names.—AUTHOR.

| FIELD OFFICERS AND CAPTAINS. | LIEUTENANTS. | ENSIGNS. |
|---|-------------------------------------|------------------------|
| William, Lord North and Grey, Col. and Capt. | Grinval Raleigh, Capt'n's Lieut. | Alexr. Sinclair. |
| Henry Grove, Lt.-Col. and Captain. | Henry Slingsby. | John Ramsey. |
| John Granville, Major and Captain. | James Scott. | Robt. Granville. |
| Samuel Buller. | James Littlejohn. | August de Bees. |
| Charles Legg. | Robert Cujolas. | George Langley. |
| Rd. Trevannion. | James Cunningham. | Edmund Tichburne. |
| Cuthbert Morland. | Thomas Preston. | John Preston. |
| Henry Coiblaime. | William Walker. | William Lyne. |
| Scipio Durour. | Henry Rogers. | Alexr. Elphinstone. |
| Manus O'Cane. | Henry Sprott. | G. R. La Coudrier. |
| John Langley | Charles Tonyne | Granadiers. |
| Caeser Bonnin. | Arthur Taylor | Dated 6th Decr., 1714. |
| | Henry Brownjohn. | John Wharton. |
| CHAPLAIN : Joseph Foster. | | |
| QUARTER MASTER : Jno. Cunningham. | | |
| ADJUTANT : Gustavus Hamilton | | |

This list of Commissions came as one of many—not merely for the King's signature formally, but to assert the necessity for a strong standing army in England. When the Treaty of Utrecht was signed there was an instant demand either for the disbandment or the reduction of the army, and before Anne died, as many as 33,000 men were sent adrift. The cost of the war had been such that there was an immediate cry for retrenchment. The thought, moreover, of so ignominious a peace following such brilliant feats of arms, and the dismissal of the great general who had added so incalculably to the nation's glory, had much to do with this outcry. Bolingbroke responded readily enough, since it suited his purpose to do so, and officers who were not sympathetic politically, and were supposed to be anti-Jacobite, were dismissed wholesale, or advised to resign, since it would be well for them. If an officer spoke favourably of the Hanoverian Succession, or, at a regimental dinner, drank the health of the Hanoverian

Prince, who was to succeed to the throne on the death of the Queen, he was advised to sell his commission, or was summarily dismissed. Officers of high rank and of high degree in the social scale did not escape. Some who did not accept the hints that were given, found things so disagreeable that in sheer self-respect, and for peace of mind, they resigned. It is probable that the disappearance of some names from the Tenth's list of Officers, and the impossibility of tracing any army record afterwards, was due to this sort of thing. When Queen Anne heard of these wholesale resignations, and was made acquainted with the fact that the vacancies were filled with Roman Catholics who were known to be Jacobites, she was amazed. But care was taken that she should be kept in ignorance as to the full extent to which this was carried.

All the intrigues of the Jacobites were frustrated when the Queen died, for in the quietest manner possible the Elector of Hanover, in accordance with the Act of Succession, was proclaimed King as George I., everywhere. Bolingbroke and his partisans were checkmated, and, to their chagrin, Marlborough returned to England, and was received with a popular enthusiasm, which contrasted greatly with the studied insults that were displayed by those who were in office.

1715. When Marlborough once more took charge of the army, he found it, to his great concern, so seriously reduced, that the safety of the kingdom was jeopardised. When the Jacobites resolved on a rising in 1715, the kingdom was in an almost defenceless state, and the 9,000 men who were at his Majesty's disposal were altogether inadequate to put down the rising, and secure the safety of the throne.

The position of the Tenth at this crisis was a singular one. It was one of the most loyal regiments of the army,

and its Colonel, Lord North and Grey, as fine an officer as any in the service. His services were exceptionally valuable, and step by step, by sheer merit, rather than by patronage, he had risen to high rank. When the Queen died and George became King, it was realised that he was deserving of recognition, and a warrant was issued, promoting him to the rank of Lieutenant-General.

It was duly signed but not dated, and later it was cancelled, it having been discovered that Lord North and Grey's tendencies towards Jacobitism were so pronounced that it was unsafe to entrust him with any military command. Many things were recalled which shook the confidence of the authorities. On the 8th of April he had spoken warmly in the House of Lords against setting a price on the Pretender's head. In the speech he "endeavour'd to show the Barbarity of setting a Reward upon anybody's Head ; which, he said, was an encouraging of Murder and Assassination, and how repugnant such a practice was to Christianity, the Law of Nature, and the Laws of all Civiliz'd Nations." Later in the speech he protested that "no man either had more Respect and Affection for the illustrious House of Hanover, or would do more to serve them than himself ; but that they must excuse him, if he would not venture damnation for them." When the Jacobite threats assumed reality, this was remembered against him, and he was removed from his position as Colonel.

The Colonelcy of the Tenth was given to Lieutenant-Colonel and Brigadier-General Henry Grove. The Commission which made Grove Colonel was dated June 23rd, 1715.

When the rebellion broke out in September, volunteers were invited, and while disbanded regiments were brought

into existence again, depleted regiments were strengthened by calling out the officers and men who had been induced, or, more correctly, compelled, by Bolingbroke's friends to resign. Fortunately, the rising of 1715 was put down with very little trouble, but not until the greatest concern had been felt throughout the country.

News of a threatened rising occasioned the return of the Tenth from Flanders to England. It was known that Grove could be depended on for his loyalty, courage, conduct, and fidelity, while his men and officers were as reliable as himself. Consequently, word was sent to him to bring back his regiment to this country with all speed, and with a soldier's alacrity he was ready to set sail with his men in a few hours. Before long he reported himself in London, and had his regiment at the Tower Stairs, waiting for instructions. This was in the middle of August, and when the rising took place the Tenth were in garrison at Colchester.

It was suggested that the regiment should march to Scotland, but it was considered advisable to retain it for service in England, in view of a possible Jacobite insurrection here. None had come out as yet beyond the insurgent bands, which were led by the Earl of Mar in Scotland, but secret intelligence was to hand which led to the Colonel being instructed to bring the Tenth with all speed to Hammersmith, to act as a Bodyguard to the Royal Family. They moved two or three times in the month of October, leaving Hammersmith for Kensington, and later going into quarters at Chelsea.

The condition of things was remarkable. The military prestige of England had so advanced that she was easily first in the esteem of Continental nations; yet the people were actually trembling at the possible outcome of an

insurrection of the Jacobites, and breathed with intense relief when news was received that the Pretender, whom Mar had proclaimed King in Scotland, finding his cause hopeless even there, had re-embarked and returned to the Continent. The important consequence of this alarm was, that Parliament voted funds for an additional number of men. It did not result in any increase, for a sense of confidence having been restored, a reduction actually took place, and no less than 10,000 men were dismissed. By 1719, there were not more than 12,000 men in the army.

The Tenth now had a long experience of garrison service. For the next few years the record is merely one of changing quarters: now to Lichfield, then to Newcastle-under-Lyme, the stay at the latter place lasting through the winter and on into the spring of 1716.

1716. Garrison duty still occupied the Tenth during the years 1716 and 1717, the regiment being stationed in Warwickshire in the former year, and in the latter in Lancashire. In 1716 there was the prospect of active service, since the fear of another invasion by the Pretender was felt by all ranks of society, but in the following year the panic subsided, and the soldiers of the Tenth experienced once more the easier part of garrison duty.

1717. Amid the changes the Government were making in the Army, the Tenth were in no way diminished in their strength, and Grove was too good an officer to permit any laxity in discipline. The Establishment voted the previous year had been 36,000 men for home, 6,000 Dutch soldiers and the troops in Ireland remaining as before. But this year the Establishment was diminished by one-fourth, and in May the King announced that he had given orders to reduce the army by 10,000 more.

1718-1721. The estimates for 1718, accordingly, did not provide for more than 16,000 men in Great Britain, while

those for 1719 diminished even that handful by one-fourth again, and brought the total down to 12,000. Fortescue's figures are here given. Throughout the years that followed there were always some who resented the maintenance of even this small establishment, and the insane cry was raised again and again of "No Standing Army!" Naturally, the Jacobites, who had everything to hope for if the army were disbanded, shouted their loudest; but the Government, weak enough to yield in part, doggedly refused any further reduction. Indeed, when it was recognised that the clamour came principally from known Jacobites, the army was increased by another couple of thousands. Later, the Government, possessed of secret information, raised the strength of the existing corps. Thus the Tenth was raised to and maintained at 655 men, and the Home Army numbered 18,000. Under even these circumstances, Lord Townshend said in the Lords, in 1722, that "it was impossible to collect 4,000 men without leaving the King, the capital, and fortified places defenceless."

It can scarcely be said that the garrison duty which fell to the men of the Tenth, was altogether pleasant or good for the soldiers under existing conditions. The presence of barracks would have been better in every way, but no one had the temerity to propose the building of such places in face of the yearly cry of "Retrenchment, and No Standing Army!" The soldiers were scattered about the garrison towns in the various inns, and had the Jacobites got hold of them, it would have been an easy thing to seduce some of them to disloyalty or desertion.

Nor were there any real efforts made for the soldiers' comfort, nor for the provision of the barest necessities that would keep them in good health. It mattered not what

the conditions were, the soldiers were scandalously neglected. But it was an old, long-lasting, and disgraceful story, which continued decade after decade, with no attempt to better the conditions. Anticipating history for the moment, we find that during their American experience, in the second half of the 18th century, the Tenth had not the care bestowed on them for their comfort which the climate and their work called for. Again and again the commanding officers were writing to complain of the want of firing, and even of the common necessities of life. In one of General Gage's despatches he said that in some places where the troops were quartered there was no barrack accommodation, and that the Colonials were averse to allow their houses to be converted into barracks. The men were "miserably lodged in the vilest huts," and, as a consequence, the general was harassed by their constant sickness. Gage received a petition from the officers of some of the regiments in which they stated that they were put to the expense of purchasing arms, clothing and accoutrements, and saw no movement on the part of the Government at home to reimburse them. So hard pressed were they that they were thereby deprived of the means of providing for themselves and families.

One understands from this how shamefully lax the authorities were all the way through—in the early and the later days—as to the provision of the means for the comfort of the men who were fighting the nation's battles at such a cost. The wonder was, that the soldiers served so well a country that was so indifferent, and so slow to recognise the claims of the men who were upholding the nation's honour before the world. What could be said of a Government when it was possible for an officer to write home in the following terms? "I am excessively sorry to find myself still under an absolute necessity of reporting



Copied by permission of H.M. George V.] [From a print in Windsor Castle.

LIEUT.-GENERAL COLUMBINE,
COLONEL BENTH,



the State of the Men, without a Bed, Blanket, or Sheet." And winter was coming on!

This abominable mismanagement was not the matter of a year or two, after which vigorous measures were taken to promote the comfort of the soldiers. It went all through the century, from the time when the Tenth returned to England to be in readiness for the Jacobite rising, on through the home service days, while the regiment was going from place to place; now in London, then at Lichfield, or Newcastle, Warwickshire, or Lancashire, Wolverhampton or Birmingham, Gibraltar or America.

1722. The Pretender's party still gave trouble, and particularly in Scotland; and this served to provide a welcome change for the Tenth from the monotony of garrison life under such wretched conditions. The Government were in possession of facts which revealed the existence of a Jacobite plot of a most formidable character. Lecky puts the story into shape as follows: The Duke of Ormonde was to invade England, and a plan was made for seizing the Bank and the Tower. The Government instantly prepared to meet the threatening danger. A camp was formed in Hyde Park, and the officers of every regiment were called on to be at their posts instantly. Several men of rank were arrested, and among them Lord North and Grey, so lately the Colonel of the Tenth, and as fast as ships could carry them, several regiments were brought over from Ireland. Orders were given to four regiments of infantry—the Tenth, the 12th, the 19th, and the Scots Fusiliers (21st Foot), and six companies of the Black Watch, to be in readiness to march to Scotland, for the purpose of disarming the clans in the neighbourhood of Castle. Before starting for the north, the four regiments went to Salisbury Plain, where the King met them on the 30th of August, 1722.

The "Political State" for that month contains an account of the review, and from it the following extract is taken :—

"Whitehall, Sept. 3. On Tuesday, the 28th past, in the Morning, His Majesty set out from His Palace at Kensington, and being joined on the Way by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, who accompanied His Majesty throughout his Progress, went that Day to his Grace the Duke of Bolton's Seat at Hackwood, where many Persons of Quality waited to pay their Duty to His Majesty at His Arrival. The High Sheriff of Hampshire met His Majesty at his Entrance into that County, and attended Him till His Majesty passed into Wiltshire. . . . On Wednesday, the 29th, His Majesty proceeded to Salisbury, being received at the Entrance into Wiltshire by the High Sheriff of that County. Arriving at Salisbury in the Evening, His Majesty was met by the Mayor and Aldermen in their Formalities, and complimented on their part by Sir Robert Eyre, one of the Justices of the Court of King's Bench, their Recorder. The Mayor presented to His Majesty the Keys of the City and a Purse with 100 Guineas in it, and another Purse with 50 Guineas in it to the Prince. His Majesty was conducted to the Bishop's Palace, where His Majesty supped in Publick in a Room where were two Tables equally Served. . . . His Majesty lodged in the Bishop's Palace that Night and the next. Thursday, the 30th, being the Day appointed for the Review of the Forces encamped within two miles of Salisbury, His Majesty went first to Divine Service in the Cathedral Church; and proceeded from thence to the Camp; where, being on Horseback, His Majesty reviewed the following Regiments.—

REGIMENTS OF HORSE.

Lord Londonderry's.
Major-General Wade's.

REGIMENTS OF DRAGOONS.

Major-General Evans's.
Brigadier Gore's.

REGIMENTS OF FOOT.

Lieut.-General Wills's.
Collonel Cadogan's.
Collonel Pocock's.
Brigadier Stanwix's.
Brigadier Grove's.
Collonel Montague's.
Collonel Clayton's.

And His Majesty was pleased to declare His Satisfaction with the excellent Order in which they all appeared. The Concourse of People from all Parts to see His Majesty at this Review, was exceeding great. His Majesty returned to the Bishop's Palace at Salisbury, the Dean and Chapter, the Clergy of that Town, and many of the neighbouring Clergy."

It is recorded that his Majesty, when he had reviewed the troops, harangued them in broken English, and that on the following day the camp dispersed, and the Tenth and their comrades marched to the North, halting on the way for rest at Wolverhampton and Birmingham. One would have supposed that the exigencies of the occasion would have led to forced marches, but it was not until the summer of the next year—1723—that the Tenth arrived in Scotland in company with the other troops.

Here they were under the command of General Wade, who had served in the Tenth in the early days of his successful career. He was with the Tenth at Steenkirk, and it is on record that the grenadiers of the regiment greatly distinguished themselves under him in storming and carrying the citadel of Liege, which was one of the strongest fortifications in Flanders. Wade had pleasure in welcoming to his command his old regiment, whose record was now so glorious.

Stockqueler, having shown that the Tenth were quartered in various Lowland towns, tells how Wade's army began the march for the district "which was then, to Englishmen, a *terra incognita*, the country of the clans." What is interesting in that account is the description of the force.

"Meanwhile, in their quaint uniforms, with cross-belts and Kevenhuller hats, or Grenadier caps like sugar-loaves, their queues and pipe-clayed inexpressibles, the King's troops, those veterans of the Flanders wars, toiled on by the Moors of Rannoch and the Black Mount, where other roads and ways there were none, save the old Fingalian war-paths—by stupendous mountains whose heads are veiled in mist, by deep, solemn, and silent valleys, where the whistle of the curlew or the rush of the torrent alone wakes the echoes—amid the same scenery from which the Hessian infantry had shrunk some thirty-seven years before, when they declared that beyond the gorge of Killycrankie lay the end of the world; and where the wild and barbaric dress of the inhabitants seemed as strange to the eye as their language was harsh and uncouth to the southern ear."

The task set for the Tenth and those who marched with them into the far North, among the rugged and awesome

Highlands, was a dangerous one. It might well have brought on them a rushing force of desperate Highlanders—men who remembered what the troops from the South had done in the bloody march through Glencoe—and who would not leave them until the whole army was annihilated in the passes.

Wade had come among the Highland fortresses to receive the submission “of a high-spirited people who had resisted as long as resistance was possible,” and who were pledged to the cause of the Pretender, whom they esteemed their rightful King. Again and again letters reached him, “letters of menace, to intimidate him from putting the Disarming Act into execution.” The enemies of the Hanoverian Dynasty were doing everything possible to inflame the people, and Wade, knowing this, realised how, by any false step, he might lead these choicest troops of the British Army to destruction. Bringing wonderful tact to bear upon his task, he succeeded in accomplishing it with consummate ability. He reconnoitred the Highlands, and reported to the Government what he saw of their strength and their resources. When he was appointed Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, with the same forces at his disposal, he commenced “the construction of those important military roads which brought the inmost fastnesses in the north and west of Scotland within touch of the rest of Great Britain.” Wade employed his soldiers in making these roads, for which the men received sixpence a day extra pay, and in three years the work was well advanced.*

Cannon says that in 1724 the Tenth left Scotland and went into garrison at Nottingham, but Major Lawrence-Archer, in his “Regimental Records,” says that the regiment was employed, under General Wade, in making roads in the Scottish Highlands in 1727-8. There is

* Nat. Dictionary of Biography.

little doubt that the latter writer is correct as to the road-making, but the date must be wrong. Another writer gives it as 1726. That may be taken as correct, and allows for Cannon's statement, that "On the prospect of hostilities taking place on the Continent, in the spring of 1727, between the Emperor of Germany and 1727 the Dutch, the regiment was held in readiness to proceed on foreign service." The Record then states that at the same time its Colonel was promoted to the rank of Major-General; but no embarkation took place.

The Tenth, recalled from the exciting and dangerous, as well as laborious, work in the Highlands, now spent a tedious time in garrison duty. They were, nevertheless, kept well up to war strength in readiness for contingencies.

In this pause in the story one may take note of an old manuscript which would have been invaluable if it had been finished, and not left in a state of promise only, with very little done. The MS. is entered in the Bodleian Library as:—

REGIMENTAL BOOK OF RECORDS, 1726.

Compiled for Grove's Regiment
10th Foot.

It is a disappointing book. What there is in it is valuable, but the MS. in no way comes up to expectations. All that it contains is set forth in detail, thus:—

Codex chartaceus, in folio, ff. 129, quorum paene omnia vacua sunt, sec. XVIII. In tegmine interiori sunt insignia gentilitia Francisci Columbine, "Lieut.-gen. of all his mayesty's forces and col. of a regiment."

A book prepared for entries relating to the Tenth or North Lincolnshire regiment of Foot, but containing a few coats of arms and the regimental insignia, neatly

painted. On the first page is the title, "Regimental book of record"; beneath, a representation of Mars bearing a sword with the motto, "Ad utrumque paratus," and Britannia, with a shield containing the white horse of Brunswick (marked "C.F.C. fecit"); at the foot, "Sterling in North Britain, 1725."

On folio 2 (marked "Officers" on a vellum label projecting from the book) are the royal arms, followed on ff. 3, 12, 13, by twenty-four other coats, chiefly in colours, with a few in trick. There are besides many vacant shields.

On fol. 29 (labelled, "Court Mart.") are the arms of Col. Henry Grove, Colonel of the Regiment from 1715 to 1736, of Francis Columbine, Lieut.-Col. from 1715 and Colonel from 1737 to 1746, and of Scipio Duroure, major, surmounted by flags. At fol. 99 is a label marked "Death." On fol. 101 (labelled "Quart") are three shields with the arms of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, and Brunswick and Luneburgh.

In the MS. itself there is not a word in the way of record; nothing to throw any light on the doings of the regiment during the colonelcy of Grove.*

One thing comes out of the perusal of this MS., namely, that "There must have been in Grove's Regiment 10 camp colours, one for each company; from the fact that they were of yellow material it may be inferred that the facings of the regiment were of that hue at the time."

Unfortunately, information is not forthcoming as to the clothing of the Tenth, and not until the year 1742 is anything obtainable that is trustworthy, not even in descriptions of deserters. A work entitled "Cloathing of His Majesty's Troops," gives illustrations of a private soldier

I have mentioned this matter fully, since some may turn to the MS. to read a record and be disappointed.—AUTHOR.


in the Tenth in 1742, and the description runs as follows:— A long, loose, red coat, reaching to the knees; the edges of the skirts are turned inwards, and lined with bright yellow. There is no collar, simply a patch on either side with a button. The front of the coat has bright, yellow lapels ornamented with nine white metal buttons, and long imitation buttonholes. Large, bright yellow cuffs, turned back from the sleeve, ornamented with three white metal buttons and three V-shaped white patches below each button. Immediately below the waistbelt a white metal button is visible. There are cross-pockets, and white metal buttons again. The waistcoat is red, and worn long, and on the right side are smaller white metal buttons. The shirt and neckcloth are white, so also are the shirt cuffs, which are visible. The breeches are scarlet. The feet are spatted, and white leggings are worn well up above the knees. The garters are black. The hats are three-cornered, and are trimmed with white lace. The Hanoverian cockade is fastened on the left side. The sword-belts are brown buff in colour, as also is the sling of the firelock. The officers were clothed in similar garb, the cloth being of better quality, and gold lace substituting cotton trimmings.*

Returning to the story of the Tenth; notwithstanding the smallness of the Army Establishment, the Government had the temerity to join the Quadruple Alliance, in which England, France, the Emperor of Germany, and Holland combined, with the purpose of checking the aggressive policy of Cardinal Alberoni, the Chief Minister of Spain. In 1727, things assumed such a threatening aspect, that

* I am indebted to some valuable notes in MS. which have been collected with great care by Major E. B. Wilkinson, who has gone into the question of the uniform of the Tenth most thoroughly.—AUTHOR.

NOTE BY CAPTAIN A. C. CHAMIER.—The officers were still wearing *silver* lace in 1813, for which gold was substituted in 1832 (Army Lists). As the men were wearing white metal buttons, I think gold (*supra*) is a mistake.

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1768.



1795.

REGIMENTAL UNIFORMS.



1795.

war with Spain appeared to be almost a certainty, so that it was felt to be necessary to strengthen the garrison at Gibraltar. Accordingly, the Tenth were sent thither, and it was their misfortune to remain there for no less than nineteen years. The embarkation took place at Portsmouth in June, 1730. During that long period

1730 there was twice a change in the colonelcy of
to the regiment. Lieutenant-General Grove died

1763 on the 20th of November, 1736, but no steps
were taken to fill up the vacancy for several

months. In June, 1737, Major-General Francis Columbine was appointed Colonel of the Tenth. Grove was an officer of whom the men of the regiment were deservedly proud. He entered the army on the 1st of December, 1688, as an ensign, and his connection with the Tenth, which he joined as Lieut.-Colonel in 1704, lasted for 32 years. He went through every campaign with William III., and also with Marlborough, served in Scotland under Wade, and died while still in the service, holding the rank of Lieutenant-General at the time of his death.

Francis Columbine was likewise a soldier who won distinction, and was welcomed as Lieutenant-Colonel of the Tenth, coming to it from the 8th Regiment of Foot, in which he was Major and Brevet-Colonel. The record when he died, in 1746, after having been Colonel for nine years was, that "he preserved the regiment in a high state of discipline and efficiency." At the time of his death he was Lieutenant-General, having been advanced to that rank in 1739 (July 2nd).

The new Colonel was Lieutenant-General James Lord Tyrawley, who came from the third troop of Life Guards, which George II. reduced, in response to a reiterated and almost hysterical demand in the country for the reduction of the army, and a consequent diminished army charge. The

appointment dated from December, 1746, but Tyrawley did not hold the post for more than two and a quarter years, when he was removed to the 14th Dragoons. He was not a long stayer in any of his regiments. For about a year he was with the 3rd troop of Life Guards, was Colonel of the Tenth till 1749, then of the 14th Dragoons till 1752, when he went to the 3rd Dragoons. In 1755 he was Colonel of the Coldstreams or 2nd Foot Guards. But he was a fine officer and a gallant soldier. He had gone through the Marlborough campaigns and was desperately wounded at Malplaquet. He had previously been wounded at the battle of Almanza, when he saved Lord Galway's life by his conspicuous courage. Possibly a restless spirit accounted for his many removals, for his soldierly qualities were so apparent that he was ultimately made General in 1761, and Field-Marshal in 1763. Walpole spoke of him in later days as "imperiously blunt, haughty, and contemptuous, with an undaunted portion of spirit."

The order for relief from garrison duty at Gibraltar came in 1749, when the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed. The Tenth hailed it, for they were heartily sick of their stay at the great fortress. They were restless up to the point of irritation when they heard of the war on the Continent, and of the alarm in England on the occasion of the Young Pretender's raid in 1745, when the Prince was beaten at Culloden.

This long stay at Gibraltar was illustrative of the stupid policy of the Government in locking up a regiment in one place for years, when it could have been doing efficient duty elsewhere. Fortescue refers to what he terms "the greatest hardship of service on foreign stations . . . namely, the absence of any system of periodic reliefs. Englishmen," he goes on to say, "did not accept exile so readily in those days as in these. Ordinary soldiers did

not conceive that they enlisted for service in foreign garrisons; that duty was for men especially recruited, as they thought, and they constantly deserted in sheer despair of ever returning home. A distinguished officer, the Duke of Argyll, went the length of saying that a long term of duty at Mahon was equivalent to a punishment, and that his only surprise was that the troops had not mutinied both at Minorca and at Gibraltar." Once away from England the men seem to have been forgotten, and suddenly discovered when good soldiers were wanted for emergency duty. "In the contracts the most obvious necessities were overlooked. Thus, though Minorca was supplied with brandy, oil, bread, salt, and tobacco, the item of meat was entirely omitted, and it was actually necessary for the Governor to explain that the five articles above enumerated were insufficient for the nourishment of the British soldier."* As for the Tenth, while at Gibraltar the men were driven to burn their huts for fuel.

When the order came to quit Gibraltar, and to proceed to Ireland, there was disappointment. The hope had been for home; but any change was better than a prolonged stay at a place which was deadly dull, and fever-stricken. They might have gone on for another score of years, for garrisons had been left so long unshifted. In the book just quoted there is a footnote which points to the fact that the 38th Foot remained in the West Indies for nearly 50 years, from 1716 to 1765. The 40th Foot was continuously on service abroad from 1717 to 1763. The 13th Foot went to Gibraltar in 1710, and remained there for 28 years; the 9th served at Gibraltar and Minorca from 1718 to 1746; the 17th from 1723 to 1748, the 18th from 1718 to 1742. Here were the men of the Tenth as likely to go on at the end of 19

* Fortescue: "History of the Army."

years for a score more, half starved, deprived of all social life and comforts, and abominably clothed.

1749. The garrison duty in Ireland was nearly as long in duration as that of Gibraltar. It lasted from 1749 to 1767, but it was more endurable, because the regiment moved from place to place. Lord Tyrawley, who had been Colonel of the Tenth since 1746, was transferred to the 14th Dragoons in July, and his successor, Colonel Edward Pole, from the Irish half-pay, and previously Lieutenant-Colonel of the 12th Dragoons, was appointed Colonel of the Regiment in August.

Pole was a fine soldier, a seasoned warrior who had gone through the hardest part of Marlborough's latter campaigns, fighting with the Scots Greys at Malplaquet, and taking part in the suppression of the Jacobite rebellion in Scotland in 1715 and 1716. While Colonel of the Tenth, which was till his death in 1762, he was promoted to the rank of major-general in 1757, and made lieutenant-general in 1759.

A further change took place in the colonelcy of the regiment during the stay in Ireland. Colonel Pole died in the winter of 1762, and his successor was appointed on January 4th, 1763. This was Major-General Edward Sandford. He came from the 52nd Foot, and was colonel of the Regiment until his death in 1781. Seven years after his appointment to the regiment he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general. That was in 1770.

1762. The officers of the Regiment at this date were :

| | Rank in the Regiment. | Rank in the Army. |
|------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Edward Pole | Colonel, 10 Aug., 1749 | Lt.-Gen., 9 Apr., 1759. |
| Francis Smith | Lt.-Col., 15 Feb., 1762 | Lt.-Col., 16 Jan., 1762. |
| William Percival | Major, 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| James Hamilton | Captain, 27 Apr., 1756 | Captain, 4 Sept., 1754. |
| Henry Bassett | " 7 May, 1757 | |
| Israel Mitchell | " 7 Feb., 1759 | |

| | Rank in the Regiment. | Rank in the Army. |
|-------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| John Vataas | Captain, 5 May, 1760 | Captain, 7 Feb., 1759. |
| Samuel Brown | " 17 Sept., 1761 | " 5 May, 1760. |
| Mundy Pole | " 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| William Candler | " 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| Robert Dalway | Capt.-Lt., 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| Thomas Herbert | Lieut., 7 Feb., 1759 | |
| Aaron Lilley | " 31 Dec., 1759 | |
| Walter Cuffe | " 4 Mar., 1760 | |
| Edward Fitzgerald | " 5 May, 1760 | |
| Robert Nettles | " 6 May, 1760 | |
| Henry Conran | " 17 Sept., 1761 | |
| Julius Stirke | " 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| Andrew Craufurd | " 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| Richard Withers | " 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| William Thompson | " 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| Laurence Parsons | Ensign, 3 Mar., 1760 | |
| Anthony Botet | " 4 Mar., 1760 | |
| Barry Denny | " 5 Mar., 1760 | |
| Robert Blackmore | " 6 Mar., 1760 | |
| Thomas Williamson | " 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| John Hatch Jenkin | " 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| George Milnes | " 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| George Thwaites | " 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| Pierce Hely | " 13 Feb., 1762 | |
| James Montgomery | Chaplain, 30 July, 1762 | |
| Richard Withers | Adjutant, 27 Aug., 1757 | Lieut., 13 Feb., 1762. |
| James Sempill | Surgeon, 17 June, 1761 | |

Agent—Mr. Whitlock, Sackville Street, Dublin.

CHAPTER XVIII.

UNIFORMS AND COLOURS.

The Government was lax in many matters that concerned the well-being of the soldier, but seemed desirous to make changes in his uniform. Thus in 1743 a Royal Warrant, dated September 14th, provided for a change in the caps of the grenadiers. The cap was to be of the same colour as the facings, with the King's cipher embroidered. The lower part, which was red, bore the motto, "Nec Aspera Terrent," and the White Horse of Hanover. The back part of the cap was red, the turn-up yellow—the colour of the facings. The number of the regiment was shown in figures in the middle part, behind. Numbers were also shown on the colours in gold Roman figures, within a wreath of roses and thistles on one stalk.*

From a MS. work in the Royal Library in Windsor Castle the following "Regulation for the uniform Cloathing of the Marching Regiments of Foot, their Colours, Drums, Bills of Arms, and Camp Colours," is taken. It is dated 1747, and is signed by R. Napier, Adjutant-General.

Drummers' Coats.—The drummers of all Royal Regiments are allowed to wear the Royal livery, viz., Red lined, faced, and lapelled on the breast with blue.

The drummers of all other regiments are to be cloth'd with the Colour of the Facing of the regiments, lined, faced, and lapelled on the breast with red, and laced in such a manner as the Colonel shall think fit for distinc-

* MS. notes by Major E. B. Wilkinson.

tion sake, the lace, however, being that of the colours of that on the soldiers' coats.

Grenadier Caps.—The front of the grenadier caps to be of the same colour with the facing of the Regiment, with the King's Cypher and Crown over it, embroidered in colours. The little flags to be of Red, with the White Horse and motto over: "Nec Aspera Terrent."

Drums to be painted in the same manner.

Camp Colours.—To be of the colour of the Facing of the Regiment with the rank of the Regt. upon them.

For the next twenty years no regulations were issued which greatly affected the Tenth. But in 1765, red breeches were abolished, and black bearskin caps were introduced for the grenadiers, with the White Horse, and the motto in white on a japanned piece of metal. This was the first year that white breeches were worn by the Tenth. Two years later, on the 21st of September, 1767, a Royal Warrant was issued, requiring that the regimental number should appear on the buttons (presumably white metal). Whether the Roman X. or Arabic figures were introduced, Major Wilkinson says he was unable to discover. On his MS. Notes the following appears in pencil:—



"Button of the 10th Foot private soldier found last year near New York, deposited there 1778 or '79.

I cannot find that the Roman X. appeared on the buttons until quite 1829."

A Royal Warrant which bore date, Dec. 19, 1768, directed that the uniform to be worn by officers was to be:

Scarlet coat to be lapelled to the waist with yellow cloth; lapells 3 inches wide, fastened back with silver buttons (having the regimental number) and placed at equal distances: the collar turned down and fastened by one buttonhole to the top button of the lapell.

Small round yellow cuffs $3\frac{1}{4}$ inches deep, having four buttons at equal distances; skirts lined and turned back—white. (Wilkinson crossed out the word "yellow" and inserted "white," undoubtedly with good reason.)


Officers of the grenadier company wore an epaulette of silver lace on each shoulder. Battalion officers wore one epaulette only, and that on the right shoulder.

Further instructions ran thus:

White waistcoat and breeches; black gaiters with black buttons; crimson sash, tied round the waist (until recently worn over the shoulder), silver gorget with the royal cipher engraved on it, fastened to the neck with silk ribbon rosettes. (Wilkinson says, "I do not know the precise colour.") Hats laced with silver, and bearing the Hanoverian cockade in black. (Here Wilkinson puts the question: "Did the officers wear white feather plumes in their hats in full dress?" His answer is pencilled: "I do not think so.")

Grenadier officers wore the black bearskin, similar to those of the men. They carried fusils, and had white shoulder belts and pouches.

In Wilkinson's notes the following occurs: In the Prince Consort's Library at Aldershot, there is a MS. work showing the uniform of a grenadier of every regiment in existence at the time, dressed according to the King's Regulation of December 19th, 1768. The illustration of the grenadier of the Tenth Regiment is as follows:—

Coat scarlet, fitting closer than that of 1742, full skirted, reaching well down the thighs; the front of the skirts is turned back and lined with white. The collar is of yellow, and is turned over, and fastened down with one button surrounded by a white patch of lace, with a dark line on either side, probably blue—thus:  Lapells on coat

of yellow cloth with nine patches of white lace with a dark line round each, and on each a white metal button, set on either side at equal intervals. The cuffs are yellow, with two similar laced patches and buttons on each. On either shoulder were white laced "wings" with a dark line—probably blue—running up the centre of each piece of white lace forming the "wing," and the bottom piece edged top and bottom with a dark line.

The waistcoat, which reached well down below the waist, was white, and well buttoned with white metal buttons. The shirt and throat cloth were white, but there was also a black stock or neckband in addition.

The breeches were white. The gaiters, which reached well above the knee, were black, and had black buttons. The caps were of black bearskin, and bore the motto: "Nec Aspera Terrent," and the King's cipher on a metal plate of japanned material in front.

The white buff cartridge pouch sling was worn over the left shoulder, and kept in position by one scarlet shoulder strap on the left shoulder. The picture also shows the grenadier match, which was of brass.

The swordbelt was worn over the waistcoat, under the coat, and was buckled in front with a large brass buckle. From the belt a short "hanger," with a brass hilt and guard, and a black scabbard, was suspended. The battalion officers carried the espontoons, and the serjeants had swords and halberts.

The official Army List of 1769 gives for the first time particulars of the patterns of regimental lace, and under the heading of "Succession of Colonels" we find the following: "Facings yellow, white lace with a blue stripe."

Before the American War of Independence cross-belts of a lighter make were issued. The bayonet belt was no

longer worn round the waist, but over the shoulder, and a brass breastplate for this belt was introduced. Wilkinson, after much searching, failed to discover what shape or pattern this could have been. He also failed with regard to the officers' breastplate. The swords of the officers were ordered to be worn suspended from a white buff belt over the right shoulder with a breastplate, the shape of which was probably oval.

NOTE.—The whole of this chapter is more or less a reproduction of some valuable MS. notes by Major E. B. Wilkinson, who has been at great pains to obtain from many quarters such information as was available concerning the uniform of the British Army in the first half of the eighteenth century. My work has been mainly editorial.

AUTHOR.

THE AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR.

1767. The story of the achievements of the British Army in America is one in which glory and discredit are strangely interwoven. It tells of the conquest of vast dominions during Britain's great struggle with France, and then of the loss of those New England Colonies which were destined to consolidate, and become one of the greatest and most enterprising nations of history.

The Tenth played a great part in this latter contest, known as the American War of Independence. But before embarking for service in the New England Colonies they had many years of garrison duty in Ireland. They had left Gibraltar in 1749, and the order to proceed to America did not come until the spring of 1767. The Tenth had not been in England since June, 1730, when they embarked for service in the Mediterranean, and now, thirty-seven years later, they were destined for some important foreign service, with the prospect before them of an embittered war between the Mother Country and the Colonists.

In 1767 the Tenth were on the ocean, enduring all the horrors of transport life. Ultimately they arrived at Halifax, in Nova Scotia, where they were detained for some time, awaiting orders from General Gage, the Commander-in-Chief in America.

Possibly the men knew little or nothing of the causes of discontent which drove the Colonists to war with the Mother Country, and it is very probable that they did not care. After so long a season of inactivity they were "spoiling for a fight," having been disappointed in their hopes of taking part in the Seven Years' War on the Continent. They were essentially a fighting regiment, and there was not a man among them who did not hope to hear of the commencement of hostilities, which, considering the temper of the Colonists, was more than probable. There was some chance of fighting with the Indians, who were making some murderous onslaughts on the outskirts of the Colonies, and filling the minds of the settlers with horror at their barbarities. That would be welcome, but there was still more probability that the sword would be drawn against the Colonists themselves.

The Home Government was conspiring against American liberty. With the increase of colonial wealth came schemes for a colonial revenue. Duties were laid on certain imports, and, as a result, the Colonists, without calling in question the propriety of such duties, resorted to an organised system of smuggling. To correct this evil, orders were issued to the Navy officers at the American station "to detain and libel all vessels violating any provision of the Navigation Acts." Search warrants were issued to the officers in the American waters, and they were authorised "to break into stores, and even private houses, if suspected of containing smuggled goods, violating a principle long dear to the English people, that 'Every man's house is his castle.'"

The levying of a direct tax on America was the final act on the part of the British Government which led to a sanguinary war between the Mother Country and the Colonies. The war gave the Tenth some of the hardest work it had yet experienced. To look into the causes of

the struggle a little more closely, various offences aroused discontent among the Colonists. Among them were "the dulness and rigidity of British soldiery"; the "wish of Episcopalians of New England and their friends in the Mother Country" to place the Anglican Churches of the Colonies under a Bishop, was another cause of discontent to many. The exaction of legal fees and official corruption, were a third; but the greatest offence of all was the project for taxing the Colonies. The passing of the American Stamp Act in 1765 brought matters to a head. The Act had been proposed before, in Walpole's days, but it was felt to be unjust, and was not proceeded with. But in 1765, when Lord Grenville was in power, a tax was laid by Act of Parliament, requiring that stamped paper should be used for newspapers, all law papers, all ships' papers, property transfers, college diplomas, and marriage licenses. Wherever there was non-compliance with the Act, a fine of £10 was to be imposed, "the enforcement of which was not to be left to the ordinary courts and juries, but to Courts of Admiralty without juries, the officers of which were appointed by the Crown, and paid fees out of the fines they imposed, the informer receiving one half."*

The measure was resented instantly, and so intense was the opposition in the Colonies that the Government repealed the Stamp Act the following year. A sting was left, however, by the insertion of this clause in the Repeal, that Parliament reserved the right "to bind the colonies in all cases whatsoever." The people of America were too pleased to be once more on friendly terms with the Mother Country to take formal notice of this, and they received the news with rejoicing, resuming their commercial intercourse with England.

* Ryerson: "Loyalists of America."

This was the position when the Tenth landed at Halifax.

In spite of appearances there were many who foresaw trouble, and among them was General Gage, who, again and again, asked that he might be reinforced. There had been a disposition at home to lessen, rather than increase the army in America, and there was the same old indifference to the need for relieving regiments who had long been stationed in the Colonies. But his persistency resulted in a strengthening of his forces, and the Tenth came out as one of the relief regiments. General Gage, who had waited anxiously for the battalions that were promised from Ireland, and ought to have been with him in the summer of 1767, was not able to report their arrival in America until January the 19th, 1768, when he wrote to the Secretary at War as follows :

“Brigadier-General Carleton has reported the arrival of the 10th, 42nd, and 1st Battalion of the Royal American Regiment,* as good Bodys of men, and very expert in their exercise, that the 15th Regiment, having many men much older than the other Regiments, was not so expert in the exercise, but was a good Regiment of Veterans.”

Gage's position was by no means a happy one. There was the constant anxiety lest the discontent that was smouldering should burst into flame, and he should be compelled to decide as to the steps to be taken if the Colonists rose in revolt. There was, moreover, the task of providing accommodation for his troops.

Again and again the worried Commander-in-Chief reported wholesale desertions to the War Office. The desertions were not to be wondered at under such scandalous conditions. It was the misery of the whole

* Now the King's Royal Rifles.

army, and not of any one regiment, that was so apparent, and while men fell sick for want of common necessities, many, resenting the indifference of the Government at home, deserted. The Tenth men acted thus in large numbers. After a time, in response to General Gage's promise of pardon if they would consent to be drafted into other regiments, many believing that things might be better, accepted the terms, and served again, only to find the Authorities in England absolutely indifferent, and the state of things no better than before.

The General called up the Tenth from Halifax to Boston, but was confronted instantly with the difficulty of quartering them. Gage wrote the following letter to the Secretary at War—Viscount Barrington :

New York, October 10th, 1768.

My Lord,

As there appears much difficulty in quartering the two Regiments that are arrived at Boston from Halifax, so as to answer the Intent of their being ordered there, and that the Expense of quartering at that Place is likely to fall upon the Crown, and as the two Regiments from Ireland may soon be expected to arrive ; I have determined to set out for Boston immediately, in order to do the best I can, for the accommodation of the Troops, and to avoid giving any just Cause of Complaint."

General Gage could scarcely have expected to find any in Boston willing to receive soldiers on billet, for the people of the town were indignant at the news that a sloop laden with wine from Madeira had been seized by a warship while the skipper was trying to smuggle his cargo. There was more than a mere expression of indignation. There was an angry riot, and the lives of the Commissioners of Customs, who had directed the seizure, were endangered, as

well as those of any who sympathised with England. The Tenth were among the regiments that were called out to quell the disturbances, which assumed a graver aspect than mere rioting. Bloodshed followed.

After that, matters went from bad to worse. Everything pointed to open rebellion, and the position of Gage and his battalions was a most unhappy one. The Duke of Grafton said in his MS. Memoirs: "The internal state of the country was really alarming." The Colonists resented the presence of the soldiers. The members of the Assembly, meeting in May, 1769, in Massachusetts, "complained that they could not discuss the public affairs with freedom, being surrounded with an armed force." When the Governor declared that he had no authority over the ships in port, or the troops in the town, the Assembly went to Cambridge, where there were no soldiers, and deliberated there.

1770. The idea of that reserving Clause in the Repeal of the Stamp Act being retained was an increasing annoyance to the Colonists. When the first feelings of gratification had passed, there was a desire expressed to have the clause removed. Added to this, disputes of a more or less petty nature were constantly occurring, and in 1770 the troops and a mob in Boston came in conflict, the soldiers received orders to fire, and three people were killed. Some called it a massacre, and the Tenth, like their comrades in arms, were execrated and howled at, as they marched through the town. That fight in the streets of Boston was never forgotten. The feeling was growing in the Colonies that the Home Government wished to enslave America, and the soldiers were considered to be their instruments. When a tax of

threepence per pound on tea was levied in
1773. 1773, the attitude assumed in America was,
that taxation without representation was
intolerable—that it was tyranny to which submission was

impossible. New York and Philadelphia sent the tea back to England without opening the chests, but some men in Boston, disguised as Mohawks, boarded three tea ships, and threw the cargoes into the water of the harbour.

Apparently the Tenth and other regiments had been withdrawn from Boston, to avoid enraging the citizens by their presence, for George III., writing to Lord North, who was First Lord of the Treasury, said: "General Gage, though just returned from Boston, expresses his willingness to go back at a day's notice if convenient measures are adopted. He says they will be lions while we are lambs, but if we take the resolute part, they will undoubtedly prove very meek. Four regiments sent to Boston, will, he thinks, be sufficient to prevent any disturbance." This letter of the King's was dated February the 4th, 1774.

1774. Before long the position of the army in America was startlingly perilous, having regard to the rising anger of the Colonists. The situation to the soldiers had for a long time been trying, for no insult was spared which could be inflicted on them. Fortescue tells us how they were "daily accosted by such endearing names as 'lobster scoundrel,' 'red herring,' and 'bloody back,' this last term alluding, of course, to the results soon to be experienced by American soldiers under Washington, of a flogging at the halberts. The troops, having strict orders never to strike an inhabitant, whatever the provocation, endured these insults with a forbearance which speaks volumes for their discipline, but this did not save them from most violent and barbarous assaults. Such was the brutality of the worst ruffians of Boston, that they would attack a sick man when hardly able to hobble out of hospital; and when reviling the soldiers they always encouraged each other by the words, which were unfortunately too true, 'They dare not fire.'"

The first Continental Congress met in September, 1774, delegates going to it from twelve Colonies to discuss the situation. "Relentless intimidation of the Loyalists continued; the insurgents began to collect ammunition and military stores, and the young men to assemble to learn their drill." When General Gage warned the people of Rhode Island against obedience to the revolutionary Government, the response was an instant uprising. Forty cannon were seized, and a small fort, with all its stores, invaluable to Gage in this extremity, was surprised and taken.

King George had the idea that four regiments would suffice to bring the Colonists to their senses, and he rehearsed the records of the battalions that were there; but Gage wrote to say that 20,000 troops at the least would be required, if New England was to be reduced to submission. In every way George III. underrated the strength and temper of the Colonists, and his repressive measures at every stage made bad into worse, widening the gulf until reconciliation was impossible. Nothing would end the matter but overwhelming force from England, or independence for New England. Gage insisted on being provided with an adequate army, for he wrote in the following terms: "If force is to be used at length, it must be a considerable one, for to begin with small numbers will only encourage resistance, and not terrify."

Meanwhile the people in the New England States were arming, and the Provincial Congress, resolved to maintain their rights by force of arms if no other way was possible, formed an arsenal at Concord. General Gage—who was also Governor of Massachusetts—was loth to move, lest by displaying military force he might precipitate a war. This brought upon him censure from some of the Ministers at

home, but Lord Chatham, who protested against the Government policy, said, when speaking in the Lords: "I find a report creeping abroad that Ministers censure General Gage's inactivity. . . It is a prudent and necessary inaction. . . . This tameness, however contemptible, cannot be censured; for the first drop of blood shed in civil and unnatural war might be *immedicabile vulnus*."

1775. It fell to the lot of the Tenth to shed the first blood in the War of Independence. From contemporary letters it would appear that the Tenth had not remained stationary in 1774, but were actually at one time in Quebec, if the following is reliable: "Information was given to General Gage that the Americans had a foundry situated between the towns of Bridgwater and Abingdon, where a number of cannon were ready for immediate service, and that more were daily preparing. The destruction of this work would have been severely felt by the disaffected, but as no steps were pursued for this purpose, it is presumed either that the Commander-in-Chief did not approve of the enterprise, or that his instructions did not authorise him at this time to have recourse to such strong measures. Abingdon is about thirty miles from Boston, and the nearest communication to it by water is at the head of North River, about fifteen miles from Abingdon. General Gage having ordered the 10th and 52nd Regiments of Foot from Quebec to Boston, transports were hired to bring them from that place; but such a spirit of opposition prevailed among the people of Boston, that no pilots could be found who would take charge of the vessels, so that the Vice-Admiral was obliged to send the master of the 'Tartar' frigate on this duty." This writer was so reliable on other points that he may be considered correct on this.

The Tenth at this time were once more at Boston, and may have taken their part in some of the dangerous

expeditions which Gage despatched from that city. Troops were sent on the 28th of February (1775) to Marblehead to seize some cannon, which the Commander-in-Chief was informed had been deposited near Salem ; but they returned next day without having found them. On the 18th of March Gage sent out another party who seized "13,425 musquet cartridges, and 3,000 pounds weight of ball, which the provincials had collected."

But in April the expedition was despatched which resulted in the Tenth coming under the first fire of the War of Independence. The account given in "Naval and Military Memoirs" of the time runs as follows:—

"General Gage having received undoubted intelligence of a large quantity of military stores being collected at Concord, the town where the Assembly of the provinces of Massachusetts's Bay had met, and that this magazine was for the avowed purpose of supplying a body of troops destined to act in opposition to His Majesty's Government, Vice-Admiral Graves, on the 18th of April, by desire of the General, ordered the boats of the squadron to assemble at the Boyne at eight o'clock of the evening, their officers being instructed to follow the instructions of Lieutenant Bourmaster. About half-past ten the grenadiers of the army and the light infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of the Tenth Regiment, and Major Pitcairn of the Marines, were embarked in these boats, with orders to destroy the above-mentioned stores."

The troops landed at the entrance of the Cambridge River, at Phipps's farm, and immediately began their march. General Gage was surrounded by many enemies, so that it was impossible for this expedition to remain secret. They contrived to send information of the intended enterprise, and also of their suspicions, that in addition to the destruction of the stores it was proposed to seize John

Hancock and Samuel Adams, two of the most prominent members of the Assembly then sitting at Concord.

Lieutenant-Colonel Smith had marched only a few miles when he found the whole country alarmed by the ringing of bells and firing of guns. He thereupon despatched six companies of light infantry, under the command of Major Pitcairn, to secure two bridges on different roads beyond Concord. This officer, upon his arrival within two miles of Lexington, which was about four o'clock on the morning of the 19th, received intelligence that a body of five hundred men were assembled, and were prepared to oppose the King's troops. A man had advanced towards the officer, and, presenting his musket, fired, but the piece had flashed in the pan.

On this the Major commanded his troops to move forward, but on no account to fire without orders. When they arrived at the end of the village, they observed about two hundred men drawn up on a green, and when they came within a hundred yards of them, these men began to file off towards some stone walls on the right flank. Major Pitcairn called to them to disperse, but they took no notice of his words. The King's troops followed them, with the purpose of surrounding them and disarming them. A few of the men, after leaping over a wall, turned and fired at the English soldiers, wounding a man of the Tenth, and shooting Major Pitcairn's horse in two places. Shots coming from other parts, the soldiers responded with a scattered fire, killing several of the Americans.

Soon after this unfortunate transaction, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith joined Major Pitcairn, and marched forward to Concord, arriving there at nine o'clock. Hancock and Adams, warned and assisted by their friends, made their escape, and great numbers of the people of the countryside gathered on the neighbouring heights to watch what would

follow. While Smith, with the main body of his troops, was at Concord, searching for cannon and stores, he, as already indicated, directed Captain Parsons to secure two bridges at some distance from the town, and having done this, to search certain houses where it was said that stores had been deposited. In pursuance of these orders, Parsons posted three companies at the bridge, and on some heights near it, under the command of Captain Laurie, of the 43rd Regiment, and with the remainder marched on to a spot where he found cannon carriage wheels, powder, and some stores. These he destroyed.

Presently the position assumed a yet more serious aspect. The people on the heights began to move towards the bridge. The light companies of the Fourth and Tenth then descended and joined Laurie at the bridge; but they were followed by the Provincials in great numbers. These fired at the King's soldiers, killing three, and wounding several officers and men. After returning the fire, and consulting with his officers, Laurie judged it prudent to retreat towards the main body at Concord. He was joined on the road by two companies of grenadiers. Captain Parsons, with the companies under his immediate command, followed close on the heels of Laurie, finding the position increasingly perilous. On the march they saw the three men who had fallen by the volley from the Americans lying on the ground, one of them scalped, his head much mangled, and his ears cut off, though not yet dead. This incensed the soldiers, and filled them with horror. This was fighting with savages, they declared, and there were some terrible threats of revenge.

Colonel Smith destroyed all the stores and cannon he could find at Concord. The story then proceeds that he and Pitcairn assured the people that no harm was intended; that all that was desired was, that they should throw open

their doors and allow a ready search for military stores. The proposal was received with scorn, and when more was said, one of the Colonists struck Pitcairn in the face. There was clearly to be no compromise.

News of the affray having been carried to Boston, General Gage despatched eight companies of the 4th Regiment, the same number of the 23rd and 49th Regiments, with some Marines and two field pieces. Earl Percy was in command of this detachment, and was ordered to march to Lexington by way of Cambridge Bridge. Smith, to whose support he was going, had already started for the same place, thinking to go forward to Boston, so that he was in the direct road, fortunately, for meeting Lord Percy. When the two forces met, Percy found that Smith had barely got out of Concord when they were assailed by a heavy fire from all sides, from walls, fences, houses, trees, barns, and other spots.

The English soldiers had to turn and make a stand, and for a while they succeeded in driving the Americans back with cannon and musket fire, but as soon as the retreat began afresh, the foe came on with renewed energy, hanging on the rear, and picking off the troops with fatal precision, until they came to Charlestown. Beatson, who tells the story of that fatal day, fraught with such momentous results—one of the historic days in the Empire's history—says, that considering how very much fatigued the troops were, as the greatest part of them had been under arms the whole of the night, and had marched nearly forty miles before they reached Charlestown, it was astonishing how small their losses were while so surrounded. The loss was the more suprisingly small when it is remembered how overwhelming were the numbers of the Colonials who dogged their line of march, and from the most advantageous positions, since they were so familiar with the country. Nor must it be forgotten that the fight continued while the tired

troops were covering no less than fifteen miles of difficult road. On this memorable occasion, one lieutenant, one serjeant, one drummer, and fifty-two rank and file were killed; two lieutenant-colonels, two captains, nine lieutenants, two ensigns, seven serjeants, one drummer, and a hundred and fifty-seven rank and file wounded; and one lieutenant, two serjeants, and twenty-four rank and file were missing. Three pieces of ordnance were destroyed by the detachment; some new gun-carriages, and a great number of carriage wheels burnt, and a considerable quantity of flour, gunpowder, musket-balls, and other articles were thrown into the river. What other loss the Americans suffered in the fight neither Smith nor Percy could say, but the Colonials acknowledged the loss of thirty-eight men killed, and more than twenty wounded. It can scarcely be pretended that the loss in such a prolonged fight could be so trifling.

This so called "skirmish" at Lexington was a much more serious affair than is generally supposed. Had it not been for the opportune arrival of Earl Percy, the Tenth and other battalions might well have been annihilated, for, as Fortescue suggests, "Not Braddock's column itself was in a more desperate situation. It was useless to attempt a counter-attack; and the men were weary after fourteen hours afoot, and a march of twenty miles without food." Beatson, who wrote the "Naval and Military Memoirs" account, goes on to add that when Vice-Admiral Graves knew that Earl Percy was coming into Charlestown, he held his Marines in readiness to land, and later they were on shore, covering the retreat. By this timely action, the exhausted men, whose ammunition was nearly expended, passed over to Boston without further molestation.

The force engaged in this disastrous, historic, and momentous march, comprised the following troops:



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[From a print in Windsor Castle.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR ROBERT MURRAY KEITH, K.B.,
COLONEL OF THE TENTH, 1781—1795.



| | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|-------|---|-------|
| Flank com- panies of the | { | 5th, | { | 4th, |
| | | 10th, | | 23rd, |
| | | 18th, | | 47th, |
| | | 23rd, | | |
| | | 38th, | | |
| | | 43rd, | | |
| | | 52nd, | | |
| | | 59th. | | |

The whole of the and ten companies of Marines.

There has been much discussion concerning this opening fight in the war, wherein the first man killed on the English side was a soldier of the Tenth. The Americans blame Pitcairn, who, "on the Militia refusing to disperse, ordered his men to fire, and that his men refused to do so until he set the example by firing his pistol." The controversy was never satisfactorily ended. There were recriminations down to the last, and untold bitterness was brought into the discussion as to who was to blame for the first shot. The consequences were so far-reaching that one cannot refuse to hear what was said on the American side. Equally so, it is necessary to give Lieutenant-Colonel Smith's version, as embodied in a letter addressed to General Gage in his capacity of Governor.

The letter here reproduced was written at Boston on April 22, 1775.

Sir,

In obedience to your Excellency's commands, I marched on the evening of the 18th inst., with the corps of grenadiers and light infantry for Concord, to execute your Excellency's orders with respect to destroying all ammunition, artillery, tents, etc., collected there, which was effected, having knocked off the trunnions of three pieces of ordnance, some new gun-carriages, a great number of carriage wheels burnt, a considerable quantity

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of flour, some gunpowder and musquet balls, with other small articles thrown into the river.

Notwithstanding we marched with the utmost secrecy, we found the country had intelligence or strong suspicion of our coming, and fired many signal guns, and rung the alarm bells repeatedly; and were informed when at Concord, that some cannon had been taken out of the town that day, that others, with some stores, had been carried three days before, which prevented our having an opportunity of destroying so much as might have been expected at our first setting off.

I think it proper to observe that when I had got some miles on the march from Boston, I detached six light companies to march with all expedition to seize the two bridges on different roads beyond Concord. On these companies' arrival at Lexington, I understand from the report of Major Pitcairn, who was with them, and from many officers, that they found on a green close to the road a body of country people drawn up in military order, with arms and accoutrements, and, as appeared after, loaded, and that they had posted some men in a dwelling and meeting house. Our troops advanced towards them, without any intention of injuring them, further than to inquire the reason of their being thus assembled, and, if not satisfactory, to have secured their arms; but they in confusion went off, principally to the left, only one of them fired before he went off, and three or four more jumped over a wall and fired from behind it among the soldiers; on which the soldiers returned it, and killed several of them. They likewise fired on the soldiers from the meeting and dwelling house. We had one man wounded, and Major Pitcairn's horse shot in two places.

Rather earlier than this, on the road, a countryman, from behind the wall, had snapped his piece at Lieutenants Adair and Sutherland, but it flashed and did not go off. After this we saw some in the woods, but marched on to Concord without anything further happening. While at Concord we saw vast numbers assembling in many parts; at one of the bridges they marched down, with a very considerable body, on the light infantry posted there. On their coming pretty near, one of the men fired on them, which they returned; on which an action ensued, and some few were killed and wounded. In this affair, it appears that after the bridge was quitted, they scalped and otherwise ill-treated one or two of the men who were either killed or wounded severely, being seen by a party that marched by soon after.

At Concord we found very few inhabitants in the town; those we met with, both Major Pitcairn and myself took all possible care to convince that we meant no injury, and that if they opened their doors when we required to search for military stores, not the slightest mischief would be done. We had opportunities to convince them of our good intentions, but they were very sulky, and one of them even struck Major Pitcairn. On our leaving Concord to return to Boston, they began to fire on us from behind walls, ditches, trees, etc., which, as we marched, increased to a very great degree, and continued without intermission of five minutes altogether, for, I believe, upwards of eighteen miles; so that I can't think but it must have been a preconcerted scheme in them, to attack the King's troops the first favourable opportunity that offered, otherwise I think they could not, in so short a time, as from our marching out, have raised such a numerous body, and for so great a space of ground.

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Notwithstanding the enemy's numbers they did not make a gallant attempt during so long an action, though our men were so very much fatigued, but kept under cover.

I have the honour, etc.,

F. SMITH, Lt. Colonel,
10th Foot.

It will be seen that Smith tells the story without embellishment, and gives us no idea of the real tragedy of that retreat. But Trevelyan, in his fine work on the American Revolution, shows how no courage or generalship on the part of the British commander could turn a rearward march into a winning battle. He goes on to say that as the afternoon wore on, Smith's men had expended nearly all their cartridges; and they had nothing to eat, for the waggons containing their supplies had been captured by the exertions of a parish minister.

"I never broke my fast," so a soldier related, "for forty-eight hours, for we carried no provisions. I had my hat shot off my head three times. Two balls went through my coat, and carried away my bayonet from my side."

Trevelyan goes on with the story, and shows how, as the tumult rolled eastwards into the thickly inhabited districts near the coast, "the militia came up in more numerous and stronger companies, fresh, and with full pouches. When the sun was setting the retiring troops, half starved, and almost mad with thirst, came to a halt on the English side of the causeway over which the Cambridge highway entered the peninsula of Charlestown. They were only just in time." Washington himself said, that "they had not arrived in Charlestown, under cover of their ships, half an hour before a powerful body of men from Marblehead and Salem was at their heels, and must, if they had happened to be up

one hour sooner, inevitably have intercepted their retreat to Charlestown."

Had that been the case, the Tenth would have played no further part in the War of Independence. As it was, they were the first to discover that the Colonists were no mean foes. It had been forgotten by everyone, and especially by those at home, that North America was "full of men accustomed to fire-arms," who, prompted by enthusiasm, were ready to measure their apparently puny strength against the veterans of the Mother Country.

CHAPTER XX.

THE TENTH AT BUNKER'S HILL.

1775. The success of the Colonists at Lexington awakened the war spirit, and in a few days they had an army of nearly 20,000 men in the field, while Gage had at his disposal only eleven battalions. Admiral Graves offered to land some of his men from the ships in the harbour, but even with these the force was inadequate when it was found that the Colonists were gathering about Boston, and throwing up entrenchments with wonderful alacrity.

Gage realised his danger and his difficulties. Reports were going through the town that the place was to be stormed, Castle William to be seized and destroyed, Point Alderton to be fortified, the ships of war to be burnt, and every person to be held prisoner who was inimical to the cause of the Loyalists. Then came news that the insurgents had surprised the forts at Ticonderago and Crown Point, and had thus obtained cannon and ammunition, and later it was found that they had cut off supplies from Boston. News also came that the Second Continental Congress at Philadelphia had appointed George Washington as Commander-in-Chief of the American forces, while steps were being taken to raise the Loyalists to 30,000 men, who were to be thoroughly well equipped. Fortunately for Gage, at the critical moment he was reinforced by 10,000 soldiers from England. The General, finding himself thus strengthened, proclaimed martial law, but offered an amnesty to all who should lay down arms.

Meanwhile the men of the Tenth and those who had shared with them the trying experiences of the historic

march from Concord, recovered from their fatigue, and were once more in fine equipment and discipline. They were burning to avenge what was practically a severe defeat. They realised that the opportunity was not far distant when it was discovered that the rebels were on the heights of Bunker's Hill, and had thrown up during one night a redoubt and other works, on which they had mounted some cannon. "When day broke—and on the 17th of June it was not long in appearing—the morning watch on the British vessels discovered an intrenchment six feet high where overnight there had been a smooth pasture. The ships, and the guns ashore concentrated their fire on the little redoubt, which measured fifty yards on its longest face." But the Americans were not driven out, and, as Trevelyan says, it was a satisfaction to the British soldiers that it was so. "To win without fighting had no attraction for men who on the last occasion had fought without winning."

None were so eager for a fierce battle as the Tenth, so that the doings and discredit at Lexington might be amply atoned for. They were full of enthusiasm when they found that the General had determined to dislodge the Americans from Bunker's Hill, since, so long as they held the redoubt, they commanded the whole of the town and harbour of Boston. The flank companies of the Tenth were in the force selected for the assault.

The commander of the troops who were to wage the fight was Sir William Howe, brother of the famous Admiral, Lord Howe. It is said that he briefly and frankly explained to his men before they started, the situation of the British army, which, he said, nothing but a victory could save. "I shall not," he told the soldiers, "desire one of you to go a step further than where I go myself."

There was no delay in commencing the fight, and when the little army advanced, the full seriousness of the enter-

prise was comprehended. The enemy, who were entrenched on the heights, were more than twice the number of the troops who were attacking. The soldiers, moreover, were heavily burdened, "with full knapsacks," and what with these, the cartouche box, the ammunition, and the firelock, each man had to climb the hill and fight while carrying fully 125 pounds' weight! It seems incredible, but the statement has been seriously made, and must be accepted. The grass through which they had to pass, was long, reaching to their knees, and constantly they found walls and fences in their way.

The experience of those who climbed the hill in the summer heat, largely on soft ground into which their feet went deep, was terrible. In a sense they treated the enemy with contempt, but they soon found that they had to deal with a "militia who had already acquired to a considerable degree the steadiness of regular soldiers, and were led by officers not unskilled in the art of war."

Howe began his attack in the afternoon by a brisk cannonade from his field-pieces and howitzers; the first and second lines advancing slowly, and frequently halting, to give time for the artillery to fire with more effect. The light infantry were directed to force the left point of the breastwork, to take the enemy in the flank, and the grenadiers to attack in front, supported by various regiments. As the troops went on no shot came from the entrenchments until the approach was near enough for a volley to have fearful effect; then came a word from Putnam, who commanded the Americans. The fire was terrible in its deadliness. The soldiers fell in scores, for the men on the height had been told to aim at the redcoats, and as near as possible to the waistbelts. "Our light infantry," wrote one to his friends at home, "were served up in companies against the grass fence. Most of our grenadiers and light infantry,

the moment of presenting themselves, lost three-fourths, and many nine-tenths, of their men." Before the fight was over every officer of the Tenth who took part in the affair was more or less seriously wounded.

But the end had not come after that first murderous reception. The British soldiers retreated, but Howe, when they were out of range of the enemy's fire, re-formed them, and again the advance was made. The experience was repeated. Ignoring the danger, the men went on, stepping over the bodies of their dead and wounded comrades, still burdened in the sweltering heat, when Howe might reasonably have caused them to throw aside their knapsacks. Again the fearful volley came, the shots, as before, aimed at the waistbelts of the oncoming soldiers, and, as the continuous flashes poured forth, men dropped by scores. Trevelyan says that "the British officers, utterly regardless of everything but their duty, urged the men forward with voice and sword hilt; and where no officers were left, the oldest privates placed themselves in charge of the half sections, which represented what had once been companies."

The terrible nature of the fight on Bunker's Hill has not been fully recognised; otherwise it would be understood that the troops dropped back that second time simply to escape annihilation. "Every corps had been broken; every corps had been decimated several times over; and yet the same battalions, or what was left of them, a third time mounted the fatal slope with the intention of staying on the summit."

This third time the fighting was to be of a different character. Reinforcements were brought up by Major-General Clinton, making the depleted force number some two thousand men. The knapsacks were thrown aside, the men were to reserve their fire, and charge with the bayonet, and the artillery was so placed that it could sweep

the fortification with an enfilading fire. Then came the third advance, and the men went on, despite all danger, resolute not to fall back again.

Now came the turn of the attacking force. As they went on the firing at first was as fierce as ever, but it slackened. The powder-pouches of the Colonists were emptying, and when, with a shout, the soldiers dashed on, their bayonets gleaming in the fierce sunlight, they were shortly scrambling over the breastworks. The place was won!

But the death roll, after the fight on Bunker's Hill had ended, read appallingly. The loss among the officers was unusually great. More than a thousand of the British soldiers were killed or wounded out of a total of two thousand men who first set out to storm the hill, and "92 of these bore the King's commission." General Gage, writing to Lord Dartmouth to report the battle, said: "The success, which was very necessary in our present condition, cost us dear. . . . The trials we have had show the rebels are not the despicable rabble too many have supposed them to be." Fortescue, in his "Lectures" on the army, indicates the advantages the Americans had in the fight, for he says there was not a rifle in the whole of the British army when the war began, whereas there were plenty in the hands of the Americans, who understood perfectly how to use them. They picked off the officers in amazing proportion in consequence.

After the fight the British entrenched on Bunker's Hill, where Howe and the main body of the army encamped. But half a mile away the Americans had thrown up strong works at various points, notably on Winter Hill and Prospect Hill, and prepared to defend them. Washington was thus enabled to continue the blockade of Boston through the autumn and winter.

The position of the Tenth, like that of the other regiments, was a precarious one, and if Gage decided to hold Boston, and retain the troops there, Washington would be enabled, almost without opposition, to strengthen his position elsewhere. Disquieting news came into the blockaded town from time to time. It was declared that patriotism was running so high among the Colonists that Washington would shortly have an army of 150,000 men at his disposal! That may have been an exaggeration, but the fact which the Governor and Howe had before them was this—that Washington was blockading Boston throughout the winter of 1775, bringing the British Commander, from cold and sickness, and want of provisions, into straits which were fraught with danger to the very existence of the army. When March, 1776, came, Washington had taken possession of Dorchester Heights, and had no less than 18,000 troops with him. By persistency and military skill he made Boston so untenable that Howe evacuated the place on the 17th of March.

Howe, in the last degree, was to be commiserated. The authorities at home were neglecting him and his men shamefully, for while they had command of the sea, they failed the army in every way, neither sending food nor reinforcements, in spite of the urgent calls for them. The fact was that at home there was no standing army worth the name. Lord Barrington told the King, early in 1776, that there were not more than 14,000 soldiers in the kingdom, counting in the officers, "who, in the higher grades, were in prodigious excess with reference to the men." Such is Trevelyan's statement. What was still worse for Howe, orders came from England for the despatch of 2,000 men from Boston, under Clinton, for service in the Carolinas. In all England's military experience there was

never such a display of imbecility as that which was exhibited by those at home who, in 1776, called for the impossible from troops, whose bravery and patriotism were beyond all question. Two thousand other soldiers who ought to have gone to Howe, were turned aside to swell Clinton's command. This must not be forgotten when the evacuation of Boston is being considered.

The evacuation proceeded quietly. Howe had caused it to be known that if Washington fired on him while his troops were embarking he would put the town to flames, and Washington, anxious to save the place, was silent and still. When the Tenth had gone with their comrades it was found that "vast quantities of public stores were abandoned to the enemy, after having been damaged as effectually as could be done by people who had begun to count their stay at Boston by half-hours. The British officers sacrificed all except the most portable of their private baggage. They themselves, huddled up amidst a miserable throng of both sexes, and all ages, "with top-heavy decks and encumbered gangways, put to sea, praying for a quick passage." There was reason to do so, for the north-east winds were blowing furiously, making it possible that the ships should be driven out of their course, "without a stock of provisions in any degree sufficient to subsist them in such a passage."

One may suppose that when the ships sailed into Halifax harbour, there was not a man of the Tenth who did not think that those at home were indifferent as to what might happen to the soldiers who were set to fight for a country the Government were doing their quickest to lose absolutely and discredibly. Before they were well out of Boston Harbour they heard Washington's drums beating, and knew that he and his men were marching into the town with colours flying, "and in all the triumph of victory."*

* See Annual Register.

CHAPTER XXI.

ON STATEN ISLAND.

1776. THE Tenth, on the evacuation of Boston, proceeded to Nova Scotia, where they found themselves in their old quarters, from whence they had been summoned to join General Gage. Remaining in Halifax, they were enabled to recover from their fatigue, Smith, who had received his brevet of Colonel, looking as well to the comfort of his men as possible, and jealous for their appearance and discipline. On June the 11th, 1776, Howe embarked with a force, which included the Tenth, for Staten Island. Washington was collecting a great army on Long Island, some of his troops being in New York itself.

It is difficult to understand why the American Commander-in-Chief left Staten Island unoccupied, unless we attribute it to an oversight. He certainly did not include Staten Island in his plan for the defence of New York, and Howe, taking advantage of the omission, was able to land his army without opposition on July the 3rd. From time to time during the following days the inadequate British Army was augmented by reinforcements which Howe's brother, the Admiral, sent in from ships that were arriving from England.

On the 4th of July, the army on Staten Island heard with amazement of the Americans' Declaration of Independence, when the Colonists declared themselves a separate nation, no longer under the control of the British Government. It was now to be a war between nations, and no longer a rebellion.

Howe sought to treat with the Americans, but he was refused a hearing. He consequently pressed on with his military preparations, his first object being the capture of New York. He accordingly organised his army into brigades, as follows:—

First Brigade—4th, 15th, 27th, 45th.

Second Brigade—5th, 28th, 35th, 49th.

Third Brigade—10th, 37th, 38th, 52nd, 55th.

Fourth Brigade—17th, 40th, 46th, 55th.

Fifth Brigade—22nd, 43rd, 54th, 63rd.

Sixth Brigade—23rd, 44th, 57th, 64th.

Seventh Brigade—Fraser's Highlanders, New York Companies, Hessians.

Reserve—Four battalions of Guards, 33rd & 42nd.

Light troops—Three battalions of light infantry, 16th and 17th Light Dragoons.

The Third Brigade, in which the Tenth had its place, was commanded by Major-General Jones, and formed part of the division which was placed under Lieutenant-General Earl Percy. Lord Percy's division was composed of the Guards, the Second, Third, and Fifth Brigades, Clinton's Division comprising the remaining Brigades.

The English army then made its descent, the fleet covering its movements, and landed on Long Island at Utrecht, in Gravesend Bay, without any opposition. It seems to have been the determination of the enemy to await Howe's coming behind the works at Brooklyn, a few miles from the shore, Putnam's lines being drawn across the neck of the peninsula, where Brooklyn is situated.

The work which Howe's army had to do was not an easy one, if Putnam proved to have taken full precautions. Between the armies lay a ridge of hills—the heights of Guana—and these were covered with wood. Two strong

forces occupied the pass and the hills—Stirling commanding the Americans on Howe's left, and Sullivan being in command on his right. The road to the enemy lay through the village of Flatbush, and Von Heister, with the Hessians and other troops, took this road, while Clinton, followed by Percy, turned to the right, to get round to the rear of Sullivan. The movement began in the darkness of the night of the 26th of August, and to Clinton's amazement, when he came to a pass which crossed the hills on Sullivan's left, he found it unguarded. Putnam had overlooked this completely, so that Clinton, and later, Percy, with the Tenth and the other regiments in his division, got through without their coming being known.

Meanwhile, Von Heister began his attack on Sullivan's front, calling off the attention of the enemy from the real danger on the left and rear. When Von Heister drove them back, the Americans, thinking to reach their camp, found themselves intercepted. They were now assailed on all sides, and had to retreat to the woods. The fighting then assumed the most desperate character. In the "Annual Register," which tells of the struggle, it is stated that in the woods they met the Hessians, and were assailed in turn by the light infantry and dragoons. Some fought their way through with terrible loss; others plunged into the morass and were smothered; others maintained the hopeless fight, but had to yield in the end. "Their loss was represented as exceeding 3,000 men, including about a thousand, who were taken prisoners. Almost a whole regiment from Maryland, consisting altogether of young men of the best families in the country, was cut to pieces." The loss to the Americans was aggravated by the fact that among the prisoners were Major-General Sullivan, Brigadiers General Lord Stirling and Udell, and ten other field officers. The loss to the British is said to have been

trifling, "being under 350 in killed and wounded, of which the former did not compose one-fifth."

The behaviour of the Tenth and their comrades that day was beyond all praise, and worthy of the reputation they had won in bygone campaigns. In Howe's despatch he said of the troops:—

"So impetuous was their courage, that it was not without difficulty they could be restrained from attacking the American lines. But it was apparent that the lines must become ours at a very cheap rate by regular approaches. I would not risk the loss that might have been sustained in the assault, and ordered them back."

Howe was greatly blamed for having restrained his men, but his reasonable answer was, that "the lines were strongly constructed and strongly held, the troops on the hills being but an advanced detachment, and that, even if these works had been carried, the enemy's retreat was still secured by the entrenchments on Brooklyn Heights, and by floating batteries on the water."*

The severity of the defeat was shown before the week was out. The great fight took place on the 26th of August. On the following evening Howe had his army in front of the works. On the 28th he began to break ground, resolving not to repeat the doings at Bunker's Hill, as Washington hoped, but to sit down for a regular siege of entrenchments. Throughout the 29th he strengthened his own works, but on the morning of the 30th he was amazed to find that Washington was gone. He had carried away his stores and guns during the night, and the lines were empty. All that Howe captured "was a train of waggons, and a few ancient cannon of the description which insurgents seize upon at the outbreak of a revolution, but of which, when serious fighting has begun, the artillerymen who work them are

* Fortescue: "History of the Army."

only too thankful to be quit." Trevelyan goes on to say that "when the Englishmen at last bethought themselves of going to see why there was no noise or movement behind the hostile breastworks, they found that everything of military value had been removed—field guns and horses, ordnance stores, and even the biscuits which had not been, and the raw pork which could not be, eaten."

Long Island, by this evacuation, was left in the hands of the British troops, and Howe's attention now turned to New York itself, which he determined to capture. But he seems to have lost a full fortnight, whereas the city might well have been at his immediate mercy, especially when we hear that the Americans were so disheartened that "the Militia deserted in whole companies."

Washington felt that it would be impossible to hold the city, and advised its abandonment, but Congress would not listen to it, being determined to keep it at all hazards. He therefore left a garrison of 5,000 men, saying, that since men must be lost because of such an unwise decision, it was better to lose a quarter of his army than the whole. His main body occupied a strong position some miles north. Some of his officers urged him to set New York on fire, and then withdraw. He would not hear of that, but got away with his main army, leaving a quarter of his forces to hold it if possible. When, on September 16th, Howe crossed over from Long Island, these marched away. Hence he did not succeed in taking more than some 300 prisoners. But Washington had left behind him 67 guns, and these fell into the hands of the incoming army, as well as a quantity of military stores.

The Tenth were among the first to enter New York, but this was after a sharp brush with the enemy, who retired, leaving 300 dead and wounded behind them. The loss of the British was small, considering the severity of the

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fighting, eight officers being slightly wounded, fourteen men killed, and about seventy wounded.

A few days later the Tenth had some exciting experiences. Some incendiaries set fire to New York in several places, and the soldiers were called out to prevent the destruction of the city, but with all their efforts, they could not prevent the ruin of fully one-third of it.

Howe next determined to place his main army on the flank and rear of the Americans, but left Earl Percy with three brigades in New York to hold the city. The Tenth were detached from Percy's command, and went with the other troops, who were embarked in boats, and proceeded up the river to West Chester. The men landed in a thick fog at Frog's Point, in the Sound, at the extreme end of the peninsula, and with wonderful facility military stores and provisions, horses and waggons, were also brought up, and with such secrecy, that Washington was unaware of what had transpired until the fog lifted at the break of day. Tenth were now on the mainland, but for some inexplicable reason, Howe, "with an irresistible army, and a fleet which there was nothing to resist," took nearly a fortnight to traverse thirty miles. The landing took place on October 12th, but White Plains, about thirty miles up the Bronx River, was not reached until the 26th.

Previously to the general advance of the army along the peninsula, the Tenth were told off to re-embark, and proceed to Pell's Point, where the enemy had occupied a pass. The fight in which they engaged was sharp and decisive, and having achieved their purpose and cleared the pass, the regiment rejoined the main army in its northern march. The Tenth were now attached to General Clinton's column, and consequently took part in the heavy fighting at White Plains on the 28th of October. Had Howe pressed his advantage, he would have done what he was

sent to America to do—he would have destroyed the American Army—“and he now had such a chance as has never occurred again.” The memory of the slaughter at Bunker’s Hill restrained him, and although the Americans were beaten severely, Washington got away with the greater part of his army.

Once more the Tenth came into Earl Percy’s command. This fourth column, which consisted of the 4th, 10th, 15th, 23rd, 27th, 28th, 38th, 52nd, and Fraser’s Highlanders, together with a brigade of Hessians, were sent down Haarlem Creek in the night, to assault the right flank of the American entrenchments at Fort Washington, which was now invested. This was on the 16th of November. Fort Washington is described as an open work, bordered on three sides by heights, and of small extent, which a few hours of shell-fire would render quite untenable. “It was, indeed, surrounded by an exterior position partially fortified, and so strong by nature that one of General Howe’s officers” exclaimed when he saw it, “Becket, this is a damned strong piece of ground. Ten thousand of our men would defend it against the world.” So runs Trevelyan’s story.

Had Washington been able to spare that number, instead of less than half, the result of the investment might well have been different. As it was, the attacking force carried the advanced works after some terrific fighting, described as “severe and bloody”; then the Tenth, with others, passed the lines, having to climb in places such a precipitous hill that they had at times to pull themselves up by bushes and tree roots. And all this in “heavy marching order!” At last, defying the furious fire, the Tenth, and those who shared in this assault, got to the top, and were then face to face and fighting hand to hand with the defenders.

In a brief space the fight was over. The British soldiers were swarming everywhere, and the American commander surrendered. Two thousand prisoners fell into the victors' hands. Strangely enough, in spite of the fierce fire through which the Tenth passed, their loss was trifling. The men for that day seemed to bear charmed lives, for "the loss of the regiment was limited to Captain Mackintosh, and three rank and file killed, five rank and file wounded." The total loss in Howe's army was 458, but, including prisoners, the enemy lost no less than 3,300 men.

The fighting for this campaign was not yet over. Howe had hoped to send his men into winter quarters, for they were worn out with the incessant toil, the exposure, and the inclement weather. But Rhode Island called for occupation first, this being "the principal station of the enemy's naval force, whence the Americans sent out privateers, which interrupted the British commerce."

The Tenth were chosen to form a part of Clinton's force, which was deputed for this important work. Clinton's command included the 10th, 22nd, 37th, 38th, 43rd and 52nd Light Infantry, the 54th, 63rd Light Infantry, Grenadiers, a detachment of the 17th Light Dragoons, and six battalions of Hessians.* These were conveyed by Sir Peter Parker's squadron, and, landing on the island on December the 9th, marched from end to end of it. The disheartened Americans submitted everywhere, so that the Tenth, glad of rest, went into winter quarters. The men were distributed among farms and hamlets . . . to remain under cover of a roof, and to live at rack and manger, until the spring should arrive †

If Howe had not blundered so frequently, and lost so many and splendid opportunities, the Tenth would not have been called out to undergo another and yet more arduous campaign.

* Fortescue,

† Trevelyan.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE TENTH AT PHILADELPHIA.

1777. When the army took the field in the early part of 1777, the Tenth joined it in New Jersey, General Sir William Howe being still in command.

The Government's plan for the new campaign was to make three simultaneous attacks on the Americans, "with very considerable and well-appointed armies." In the first of these attacks General Howe was to endeavour to gain possession of Philadelphia, and Lord Howe's fleet was ordered to lend full assistance, as well as to prevent the northern colonies from sending succour to the south. Lieutenant-General Burgoyne was to march from Canada with the second army, and, going by way of Lakes Champlain and George, and the Hudson River, to penetrate to Albany and form a junction with the Commander-in-Chief. Clinton was in command of the third army. He was at New York, and was to send a strong detachment up Hudson River, to attack the settlements on the bank, and, if possible, to form a junction with Burgoyne.

The Tenth were with Howe, but apparently did not join him until the early part of June. Washington by this time had withdrawn his army into the hills, where his camp was exceptionally strong. He held the mountain passes, which, in the hands of the British troops, would have led to disaster for him. Howe, realising that it would be madness to attack him there, crossed with his army to Staten Island, and made preparations for embarkation. The news filled the Americans with dismay, for none knew what the

expedition's destination was. Was it Boston? the North River? the Delaware? Chesapeake Bay? Or was it Charlestown? Washington remained where he was, awaiting definite news.

In reality Howe was going to Philadelphia.

On the 5th of July the Tenth embarked for Chesapeake Bay, but for days the soldiers were cooped up in the transport, in the hottest season of the year. It was the same in all the ships. Days before the fleet was ready to sail, the men were sent on board, and with the horses were crowded in the sweltering holds. Not until the 23rd of July were the ships moving from Sandy Hook. The "Annual Register" says that in order more effectually to perplex and deceive the enemy, the General ordered some transports, with a ship cut down to act as a floating battery, up the North River, and thus, by this feint, he induced Washington to send a considerable body of his army across the stream. Then the voyage began, and the Tenth experienced all the horrors of transport life in bad weather. It took a week to gain the capes of the Delaware.

On the 24th of August the army landed at the mouth of the River Elk without opposition. When Howe went forward with his troops he left a strong contingent at the landing place to guard the stores, provisions, and artillery, and bring them on as quickly as possible—a difficult task, because of the scarcity of horses and carriages.

Washington at this time brought his army from Philadelphia, which he feared was threatened, and hastened to Brandywine River. His men numbered 15,000, so that the two armies were nearly equal in numerical strength, the British army being the weaker of the two. Washington was strongly posted; the stream, which at that point was a torrent, being pent in "between high steep cliffs, which effectually forbade any attempt on his left." Here he

placed his militia. Washington commanded the centre at Chad's Ford, and Sullivan was with the right, "two miles up the stream, in broken, wooded, and difficult country."

Howe formed his army in two columns. Knyphausen was with the left, and Cornwallis commanded the right. These were composed as follows :

The Right (Cornwallis) :

3rd Brigade, 15th, 33rd, 44th, 55th, Major-Gen. Grey.

4th Brigade, 17th, 37th, 46th, 64th, Major-Gen. Agnew.

Two battalions Guards.

Two battalions Light Infantry.

Two battalions Grenadiers.

Two squadrons 16th Light Dragoons.

Three battalions Hessians, mounted and dismounted chasseurs.

Four 12-pounders, and battalion guns.

The Left (Knyphausen) :

1st Brigade, 4th, 5th, 23rd, 49th, Major-Gen. Vaughan.

2nd Brigade, 10th, 27th, 28th, 40th, Major-Gen. Grant.

Four Hessian battalions.

Three battalions, Fraser's Highlanders.

Queen's Rangers (Irregulars).

One squadron 16th Light Dragoons.

Six 12-pounders.

Four howitzers, and battalion guns.*

Howe's purpose was to turn Washington's right flank. On September the 11th, he began his attack, and the Tenth, under Knyphausen, went straight to Chad's Fort, where Washington was posted—the centre of the Americans. Howe made the pretence of an attack in force at this point, and opened a furious cannonade, while the Tenth and other troops dashed, despite a heavy fire, across the turbulent

* Fortescue's list is here given.

stream with fixed bayonets. More than once they were driven back, but again and again they advanced.

Meanwhile, Howe distracting Washington's attention, and giving him the impression that this was the main attack, —Cornwallis, by a circuitous march of sixteen miles to the left, having crossed the Brandywine—encountered Sullivan's column, drawn up in front of a wood, strongly situated. A determined advance compelled the enemy to fly into the woods in their rear. Unfortunately a large number of Cornwallis's men, in the eagerness of pursuit, got entangled there, and were for the time being unavailable. Sullivan re-formed his force in another part of the wood, but he was driven out of it disastrously.

The Tenth by this time—towards evening—had forced their way, and secured themselves across the stream. After some desperate fighting, Washington was beaten, his entrenchments were carried, and his batteries and cannon captured. Cornwallis's troops, having traversed the wood, now came up, and attacking in the rear, completed the rout. Fortunately for Washington, the coming on of darkness prevented effective pursuit, and saved his army from annihilation. Grant, who commanded the brigade in which the Tenth was fighting, handled his troops so skilfully, that in spite of Washington's obstinate resistance, the Tenth's loss was small—two rank and file killed, and six men wounded. The enemy's loss was computed at three hundred killed, six hundred wounded, and four hundred prisoners. Howe's army sustained a loss of less than five hundred, of which the slain did not amount to a fifth.

That night the Tenth lay on the battlefield, little comprehending the dismay which filled the hearts of the Americans throughout the country when news of the disaster came. While they slept after that hard day of fighting, the highways were thronged with fugitives, who were told

lying tales of the barbarities practised by the British troops. They had forgotten what their own countrymen had done to the unfortunate soldiers who had been scalped at Lexington.

On the next day the British army was on the way towards Philadelphia, coming to Concord. On the 13th, the day following, the Tenth were at Ashtown, and news was coming in of Washington's endeavours to save Philadelphia, and of the despair prevailing among the Americans, belligerent and civilian. On the 25th of September the troops were at Germantown, preparing to enter Philadelphia, which was at their mercy, and was only six miles away. On the 26th, the Tenth, with their comrades, were on the march for the city, which was plainly seen as they went along the Germantown Road.

The army, as Trevelyan puts it, entered the place, and marched in sober triumph, into and through the heart of the city. "The vanguard was commanded by Lord Cornwallis, who then, and always . . . in many quarters of the world, and under circumstances of extreme temptation—never failed to display a humanity and a generosity worthy of the great nation to which he and his soldiers belonged. The regimental colours remained in their cases; but the bands struck up the tune of 'God Save the King' amidst the acclamations of several thousands of inhabitants, who (as an English officer observed) were mostly women and children. Some of the latter, many years afterwards, wrote down their youthful impressions of the scene. They all agreed in testifying that the discipline of the Royal troops was exemplary, and their conduct irreproachable. Men occasionally dropped out of the line, and asked for milk or cider; but in case of houses where these applications became too frequent, a sentinel was stationed at the door, and relieved hour by hour until the whole army had filed past.

. The British, said a Whig lady, were clean and healthy, and well-clad ; and the contrast between them and General Washington's poor, bare-footed, and ragged troops was most startling, and aroused a feeling very near akin to positive despair.*

The Americans had meanwhile made great efforts to prevent Lord Howe's passage up the Delaware. They had constructed numerous works and batteries on a marshy island, and had sunk many great obstructions in the stream, "destructive to any ship which had the misfortune of striking against them." In order to remove these it was necessary to send a force across the stream, and drive the Americans from their batteries. The Tenth and 42nd were detached for this purpose, the Lieutenant-Colonel of the latter regiment being in command. The point at which they aimed was known as Billing's Fort, where a redoubt of unusual strength had been erected. They crossed the river with such celerity that the enemy were taken by surprise, and without staying to be attacked, remained only long enough to spike the guns, and fire the barracks, after which they fled in some confusion. Pursuit was useless, and consequently the soldiers bent their energies to the more profitable task of destroying the works, thus enabling the sailors of the ships in the stream to remove the chevaux-de-frise and clear a passage.

Having done their work so well, the Tenth and the other regiments crossed the river and returned to their quarters at Chester. They were, however, sent away at once, strengthened by the addition of the 23rd Regiment, their allotted task now being to serve as escort to a large convoy of provisions, and bring it to the camp at Germantown. The despatch of three strong regiments necessarily weakened the camp at Germantown, and intelligence of

* Trevelyan: "American Revolution."

this having reached Washington, he, now strongly reinforced, determined to attack Howe before the troops could return. He was the more eager to do this because he also heard that other detachments had been sent out in various directions. The idea was to surprise the English army, and consequently, Washington, setting out on the night of October the 3rd, appeared before Germantown at daybreak the following morning. Germantown was a village which formed, for two miles, one continuous street, which the line of the British encampment crossed at right angles, nearly a mile from the head of it." The 40th Regiment and the 2nd battalion of light infantry formed the advanced corps.

Howe was not taken by surprise, as had been intended, for intelligence came of Washington's movements, and although he had but 8,000 men at his disposal, he was awaiting the coming of the Americans. The formation of Howe's army, which stood to arms, was as follows :

On the left of the village, extending to the Schuylkill—Lieutenant-General Knyphausen, Major-Generals Stern and Grey, and Brigadier-General Agnew. Seven British and three Hessian battalions were here, with mounted and dismounted chasseurs, who were in front. On the right, with Major-General Grant and Brigadier-General Matthew, were six battalions of British and two squadrons of Dragoons, and the first battalion of light infantry. These latter, with the Queen's American Rangers, were advanced in front of the wing. In this wing, the Tenth were placed, having arrived in time for the fight, coming in after a forced march.

Sullivan came down the main street, and on either side of it, while Greene was on his left, endeavouring to take Grant in the flank ; but there he was face to face with the 25th and 27th Guards. The American Militia were to

Sullivan's right, near the river, and found themselves facing Grey. Stirling followed in reserve.

A dense fog had settled over the country, but although this served to spoil the scheme of a combined attack, Washington's troops began without delay. The fog allowed the enemy to surprise the light infantry, and drive the battalion back, although they fought every foot of the way. Presently they came to the spot where the 40th were stationed, and strengthened thus, they fought with such spirit as to hold back the attacking army for some time. The overwhelming force of the enemy, however, caused the line to give way, until Howe, galloping up, cried to them: "For shame, Light Infantry! I never saw you retreat before. Form! Form! It is only a scouting party!" The fog, however, lifted, and Howe, with a storm of grape rattling about him, laying the men low on all sides, saw before him a whole American column.

The 40th were unexpectedly surrounded by a great body of troops, but Colonel Musgrave hurried into the Chief Justice's house, known as Chew House, and this he held in spite of the cannon that were trained against him. The outcome of this incident was amazing. Its effect on Washington's plans was bewildering and ruinous. "The roar of the guns exerted a fatal attraction over those American generals and colonels who were painfully and blindly groping their passage through the fog. Battalions, brigades, and in one case a whole division came blundering up from right and left and rear, firing in the direction of the foe, and sometimes into the backs of their friends; increasing the confusion, and perpetually adding to the noise. Before very long three thousand Republicans were clustered and intermingled around the British stronghold; and Musgrave's seven score of musketeers, like the Guardsmen of Hougoumont, performed the inestimable

service of detaining and paralysing, through the critical hours of a disputed day, a hostile force enormously out of proportion to their own scanty numbers."

The Tenth meanwhile were not engaged. It lay with Grey, who was on the extreme left, to sweep round with the 3rd Brigade, and attack those who were storming Chew House. Shortly after, while the fierce fight was now progressing, Grey was supported by Brigadier-General Agnew, who came up with his 4th Brigade. It was presently the turn of Howe's right. A portion of the right wing, in which the light company of the Tenth had a place, came up suddenly on the enemy's left, and so fierce and irresistible was the onslaught, that Sullivan's column fled in great disorder, almost amounting to panic. It is doubtful whether the whole of the Tenth took any active part in this battle of Germantown, but those who did displayed unusual valour in a desperate contest.

Greene's position was one of extreme jeopardy now that Sullivan's men were retiring in "hurry and disarray." Yet he fought in such a manner that his name became a household word in the New England homes, and not until his powder and shot were exhausted, and his men had fallen by scores, did he take off his troops and artillery. What might have happened if Howe had decided to follow up his advantage it would be hard to say; but there is no question that he lost a splendid opportunity, which, as Trevelyan declares, was his last. Washington did not halt till he came to a place twenty miles away, and Howe pursuing a laggard's policy, the American Commander-in-Chief gathered his scattered forces together, amazed at the opportunity being his to do so.

For America the battle was disastrous. There were two hundred killed, sixteen hundred wounded, and four hundred prisoners. In Howe's army the death roll numbered a

hundred, and four hundred were wounded. Among the dead were Brigadier-General Agnew and Lieutenant-Colonel Bird, "both most deservedly regretted by the whole army." Several of the Tenth who were engaged were killed and wounded.

The despatch which Howe sent home bore testimony to the good conduct of the general officers, and of the bravery of the other officers and men. The commander of the Tenth had reason to be proud of his regiment, for they had borne their full share of peril and toil in the campaign of which Howe spoke in the following terms: "The fatigues of a march exceeding one hundred miles, supported with the utmost cheerfulness by all ranks, without tents, and with very little baggage, will, I hope, be esteemed as convincing proofs of the noble spirit and emulation prevailing in the army to promote his Majesty's service."

Little time was allowed the soldiers who had achieved this striking victory to rest. On the night of the 6th of October they were on the move again; on the following morning they were at Edge Hill. Here they found themselves in front of the enemy's left, but the advance guard of Cornwallis's division drove them out. On the 19th the British army was again near Philadelphia, and the Tenth were employed in the operations for reducing two forts on the river. One of these was called Mud Island, known also as Fort Island.

It was an apparently easy task, but the access was so difficult that everything was in favour of the defenders. Consequently the assault was not successful. Later, however, dreading a renewal of a fierce attack, the enemy abandoned the place. They had suffered terribly in the previous fighting, for four-fifths of their artillerymen had been struck down, and were either killed or incapable, while

"no angle of wall or bank of earth could afford them protection against the storm of missiles which swept across their islet from every quarter of the compass." They retired during the night, leaving behind them nothing but ruins.

Red Bank, where eight hundred Americans were entrenched, was assaulted on the same day. Here, also, the fighting was of a desperate character. The enemy were driven from the outworks, and retired to an interior entrenchment "which could not be forced without ladders, being eight or nine feet high, with a parapet boarded and fraised." The assault failed. Many officers were killed or wounded, and the men suffered seriously. Their task had been rendered more dangerous because of a galling fire from the floating batteries and galleys.

This was on October the 22nd. On the 23rd the assault was renewed, but the enemy retreated when they had spiked their cannon. Red Bank thus came into Cornwallis's hands. The Americans, having evacuated their stronghold, joined their compatriots at Whitemarsh, where Washington was in command, fourteen miles away from Philadelphia. Howe, who took up a position on Chesnut Hill, endeavoured to bring on a general engagement, but without success. Washington, in spite of all that Howe could do, considered it safest to pursue a Fabian policy, not from want of enterprise, but for lack of resources.

Throughout the early days of December there were many skirmishes in which the Tenth played their part. In these the enemy were always defeated, and notably on Edge Hill there was a desperate fight, in which the Americans lost heavily, and with difficulty saved their guns. "Perceiving that no temptation could induce General Washington to quit his present position," says Trevelyan, "and being unwilling to expose his troops longer to the weather, at

such an inclement season, without tents or baggage of any kind for officers or men, Howe returned on the 8th to Philadelphia ; and met with no molestation on his march." There were even yet further skirmishes, but ultimately the Tenth were in winter quarters, glad of rest after a long and trying campaign. At the time the weather was intensely cold, and the ground covered with snow. The statement, therefore, as to the absence of tents or baggage, indicates the cruel conditions under which the Tenth and the remainder of the army fought in this unusually protracted campaign.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE LAST AMERICAN CAMPAIGN.

1778. THE Tenth passed the winter in comfortable quarters in Philadelphia.

The city itself was an ideal place for an army to winter in, and, being in possession of the British, its comforts were at the disposal of the soldiers, who came in utterly worn down by incessant duty. Trevelyan describes William Penn's city as "already large enough to be a centre of accumulated wealth and high civilisation"—very different from the towns so easily to be found in Europe, which consisted often of "a tortuous maze of dwellings crowded within the narrow limits of an ancient rampart." The Tenth were resting in a city with "straight and uniform thoroughfares, sixty or a hundred feet broad, which crossed each other at right angles." The writer just quoted says that the streets were "well paved, adequately lighted, scrupulously clean—and completely, though very economically, equipped with educational, scientific, social, medical, and charitable institutions."

It was here—amid the gardens and deer-parks, and avenues, where there was so much that spoke of wealth—that the Tenth spent their last winter in America. There were citizens there by the thousand who were against the Revolution, and although they could ill bear the disabilities of having an army to lodge, they were generous in their treatment of the soldiers who were fighting their battles. "For every native-bred inhabitant of either sex, over the

age of ten years, at least one Royal soldier was now quartered within the city."

On the whole the men behaved exceedingly well. To every rank in the army the winter was a round of festivities. When news came that in response to Sir William Howe's request to be relieved, he was to be superseded by Sir Henry Clinton, the soldiers and their officers "resolved to give, in their general's honour, the most splendid festivity that the New World had ever witnessed." They gave him a send-off homewards never to be forgotten. They thought of him and loved him as "an indulgent commander, and a hearty companion, who lived and let live, and who, when off duty, was as genial to his followers, high and low, as on the actual day of battle he was formidable to the enemy." In spite of criticisms and complainings at home, it could not be forgotten that he "had won half a dozen pitched battles, and had seized the hostile capital."

When Howe left his army in Philadelphia, in May, 1778, Clinton entered the city—by no means a welcome arrival to the majority of the soldiers. The men in the army, when they heard of his coming, declared that Sir Henry Clinton was a general under whose leadership they would gain no laurels; and no sooner had he come than he began apparently to undo all that Howe had achieved.

He was acting under instructions from Lord George Germaine, whose three-fold plan had already proved a huge disaster, what with Burgoyne's surrender of his army, and failure elsewhere. Clinton began at once to transfer his army from Philadelphia to New York. Fortescue tells how the newly-arrived commander began "to ship his stores for the evacuation of Philadelphia, but finding that he could not embark the troops at any point nearer than Newcastle—some forty miles away—and that his transports were insufficient to convey both the army and some three

thousand refugees who claimed his protection, he decided to retreat to New York by land."

The evacuation of Philadelphia began on the 18th of June. Up to that hour the English General had squandered most valuable time, which gave Washington full opportunity to equip and train his army, which hitherto had been impossible. "Von Steuben," says one historian, "was re-moulding the infantry, General Knox could be trusted to restore the efficiency of the artillery, and Washington himself took measures to remedy the most glaring of all the defects in the composition of his army."

Delay which allowed Washington time to do all this, and supply himself amply with stores and ammunition, while the English soldiers were provided for in the usual slipshod fashion, was a piece of suicidal folly, and ended in the loss of America. No fault could ever be found on the score of willingness and endeavour and courage on the part of the army. Indeed, while the Tenth were going through the American War they won for themselves the nickname of The Springers, by reason of their readiness at any time for duty, and whatever the emergency. They were notably ready, and the nickname, honourable in its origin, has never left them.* But for all the army it can be claimed that their courage and endeavour were in constant evidence. These were matchless, though they could avail nothing when there was such abominable mismanagement at home, and when orders came which paralysed the British commanders. Howe had gone from that "land of baffled hopes and lost opportunities" absolutely disheartened; and doubtless much of what has been termed

* Another tradition has it that this nickname had its origin in the Regimental March.
"The Lincolnshire Poacher":

"For it's my delight on a starry night
In the season of the year," &c.;

a "springer" (archaic) being one who sets traps or springs. I give the above on what seems to be indisputable authority.—AUTHOR.

failure on his part was due to the half-hearted instructions which came to him from time to time from those who were ignorant of the conditions in America.

Clinton left Philadelphia to avoid being starved out. Washington's flying columns had "swept the more remote townships clear of food and fodder, and left a bare larder for the British Commissariat"; he also prevented the farmers from carrying food into the city. When cattle ships and flour barges attempted to go up the river, Washington's guns sunk them in the daytime, and in the night his men in boats captured them. When war stores came and were taken, they found their way into Washington's camp.

Clinton came with instructions to evacuate Philadelphia, and this officer, a mere automaton, since he was not allowed to use his judgment, had to undertake the tremendous task of getting the army away in face of the greatest difficulties and dangers. The fleet took off the heavy baggage, as well as the sick and wounded. Then, at day-dawn, on the 18th of June, the Tenth were on the move towards the ferry, and crossed the river in boats. In this way went the whole army—17,000 men and 46 field-pieces—"a most formidable body of soldiers, if only their faces had been turned in the right direction. They were hardy, strong-limbed, and active fellows, responsive to the leadership, and amenable to the control, of their high-spirited and vigilant regimental officers." But orders had come from home, and they were compelled to go that way and no other.

When they landed on the New Jersey shore they remained in camp for a few days.

Then began experiences rarely equalled in the past by the men of the Tenth. For fourteen consecutive hours the rain poured down, soaking through the clothing of the

soldiers, ruining both ammunition and food, followed by a spell of intolerable heat : " the most terrible heat which had afflicted the province within the range of human memory." In a letter written by the Commander-in-Chief to Lord George Germaine, it was said that "many died of sunstroke; the features of the men were swollen past recognition by mosquito bites; and at the end of a short day's march—short in distance, though long in time—one Hessian out of every three had been left panting and prostrate on the roadside. The infantry, burdened like pack-horses, and clothed and accoutred as if for a birthday parade in a European capital, were kept stationary, hour after hour in the blazing sun; for the train of carts was a dozen miles in length, and frequently travelled on a single causeway."

Under such conditions the soldiers were powerless to hinder the Americans, whom they saw breaking down the bridges everywhere. Wherever the population could hinder or damage, they never failed to do so, having first driven away their live stock and carted away provisions. But Clinton pressed on, determined not to encamp until he reached the spot fixed in his mind.

On the 27th of June that spot was reached, after the army had traversed the woods which must be passed, and crossed the creeks and marshy brooks, which seemed to be everywhere. The Marquis de La Fayette harassed the army constantly in its march, riflemen in linen smocks picking off our men continually.

The army bivouacked on the 27th, about some buildings known as Monmouth Court House, and having reason to believe that Washington's main body was not far away, Clinton determined to free himself from the encumbrance of the baggage. Accordingly he gave this into the charge of General Knyphausen. The army was thus divided into two divisions—the van under Knyphausen, and the rear

under Cornwallis. The Tenth were with Knyphausen, whose command comprised the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Brigades of British, two battalions of British and the Hessian Grenadiers, a battalion of Light Infantry, the Guards, and the 16th Light Dragoons.

The Tenth were on the move on Sunday morning, June 28th, 1778, a day "long remembered all over the United States as the most sultry day which had ever been endured since mankind learned to read the thermometer."

The march began before day-dawn—soon after midnight—Knyphausen leading through some high country. Some hours later—at eight in the morning—Cornwallis's division was on the move, and in a short space he was in the plain below Freehold, which he had just quitted. The plain, which was three miles in length, and about one in width, became a battle ground. Cornwallis discovered that he was threatened on three sides, large bodies being on his flanks, and the main American army in his rear.

Assured that it was Washington's design to break up the immense baggage train, Cornwallis saw that his only chance of saving it from destruction or capture was to assail the army in his rear, and thus draw away the forces that were threatening Knyphausen. He asked that general to send him one of his brigades, and the 17th Light Dragoons, and thus the Tenth joined Cornwallis, and played a distinguished part in the fierce fighting which followed. The brigade to which they were attached took up a position where they effectually covered Cornwallis's right flank, "being on the side of which he was most jealous of the design of the enemy."

The fight began by an attack of the Queen's Light Dragoons on La Fayette's cavalry. When the enemy realised their danger, they did not wait for them, but fell back in something like a panic. The arrival also of the

Tenth and the remainder of the brigade from Knyphausen's army, so disconcerted the Americans that they hurried away from the plain to Freehold, on the heights. Although worn out with the excessive heat, the Royal forces made a vigorous attack on the enemy and drove back the first line. Another fierce encounter followed, and the second line fell back completely routed. But for the weariness of the men, the King's army would have assailed the enemy, in the third position which they took up, behind a marshy hollow, but having saved his baggage train, Clinton did not pursue what was, to the Americans, a disastrous fight.

Meanwhile, Major-General Charles Lee had attacked Knyphausen, and although that commander only sent out the piquets of the 40th, and a troop of the 17th Light Dragoons, Lee retreated in what bore "a very close resemblance to a rout." Lee was called "a damned poltroon" by Washington, and after being tried by Court-Martial, was suspended from service for a year—a punishment altogether incommensurate with such a despicable display before the enemy.

This day's fighting was in every way creditable alike to the British general and his men. They defeated the enemy, who were twice their own strength in point of numbers, and drove them out of two strong positions, in spite of the terrible heat and their fatigue. A large proportion of the dead fell on the field not from wounds but from the intolerable heat. The sun blazed down on the burdened men with an angry fury which tried the strongest, and men who fought dropped when called on to make the charge. Fortescue says that "the action cost the British 358 officers and men, of whom no fewer than 60 fell dead from sunstroke, owing to the overpowering heat of the day. The loss of the Americans was almost exactly the same, but Clinton's army was considerably reduced during this march

by the desertion of some six hundred men, three-fourths of them Germans, who had contracted attachments of one description or another to the town of Philadelphia."

Clinton, in his despatch to England, spoke in the strongest terms of commendation of the bravery and good conduct of the officers and men under his command. Yet when he issued a general order, in which he thanked his troops for their "cheerfulness under fatigue," and their "noble ardour in battle," he "confessed himself obliged to say that the irregularity of the army during that march had reflected much disgrace on the discipline, which ought to be the first object of an officer's attention. Marauding had been unbridled," and, as we have seen, there was a great amount of desertion.

Clinton lost no time in the march on New York, which he was anxious to reach before the French could land the troops that were promised to the Americans by the sympathising Government of France. When the army arrived at Sandy Hook, Clinton found himself in difficulties which he had never anticipated. The "Annual Register" explains it thus: "It happened in the preceding winter that the peninsula of Sandy Hook had been cut off from the Continent, and converted into an absolute island by a breach of the sea—a circumstance then of little moment, but which might now have been attended with the most fatal consequences."

Clinton knew not how to transport his army to New York, but the fleet, fortunately, arrived at the opportune moment. The Admiral helped the Commander-in-Chief out of his difficulties by putting his men to the task of making a bridge of boats. It was completed in an incredibly short space of time. By the 5th of July it was ready for the army to march over, and very shortly after Clinton was in New York.

The fighting days of the Tenth in America had ended. When the regiment arrived in New York, it was found that the numbers had diminished disastrously, what with those who had fallen in battle, or dropped out dangerously wounded, or were worn out with excessive privation and fatigue. Such was the weakness of this distinguished regiment that the Commander-in-Chief recommended its return home, that the men might rest, and recruits be obtained. The men who were fit for service demurred, and since Clinton desired to retain as many efficient as possible, he permitted these to volunteer for other corps which needed recruiting. The consequence was that a number remained in America, but they lost their identity as men of the Old Tenth. Towards the end of October, those who were able to undertake the homeward voyage embarked. They arrived in England early in December, and immediately commenced recruiting their numbers.*

The worn-out soldiers—veterans, every one of them—men who had fought with honour under conditions which not only tried their courage, but tested their loyalty to its full degree, saw England's shores for the first time for many a long year. The regiment had not been back in the old country since the year 1730, when it embarked for Gibraltar, where it had spent the next nineteen years. Then it had gone to Ireland, and when the dispute between England and her North-American Colonies assumed a serious aspect, the Tenth embarked for America. That was in 1763. Through the fiercest fighting in the war the Tenth bore their full share. We have seen that the first blood that was shed in that lamentable quarrel was that of one of their men. Of all who played their part in the skirmishes and sieges, marches and battles, none could deny the glory of the record of the regiment's achievements.

* Cannon.

Lord Clinton, in an official letter to Viscount Barrington, Secretary at War, dated October the 12th, 1778, wrote:—

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that having drafted the 10th, 45th, and 52nd Regiments of Foot, agreeable to the King's Commands, The Officers of those Corps, with the Serjeants, Corporals, and Drummers, are embarked, in order to return to Britain, and will sail the first favourable Wind.

The letter went on to say that about three hundred invalids accompanied these on the homeward voyage.

The Tenth had become an absolutely shattered regiment. How serious the losses were which they had suffered in New England may be realised from the following abstract of the "Monthly Return," dated January 1st, 1779, when the Regiment was quartered at Doncaster:—

| | | | | | | |
|--|-----|----------|-----|-----|-----|---------|
| Effective Rank and File, present and fit for duty, on Command, Recruiting, and on Furlow | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 39 men. |
| Wanting to complete the allowance and bring the regiment up to full strength | ... | 901 men. | | | | |

One must not forget that any efficient soldiers of the Tenth who elected to do so, remained in America, and as Lord Clinton indicated in his dispatch, were drafted into other regiments, but how many these were, I have not discovered. There were also among those who sailed home, doubtless, many men whose time had expired, and claimed their discharge on landing. None the less, the losses were extreme.

In spite of the Recruiting Act, 577 men were yet required eleven months later (December 1st, 1779) to bring the Tenth up to their full strength. The men in the ranks did not at that time exceed 275, and of these 44 were absent from their quarters, recruiting.

THE NORTH LINCOLN REGIMENT.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE TERRITORIAL DESIGNATION.

1778. WHEN the Tenth returned home in such a shattered state, after an absence of forty-eight years, immediate steps were taken to recruit the depleted ranks. An Act of Parliament had just received His Majesty's sanction for the better recruiting of the Land Forces, and it was brought into force for filling the gaps in the Tenth.

By this Act the Justices of Peace and Commissioners of Land Tax were appointed to put it into execution, and were empowered, within their several jurisdictions, "to raise and levy all able-bodied, idle, and disorderly persons, who cannot, upon examination, prove themselves to exercise and industriously follow some lawful trade and employment, for their support and maintenance, to serve his Majesty as soldiers, and they are to order a general search within their parishes for all persons answering such descriptions; and all persons convicted of smuggling, to the value not exceeding forty pounds, may be raised and levied in like manner for soldiers, in lieu of the present punishments they are liable to. Able-bodied men only to be inlisted, and none under 17 or above 45 years of age. It is strictly enjoined, that the inhabitants of the different parishes shall be assisting to the Commissioners, in putting in force this Act. And, as an encouragement to the inhabitants, they are to receive a premium of 10s. for giving information of

any able-bodied man, who shall in consequence thereof be apprehended and inlisted. The chief magistrates of cities to inforce this Act upon notice from the Secretary at War."

This Act, which was somewhat amended in the following year, provided that no person entitled to vote at an election of a member of Parliament could be impressed, and those who had been so impressed could take their discharge at the end of five years' service, provided the nation was not then engaged in war, in which case they must serve during the continuance of the war. Any who came forward voluntarily, received three guineas bounty money; they entered into immediate pay, and could claim their discharge at the end of three years, were exempted afterwards from Statute duty, parish offices, and the Militia service, and could set up and exercise any trade, agreeable to the statute 3 Geo. III. c. 8.

Such an Act served to assist the recruiting officers who were sent down to Lincolnshire to find men who would take the place of those who had succumbed under the trying experiences of the American War. Whether there was a ready response, a voluntary offer of service on the part of the young men of the county, one cannot say. We can only look at the muster roll and get the figures. One thing is certain, that for some months at least—as indicated at the close of the preceding chapter—the officers who were recruiting were baffled, and did but little towards filling the gaps. It required a drastic enforcement of the provisions of the Act of Parliament.

The Tenth acquired its proper complement at last. Brought up to its war-footing, the regiment remained in England, in spite of urgent calls for reinforcements in America. Alarm followed alarm in the matter of foreign invasion, especially from France, and led to protests against

depleting the country of troops, and leaving it defenceless. Rather than add to what was assuming the appearance of panic, the Government retained some of its finest regiments at home, the Tenth among them, although the soldiers, now rested, were eager to be at the seat of war again.

During garrison life in England the Tenth lost their Colonel, Lieutenant-General Edward Sandford, who had been appointed in 1763. On his death in 1781, he was succeeded by Major-General Sir Robert Murray Keith, K.B., the appointment dating from October the 10th, 1781.

Sir Robert's career was an honourable one, and the Tenth had reason to express their satisfaction when it was known that he was to be their Colonel. At the time of his appointment he was sixty-one years old, and had seen service as a soldier and a diplomatist. Born in 1730, he became a cornet in Lord Rothe's Dragoons in 1746; in the following year he accepted a company in a Scottish regiment under Lord Drumlanrig. The regiment immediately joined the Scots Brigade, which was in the Dutch service at Breda. He was spoken of then as "much esteemed for his judgment and politeness." The "Scots-Dutch," however, were reduced, and Keith was pensioned off. When he was "cast for reduction" Lord Drumlanrig would not part with him until the Scots Brigade was again reduced, and then the pensioning off came into force. In spite of his literary tastes he was eager to continue his career as a soldier, and consequently on the first opportunity found a place on the staff of Lord George Sackville, who was in the pay of the Brunswick State. While in this service he was present at the battle of Minden, which was fought on August the 1st, 1759.

At the end of that month three companies of Highlanders were formed out of the 2nd Battalion of the 42nd Highlanders at Perth, and these, with Keith as major-

commandant, were sent to join the Allies in Germany. They experienced some hard and successful fighting. Keith's Highlanders, when augmented, became the 87th Foot, he being lieutenant-colonel commandant. Then came great glory alike to Keith and his men, some terrific fighting ensuing in the various campaigns. Once Keith was reported dead, after the battle of Kirch-Denkern, but he was found, and recovered from his desperate wounds. At the disbandment of the 87th, Keith had a long spell of experience as a diplomat in Saxony, being British Minister there. Later he was Envoy-Extraordinary at Copenhagen, where he had some remarkable experiences while defending the Queen, George III.'s sister, from an angry mob. Having saved her, "he despatched a messenger to his own Government for further instructions, and then shut himself up for four weeks. At the end of that time he received the return packet, with the Insignia of the Bath, enclosed by the King's own hands, to mark his sense of Keith's conduct. He was instructed to invest himself and go straight to the palace."

For many years after that Keith represented the King at Vienna; in 1781 he was made colonel of the Tenth, and attained the rank of lieutenant-general in 1782. He remained Colonel until his death in 1795.

Shortly after Sir Robert Murray Keith's appointment as colonel, the Tenth became territorially associated with Lincolnshire. The following Order, which was, *mutatis mutandis*, general throughout the army, was addressed to the Colonel:

London, 31st August, 1782.

His Majesty has been pleased to Order that the 10th Regiment of Foot which you command should take the County name of the 10th, or North Lincolnshire Regiment, and be looked upon as attached to that Division of the County, I am to acquaint you it is His Majesty's

farther pleasure that you should in all things conform to that Idea, and endeavour by all means in your power to cultivate and improve that connection, so as to create a mutual attachment between the County and the Regiment which may at all times be useful towards recruiting the Regiment. But as the completing of the several Regiments now generally so deficient, is in the present crisis of the most important national Concern ; you will on this Occasion use the utmost possible exertion for that purpose, by prescribing the greatest diligence to your Officers and recruiting parties, and every suitable attention to the Gentlemen and considerable Inhabitants ; and as nothing can so much tend to conciliate their affections as a Orderly and Polite behaviour towards them, and an Observance of the strictest discipline in all your Quarters, you will give the most positive Orders on that Head ; and you will immediately make such a disposition of your Recruiting parties as may best answer that end.

I have the honour to be

Sir

Your most Obedient and
most humble Servant

H. S. Conway.

Major-Genl. Sir R. Murray Keith, K.B.

This territorial designation has been dated by some writers for 1783, but the official document which has just been quoted from the War Office Warrants fixes the change for August 31st, 1782, and must be taken as correct.

The system now adopted received its initiative when Britain was not only menaced by France, and engaged in the distressing war with the American Colonies, but had every reason to fear that Spain would at any moment be counted among her enemies. The position was perilous in

the extreme, but the enthusiasm aroused in the country resulted in the rallying of civilians everywhere. Fortescue tells how noblemen and gentlemen came forward with offers to raise regular regiments at their own expense; "and within two months thirteen regiments of infantry for general service, three regiments of Fencible Infantry, a twenty-second regiment of Light Dragoons, and yet another small corps of cavalry were all raising without cost to the country."

This was in the year 1779.

In addition to this, various counties provided volunteer corps—bodies of citizens serving at their own charges, choosing their own officers, trained to great expertness, and "obeying with exemplary regularity and steadiness." The voluntary raising of the Regulars just referred to, and the beginning of the practice of specially connecting such forces with their particular counties, marked the first idea of a Territorial System. As already intimated, the Tenth became associated with the County of Lincoln, and the recruiting officers henceforth sought their recruits for the depleted regiment in that county.

The rally indicated that the sentiment of the people had been successfully appealed to, and gave the warrant for the attachment of various regiments to particular counties. The Tenth was apportioned to North Lincoln, and the 69th was created the South Lincolnshire Regiment.

The South Lincolnshire Regiment, which is now the Second Battalion of the Welsh Regiment, was raised in Lancashire, Derbyshire, and Nottinghamshire, as the 2nd Battalion of the 24th Foot, in 1756. In that same year it became a separate regiment—the 69th—and its green facings, which had first distinguished it, were changed, becoming "Lincoln Green." The regiment was in the



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from a print in Windsor Castle.*

GENERAL, HON. HENRY EDWARD FOX.
Colonel of the Tenth,
1795—1810.



West Indies when it received its title, which it retained for some considerable time, a second battalion being raised in Lincolnshire in 1803.*

A third regiment associated with the county was the 81st, raised as the "Loyal Lincoln Volunteers," which territorial designation was confirmed in 1832. It is now the 2nd Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.

* Lawrence-Archer: "British Army, Regimental Records."

SERVICE IN IRELAND.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE TENTH IN IRELAND.

1783. IN the year 1783, Great Britain gave up her hopeless struggle with the American Colonies, and ended the unhappy war, acknowledging the independence of the nation to be thenceforth known as the United States of America.

Disaster to the British arms had followed disaster. Cornwallis, who had entrenched at Yorktown, found himself effectually cut off by a superior force, and later, after a stubborn resistance, had his defences battered in by the Americans, while his men were weak from lack of food. He had no alternative but to capitulate, and when the news reached England, the people realised that the end had come. The Americans had cut off his escape on the land side; the French locked in what ships he had in port, and the only course left to him was that of surrender. He and his little garrison had gone through "weeks of untold hardship, fatigue, and want," holding out heroically for a fleet that came so tardily, and five days too late!

The news of the capitulation created great consternation. It was everywhere felt that peace at the cost of the loss of the American Colonies was the inevitable, and the hopes of the Tenth of crossing the Atlantic to take their further part in the war, were dashed. What was more, the very existence of the regiment was threatened when instructions

were issued to reduce the Army from the War footing to the Peace Establishment. In consequence of the Order, a large number of the soldiers of the Tenth were sent adrift.

The wording of the Order was as follows:—

Headquarters, 5th February, 1783.

ORDERS.

A Proclamation having been issued in last night's "Gazette" relative to the Marching Regiments and Corps of Infantry, the Commander-in-Chief directs, that you and every Officer of the Regiment will immediately explain to the Men, the situation they at present stand in, and as it is by no means intended to break faith with them, that it is expected that they will behave themselves as Orderly and Good Soldiers.

It is necessary that they should be acquainted that the ratification of the definitive Treaty of Peace between the different Powers at War is not yet accomplished, when that event takes place, all such men as have fully served their three years will be entitled to demand their discharge.

Those who have not fully served their three years are to be considered to all intents and purposes as Soldiers to the end of that time, and will, when expired, be entitled to demand their discharge, and in the meantime they may rest assured that they will not be sent out of the Kingdom.

When the ratification of the definitive Treaty is complete, you will receive further Orders for the Reinlisting of such as choose to enter again into His Majesty's Service.

A. W. D.,

A.-G.

T 2

A month later these further Orders came, dated March the 6th, stating that the men whose time had expired were to be discharged, but if their conduct had been good, they could re-enlist and receive a bounty of a guinea and a half.

It was here that the drastic nature of the reduction of the Army was displayed. Whatever the former establishment had been, only forty privates were to be taken to complete each company. No man was to be re-enlisted who was over thirty years of age. The minimum height was to be 5 feet 7 inches, and every man was to be healthy and well made. Straight boys of eighteen years of age might be taken who were 5 feet 7 inches tall. A further statement was that all men whose time had not expired could take their discharge if they desired it.

The regiments were to contain ten companies only, each company to consist of two serjeants, three corporals, two drummers, forty private men per company, and two fifiers to the whole. Thus the numbers of the Tenth were reduced to four hundred and seventy-two men exclusive of the commissioned officers.

In the month of April a further instruction was received. There were to be ten companies, two serjeants, three corporals, two drummers, thirty-eight effective privates, and two fifiers to the grenadiers. The age limit was more restricted, for no recruit was to be over twenty-seven years old, nor under 5 feet 7 inches in height as before, and he must be straight and well made. The boy recruit could be taken if seventeen years old, and of the regulation height, 5 feet 5 inches.

The drastic reduction of the Tenth meant also the reduction of the additional company, with the result that Captain Robert Adair, Lieutenants John Treydal, and Murray Babington (?) and Ensigns William Ross and John Grandon (? Sandiaman) were placed on half pay.

The Government marked what followed with something approaching to consternation, for "the men with hardly an exception took their discharge and declined to re-engage, leaving very many regiments with no more than a handful of privates." In a few days the numbers in the Army came down from about 150,000 men of all arms to about 50,000, the actual figures being these :—

| | | | | |
|----------------------------|-----|-----|-----|--------|
| Great Britain | ... | ... | ... | 17,483 |
| Gibraltar | ... | ... | ... | 2,826 |
| Plantations | ... | ... | .. | 9,421 |
| India | ... | ... | ... | 6,366 |
| Artillery | ... | ... | ... | 3,282 |
| Irish Establishment, about | ... | ... | ... | 12,000 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| Total | ... | ... | ... | 51,378 |

The reduction was due to what one of the Ministers termed "the deplorable state of the finances of the country," which, he said, revealed a national debt of £250,000,000, the interest of which amounted to £9,500,000. By the time the Peace of Paris had been signed, and the United States of America took her place unchallenged among the nations, the Army Estimates did not provide for more than the numbers just quoted.

The Tenth, on their peace footing, were sent over to Ireland in the autumn of 1783, and their numbers were probably included in the returns just given for the Irish Establishment, namely, 12,000. The regiment landed in Ireland on the 30th of November, 1783. The strength of the Tenth at the time of landing was :—

| | |
|--|---------------|
| Commissioned Officers as usual. | 8 Drummers. |
| 16 Serjeants. | 2 Fifers. |
| 24 Corporals. | 384 Privates. |
| making a total, with officers, of 463. | |

The statesmen at home could not fail to recognise the dangerous symptoms in Ireland when Lord Northington was Viceroy. They realised that a strong force was necessary in the country to meet emergencies. When the Tenth arrived the people were not only suffering great distress in consequence of the bad harvest, but also because the prices were so high that "the industrious poor could barely support their families by their labours." Oatmeal, on which they chiefly depended, had trebled its price, and the people having grown restive, and, indeed, taken part in several tumultuous risings throughout Ireland, it was necessary to have a strong military force to restrain anything like a general rebellion.

Throughout the whole of their stay in Ireland, the Tenth, like all other regiments in that country, were kept on the constant alert. "The fever of political agitation" was as great a source of trouble as ever, and the attitude of the Irish volunteers was a menace to the peace of the country. They were discussing questions which might well lead to serious disturbances—such subjects as "the propriety of shortening the duration of Parliaments, exclusion of pensioners, a limitation of the numbers of placemen, and a tax on absentees," all of which were legitimate questions to raise, but dangerous when men who discussed them formed an armed and disciplined force.

The soldiers had frequently some very rough experiences in consequence of outrages which made it necessary for them to be constantly on the move. Lecky tells of some of these disturbances, and says that "the soldiers were more than once called in to repress them, and they became the objects of fierce popular animosity. Several were brutally houghed by butchers in the streets, and the crime assumed such dimensions that a special Act was passed to make the

offence capital, and to throw the support of the wounded soldiers on the district if the culprit was not detected."

They were rough times, for civilians were tarred and feathered, and the mob attacked the soldiers on guard, and were fired on in return. Such were the experiences of the men of the Tenth while quartered in Ireland, which was seething with sedition which the Press, and it is said the French emissaries, were encouraging. Equally serious was the position, when, towards the end of the stay of the Tenth, a dangerous change was noticeable among the volunteers. What Lecky says in his "England in the Eighteenth Century" is worth quoting.

"The original volunteers had consisted of the flower of the Protestant Yeomanry, commanded by the gentry of Ireland, and in addition to their services in securing the country from invasion in a time of great national peril, they had undertaken to preserve its internal peace, and had discharged with admirable efficiency the functions of a great police force. But after the signature of peace"—at the close of the American War—"and again after the dissolution of the Volunteer Convention, a great portion of the more respectable men connected with the movement considered their work done, and retired from the ranks, and they were being replaced by another and wholly different class. The taste for combining, arming, and drilling had spread, and had descended to the lower strata of society. Demagogues had arisen who sought by arming and organising volunteers to win political power, and who gathered around them men who desired for very doubtful purposes to obtain arms. Grattan, who at all times dreaded and detested anythin movements in Ireland from the gentry, was one of the first to would now draw the attention

the alarming measure of drilling the lowest classes of the populace. . . . The old, the original, volunteers had become respectable because they represented the property of the nation, but attempts had been made to arm the poverty of the kingdom. They had originally been the armed property of Ireland. Were they to become the armed beggary? "

Much more might be brought forward to show that the Tenth, like the other regiments in Ireland, might find themselves face to face not merely with a mob, but with a strong body of well-armed and drilled men, capable of showing fight that could be as fierce as anything in a time of war. When the Tenth were quelling riots the volunteers "remained absolutely passive, and refused when summoned to assist the civil power." News leaked in from time to time that "great quantities of arms were being scattered through the very lowest section of the population." If all that has been said proved true, the position of the Tenth in Ireland was precarious—the position, indeed, of all the soldiers in the English regiments there. Count d'Adhémar, the French Ambassador, wrote home to the effect that it appeared to him that 70,000 of the Irish were under arms, and that if France went to war with Great Britain, here was an army to co-operate with her. He had in mind a military association, which, he said, had been "deliberating about presenting an address to Louis XVI., the defender of the rights of the human race."

ON WEST INDIAN SERVICE.

CHAPTER XXVI.

ON DUTY IN JAMAICA.

1786. THE experiences of the Tenth in Ireland came to an end in 1786, and on the 2nd of March in that year the regiment embarked for Jamaica. The strength had somewhat diminished, for counting in the officers and 336 privates, the numbers of those who sailed did not total more than 415, as against 463 men who had landed in Ireland two and a half years before. Although sent out of Ireland on foreign service, the Tenth were continued by Special Order on the Irish Peace Establishment. They were "lent" for foreign service only.

The voyage to the West Indies was a rough one. In a letter dated Jamaica, May 21st, 1786, the Commander-in-Chief of the forces wrote to the Secretary at War, saying: "I avail myself of the sailing of His Majesty's Ship Bull Dog to acquaint you that two of the transports, with a part of the Tenth Regiment on board, arrived here on the 19th instant; the Elizabeth, having on board the remainder, parted with them in a gale of wind which they met upon the coast of Ireland, but there is every reason to expect her in a few days." Presumably she arrived safely, for I can find no mention of her in the correspondence which crossed over to England.

The Tenth had rough experiences in their early days in Jamaica, when a storm devastated the island; but what was

more serious was the danger which threatened the health of the men. The prospect of the new service was an appalling one, for Jamaica had proved to the soldiers of the past little more than a "white man's grave." In the debates in the House of Commons at the time, on the subject of sending reinforcements or recruits to the garrisons in the West Indies, one of the members advised the Government to send out coffins with the men. It was indicative of the reputation the island had as a fever den. Some who evidently had an interest in making such representations, declared that the climate was healthy, and that the fever must have been generated among the soldiers while on the ships that brought them over seas.

That might have been absolutely true in some cases. One has but to recall the scandalous state of the transports, and the fever-stricken dens which all our warships were at the time; but there were the facts, which were too terrible to be explained away. No sooner had the Tenth landed than the thing they feared and dreaded presented itself. They were told that the troops at Up-park Camp, consisting chiefly of new recruits, were in a disastrous situation, and that three or four men were buried every day, while in that same camp there were not above sixteen able to do duty, owing to the fearful ravages of the yellow fever.

The apprehensions that the French and Spanish Governments were preparing to seize Jamaica, made it necessary to send a strong military force to the island; but the soldiers suffered more from disease than from those who purposed to invade our valuable possession. Word came across to England of the ravages of pestilence alike among our own men and our foes, and it was said—and not without exaggeration—that the Spaniards themselves, when their ships touched at Dominique, landed no less than 1,200 sick, and yet greater numbers when they came to Guadeloupe

and Martinique. The distemper, says the writer of the "Annual Register," "was little less contagious or fatal than a pestilence." The loss through disease was so great among the English soldiers, that not long before the Tenth received orders to sail to the West Indies, the troops then in the island were too sick to march through the rainy districts to the lake, where the climate was healthier. The very Indians, says Fortescue, were sickly, and began to desert in numbers. "By the middle of May there were not men enough to do the duty of the camp, and the guards remained unrelieved for forty-eight hours. . . . At the end of June but ten men out of two hundred and fifty were fit for duty. . . Altogether, out of some fourteen hundred men of one kind and another, only three hundred and twenty of them, blacks and whites, were left alive, while out of these not one half were fit for duty."

The Tenth were face to face with such a prospect, and if the majority went on board the transports with gloomy anticipations, and thought they were taking their last look at the receding shores of the island which was so near their old home, it was not to be wondered at. But Fortescue tells us a still more dismal story, which must have come to the knowledge of the men of the Tenth. Four regiments had gone out to Jamaica in 1780. They arrived in the West Indies at the beginning of the "sickly season," in July. By the 1st of August, out of 2,300 men, 168 were dead, and 780 on the sick list. "Between the 1st of August and the 31st of December, 1780, eleven hundred men out of the seven and a half battalions in Jamaica died outright, while half of the three thousand that remained were sick." Fortescue states the cause to be this—that "the barracks were built on low and unhealthy ground, and were continued there because neither the Assembly of Jamaica nor the British Government would be at the expense of

reconstructing them in the higher and more salubrious districts of the island."

Such an abominable lack of consideration for the men who were defending the Empire against persistent and aggressive enemies, could never be condoned. If, instead of squabbling with political antagonists, the authorities had looked to the well-being of the men who did so much to uphold the prestige of the nation, the story of sickness and suffering would not have been possible, or at all events the consequences could have been rendered infinitely less serious.

The Tenth had been sent to Jamaica in order to relieve the 60th Foot, who were to proceed at once to Nova Scotia, having already experienced some hard service while "drawing a chain of posts across the Central American isthmus from ocean to ocean." Once in Jamaica, the Tenth remained there for nine years, apparently forgotten by the Government, except for some attention in the matter of uniform, or things of that nature.

Instructions had been issued from time to time relating to these details. In 1771 a light company had been added to the Tenth, as to all other infantry regiments, in addition to the grenadier company. The light company wore jackets, short gaiters, and a leather cap. A change had also come in the matter of fusils and pouches, for all officers and sergeants had to carry them. Just before the Tenth started for Jamaica, the sergeants of the grenadier company were ordered to carry fusils instead of halberts, and on the eve of sailing, battalion officers were instructed to discontinue the use of espontoons.

None of these items escaped the memory of those who had to look to the welfare of the Army. A regiment might starve or die off, and no effort was made to remedy the mischief, but as for the smart appearance of the regiment,

or some petty detail as to uniform, that counted greatly, and could not be neglected. During the stay of the regiment in Jamaica—in 1791—a general Order was issued, dated December the 10th, that effective field officers should in future wear two epaulettes, whereas they had hitherto worn but one. The officers of the flank companies, who already wore two, were, as a distinguishing mark, to have a grenade, in the case of a grenadier company, while those of the light company were to have a bugle, embroidered on each.

In Wilkinson's collection of notes on uniforms and colours, I find an item to the effect that in several of Dayes' illustrations the buttons—all of which are silver—of the officers have the number of the regiment on them in Roman letters, and those of the men are shown in Arabic numerals.

In the Prince Consort's Library at Aldershot there is a copy of Dayes' series of illustrations of the uniform of regiments about the year 1792. The men of the Ninth and Tenth were dressed alike, and the description runs as follows: The coat is less voluminous than formerly. The skirts are still more cut away than before, and the edges are turned back, displaying a white lining. The officer's coat has the collar cut high, and standing up. There is an embroidered button-hole on either side, now only used as an ornament. The lapels which are on the coat extend below the waist. They are yellow in colour, and have ten silver buttons on either side; the button-holes are embroidered in white; and, says Wilkinson, there was probably a blue stripe down the centre of each. Each yellow cuff had three silver buttons, and the button-holes were embroidered. The officer wore a white lace shirt frill, a black neck-cloth. and white shirt cuffs or frills. The waistcoat was shorter, barely reaching below the waist, and was white. The buttons also were of white metal. Round

the waist was a crimson sash, the ends of which hung down on the left side. On the right shoulder was a silver epaulette.

The breeches were also white, and there were four buttons down the outside of each leg below the knee. The gaiters were black, had white buttons, and did not come up higher than just below the knee. The three-cornered hat was edged with white lace, and on the left side was the Hanoverian cockade, out of which came a plume of white cock's feathers. In the centre was a white lace ornament with a white metal button. The silver gorget worn by the officers contained a Royal cipher, and was suspended from the first button on the lapel on either side by a coloured ribbon and rosettes. The sword-belt of white buff was suspended over the right shoulder with an oval silver breastplate, on which appeared the number of the regiment.

The sword was straight-bladed, and on it were the King's initials. The hilt was of steel, and there was a scarlet and gold sword-knot, ending with a tassel with gold and scarlet fringe. The gloves were white, in "review order."

The clothing of the private soldier is thus portrayed in *Dayes*, as very similar to that which has just been described, but the differences are as follows: The collar of the private soldier's coat is cut high, but is again turned over, and a white patch of lace, and a button of white metal is shown. A line is also visible, which in the case of the Tenth was blue. The lapels, which are of yellow cloth, have on them ten white metal buttons set on in pairs at equal distances apart, each button on a rectangular patch of lace with a blue stripe. The yellow cuffs have three buttons on each, and there are white lace patches. The pockets are crossed, and have four lace patches with a button on each. The yellow shoulder straps are fastened to the coat with a white metal

button. White buff crossbelts cross below the second pair of buttons in front, and have an oval breastplate with the regimental number on it. The cockade on the hat is without a centre white lace ornament.

At this time the halberts which the sergeants had carried for so long a time were discarded, being superseded by pikes which possessed a plain spear head, with a steel cross-bar below. Fusils were retained by sergeants of the flank companies, but before much time had elapsed the sergeants of these companies received orders to discontinue the use of fusils, their only weapon being the sword. In consequence of this change the cross pouch-belt disappeared.

Milne, whose authority for these changes has been taken, states that towards the end of the century, following the Prussian fashion, the coats for all ranks were fastened down to the waist, completely hiding the waistcoat. It is pointed out that in the case of the officers the lapels were to be continued down to the waist, so as to button over occasionally—making a double-breasted coat—or to fasten with hooks and eyes close up the front, thus exposing the yellow lapels. The jackets for the rank and file, however, were only single-breasted, having ten buttons and loops of regimental lace arranged at equal distances across the chest. I find a note to this effect, that up to the year 1794, the officers of regiments wearing silver lace, wore silver gorgets; but after that date gilt gorgets were ordered to be worn by all officers. Two years later, the Warrant directed that the swords of the officers were to have a brass guard. The sword-knot was to be crimson and gold in stripes, while the gorget, which was to be gilt, was to have the King's cipher and crown engraved upon it.

At the close of the century—in the year 1799—a Warrant was issued in the month of April, directing that officers and men of the King's infantry regiments—the flank companies

excepted—should wear their hair queued. The tie was to come a little below the upper part of the collar of the coat, and the queue itself was to be of regulation length, namely, ten inches. This included the one inch of hair which was to appear below the binding.

A General Order was issued in 1800, which directed that the cocked hat worn by the men in the infantry regiments should be discontinued. The substitute for this was a cylindrical shako, ornamented with an oblong plate of brass in front, thereon the King's crest; a red and white worsted tuft was fixed in front, rising from a black cockade. Sometimes the number of the regiment and the King's cipher were shown on this plate. The note goes on to say that the officers continued to wear their cocked hats with a red and white plume. At this time they were worn so that the points were over the shoulders, but during the Peninsular War the position was changed, and the points were worn from back to front.*

The men of the Tenth, while doing duty in Jamaica, were armed with the Flintlock Musket with a bayonet attachment. It was the old "Brown Bess" which came into use as early as the year 1700, superseding the first Flintlock musket which was used in 1640 and for the next sixty years. "Brown Bess," which the Tenth took with them to Jamaica, and which they used during the Napoleonic Wars, had an effective range of two hundred yards. When the bayonet was attached it was a formidable weapon for fighting at close quarters, the musket and bayonet together measuring six feet.

* Milne's work on these points is invaluable, and in this case, as with regard to Major E. B. Wilkinson's Notes, I have referred to it freely.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE INSURRECTION OF THE MAROONS.

1795. APART from the ravages of disease while in Jamaica, the Tenth were in considerable peril by reason of the distracted state of the West Indian Islands generally. France was in the throes of the Revolution, and the French Islands in the West Indies gradually became involved in the horrors which devastated France.

The islands were occupied by people who have been divided into three great classes—the whites, the negroes, and the mulattos, the offspring of the intermixture of the two other classes, the whites and the blacks. “Betwixt the three there was drawn an impassable line.” Gradually the blacks and the mulattos began to resent the treatment which was meted out to them, and the oppression which came to them as an enslaved people. The mulattos especially were shamefully treated. They had no political liberty. They could not exercise any liberal profession. They were considered as belonging to “an inferior species, as bordering on the brutes.” To explain the position, one may quote the following from the “Annual Register,” which gave the world a summary of all the great affairs which had occupied public attention during the year: “They were subjected to the most intolerable grievances; they were permitted by the laws to be insulted, and even beaten, with impunity. As it was not in their case, as in that of the negroes, the interest of anyone to protect them, so they were cruelly oppressed by all.”

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The whites and the negroes found much in their conditions also that was intolerable, owing to the despotism of those who were put in authority by the French Government. There was in consequence everything to encourage an outburst of rebellion, and the news of the terrible Revolution in France seemed to be a lever to an upheaval in the West Indies under French domination. The moment the Declaration of Rights was known to have been voted by the Revolutionaries in Paris, the people of St. Domingo were ready to claim their privileges, as contended for in France. But black and white alike refused to recognise the validity of the claims of the mulattos. Exasperated by the brutal treatment which accompanied this refusal, the mulattos rose in arms, prepared to enforce their rights with the sword.

Negotiations proving unavailing, the West Indies were plunged into anarchy. Joseph Oge, a mulatto, who was in France at the time, hearing that his compatriots were being refused their rights in so shameful a manner, embarked for America in July, 1790, taking with him arms and ammunition. But, to his intense disappointment, only a few rallied to his standard, and these, getting out of hand, in spite of his endeavours, committed what have been rightly termed "the most atrocious enormities." All the mulattos who would not join them were massacred, men, wives, and children. This murdering band was ultimately destroyed, and Oge broken on the wheel.

The whites were now more hostile to the mulattos than before, and goaded to rebellion by so many cruelties, the coloured people revolted. The horrors that followed—shared in by the negroes—are too terrible to be told here. The rebellion spread throughout the islands, and thousands were killed with the most revolting barbarities. Finding that the Government, in spite of promises, had deceived

them, the men of colour, exasperated to madness, swore never to lay down arms until "either themselves or the whites were exterminated."

This war of extermination was going on while the Tenth were in Jamaica, and none knew what would happen in the island—whether the race hatred would be displayed there as elsewhere. The population of the island was such that any similar outbreak would mean extermination for the whites, of whom there were only 30,000 out of a total of 291,400 persons. The position of the Tenth and their comrades in the British Army stationed in the West Indies was rendered still more trying by the activity of the French, who were at war with England.

There was one Victor Hugues, who commanded the French forces in the West Indies, and whose hatred of the English was intense. He armed the blacks and mulattos who were willing to enter the French service, and was not only employing these forces in recapturing the islands that had been taken in the wars from France, but was everywhere inciting the negroes and men of colour against the British Government. The consequence was that in all these islands a concerted revolt took place. In some the garrisons were overpowered, in spite of heroic fighting.

The true position is given in Fortescue's second lecture to the students at the Staff College, where he says that the whites, having the climate and overwhelming numbers against them, were overpowered in St. Domingo, and the whole of the West Indies under British rule lay quaking with fear, lest their negroes should treat them in the same way. He goes on to say that Jamaica, in particular, dreaded lest the French negroes in St. Domingo, only twenty-four hours to windward, should cross the sea and devour her. By the end of 1792, therefore, we had no fewer than 19 battalions of the Line out of 81 in, or on their way

to the West Indies, where it was safe to reckon that fifty per cent. of the men would die, or become permanently unfit for duty, every year. Here we have the situation expressed concisely, and can understand why the Tenth were always under arms in expectation of the revolt which was likely to affect Jamaica so disastrously.

Fortunately the island escaped the horrors which threatened. It was well, considering the terrible sufferings of the British troops, who were dying by scores from excessive fatigue and fever. All that has been said in a previous chapter needs to be accentuated, for worse than all was the unpardonable refusal of the authorities in Jamaica to look into the real reason of the sickness—that while there were healthy spots where the troops might encamp, they were kept for months in swampy, fever-stricken localities in spite of the representations of the officers. There were barracks in Jamaica almost emptied by the fever; the Tenth and the other men were going off like flies, while the hospitals were crowded continually. All the beds could have been filled twice over.

The trouble was, that it was difficult to get at the real state of affairs, and one cannot help suspecting that the officials sought to make the case bear as favourable a look as possible. While the men were dying with alarming rapidity, the Governor of Jamaica was sending home word that the soldiers were “in high health.” In the case of those who were garrisoned in healthy quarters, it was so; but it was basely misleading in the case of those who were quartered in fever dens. Probably the Government returns were “inspired.” They must have been so, if Fortescue’s comment in his “Lectures” is a true one, when he says that “Dundas always treated troops as though they were immortal, and their clothing as though it were imperishable.”

There was more satisfaction among the troops in Jamaica when the island affairs seemed to promise some fighting, but the Tenth were in too parlous a state to take part in it. Lord Balcarres wrote home to the War Office on the 30th of June, 1795, to say that the island was quiet. On July the 21st he wrote a very different story. He had to announce with much concern that an insurrection had broken out among the Maroons in Trelawney Town.

The Maroons were the descendants of the ancient inhabitants whom the Spaniards had failed to conquer, and had secured themselves in the mountainous recesses. They had "insisted that the lands they inhabited should be their own, and themselves remain free, and retain their former customs and privileges. This being agreed to and solemnly ratified, they had lived ever since independent of the British Government in Jamaica." When it was absolutely essential that their friendship should be retained, in view of the fact that the West Indies were seething with sedition, some official was mad enough to violate the privileges of these people. The Government of the island—equally as mad—refused satisfaction, pretending that they could not stultify the action of one of their representatives.

At once the island was plunged into anarchy. The Maroons were up in arms, and could not be suppressed save by the pursuit of a policy of extermination. The position was made infinitely more alarming because French intriguers were at the bottom of the mischief. They had made friends with the Maroons, who had sent all their women and children into the woods, and into recesses so intricately situated that bloodhounds were employed to discover them.

When the troops were called out the Tenth played their part in what followed. It is said that the soldiers displayed striking courage, while "the valour, conduct, and knowledge in tactics displayed by the British commanders and officers"

were remarkable. But the men were sick, and their ranks so depleted, that they were only fit for hospital, and not for active service. They were sick men performing their duty while scarcely able to carry their muskets. It was realised that the Tenth would die right out as a regiment if they remained in Jamaica any longer, and consequently they were ordered home to recruit. It was the regiment's only chance.

The Tenth arrived in England, a broken regiment, and belonging, now, territorially, to Lincolnshire, they marched by easy stages to the county town, from whence the recruiting officers went in order to enlist men to fill the thinned-out ranks. When the Tenth arrived at Lincoln, 186 men of the rank and file only were fit for duty. With all the efforts of the recruiting officers, and all the attractions set forth to induce young fellows to enlist, a month's hard work only brought in seven recruits. Later on, however, they came in more rapidly, for on the 1st of March, 1796, the effective rank and file numbered 371. Whether the men

1796. in the regiment who had been on the sick list failed to recover, in spite of being home again, one cannot say, but in the month of February as many as 29 of the soldiers died, 32 were in sick quarters, and 84 were in hospital.

The story of the ravages of sickness in the ranks of the Tenth at the time is a distressing one, and one return, for the 1st of October, 1795, when the regiment had just landed in England, is significant of the fact that sickness is as serious to soldiers as actual warfare. On that day only 147 were entered in the Monthly Return as present and fit for duty, and all told the rank and file totalled not more than 191, although the recruits were included. As many as 929 men of the rank and file were declared, with 40

serjeants and 18 drummers and fifers, to be "wanting to complete establishment."

Cannon gives us the clue as to the manner in which the regiment was brought up to its required strength, this being necessary, since it had been determined to send the Tenth, or a part of the regiment, to the West Indies again. "The establishment was completed by drafts from other corps," says Cannon; and it is clear, from this, that the recruits were slow in coming, in spite of the fact that the regiment now belonged to the county, and could appeal to the loyalty of the men of Lincolnshire. Doubtless the response would have been a ready one, but for the knowledge that Jamaica was to be the destination of the regiment for the second time.

The invitation to join the Tenth was couched in the following terms:—

"A year's wages advanced, or 20 guineas for a day's pay. Lincolnshire heroes having always been remarkable for zealously supporting their King and Country, they are now presented with a glorious and never returning opportunity of distinguishing themselves in the North Lincoln Regiment of Foot, commanded by Major-General the Honble. Henry Edward Fox, now stationed at the flourishing City of Lincoln. Let all those who delight in the Honourable Profession of Arms, and disdain the drudgery of Servitude repair without loss of time to (and here came names of various officers to be found at certain places) where they may exchange their whips and smocks for laced coats and silver-hilted swords. Spirited lads of size, character, and qualifications, may acquit themselves of all women labouring with child, and young children, and enter into the direct road to honour and preferment. Upwards of forty Serjeants and Corporals are yet wanted to complete the Regiment.

"N.B.—Recruits who enlist their comrades shall receive two guineas reward.

"God bless the King, and Damn the French."

Such is a specimen of the posters which were on the walls and in the beershops of Lincolnshire in those days when recruits were so desperately needed ; but in spite of the inducements so set forth, the recruiting parties were not successful, and the Tenth had to be strengthened in ways such as Cannon has indicated.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE NEGRO RISING IN GRENADA.

1795-6. THE Tenth lost their famous Colonel, Lieut.-General Sir Robert Murray Keith, K.B., on the 21st of June, 1795. He had been entertaining some friends at dinner, but was taken suddenly ill, and died in his man's arms.

The new Colonel was Major-General the Honourable Henry Edward Fox, younger brother of the famous politician of that day—Charles James Fox. At the time of his appointment he was forty years of age, having been born March the 4th, 1755. Trevelyan, in his "Early Life of Charles Fox," quotes from the diary of the Colonel's father, concerning the boy when he was nine years old: "Harry has a little horse to ride, and the whole stable full to look after. He lives with the horse, stinks, talks, and thinks of nothing but the stable, and is not a very good companion."

Notwithstanding this, he developed into a fine soldier, and saw service through the whole of the American War of Independence. His record seems to have taken him through all the fights in which the Tenth so signally distinguished themselves, and consequently he knew the regiment well when he received his appointment. On the conclusion of the American War he went to Flanders, where he served under the Duke of York, finding, when he arrived there, that the Duke's army was retreating through Belgium.

Appointed to the command of the Brigade consisting of the 14th, 37th, and 53rd regiments, "he served at the battles

of Roubaix and Mouveaux, and on the 23rd May, 1794, he performed his greatest feat of arms, the repulse of the whole French army at Point-à-Chin. He was upon the extreme right of the retreating army, when he was isolated and attacked in force, and his gallant stand and successful extrication of his brigade is the brightest feature of the whole war in Flanders from 1793 to 1795."

A week after Sir Robert Murray Keith's death, Fox was Colonel of the Tenth, and came, as we have seen, with a record which soldiers could appreciate. Before General Fox had long held his new appointment, orders came for a portion of the Tenth to embark for the West Indies.

One begins to realise in this part of the story "the great economic importance" attached to the West Indies at the end of the eighteenth century, and we are reminded that it was there that England made her most important conquests. The record of events in that part of the world became a valuable one. France and England were at war. The Continental achievements of England were not altogether creditable, for the French appeared to be sweeping all before them. They were beginning to appreciate the force and talent of Napoleon Bonaparte as a soldier. With the co-operation of the Navy, the military forces of this country were reducing the islands in the Gulf of Mexico with a facility which alarmed the French Government. In 1794, while the Tenth had been languishing in the fever-stricken districts in Jamaica, Sir Robert Jervis with his fleet, and Sir Charles Grey with his army, not only attacked and captured Martinique, but conquered Santa Lucia and Guadeloupe.

But unfortunately, the tide turned. The British Government reduced their fleet in the American waters, and withdrew too many of the troops from the islands, so that the French, with surprise fleets, regained most of the places

they had lost. Hence the need for strengthening the army in the Western part of our Empire.

The Tenth, as having had experience in the West Indies, were once more nominated for service there. The object the Government had in view was the re-capture of the lost possessions. The regiment was instructed to furnish seven companies which were to form part of the expedition under the command of Major-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, and the Monthly Return for the Tenth for October, 1795, was endorsed in red ink thus: "Gone to West Indies."

In actual fact, however, ten companies remained in Barton. An old Orderly-room book states that at the latter end of 1795 four companies of the regiment embarked under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel John Wemyss, and sailed with Admiral Christian's fleet for the West Indies.

Abercromby's command was made up of 641 officers, and 17,792 non-commissioned officers and men. This great force consisted of the following :

26th Light Dragoons, Royal Irish Artillery.

1st Brigade—14th, 27th, 28th, 57th.

2nd Brigade—3rd, 19th, 31st, 33rd.

3rd Brigade—8th, 37th, 44th, 55th.

4th Brigade—38th, 48th, 53rd, 63rd.

5th Brigade—2nd, 10th, 25th, 29th, 88th.

6th Brigade—42nd, and two composite battalions of Grenadiers.

Hospital Corps.

The fleet and the transports, two hundred in number, which it convoyed, "presented a most splendid spectacle," but before the voyage for the Leeward Islands began, there was every indication of a stormy passage. Bad weather dispersed the ships—not merely the men o' war, but the transports with thousands of soldiers on board. Some

hurried back to port, but others who sought to reach Portland Roads, ran on the rocks, and were wrecked. Hundreds of dead bodies were thrown up on the shore, and were buried in the churchyards near the spots where they were found. Many of the ships which carried the soldiers foundered, and instead of a splendid army reaching the West Indies, only such as contrived to weather the awful storms reached their destination.

Among these were the companies of the Tenth.

But while the ships had proved capable of withstanding the storm, the men who were huddled in them found them to be fever dens, and scores fell victims to the scourge which had previously wrought such havoc with the men of the Tenth. Not only did the soldiers suffer from the rough weather; in every way their lot was a hard one; so much so, that Mr. Sheridan, in the House of Commons, after the dispersion of Admiral Christian's fleet, charged the Government with wanton disregard of the comfort and well-being of the gallant men who were expected to uphold the honour of Great Britain at the Seat of War. What Sheridan said is worth quoting, as indicating some of the experiences of the men of the Tenth, on this and other occasions.

He had moved for a return of the men carried off by disease and famine in the West Indies. "So shameful," he asserted, "was the neglect of the troops, that on their arrival in that destructive climate, they were destitute of shoes and stockings. Had not diseases ravaged the enemy's forces, our own must have fallen an easy prey into their hands." The hospitals were crowded with the sick and wounded, for whom neither medicines nor bandages were provided. Such was the inhumanity they sometimes experienced, that ninety or a hundred of these unhappy men

were once left to pass a whole night on the beach, in consequence of which only seven or eight survived.

Mr. Sheridan went on to say, later in his indictment, that the information for which he asked—the list of officers and soldiers lost, specifying the loss of each regiment—would show what a drain these expeditions had proved to the population of the British Islands, and how much they tended to weaken them. He might have added to his speech that it was not to be wondered at, for example, that when the Tenth came home in such a shattered state, recruits were hard to get, in view of the possibility that the regiment would be sent to the West Indies again.

Then he proceeded to show how cheaply men's lives were held, when soldiers were confined on board the ships in ports like Southampton, Portsmouth, and Plymouth for seven whole months, exposed to the infallible effects of such a close imprisonment, notwithstanding the remonstrances made to the Government.

Explanations were made in answer to this speech, but other facts came to light which showed how the regiments were brought up to their full strength, numerically, as if efficiency did not count! "The troops destined for the West India expedition were unworthy the name of soldiers; they consisted of elderly men and mere boys, with raw youths at their head." The soldiers of the Tenth were surely not moved by regret when it was found necessary, because of the storm, to put back to Plymouth, where the majority of them went straight to hospital.

The regiment, however, went to sea again in a short time, indirect evidence of this coming from a letter to the War Office, written by Lieutenant-Colonel John Wemyss. He had been requested to explain why he had not made the usual Monthly Return for February. Wemyss said: "I am to acknowledge the receipt of your letter. As the

Companies of the 10th Regiment landed some time after the 1st of February, I did not conceive that a Monthly Return was due before the 1st of March, which Return was signed and ordered to be sent off, as also one of the 1st April." The officials at the War Office were far more anxious for figures and information than they were to provide for the men who were doing the fighting and enduring the consequences of such flagrant neglect.

When the Tenth were landed in the West Indies, they were sent without a day's delay to Grenada, and with them went the 25th, 29th, and 88th. They were to put down the negro insurrection in the island.

The blacks had been massacreing the whites in all directions, and although troops had been sent to the island, they were not sufficiently numerous to crush a rising which was being taken part in by thousands of insurgents under a mulatto named Julien Fédon, and a great number of Frenchmen who wished to have a hand in driving the English out of the island. What could a few hundred soldiers—many of them raw recruits—do against ten thousand negroes, well armed, and strongly entrenched in the mountains? Disease, moreover, had been rampant among the English soldiers to such an extent that in one brief fortnight 250 men were dead out of 1,450 in Nicholls' command. When the men were prostrate with yellow fever, Fédon made his onslaughts, and reduced the numbers yet more in these fights, actually surprising a warsloop laden with ammunition. The evil throughout was the inadequate force which was sent to quell a mischievous rising which was likely to end in the extermination of the English, or in driving them out of Grenada altogether.

Such was the perilous position when the Tenth were sent to the island to assist in the work of crushing the rebellion. News came when they were about to start from Barbados,

which induced Abercromby to strengthen the force by the addition of detachments of the 8th, 63rd, and the Buffs; but even then he had his misgivings as to whether the force was adequate to the work. It was, however, his misfortune only to have 5,000 men at his disposal, instead of 17,000 which had set sail from England under the convoy of Admiral Christian. The 12,000 men who had put back were on the way, he heard, but he knew nothing as to the probable date of their arrival.

A more serious task for the men could scarcely be conceived. Fédon's negroes were strongly entrenched—thousands of them—on a ridge, every approach to which was steep, or on ground "so difficult as to be impracticable." The summit was crowned by a fort which was armed with four field guns, and several swivels, and covered by a strong abatis.* Nicholls realised the greatness of his task and the inadequacy of his forces, but none the less he made his attack and failed, losing heavily.

His position became more serious when, at the moment of his defeat, two French men o' war, passing with reinforcements, slowed down, as if intending to land their troops. He turned his guns on the ships, and then, finding his troops eager to retrieve their defeat, ordered a general assault on Fédon's position. The loss was great under the murderous fire, but the attack was delivered with such spirit that the ridge was carried, and the negroes fled, pursued by the 17th Light Dragoons. The loss to Nicholls' force was considerable, six officers and a hundred and five men being killed or wounded; but "the loss of the enemy was five or six times as great. Such as survived the sabres" of Nicholls' cavalry "fled to the woods, allowing Nicholls to re-occupy the forts, and to prevent the arrival of further reinforce-

* Fortescue

ments from Guadeloupe." This fight occurred on March the 25th, 1796.

The insurgents were cowed, but by no means crushed, and a great deal of fighting had to be done before they were subdued. Abercromby sent a division to Grenada in June, fully determined to crush the rebels, and if possible to kill the leader, whose influence was so great. The regiments that were co-operating with the Tenth were only sufficiently strong to hamper the movements of Fédon's people, but the arrival of these reinforcements made it possible once for all to restore security to the inhabitants of the island.

The position had become more serious by the landing of a strong force of French soldiers. Approaching from Palmiste, and traversing the island which Columbus described as resembling a crumpled handkerchief, "an extravagant jumble of verdant hills and valleys," and marching being therefore a task of considerable difficulty and danger, Nicholls advanced on the enemy's camp near Goyave. At the same time Brigadier Campbell crossed the island from the east, designing an attack in the rear. So well did each column carry out the work assigned to it that in spite of a desperate resistance, the French were compelled to surrender, while Fédon and some hundreds of his negroes fled in panic to the stronghold in the hills. Nicholls followed, and here the Tenth, and others under the same command, prepared for an attack which, it was hoped, would end the rebellion.

The attack was delivered at night, and so fiercely that the negroes were driven out at the point of the bayonet. Unfortunately, Fédon got away again, but not until he had murdered his white prisoners. The pursuit was so hot that his men fell by scores, and at last the fugitives, locked, as it were, in a place whence all escape was cut off, threw down

1806.

REGIMENTAL UNIFORMS.

1815.



1826.



their arms. Some contrived to get away into the woods, but were so cowed that they took no further part in the rebellion, which was crushed absolutely in the course of the next few days. As for Fédon, he was found hiding in a hut, but rushing out of it he bounded across the grass to a precipice, and hurled himself over the edge of it. As he was never seen or heard of again it was presumed that the fearful fall killed him.

The successes achieved by Abercromby in other parts of the West Indies coinciding in point of time with the destruction of Fédon's influence in Grenada, it may be said that the campaign was at an end. The troops that were no longer needed were free to return home.

The companies of the Tenth were among the soldiers who sailed for England. Many had died in the frequent fights, but far more succumbed to the scourge which had slain so many of the men of the regiment in previous years—that terrible yellow fever. It had wrought such havoc that “nearly 2,500 British soldiers died between the 1st of April and the 1st of October,” in that year, 1796. Among them was the due proportion of the Tenth. Fortescue, after saying that it is impossible to state the number of the dead, ventures to estimate it from many indications. He says that “this force of Abercromby's, like Grey's before it, was practically diminished by one-half through yellow fever.” In his lectures on the Army, already referred to in this section of our story, his estimate of the losses is given freely, and is worth reproducing here. “Whole battalions were annihilated, leaving little trace behind, and I have found it impossible to reckon the number of men that lie buried there. I could not put the figure at less than 20,000,” (at St. Domingo alone). . . and this represents but a fraction of the total loss. In 1795 and 1796 it was acknowledged that over 40,000 men were

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discharged from the service as disabled by wounds and infirmity. I believe myself that the return is too favourable; but it is certain that most of those discharged soldiers came from the West Indies hopelessly debilitated by the climate. Altogether, I reckon that these West Indian enterprises must have cost the Army and Navy fully 100,000 men dead or disabled from service—and all for nothing.”

I have ventured to quote thus freely, in order to show the nature of the service the men of the Tenth were called on to render, and to indicate the readiness with which the appalling consequences were faced.

The soldiers of the Tenth who survived this West Indian campaign, on their return at the end of the year, joined their comrades at Chatham.

FIRST SERVICE IN INDIA.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE TENTH IN INDIA.

1798. WHEN the Tenth were once more assembled at Chatham, orders came for the regiment to proceed to Flanders, which were not countermanded until the soldiers were on board the transports, and the anchors were actually being weighed. The men were to proceed instead to Lymington, to await further instructions. In due course, these came, and the transports carried the regiment to the Isle of Wight. Some of the troops, however, were brought back to Portsmouth and remained there until towards the end of the year 1798.

Presumably, the change of plan was due to the expectation of a French invasion of England, in which case it was necessary to keep the Tenth at home. It is not at all unlikely that the mutiny of the fleet at Spithead had also something to do with their detention. It was known to the authorities that the sailors were discontented because of the many grievances under which they laboured, and it was conceivable that there would be some sudden explosion of feeling, attended with distressing consequences. If it came, as many anticipated, to positive mutiny, a military force would be necessary to prevent those excesses to which the mutineers might proceed. From information received it was thought necessary by the Government to have a number of strong regiments within call. The Tenth was

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one of those, stationed in the Isle of Wight, and available for any emergency at the briefest notice.

This is possible, but at best it is mere surmise. Undoubtedly the leading cause for the detention of the regiment in the neighbourhood of Portsmouth was the fear that the French would carry out their threatened invasion. The humiliation of England, the most formidable among the many enemies of France, was the one desire of the Frenchmen who sympathised with the Revolution. Orators were perpetually speaking of the day when England would not only be humbled but subdued; when the great naval nation that had frustrated France for centuries, and was her natural enemy, would become tributary to the Republic.

When it was known that the Directory designed a descent on England, some treated the threats as mere bluster, but the generality of the nation considered them as serious.

It was known that an army, which the Directory had named the Army of England, was being concentrated on the French coast. Every French harbour in the Channel was crowded with transports, which were to carry the invading force across to our shores. It was discovered at length that the invasion was so very real a policy of the French Government, that it had opened a loan on the credit of the English spoils. A proclamation which went into the most remote villages of France announced that "the Army of England is about to dictate peace in London, and there, republicans, you shall find your auxiliaries!" Napoleon, the conqueror of Italy, was to be the General who, at the head of the army, was, by landing in England, to open out for the French soldiers "a new field for active operations more vast and splendid."

There were indications everywhere in England that there would be no compromise, and certainly no craven yielding to a nation who had so much reason to respect, if not to fear, the military and naval power of Great Britain. She stood "unconquered and unintimidated."

England thus became more warlike than at any time in her history, and enthusiasm rose to white heat. Volunteers offered themselves everywhere; depleted regiments of the Line were speedily brought up to their full strength; every county raised not merely its militia, but bodies of irregular cavalry from the yeomen. "This island was never before in so formidable a state of defence," and it is said that party differences were entirely suspended as far as concerned this essential point, "and Britain, with united hearts and hands, 'was confident against a world in arms.'"

The Tenth was at its strongest in that time of crisis. It contained 950 rank and file, and 79 officers, showing a total of 1,029 men. These were encamped at Sandown Bay, ready for service at any spot, and at any moment, and as eager for a fight as they had ever been in any of the bygone glorious days.

It transpired that this boasted invasion by the army of the great nation, as France proudly called herself, formed part of the "projects of boundless ambition" in another quarter of the globe. But what that quarter was none could conjecture. None the less was England alert, and the Tenth were set down for service either on home or foreign soil. They were kept in a state of constant readiness.

Gradually it became a fixed conviction with some that Bonaparte had set his mind on the conquest of India, intending to wrest from us our splendid Eastern Empire. Suddenly a great French fleet slipped out of Toulon, and made for the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. It con-

voyed two hundred transports, carrying a vast quantity of military stores and provisions, and 25,000 men, with horses and artillery. In the annals of the time it is recorded that "in the fleet were also conveyed many artists of all kinds, men of science in all its different departments, linguists and proficient in literature, and, in short, all the requisites for the foundation of a flourishing colony, and the advancement of general knowledge."

The British Government were perplexed. There were regiments like the Tenth, in readiness to go to any quarter of the Empire, but ignorance as to the French objective kept them, as it were, paralysed. Was it Egypt Bonaparte had in view, or India? Or, after all, did he contemplate a descent on Sicily, or some other Mediterranean power?

The Tenth continued in garrison, and meanwhile the French fleet was moving. It arrived at Malta, and the so-called impregnable island was captured after a tame resistance, which suggested an understanding between Napoleon and the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, who held the place. In time it was discovered that Egypt was the destination of this great expedition. The regiments that were to go abroad were held in hand a while to see what Nelson would do, now that he was in full pursuit of the fleet of France. Soon came news that the Admiral had overtaken it in the Bay of Aboukir, near the mouth of the Nile, and that, closing with the French in battle, he had won one of the most famous of our Navy's sea-fights. It had been fought on the 1st of August, 1798, and when night came the French fleet was to all intents annihilated, eleven out of the thirteen ships of the line, and two of the four frigates being taken or destroyed.

The home service of the Tenth was nearing an end. It had been thought that Napoleon would give up his project

of the conquest of India after such a disastrous defeat at the battle of the Nile. But, to the amazement of Europe, the great French General was able to extricate himself from what was supposed to be a position involving absolute ruin to his army. "The genius of Bonaparte was able to provide for his force in Egypt after all communication with Europe was cut off, and to make head against the numerous foes by whom he was surrounded. He employed every art to reconcile the people of Egypt to the new dominion under which they had fallen, and he affected great respect for the Mahometan religion and its ministers." The Turks declared war against him, but he was as victorious here as elsewhere, and having defeated the Sultan, he suddenly returned to Paris, leaving his army behind him.

A call came for reinforcements, and accordingly the Tenth proceeded to the East Indies. Whatever England might have to fear at home by reason of Napoleon's menaces, the position in India was so disquieting that it was necessary to send some regiments there without delay. The voyage round the Cape was a long one, for while the transports which carried the Tenth left England on August the 28th, 1798, the soldiers did not land in Madras until the 13th of April, 1799.

In the meantime there had been anxious times for the British troops and residents in India. There were troubles in many parts of that immense portion of our Empire, but one by one the Government overcame them. None of the native princes could hope to oppose the British troops with any hope of lasting success save Tippoo Sahib, the ruler of Mysore. Ever since the Treaty of Seringapatam, Tippoo, it is said, "had shown a sullen, vindictive temper, an irreconcilable enmity, an impatience to grasp at every chance of renewing the war with some prospect of success."

Wherever he could rouse native feeling against the Government, he sent his envoys. He entered on an agreement with Republican France, and was referred to in Paris as "Citizen Sultaun Tippoo." Frenchmen throughout India were urged to join and assist him against the common enemy—England.

In addition to these overtures, there was despatched to Tippoo the following letter from General Bonaparte, but it was intercepted, and did not reach the Sultan:—

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

LIBERTY.

EQUALITY.

Head Quarters at Cairo, 7th Pluviose, 7th Year of The Republic, One and Indivisible.

BUONAPARTE, Member of the National Convention, General-in-Chief, to the Most Magnificent SULTAUN, our greatest Friend, TIPPOO SAIB.

You have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, full of the desire of delivering you from the iron yoke of England.

I eagerly embrace this opportunity of testifying to you the desire I have of being informed by you, by the way of Muscat and Mocha, as to your political situation.

I could even wish you could send some intelligent Person to Suez or Cairo, possessing your Confidence, with whom I may confer.

May the Almighty increase your Power, and destroy your enemies.

BUONAPARTE.

This was proof sufficient that the great Indian chieftain was allying himself with England's enemies. It was decided, therefore, to challenge Tippoo as to his intentions. His

response was an insolent one, although he had had ample proof that treachery towards the British Government was fraught with danger to himself. He had found again and again that in spite of his strength in point of numbers, he was no match for the troops from England, nor even for the native soldiers who were commanded by English officers. It is true that his cavalry were singularly fine for his particular method of fighting—mobile and efficient—but he could not cope with a capable general like Cornwallis, who “made concentration the key-note of the campaign.”

It was quite a different matter with Tippoo, when, having refused to explain why he was gathering a great army together, he saw that the British Government was in earnest. As soon as he had heard that the Governor had gone to Madras, thus taking a step which assured him that the position was serious, he sent word to say that he desired peace. Even then, however, he would not consent to receive an embassy from the Governor-General, and consequently Lord Mornington, who had succeeded Cornwallis in that capacity, sent forward the Madras Army.

The forces employed against Tippoo were apparently inadequate, considering the numerical superiority of the Sultan's army. The grand total did not exceed 30,959 men, and of these, 6,536 were not brought into the conflict at all, being kept in reserve at Madras. The main army numbered 18,319 fighting men, with 2,483 Lascars and Pioneers, but out of that number only 5,265 were Europeans. The Tenth were counted in the Reserve Corps at Madras, when the last fight came with Tippoo, the corps numbers standing thus :—

| | | | | Non-Com., Drums. | Total |
|-----|---------------------------------|-----|-----|------------------|-------|
| | | | | Rank & File. | |
| 1 | Company Bengal Artillery... | ... | ... | 57 | |
| 1 | „ Coast „ ... | ... | ... | 85 | 142 |
| 1st | Battn. 10th Regt. Bengal Native | | | | |
| | Infantry | ... | ... | 993 | |
| 2nd | Battn. 10th | ... | ... | 1008 | |
| 2nd | „ 2nd Coast Native Infantry | | | 1051 | |
| 2nd | „ 4th | ... | ... | 998 | |
| 1st | „ 11th | ... | ... | 989 | |
| 2nd | „ 11th | ... | ... | 1037 | 6076 |
| | Companies of Gun Lascars | ... | ... | | 318 |
| | | | | Total ... | 6536 |

This detachment was under the command of Colonel Roberts. The main army, which was under Harris, was declared to be "the best equipped force ever seen in India." Even then it did not appear to be sufficiently strong for the purpose, but, fortunately, Stuart, who was at Bombay, was available, and marched out with 6,000 men.

It was felt that Tippoo must be dealt with decisively, and deprived of his power to keep India in a state of commotion. The total of the Army of Invasion was "31,000 fighting men, exclusive of the Nizam's cavalry," and among the commanding officers was Colonel Arthur Wellesley, afterwards famous as the Duke of Wellington.

The Tenth heard of these doings while on their voyage when they touched at various ports, and when they spoke with passing ships. What they heard at the Cape filled them with enthusiasm, for they anticipated some hard fighting. They heard that when Tippoo knew of the army's approach, he had decided not to withdraw, although he was made aware of the fact that there had never been such an army brought into the field in India to fight for Great Britain.

Tippoo determined, first of all, to crush the smaller army coming up from Bombay, and for the time being to ignore Harris and Wellesley. But Stuart beat him so badly that he fled to Seringapatam in what looked like panic and rout. Here he rallied his scattered soldiers, and went to meet Harris, but when he saw the British force his heart failed him, and he retreated to Mallavelly, where he accepted battle on the following day, but was disastrously beaten. His men fled before a fierce bayonet charge, and while not more than 66 of our men were killed, wounded or missing, Tippoo lost more than a thousand. He succeeded in saving his artillery by repeated cavalry charges while the guns were being carried away.

This fight took place on March the 27th, 1799, more than a fortnight before the Tenth arrived at Madras. Harris pressed on, and came within sight of Seringapatam on the 5th of April. Then he saw how Tippoo had strengthened the city, having kept 6,000 men constantly at work at the fortifications during the six years since Abercromby had left the place, after having compelled him to sign a treaty of peace. The task before the army was to capture the greatest stronghold in India, and it was undertaken without hesitation.

Seringapatam had not fallen when the Tenth landed at Madras. Hearing this, the men hoped that they would be sent forward to join the army, but, much to their chagrin, they were detained with the Reserve Corps. A week later news came in that Tippoo was so alarmed when he saw the British army outside his city that he asked for terms of peace. He rejected those that were offered, since they included the cession of the half of his dominions, and the payment of £200,000 towards the expenses of the war. Thereupon followed repeated attacks, and on the 4th of May Seringapatam was carried by storm. When

Wellesley's troops captured the last entrenchment, and rushed into the city, they found Tippoo dead in one of the gateways, beneath the bodies of many others who had fought so desperately to hold the gate. The fight was terrific, and no less than 10,000 Mysoreans were lying dead when the conflict ended.

The fighting chances for the Tenth were small indeed. The despatches showed that the spoils were immense. The Commander-in-Chief reported that 929 pieces of ordnance, 100,000 muskets and carbines, swords, and accoutrements, and powder and shot in enormous quantities had fallen into his hands.

It was then that the men of the Tenth knew what they had missed, owing to their late arrival on the scene, namely, a share of the prize money to the amount of £1,100,000, which was distributed among the officers and troops who fought at Seringapatam. In a document written at Cawnpore, and dated July 6th, 1799, the writer says :—

I have this instant received a copy of the Distribution of the Seringapatam Prize Money. General Harris has something better than three lack of Pajodas, about £125,000. Floyd 36,000 Paj. Other Generals 25,000. Colonels a little more than 10,000. This is, however, only a first division ; they are now in expectation of near as much more :—

| | | | | |
|-----------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| Lieut.-Colonels | ... | ... | ... | 6,480 |
| Majors | ... | ... | ... | 4,320 |
| Captains | ... | ... | ... | 2,160 |
| Subalterns | ... | ... | ... | 1,080 |
| Serjeants | ... | ... | ... | 36 |
| Privates, etc. | ... | ... | ... | 18 |
| Sepoys, etc. | ... | ... | ... | 12 |

It was the hardest luck imaginable for the Tenth, who had been looking forward throughout the long and weary

voyage to a fight. To lose, not only the fighting, but a share in such a magnificent prize, was outrageous fortune.

This distribution of money was a great matter to the soldiers, but, more important than all, from the national standpoint, was "the breaking of the most formidable power in the South of India." Tippoo was our most implacable and barbarous foe, and notoriously cruel. Now that he was swept out of the way, the Tenth saw little or no prospect of any fighting, for the overthrow of this great ruler impressed the native princes, and assured them of the futility of opposing the English Government.

In spite of the natural ending of the war by the death of Tippoo, the troops were detained in India, for with Napoleon's army in Syria, there was yet the possibility, even the great probability, of a dash for the East. Not only so, the French Government had its emissaries in India, endeavouring to influence the native princes against the British. It was necessary, therefore, to maintain a strong army in India, in readiness for the possible and almost certain war.

The stay of the Tenth in India was rather one of garrison service than anything else, for no fighting of any consequence fell to their share. They remained in Madras for nearly four months, while the Mysore territory was being redistributed, but after that, on the 6th of August, they were sent to Bengal, and twenty days later were in quarters there.

The presence of the Tenth in that part of India was necessary, for while Tippoo was dead, and his Empire under complete British control, the Presidency of Bengal demanded the assistance of a strong repressive force. It had been discovered that some of the Indian princes had been in communication with the Sultan, and when Seringapatam fell, correspondence of a treasonable nature

was found, which caused the Governor-General to remove more than one potentate from the civil and military control of his dominions. Some were pensioned, and notably the Nawab of the Carnatic.

Trouble was also being given by the Nawab Wazir of Oude. He had arranged to pay the East India Company a yearly sum of £760,000, for the maintenance of 3,000 English troops, who were to defend his frontiers against the raids of the Marathas, whose depredations threatened the very existence of the Nawab's dominions. This force was altogether inadequate for the purpose, since Oude was menaced by the Afghans. He wanted extra soldiers, but declined to pay the extra sum of money. The danger to India, in the case of such an invasion, was so serious that the Governor-General felt it absolutely necessary to insist upon an adequate defence, otherwise India would be exposed to the horrors of the inroads of the savage soldiery of Cabul. It might end in an uprising so far-reaching that India would be lost.

The way out of the difficulty was found by a surrender on the part of the Nawab, who gave into the hands of the East India Company "the whole of the fertile lands lying between the Ganges and Jumna, known as the Doab, as well as the Rohilkund and the district of Gorakpur." The Governor-General, in return, agreed to meet the whole expenses incurred in maintaining an armed European force, adequate to the task of holding back the threatening princes, and their Allies.

The work of the Tenth was thus made plain. They were part of this defensive body, and were at any time liable to be called on for some heavy and serious fighting.

NOTE A.

REGULATION OF SUBSISTENCE, PAY, AND ALLOWANCE FOR OFFICERS
AND SOLDIERS OF THE TENTH WHILE IN INDIA IN 1799 AND ONWARDS.

| | Pay & Allow- ance per diem at home. | | | Pay per diem to be advanced on embarking. | | | Subsistence per diem when serv- ing in the East Indies. | | |
|---|--|----|----|--|----|----|---|----|----|
| | £ | s. | d. | £ | s. | d. | £ | s. | d. |
| Colonel and Captain | 1 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 18 | 0 | |
| Lieut.-Colonel and Captain | 15 | 11 | | 15 | 11 | | 13 | 0 | |
| Major and Captain | 14 | 1 | | 14 | 1 | | 11 | 6 | |
| Captain | 9 | 5 | | 9 | 5 | | 7 | 6 | |
| Captain-Lieutenant or Lieutenant | 4 | 8 | | 4 | 8 | | 3 | 6 | |
| Allowances to ditto | 1 | 0 | | — | | | — | | |
| Ensign | 3 | 8 | | 3 | 8 | | 3 | 0 | |
| Allowances to ditto | 1 | 0 | | — | | | — | | |
| Adjutant | 4 | 0 | | 4 | 0 | | 3 | 0 | |
| Allowances to ditto | 1 | 0 | | — | | | — | | |
| Quartermaster | 4 | 8 | | 4 | 8 | | 3 | 6 | |
| Allowances to ditto | 1 | 0 | | — | | | — | | |
| Surgeon | 9 | 5 | | 9 | 5 | | 7 | 6 | |
| Assistant Surgeon | 5 | 0 | | 5 | 0 | | 4 | 6 | |
| Sergeant | 1 | 6½ | | 1 | 3 | | 1 | 0 | |
| Corporal | 1 | 2½ | | 10½ | | | 8 | | |
| Drummer or Fifer | 1 | 1½ | | 10 | | | 8 | | |
| Private Man... .. | 1 | 0 | | 8 | | | 6 | | |

BY HIS MAJESTY'S COMMAND.

NOTE B.

THE COST OF THE MAINTENANCE OF THE TENTH FOR ONE YEAR
WHILE IN INDIA IN 1799 AND ONWARDS.

| | Pay, etc., for 365 days. | | | Pay, etc., for 365 days. | | |
|--|--------------------------|----|----|--------------------------|----|----|
| | £ | s. | d. | £ | s. | d. |
| Commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Fox. | | | | | | |
| Colonel and Captain... .. | 411 | 5 | 0 | | | |
| Allowance in lieu of Pay of 10 Warrant Men, each £9 2s. 6. | 91 | 5 | 0 | 502 | 10 | 0 |
| Lieut.-Colonel and Captain | | | | 291 | 6 | 0½ |
| " " " without a Company | | | | 291 | 6 | 0½ |
| Major and Captain | | | | 257 | 0 | 7½ |
| " " " without a Company ... | | | | 257 | 0 | 7½ |
| Seven Captains of Companies, each ... | 171 | 17 | 1 | 1,199 | 9 | 7 |
| Captain-Lieutenant | | | | 79 | 19 | 4 |
| Twenty-one Lieutenants, each | 79 | 19 | 4 | 1,679 | 6 | 0 |
| Eight Ensigns | 62 | 16 | 7½ | 502 | 12 | 10 |

| Consisting of Ten Companies of 95 Privates in each. | | | | | | Pay, etc., for 365 days. | |
|---|--|--|--|--|----------|--------------------------|---------------|
| | | | | | | £ s. d. | £ s. d. |
| Adjutant | | | | | | | 68 10 10 |
| Quartermaster | | | | | | | 79 9 4 |
| Surgeon | | | | | | | 171 7 1 |
| Two Assistant Surgeons | | | | | 85 13 6½ | | 171 7 1 |
| Sixty-two Sergeants | | | | | 18 5 0 | | 1,131 10 0 |
| Sixty Corporals | | | | | 12 3 4 | | 730 0 0 |
| Twenty Drummers | | | | | 12 3 4 | | 243 6 8 |
| Two Fifers | | | | | 12 3 4 | | 24 6 8 |
| In all 1,355 Men and Officers included. | | | | | | | |
| One thousand one hundred and forty | | | | | | | |
| Privates, each | | | | | 9 2 6 | | 10,402 10 0 |
| Allowance in lieu of the Chaplain's Pay ... | | | | | | | 114 4 8½ |
| Pay | | | | | | | 18,197 13 5½ |
| Clothing | | | | | | | 3,696 16 5½ |
| Agency | | | | | | | 292 1 0 |
| Allowances to the— | | | | | | | |
| Ten Captains of Companies, each £56 10s. | | | | | 365 0 0 | } | 703 5 0 |
| Paymaster | | | | | 120 0 0 | | |
| Sergeant-Major and Quartermaster ... | | | | | 18 5 0 | | |
| Total for the 10 Companies... | | | | | | | 22,889 15 11½ |
| ONE RECRUITING COMPANY. | | | | | | | |
| Captain | | | | | | | 171 17 1 |
| Two Lieutenants | | | | | 85 3 4 | | 170 6 8 |
| Ensign... .. | | | | | | | 66 18 4 |
| Eight Sergeants | | | | | 28 10 3½ | | 228 2 6 |
| Eight Corporals | | | | | 21 13 5½ | | 173 7 6 |
| Four Drummers | | | | | 20 18 2½ | | 83 12 11 |
| Allowance to the Colonel | | | | | | | 9 2 6 |
| „ to Lieuts. and Ensigns, each | | | | | 18 5 0 | | 54 15 0 |
| Pay | | | | | | | 958 2 6 |
| Clothing | | | | | | | 128 8 10½ |
| Agency | | | | | | | 16 13 7 |
| Allowance to the Captain | | | | | | | 38 5 0 |
| Total for this Company ... | | | | | | | 1,141 9 11½ |
| Total for this Regiment ... | | | | | | | £24,031 5 11 |

The foregoing note gives an authoritative statement as to the strength of the "Tenth" during its Indian Service.

EGYPT.

CHAPTER XXX.

PREPARING FOR EGYPTIAN SERVICE.

1800. WHILE the Tenth were quartered in the Presidency of Bengal—a period of about fifteen months—orders came to the regiment to hold itself in readiness for embarkation for special service in Egypt.

The disastrous defeat of the French in the naval battle at Aboukir resulted in Napoleon's army finding themselves in a most precarious position in that country. "Whatever he may have designed," says Rose, "Napoleon was now a prisoner in his conquest." He had defeated the Mamelukes at the battle of the Pyramids, had taken possession of Cairo, and subdued Lower Egypt; and while organizing a government for the land he had conquered, he learned with amazement of the destruction of his fleet. Yet he was in no way crushed, and, as one writer says, "the versatility of Bonaparte's genius was never more marked than at this time of discouragement. While his enemies figured him and his exhausted troops as vainly seeking to escape from those arid wastes, and while Nelson was landing the French prisoners in order to increase his embarrassment about food, Bonaparte and his *savants* were developing constructive powers of the highest order, which made the army independent of Europe." His difficulties increased, but he met them resolutely, and notwithstanding the decrease of his force by pestilence and its arduous

Y

service in Syria, he attacked an immense Turkish army, and completely destroyed it.

So far from giving up the struggle, he menaced England through her Indian dominions. He entrusted the Iman of Muscat with a letter to Tippoo Sahib—the letter which has already been quoted—offering allegiance and deliverance from the “iron yoke of England.” Its interception had made a profound impression in India, and had convinced the Government there that a blow must be struck in Egypt in order to save India.

The Tenth were to play their part in striking that blow when it was resolved upon. Accordingly, they were brought down the Ganges, and halted for a time in Calcutta, until the Marquess Wellesley should finally determine the course he would pursue. The passage towards the capital was undertaken by the men in the highest spirit. The dull time of peace to soldiers whose trade was war, and who were ambitious for distinction and promotion, was soon to be ended. The regiment had already won great glory, and the news that they were to measure their strength with the French battalions was received with enthusiasm.

At Calcutta the Tenth discovered that there was some uncertainty as to their destination. There was a report that they were to join an expedition to Batavia, an important sea-port in Java, so as to strike at France through the Dutch, who had settlements in the island, and had made Batavia their capital in the East Indies. It was an opportunity for active service, but disappointing, for the desire of the men of the Tenth was to meet the French. Before long, to their satisfaction, everything pointed in that direction, and to the withdrawal of attention from Java.

Lord Wellesley, in a lengthy despatch to England, sketched his plan of action in view of the necessity that

was felt both in England and in India for crushing the army Napoleon had left in Egypt under the command of Kleber. He had prepared an expedition against Batavia, and for this purpose had brought the Tenth to the Port of Calcutta, to embark there. But advices under date of July 20th and August 10th, setting forth the strength of General Kleber's army in Egypt, as well as the intercepted letter from Bonaparte to Tippoo Sahib, determined him to suspend the expedition, since it would have removed the main strength of the naval squadron, together with a proportion of the European land forces, far beyond the limits of any possible operation against the French in the Indian Seas, or in the Arabian Gulf.

Lord Wellesley further told the Secretary of State for War what steps he was taking in order to co-operate with the army England was sending to Egypt to serve under Sir Ralph Abercromby, thus :—

| | |
|-----------|----------|
| H.M.'s 10 | } Regts. |
| " 19 | |
| " 80 | |
| | of |
| | Foot. |

Bengal Volunteers, 1 Batta., consisting of about 1,000 firelocks; Artillery from Bengal, 38 Europeans (exclusive of Comm^dg. Officers) and Golundanzes.* The remaining proportion of Artillery to be furnished from Ceylon.

In the month of October, 1800, I ordered the force noted in the margin to assemble at Trincomalé, where I calculated it would be collected by the middle of December; and I requested Vice - Admiral Rainier to repair to the same station with the strength of his squadron. I considered Trincomalé to be a central point from which the Armament might proceed with facility to meet any exigency."

* Golundanzes were the Indian troops. A Golundaz was a native artilleryman.

The marginal note as here given shows that Trincomalé in Ceylon was the spot to which the Tenth went after a short stay in the Port of Calcutta.

Proceeding with his despatch, Lord Wellesley went on to say :—

“I proposed that this force . . . should be applied to either of the following objects, according to the state of future events and contingencies. . . .

1. To proceed up the Red Sea, in order to co-operate with any British force which might eventually be employed against the French in Egypt from the side of the Mediterranean.

2. To proceed to any point which the French might menace in India, especially on the Western side of the Peninsula.”

In pursuance of this plan, a force was also directed to be held in readiness at the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay. . . . This force was ordered to repair to such position as that officer—the officer commanding the troops in Ceylon—“might eventually appoint with a view to either of the stated objects.”

The despatch still further intimated the possible destination of the Tenth. Lord Wellesley contemplated a diversion to the discomfort of France, which was set forth in the following terms :—

“In the expectation of the continuation of the war with France, I considered the reduction of the Mauritius to be the most useful service which could be effected with a view to embarrass France in the prosecution of any enterprise, either for the disturbance of our possessions in India, or for the relief of her army in Egypt; while, on the other hand, the possession of the Mauritius appeared to me to promise powerful advan-

tages to Great Britain in any effort which might be meditated for the expulsion of the French from Egypt."

Wellesley, however, dropped this idea, considering the expedition to Batavia the more likely to be serviceable. The Tenth were accordingly in daily expectation of orders to embark for Java. But news from England induced him to reconsider his plans.

Again came up for consideration the expediency of sending the forces already named to the Red Sea. He was much exercised in his mind as to the strength of the force; whether it should be within the limit already mentioned, which would have been adequate for Batavia, or whether it should be greatly augmented. The Home Government suggested a certain number, but Wellesley did not approve, and said in his despatch: "In limiting the force to be sent from India to the number of 1,000 Europeans and 2,000 native troops, it appeared to me that you had proceeded on an opinion either that a more considerable force might not be disposable in India at the period when your Despatches would reach me, or that a larger force could not be supplied from India on the Shores of the Red Sea during the approaching season."

The decision at which the Governor-General arrived decided the destination of the Tenth. Reading into the spirit of the communications he received from England, the Marquess considered that he would do well to send the full force collected in Ceylon and Bombay, and other places, for a united effort to co-operate with His Majesty's forces, and with those of the Ottoman Porte in Syria.

Under Lord Wellesley's instructions, Colonel Wellesley was told to drop the idea of going to Batavia, but to collect troops for a rendezvous in the Red Sea. The force which was to concentrate at Trincomalé was thus composed:—

| | | | |
|-------------------|-----|-----|-------|
| H.M.'s 10th Regt. | ... | ... | 1,000 |
| " 80th Regt. | ... | ... | 750 |
| " 88th Det. | } | ... | 500 |
| " 86th Det. | | | |

| | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-----|-------|
| Total | ... | ... | 2,250 |
| Bengal Volunteers, about | ... | ... | 1,000 |
| European and Native Artillery, about | | | |
| two Companies, with Lascars attached. | | | |

At the same time, the Governor-General sent Rear-Admiral Blankett from Bombay with a strong force to carry into effect a plan he had devised for the annoyance of the enemy on the coasts of the Red Sea. The idea in Wellesley's mind was to get the men into Egypt early, so that they might act with vigour.

Major-General Baird was appointed to the command of the army, made up of the Tenth and other troops from India. While he was preparing for their immediate embarkation, a letter reached him from the Governor-General. It was dated February the 10th, 1801, and gave valuable details as to the movements of the army that was to co-operate with Sir Ralph Abercromby and the Army of England in the endeavour to drive the French out of Egypt.

"You will observe," said Wellesley, "that a force, consisting of 15,000 men, under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby, has been ordered to proceed up the Mediterranean Sea for the purpose of co-operating with the Turkish army assembled on the frontier of Syria, with a view of attacking the French in Egypt. The force under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby was expected to arrive on the coast of Egypt in the month of December last.

"You will likewise observe that His Majesty has been further pleased to order that a force be immediately

assembled in the Red Sea, with the view of dispossessing the French of the Ports and Places which they occupy on the coasts of that sea, and of creating a diversion in favour of the combined British and Turkish Armies acting on the side of the Mediterranean."

The season was considered by the Governor-General unfavourable, but none the less he did as Mr. Secretary Dundas desired. In his further communication with General Baird he wrote in these terms: "It is evident that the early preparations made at Ceylon, Madras, and Bombay will enable me even now to move a force towards Egypt within the present season, a movement which would have been utterly impracticable, if timely provision had not been made for the eventual execution of His Majesty's commands."

Lord Wellesley was well aware of the difficulties of the season when troops from India would probably arrive in the Red Sea. Admiral Popham was to bring the 61st Regiment from the Cape of Good Hope; but the Governor-General felt from the outset that Popham could not get up from the Cape before the end of March or the beginning of April. "At that period," he said to Baird, "the passage up the Red Sea is attended with delay and difficulty, and if the force ordered to be despatched from India should wait at Mocha for the arrival of Popham, it is scarcely to be expected that any seasonable or effectual aid could be afforded from the operations of the proposed arrangements on the shores of the Red Sea to the British and Turkish forces acting on the side of the Mediterranean.

"These considerations, and my conviction that the expulsion of the French from Egypt is indispensably necessary to the future security of the British Empire in India, have determined me to relinquish for the present the

proposed Expeditions against Batavia and the Isle of France and to employ immediately on the shores of the Red Sea the whole force which I had collected at Trincomalee and Port de Galle, together with 1,600 native infantry which have been held in readiness at Bombay under my orders of the 23rd of October, 1800. This service was the original destination of the Armament at Ceylon, Malacca and Bombay; but I always considered the previous assurance of an effectual concert and co-operation from the side of the Mediterranean to be indispensably requisite to justify the employment of any considerable force from India in the Red Sea.

"Being now satisfied that a large British Army will speedily act from the shores of the Mediterranean, I am resolved not to wait for the arrival of Sir Home Popham, but to apply whatsoever disposable force I can furnish in anticipating the object of His Majesty's commands by making an early and powerful diversion on the shores of the Red Sea."

In accordance with this important letter, so freely quoted from the Tenth were embarked in readiness for momentous service in Egypt. General Baird was to be in command of the army destined for the Red Sea, and Colonel Wellesley was second in command of the forces.

Rear-Admiral Blankett sailed from Bombay on December the 28th. 1800, for the Red Sea, accompanied by 240 European Infantry (belonging to the 86th Regiment), 50 European Artillery, 20 Gun Lascars, one European engineer officer, and 100 Marine Sepoys, the whole under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Lloyd. These and Blankett's sailors were to "produce all the effect of an advanced guard" to the force which was to follow under Baird and Wellesley.

Baird began at once to concentrate. The Tenth sailed from Kidgaree to Bombay, and when the designated troops were assembled there, the army was made up as follows:—

| | | | |
|-----------------------|-----|-----|-------|
| H.M.'s 10th Regt. | ... | ... | 1,000 |
| „ 19th Regt. | ... | ... | 750 |
| „ 80th Regt. | ... | ... | 750 |
| „ 86th and 88th Dets. | ... | ... | 500 |
| Total | ... | ... | 3,000 |

Bengal Native Volunteers, rank and file, 1,000.

European and Native Artillery, about two companies, with Lascars attached.

Sixteen Native Infantry, European Artillery, about one Company, with draught and carriage bullocks attached.

The 61st Regiment did not, of course, join Baird's forces at Bombay. Popham was to take them on to the Red Sea direct.

These notes and figures are given in the margin of Wellesley's despatch to Major-General Baird. In this communication instructions were given, and Baird was apprised of the powers that were granted to him in pursuance of the purpose of the expedition. He was empowered to command the tonnage for the embarkation of 1,900 Europeans and 1,000 Sepoys. The Governor-General went on to say, "for the conveyance of the remainder I rely on the exertions of His Excellency, Vice-Admiral Rainier." From Bombay 1,600 native infantry were to be despatched to Mocha, there to await the arrival of the armament that set sail first from Trincomalé, in Ceylon, and later picked up troops at Point de Galle, the southern point of that beautiful island.

It is scarcely likely that any of the Europeans regretted their departure from the Far East. The men were enthusiastic at the thought of measuring swords with their

hereditary enemies, and whatever experience Egypt might have in store for them, they were ready and eager to bring the quarrel between the nations to an issue. But from the time of starting from Kidgaree to their arrival at Bombay many weeks intervened. There were innumerable delays in spite of the dispatch with which Wellesley had made his arrangements. Officialism moved slowly, and the cattle that brought supplies to the coast could not be hurried. The sluggishness of the Orient was not affected by the eagerness of the Governor-General; and in consequence, the Tenth, while starting for Ceylon on the 5th of December, did not reach Bombay until the 1st of April, 1801. It ought to be remembered, perhaps, that the delay was in some sense due to Lord Wellesley's anxiety to secure supplies for the troops, since, in their desert march, they would be absolutely dependent on the Commissariat, the country being incapable of affording food to any number of troops. The supplies which were collected and placed on board the ships which carried the Tenth and other soldiers, were sufficient for their subsistence to the end of June, or the middle of July. Arrangements were made for further supplies to follow, enough to last the army from India until the end of November. Baird, moreover, was to take the military chest with him.

Again and again Lord Wellesley sent to Baird, urging him to get away from Ceylon. Time was precious, because of the season, and he was in receipt of news which showed how necessary it was for the army speedily to land in Egypt if it was to be at all effective in its co-operation with Abercromby. "Use all expedition to get away," he wrote; "Go with what you have, and leave the rest to follow, rather than wait; but leave a proper officer to see that the supplies follow with all dispatch. Join Admiral Blankett at once in the Red Sea, and if Sir Home Popham

is not there when you arrive, do not wait for him. Once with Blankett, concert with him the measures proper to be adopted with a view to the annoyance of the enemy in Egypt, and to the most beneficent co-operation with the Forces acting from the Mediterranean."

Baird was as eager as the Governor-General, but he was tied hand and foot. He was harassed on all sides. The officials who had to get supplies in to Trincomalé moved with an exasperating leisureliness. The native troops came in with an easiness which did not promise well for activity in the desert; while, on the other hand, the Tenth, like all the Europeans, were fuming at the time that was being squandered. News came which made them fear that they would reach Egypt just too late, as they had arrived at Madras two or three years before—too late to take part in the storming of Seringapatam.

This impatience was aggravated by news which found its way over from Egypt. The French army had suffered a serious loss by the assassination of Kleber, their general, at the hands of a Turkish fanatic. That was so much to the good. But the other news made the men of the Tenth more restive yet. The English Government had dispatched a large army to Egypt, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, as we have already seen. The general landed on March the 7th, 1801. Battles were fought on the 13th of that month, and on the 21st, near Alexandria, but, to the grief of the soldiers, Abercromby, while victorious in each engagement, fell in the latter fight, mortally wounded. Hutchinson, who succeeded in the chief command, was equally successful, and the expectation was that Menou, the French general, would be compelled to surrender before the Tenth could have a chance of fighting.

At last the army was at sea, bound for Egypt. Baird's first duty, on arriving in the Red Sea, was to procure all

possible intelligence respecting the state of the enemy's force at Suez and at Cossier, and also as to the condition of the defences at each of those places. If feasible, Suez was to be attempted, because it was recognised by Lord Wellesley that while the French were in possession of it, they were masters of the trade, and in some measure of the revenues of the nations bordering on the Red Sea. The Governor-General declared it as his opinion that the people of the district did not oppose the French, although they had the utmost dislike for them, their quiescence being presumably due to the serious consequences which would ensue if they ventured to offer any opposition.

In the interval Abercromby had been greatly disappointed when he learnt that no troops had arrived from India. He wrote home at once, asking for additional men from England, if there were none available from the East. "If it is the intention of the British Government finally to extirpate the French from Egypt," he said in this letter, "it will be indispensably necessary that a strong reinforcement of troops should be immediately sent to this army, as no co-operation of the Turks can be depended on, and as the force which it is said is to act in the Red Sea can avail little in the reduction of Egypt."

On his arrival, the General had found the French army stronger than he anticipated. He had been told that they numbered 12,000 Effectives, besides some Auxiliaries. Although they were established, and were in possession of the country, and commanded the navigation of the Nile, yet he thought he could beat them, especially since some thousands of men from India were to co-operate with him. He had 13,000 men of his own, and felt equal to the opportunity. Just before Abercromby arrived in Egypt, Sir Sidney Smith wrote to him to say that the number of the enemy amounted to 30,000 Effectives, including the

Auxiliaries. He could not credit this statement, and came to the conclusion, from other information, that the French army was composed of 13,000 Frenchmen, and between 3,000 and 4,000 Greeks and Turks. The arrival of the Tenth and others would be a veritable god-send, and they had not yet come!

Baird was not to blame, for he could not combat Oriental sluggishness, which nothing would coerce into activity. In addition to the irritation caused by such unpardonable delay in Asia, he was anxious concerning an instruction from Lord Wellesley, since it laid such a strain on his judgment, and would involve serious consequences if in any degree that judgment failed. The instruction ran thus:—

“At the earliest possible period of time you will employ every proper method to conciliate the inhabitants of the coasts of the Red Sea or of Egypt to our interests, and to induce them to make common cause with us against the enemy. In order to facilitate and strengthen their means of acting with us, it may be necessary to distribute arms and ammunition. His Majesty's Ministers have, therefore, directed a supply of muskets, side arms, and musket ammunition to be sent on board the ships of Sir Home Popham's squadron with a view to this object.”

The extent of the distribution was left to the judgment of General Baird and the Admiral. The Arabs, Mamelukes, and others were to be enlisted to annoy the French with vigour until the final expulsion of the enemy, from Cairo and elsewhere. The inordinate delay in the departure of the expedition led Wellesley to issue further instructions as to the course to be pursued in the event—the very probable one—of the French being driven

out before the arrival of the Tenth in the Red Sea, and as to securing supplies, the difficulty of which was apparent. A large supply of horses was to be forwarded from the Western coasts of India, also camels, draught and carriage bullocks, and Horse Artillery.

At last the ships entered the Red Sea, and the Tenth saw the land where they hoped to add greatly to the glory the regiment had already achieved. The one thing apparent to the officers—and Baird did not fail to notice it—was, that there was an *esprit de corps* among the men which augured well for the strenuous days which were before them. Fatigue, danger, privation, the thirst and misery of desert experiences—all these were to be subservient to the dominating determination to beat the French, and either drive them out of Egypt, or achieve their capture. None of them thought anything of the rumour that the Turkish Army—which was to co-operate with them—numbered 80,000 men. No reliance could be placed on their assistance, for Bonaparte might at any moment negotiate with them, and cause them to withdraw from their alliance with England.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE DESERT MARCH.

1801. THE apprehensions of the Governor-General were realised as soon as the squadron entered the Red Sea. Lord Wellesley had again and again expressed his fear that the Tenth and other troops would reach those waters just as the monsoon commenced, and in such a case he did not think it possible that the warships and transports could effect a passage and a landing. The north-east winds rendered the progress up the sea almost an impossibility—a hopeless task in days when navigation by steam was altogether unknown. At times the ships were becalmed; at other times the high-running sea, and the violence of the wind, blowing with all the tempestuousness of a gale, and endangering the safety of the expedition, made anything like progress impossible.

Admiral Blankett was enabled to push up to Suez, but none besides himself were equal to the task of forcing their way in the face of the furious gales which swept the sea. The suggestion was made to do what smaller craft ventured on at times—to run between the shoals and the shore; but the Admiral would not hear of it, since, as he declared, it would end in disaster. In April the following appeared in the “Journal of the Expedition from England” :—

“An account was received at headquarters of the arrival of Rear-Admiral Blankett at Suez, from the East Indies, with about six hundred troops, and that he would be followed by more, who had been obliged to put into


the ports of the Red Sea, from the wind setting against them, and were then actually at Cossier."

Blankett's arrival at Suez in a large degree helped to carry out the scheme of Lord Wellesley, which was to seize Suez and Cossier, and then endeavour to effect a junction with Abercromby's army, and occupy Upper Egypt. It was felt alike by Wellesley and Baird that by holding the sea coast any body of troops which could be moved would be enabled to act with more confidence and effect in the interior of the country. But the season ruined all the plans. Wind and sea were against the Tenth and their companions, and as the entry just quoted shows, the troops failing to beat up the Red Sea, had to put in at Cossier.

The news which reached Major-General Hutchinson as to the possibility of the Tenth arriving in time to take part in the movements he contemplated was disappointing. It caused him to write the following letter to the Secretary at War from Gizeh :—

"It is with great concern that I have to mention to your Lordship that I have now very little hopes of any essential assistance from the army of India. My last letters from Colonel Murray are dated the 24th of May. He was still at Cossier, and had little hopes that he would be able to form a junction with General Baird, as he thought the monsoon would prevent his arrival. So that I cannot now flatter myself that we shall see him, at least for this season.

"The march from Cossier to Cairo for our troops, I should think, would be near forty days. There is a desert of a hundred miles to be passed, and the troops would suffer extremely at this advanced period of the year."



Year's Wages advanced,
 OR
TWENTY GUINEAS
For a DAY's Pay.

LINCOLNSHIRE HEROES having always
 been remarkable for zealously Supporting their
KING & COUNTRY, they are now presented
 with a glorious and never-returning Opportunity
 of distinguishing themselves in the

LOYAL LINCOLNSHIRE
REGIMENT OF FOOT,
 COMMANDED BY
Colonel EDWARD LETHERLAND,
New stationed at the flourishing CITY of LINCOLN.

To all who shall be in the HONOURABLE PROFESSION of ARMS, and disdain the DRUDGERY
 of SERVITUDE, repair without loss of TIME, to
Capt. Tho. HORNBY MORLAND,
Or Mr. LLOYD, of the above REGIMENT,

At their **RENDEZVOUS** the **GEORGE INN, HORNCASTLE**, the **WHITE HART, SPILSEY**,
 and the **WIND-MILL, ALFORD**, where they may exchange their WHIPS and SMOCKS for LACED
 COATS and SILVER-HILTED SWORDS.

SINGLED LADS of SIZE, CHARACTER, and QUALIFICATIONS, may acquire themselves of all Women
 lazing with Children and young Children, and enter into the direct Road to HONOUR and PROMOTION.

Bands of **Barry Sergeants and Corporals** are yet wanted to complete the Regiment.
 ALL RECRUITS who quit their Country, shall receive **TWENTY GUINEAS** Reward.

God bless the KING.
AND DAMN THE FRENCH.

BRIDGE, TRAVERS, LINCOLN

ANCIENT RECRUITING BILL, OF THE 81ST
 (LOYAL LINCOLN VOLUNTEERS).

Interesting as showing the conditions governing enlistment in those days
 (End of 18th Century).



Fortunately Popham now came up with the 61st, some of the 8th Light Dragoons, and a company of Field Artillery. The news he brought was not promising. When he had entered Mocha, thinking to find the provision ships from India, he discovered that neither these nor the troops that were to follow were there. Nor was Colonel Wellesley, for he had been left in Bombay, stricken down with fever. When Baird heard of this, he determined to move on with what he had, since time was precious, and consequently he and Popham went to Cossier. The troops that had already arrived were waiting for him, and had employed the time at their disposal in gathering a considerable number of camels for the desert journey. This was due to the foresight of Colonel John Murray, the Quarter-master-General. "A week later Blankett arrived, bearing a letter, dated May 13th, from Hutchinson, to welcome Baird and to assure him that he would not leave the vicinity of Cairo until the Indian contingent had safely crossed the desert."

At Cossier Baird consulted with his officers as to the instructions he had received from the Governor-General. Wellesley's ideas did in a large degree coincide with those of General Hutchinson, namely, that the troops in India should occupy themselves mainly with desultory operations on a limited scale until Baird received instructions from the Commander-in-Chief to undertake movements of a more extended nature. This was what actually remained to be done, since the arrival of the army of India had been so seriously delayed. The body of troops to which the Tenth belonged was capable of hampering General Menou, by interrupting his supplies and harassing him, while General Hutchinson was dealing with him in serious fashion on the enlarged scale with a greater army.

Too late to join the army from England, Baird decided on a most daring course, which was nothing less than to attempt what Hutchinson had thought scarcely possible, although he had hoped for it—to cross the desert from Cossier, and enter the Commander-in-Chief's camp at Gizeh, or Cairo, or wherever he might be, if he had been able to remain there so long a time.

It so happened that the fleet having separated during the stormy passage up the Red Sea, only eight companies of the Tenth had arrived at Cossier. The landing took place on June the 15th, but these companies accompanied Baird on his remarkable march across the desert to Kenah, on the banks of the Nile. The ship on board of which the other two companies were did not arrive at Cossier until a week had passed—June the 23rd—but these, with other detachments which had been delayed, started after the main body without delay. They did not overtake them until the 20th of July, when they found General Baird encamped at Girgee.

The Disembarkation Return ran as follows:—

Tenth Foot, June, 1801.

Landed at Cossier, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 6 captains, 16 lieutenants, 5 ensigns, 5 staff, 46 serjeants, 18 drummers, and 854 rank and file.

The list of officers of the Tenth for 1801—July—stood thus:—

Serving in Egypt.

Colonel—Lieut.-General Hon. Henry Edward Fox [who was now Commander of the Forces in the Mediterranean, with the temporary rank of General.]

Lieut.-Colonels—Richard Quarrell; Brevet-Col. Sir Samuel Auchmuty.

Majors—Solomon Holmes, David Mellifont.

Captains—William Ponsonby Dismore, David Parkhill,

Bt.-Major William Kent, Charles Fitzmaurice Hill, John Newman, R. Luke Yearman, Colin James Milnes, Norris William Bailey, Hon. Charles J. Greville, Adam Tate Gibbons.

Captain-Lieut. and Captain—Robert McGregor.

Lieutenants—James Higginson, Francis William Cashell, William Waldron Brome, Charles Aytoune Douglas, William Aird, Thomas Trustey Trickey, John Westropp Carey, William Henry Disney, Thomas Eames, G. S. Thwaites, Arthur Gethin Coote, James Duffey, — Hayes, John Tapp, Thomas Hames, William Blyden Burley, William Hutcheon, Thomas Dent, Thomas Rynd, Thomas Poppleton, Lewis Amedée de Noé, Matthew Bathurst, James Armstrong, John Law.

Ensigns—Samuel Porter, George Ferguson, W. Stuart, Richard Burke, Arthur Newport, Benjamin Sullivan, Henry Edward Addison.

Adjutant—James Duffey.

Paymaster—Francis Godfrey.

Quartermaster—Hugh Lattimore.

Surgeon—Thomas Benyon.

Assistant Surgeons—Henry Glasse, Henry Gill.

The story of that bold desert march across a hundred miles of sand is one of the most remarkable on record, and the fact that the object which Major-General Baird had in view was attained, speaks well for the fine persistency alike of officers and men who might well have been held excused if they had given up the almost hopeless task.

Early in the march came suffering and fatigue. The intense heat of the sun, the glare from the blinding and blistering sand, the torment which came because of the swarms of insects, and the intolerable thirst in a land where

wells were few and far between—these were the difficulties which tested the persistency of those men who belonged to the Army of India. Indeed, it is said that while even from the shores of the Red Sea, the country through which the soldiers were told the march would lie, “presented a frightfully desolate prospect,” the men set out without a murmur. The story runs that they “commenced their march through the desert with a cheerful alacrity, although suffering from excessive heat and dysentery, occasioned by bad water.”

The Tenth had been the heroes of many a trying march, but never before had they attempted such an one as this. They made their start after the sun had gone down, and travelled on throughout the night, the desert looking weird and forbidding in the moonlight. There was always the danger of a fight with the Arabs, who had sided with the French; men who knew every inch of the desert, and were taught to look on the English as the enemies of the human race, and creatures to be crushed relentlessly. At any moment there might appear out of the mysterious distance some clouds of these warriors of the desert, to hover around their march, and murder the stragglers of Baird's army.

At times a halt was sounded, and the tired men lay down to rest a while on the parched sand, the only mitigation being that as it was night the sun was not there to add his torture, and drain what endurance remained in them. It was a march of eleven miles to the first place where a definite halt was made—the New Wells—and here, to the relief of everything living in that marching column, water was found. It was the first of the seven stages to be traversed before the army reached the Nile at Kenna. The presence of wells here only in slight degree broke the monotony of the desert. In broad daylight the men of the Tenth saw the barrenness all around them. As one

said of that dreary waste when he crossed it a few years later: "The road in general was shut in on both sides by walls of rocks, except where little plains of sand extended, dotted with large stones, and behind those on the sides, others more distant reared their heads above in the wildest confusion, and most fantastic shapes, and different colours. Avenue after avenue, thus bounded, continued to present themselves" when the march was resumed.

In the first part of the journey, covering three whole days, the soldiers marched along a ravine, said to have been, many a century before, the track of a torrent hurrying to the sea at Cossier. It was better than what was to come—the eternal monotony of parched and burning sand. But even thus the endurance of the Tenth was tested to an extent which amounted to absolute misery. Fortescue tells us that Baird's plan was to pass his army over the whole distance in small divisions, of which the first—Colonel John Murray's—was to send its camels and water-bags back to the fifth stage; the second, on reaching the fifth stage, was likewise to send its camels back to the third stage; and the third division, on reaching the third stage, was to send back its camels to the first stage, enabling the remaining divisions to come forward in succession after the same principle.

The portion of the desert traversed at the early stage was rocky. The 88th went forward under Lieut-Colonel Beresford, Baird going with him. Behind came the Tenth and some Sepoys. The track was amid masses of irregular rock, "of all shapes and heights, from twenty to a hundred feet perpendicular." The travellers have said of these, that where they were low enough to see beyond them on the road sides, all was dreary and frightful. "Large cliffs of many tons weight, frowned from the slanting sides, and appeared to require only a touch or a breath to precipitate

them into the road." It was red rock everywhere, making the soldiers realise the heat so much the more in the blazing sun which was reflected from the surface. Duty and loyalty counted for much in such a march, in such a horrible place, where "the sharp edges of the rock . . . showed through the sand, and the whole was bounded by masses on masses of rocks piled on each other in the most splendid wildness—doubtless the most unfinished of all Nature's works."

The worn-out troops came to the end of this great watercourse, finding no water on the way, and relying on what they had brought with them. When they arrived at a spot half-way to Moilah, seventeen miles from the New Wells, they found no water. What wells were there had run dry, and the Tenth would have perished but for those whom Baird had sent on in front, and who returned with their camels laden with water-skins. The supply was scantier than was hoped for when the relief caravan came slowly in. It was found that the skins were leaky, and were almost empty, so that the exhausted soldiers could only partially slake their thirst.

Some of the Tenth had straggled in the march. Unable to resist the inclination to sleep, and overborne with heat and thirst, they lay on the burning sand and slept, and never woke again. But those who went on came to Moilah and found the wells. No water ever seemed so fresh as that after such an awful march! Again and again the men had been full of hope, and then the hope was dashed, and their perseverance seemed to flag in face of such disappointment. The fallacious mirage deceived the thirsty soldiers, who saw imaginary lakes which proved to be nothing but salt and arid sands. Then came the water they desired! The soldiers saw it shimmering in the sun, but when they gathered round it eagerly they found it

brackish, and neither man, nor horse, nor camel dared drink it.

Food was found at Moilah, but in no great abundance, and only such as was furnished by the date trees. A little rest, and the march began again. Nine miles farther on water was found at a place called Advanced Wells. Nineteen miles beyond, however, came a great disappointment, and another enforced dependence on the camels, that brought water back from the forward stage, at Legiatte, nineteen miles nearer to the Nile.

The country had now changed, but none of the discomforts slackened in that terrible march. It was a sea of sand, rolling on every hand. The rocks and stones had disappeared, "the only rise above the sand being not unlike a gravel pit." The boundless waste that shimmered beneath the awful sun, which tried one's nerve, and crushed the spirit, and sapped the physical strength, looked like land covered with a heavy fall of dirty-coloured snow. It was one vast, barren wild, which, in later marching, changed to "a hard gravel, with loose, flat stones dispersed upon the surface." No water was found here; none was in the wells half-way to Segeta, and Baromba was reached before the soldiers could drink to their hearts' content.

At Baromba they saw others than those of their army for the first time since the troops fell in at Cossier. In such distracting days, when France and England were striving for the mastery of Egypt, all enterprise was killed, and no caravans traversed the desert. The risks from either army were too great. Neither property nor life could be counted on as secure. It was a rare delight to see the village resting in the midst of cultivated fields, to look on date trees and houses, to hear the lowing of cattle, and realise that in some measure the men of the Tenth had emerged from a burning, savage desert, into more or less of

civilised life. The soldiers forgot their fatigue and sufferings in the gladness of coming once more to the habitations of men, and of knowing that when they had traversed but ten miles more, they would look upon the waters of the Nile. In large degree they were now on the edge of the desert. On either hand, when they began to march on to Kenna, they saw corn-fields and sugar-cane plantations. They passed through villages where they could buy milk, or eggs, or fowls, which the villagers were eager to sell.

At last General Baird had the satisfaction of seeing his soldiers troop past Kenna, and crowd about the bank of the river towards which they had been pressing for so many days, at the cost of so much suffering. Such wonderful persistency, almost unparalleled in the history of the marches of armies, was rewarded when the troops encamped outside the broken walls of Kenna, to wait for further orders from the Commander-in-Chief, who was either at Gizeh, or Cairo.

NOTE: The record of the march from the Red Sea to Kenna has been set forth thus:—

Cossier to the New Wells 11 miles, water.

Half-way to Moilah ... 17 miles, no water.

Moilah 17 miles, water and provisions.

Advanced Wells ... 9 miles, water.

Half-way to Legiatte ... 19 miles, no water.

Legiatte 19 miles, water and provisions.

Baromba 18 miles, water.

Kenna 10 miles, The Nile.

120 miles.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE FALL OF ALEXANDRIA.

1801. NOW that the Tenth had come to the Nile, the question arose as to the next movement which Baird should make. Should he go north along the bank of the river, taking tremendous risks in the absence of news as to whether the British Army was beaten at Cairo, or victorious? Or was it only open for him to recross the desert and return to India?

His anxiety arose from the fact that to all his inquiries he could get no reply from General Hutchinson, nor could he discover his whereabouts. Days went by—long days of anxious waiting, and full of possibilities, since, being ignorant of what was happening in Egypt, he knew not what force of the enemy he might have to encounter.

While waiting thus, satisfied in discovering that in spite of the desert journey he had lost but a few men, he received news of the arrival at El Hanka, higher up the river, nearer to Cairo, of the three companies of the 86th, who were on board Admiral Blankett's flagship when the Tenth left Cossier. Blankett sent them across the desert, a straight cut of more than seventy miles to the Nile; and with the thermometer standing at 109 degrees, the men marched on under pressure, because the guides declared that if they halted at all, the camels would soon begin to feel thirst. As it was, the men suffered more than Baird's main body of troops in the longer march. The guides took the soldiers twenty-six miles the first day in such a heat! Endurance has its limits, for when the temperature rose with the blow-

ing of a hot south wind, men dropped out one by one, and had to be placed on the camels at the sacrifice of some of the burdens which those animals carried. Yet when night came the men were benumbed with cold!

The second day's experience was as trying as the first, but with splendid persistency the men pressed on, and at the end of that march of eight-and-forty hours they saw the Nile. Cannon, when telling the story of the 86th Foot, says that the men did this great march in hunger. They were afraid to eat, lest the dry food should aggravate their thirst, and add to the horrors of the passage across the burning sands. Nine men died on the way from the heat alone, but all the others kept going until they came to a resting spot at El Hanka, not far from the banks of the great Egyptian river, to wait for orders from Baird, or the Commander-in-Chief.

Meanwhile, Baird, having halted sufficiently long to rest his tired troops, began to ascend the Nile, in obedience to orders from General Hutchinson, with whom communications were now established, and who instructed him to march to Girgeh, on the left bank of the river, and some nine miles north-west of the ancient city of Abydos. Halting in this old town, and camping close to the Coptic monastery of St. George or Girgis, Baird sent a messenger forward to announce his arrival, and ask for further instructions.

Baird told the story of his advance from Cossier in a letter to Lord Hobart, Secretary of State for War, in the following terms:—

“My Lord,

“On the 9th of July I had the honour of addressing the Rt. Hon. Mr. Secretary Dundas, from Kenna in Upper Egypt, and of reporting that I was arrived there with the

advance of my Army, waiting to know from Sir J. Hutchinson if their services would be required in Egypt. On the 15th of that month I had the honour of a letter from the General, acquainting me that as long as the French held the only harbour, and the strongest position in the country, and that preparations were made in all their ports to reinforce them, he could not consider Egypt as secured, or himself at liberty to dispense with the services of such a reinforcement. I determined in consequence to advance, and the remainder of my force was immediately ordered across the desert.

“From the previous march of the large detachment with me, I was well aware of the difficulties to be encountered, but was better prepared to obviate them. The want of water, by great exertions, was no longer to be apprehended. Depôts of wine, fresh provisions, and nourishment of different kinds, were formed at intermediate stations, and the men taken ill, or too weak to be moved, were conveyed to the next station, and there received medical assistance, until they were enabled to proceed. By these means the arduous undertaking was accomplished with little loss, the Army was embarked, and sent down the Nile to Cairo, and on the 23rd of August the whole was assembled there.”

Baird takes no notice of the halt at Girgeh, so that the stay could not have been a prolonged one. He then proceeds :

“After leaving garrisons at Cossier, on the Desert, at Kennè, at Giza, near Cairo, and at Damietta, the remainder of the corps reached this place on the 31st ultimo, on their route to Alexandria, but were halted by Sir J. Hutchinson's orders, in consequence of the capitulation of that garrison. As Sir J. Hutchinson sends his

dispatches immediately home, I have not had time to be fully acquainted with his intentions respecting this Army. He has been pleased, however, to inform me, that he is directed to leave us in Egypt till orders respecting us are received from home, and that he shall furnish me with instructions for my guidance.

“By the next conveyance I hope to have the honour of writing more fully to your Lordship on that subject. At present I must confine myself to observe that having accompanied the troops that took possession of the French lines at Alexandria, I find them so extensive that it will require a much larger Force than I possess to occupy them.

“I have the pleasure to report that the Army under my orders is in every respect fit for immediate and active service, and have the honour to enclose a return of them.

I have the honour to be,
my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient and
most humble servant,
D. BAIRD,
M.G.”

The return referred to showed a total as follows :

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----|-------|
| Europeans, Officers, &c. | ... | 236 |
| Rank and file ... | ... | 3,044 |
| Native Officers, Drummers, &c.... | ... | 1,294 |
| Rank and file ... | ... | 2,065 |
| <hr/> | | |
| Total | ... | 6,639 |

The strength of the Tenth was also shown :

Present—

| | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| Officers | ... | ... | ... | ... | 35 |
| N.C.O.'s and Drummers | ... | ... | ... | ... | 55 |
| Rank and file | ... | ... | ... | ... | 571 |
| Sick | ... | ... | ... | ... | 269 |
| | | | | | <hr/> |
| Total | ... | ... | ... | ... | 930 |

When the Tenth were making ready to quit Cairo and march to Rosetta, in the neighbourhood of Alexandria, a Vote of Thanks came from the two Houses of Parliament for services already rendered, by which, as the Vote ran, "the honour of the British nation had been so signally upheld, and additional lustre reflected on the British arms." The Houses then declared that they highly approved of the acknowledgment of the "zeal, discipline, and intrepidity uniformly displayed during the operations, so arduous and memorable, of the army in Egypt, by the non-commissioned and private soldiers and that the same be signified by the commanders of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their exemplary and gallant behaviour."

The work done by the Tenth and their comrades in their heroic march across the desert was not forgotten. Reference was made to Lord Wellesley's foresight and wisdom in sending the Army of India, under command of General Baird, on such an important service. It was realised how important that service was; that "if the French had succeeded in their project of obtaining and keeping possession of Egypt, their views would have been next directed to India, which might, to say the least, have put our territories in that part of the globe to some hazard, inconvenience, and danger."

Lord Nelson spoke in the House of Lords, and mentioned "the superior number of the French, compared with the whole of the British troops on every occasion throughout the campaign of Egypt," and spoke of it as matter highly redounding to their glory.

Major-General Baird communicated His Majesty's most gracious approval of the services of the army in Egypt in the "Morning General Orders," on August 28th, 1801. Following the Royal message, came other words :

"It becomes not troops from India, who, in every situation, have supported the national character of determined and disciplined valour, to envy the reputation which has followed the footsteps of the army of England, from the shores to the capital of Egypt ; but the Major-General is persuaded that they desire to emulate it.

"The war is not yet terminated, the enemy possess the only harbour and the strongest fortress in the country. Their services are required in the execution of their duty. He has no hesitation in declaring that under the guidance of that able officer, the Commander in-Chief, he has the fullest reliance on their supporting the character of British soldiers, by their gallantry, discipline, and strict attention to uniformity of system in all formation and field movements."

In the "Journal of the Secret Expedition" to Egypt, the following entry was made concerning the army in which the Tenth were serving at the time :

"This brave army, which, by its persevering spirit, had surmounted every difficulty that interrupted its progress, whose courage was ready to encounter any dangers that might present themselves, and whose discipline would have assured them victory, arrived too late in Egypt to prove the more active part of its character. The battle

of the twenty-first of March had been fought, while they were yet on their voyage from India."

It was not forgotten that the valour of the Tenth was unquestionable; nor was the fact lost sight of that they and their gallant comrades had endured in true soldierly spirit all the arduous service in the desert—the great heat of the weather, the difficulty of navigating the river, and the fatigue of traversing a roadless country. "Both men and officers have submitted to it with the greatest patience, and have manifested a zeal for the honour of his Majesty's arms which is above all panegyric. The conduct of the soldiers has been orderly and exemplary. A discipline has been observed which would have done honour to any troops."

The regiment had left Cossier with as little impedimenta as possible in view of the hard marches that were necessary in order to reach the Nile. The baggage of the Tenth remained on board the "Cavera," and when the march began, the transport set out for Suez, where she was to discharge her cargo. The voyage, however, was a disastrous one. The gale which had caused General Baird to put into Cossier, rather than attempt his passage to Suez, increased in such fury, that the "Cavera" foundered, taking down with her all the baggage of the regiment. It was a loss which entailed a great deal of discomfort on the officers and men, and much went down in the Red Sea which no money could replace.

The Tenth arrived at Rosetta too late to take part in the fighting which ended in the fall of Alexandria. That city, when they marched in, hot and dusty, had just surrendered. Major-General Eyre Coote had delivered his assault with such spirit that on Thursday, the 27th of August, General Menou sent an Aide-de-Camp to request an armistice for three days, in order to prepare for capitulation. This apparently led to no satisfactory arrangement, for at four

o'clock on the Sunday morning hostilities recommenced, and lasted till eight o'clock the same evening, when another flag of truce came in. Then firing ceased. On Wednesday, the 2nd of September, the terms of capitulation were finally agreed upon, and the articles signed.

With this capitulation Napoleon's dreams of Asiatic conquest, and of emulating Alexander the Great in pushing his interest right on to the Far East, came to an end, and Egypt had to be taken out of his ambitious programme.

Previous to the fall of Alexandria, General Hutchinson wrote to Lord Hobart a letter which will serve to show the nature of the service for which the Tenth were designated. Hutchinson was anticipating the removal of his army from Egypt, or at all events the greater part of it. Consequently he said, "My present intention is (in case of the fall of Alexandria) to leave five or six thousand men here, chiefly (or perhaps entirely) consisting of the troops under General Baird, who cannot, I believe, return to India for some months, as the Monsoon is unfavourable, and will continue to be so for a considerable period."

Hutchinson still designed to retain the Tenth in Egypt, even after the fall of Alexandria, when the French power in the country seemed completely broken. On September the 6th, his letter to Lord Hobart had special reference to the Army of India, to which the Tenth belonged.

"Major-General Baird arrived at Rosetta a few days ago with a great part of his troops. He cannot return to India till April. The leaving him here is not a thing of choice but of necessity. I have placed under his command the 22nd Light Dragoons, consisting of near 700 men, as Cavalry is absolutely necessary for this country."

The Tenth were thus left to all the unpleasant expectations of life in Egypt. The Commander-in-Chief was eager

to get away with his troops from perils which the Tenth were to face with what equanimity they could. Neither English nor French soldiers cared for the prospect of service in Egypt. General Sir Sidney Smith had, many months before, urged the dispatch of large reinforcements, so that the work to be accomplished might be got through quickly, "without the loss of their eyesight, which is the inevitable disease of this country." He had also spoken of other perils to the soldier, remarking that "the French are certainly more equal to undergoing fatigue, privations, exposure to sun and dews, and in short to the catalogue of evils which are familiar to everyone when they speak of the enemy's sufferings."

While the Tenth were left to these risks, they had something more terrible to anticipate—the Plague. With the finest readiness for duty, not a man in all the Tenth could have heard of the possibility with stoicism. The time when it could be looked for was approaching. Hutchinson had said so in a despatch, in which he urged the speedy removal of his troops to Malta. "It is absolutely necessary, as the season when the Plague makes its appearance is fast approaching. It sometimes begins to rage so early as the end of September. There can be no doubt of its being a disorder of the country. There is scarcely a year that persons do not die of it at Cairo, Alexandria, and Rosetta."

Such was the prospect for the Tenth, and others in that gallant little army that had faced the perils of the desert with such splendid courage. Unhappily, the anticipation of the Commander-in-Chief was realised, for as early as the 21st of September, he wrote: "I lament to add that the Plague has already made its appearance in General Baird's Corps, and that several men have already fallen a sacrifice to that dreadful distemper."

Yet the detention of a large force in Egypt was an absolute necessity. General Hutchinson was haunted by the fear of the return of a French army to the country where Napoleon's troops had met with so many disasters. He declared this fresh invasion of the country of the Nile to be a thing to be dreaded, but at the same time extremely difficult to be guarded against. He went on to say in a secret despatch to the Home Government: "There is one thing certain, that there is a prodigious antipathy in the minds of all the French soldiers to anything that relates to Egypt, and the most rooted aversion to the country."

This was absolutely true. Men were shipped to Egypt from France under false pretences. They had such a horror of the disabilities and disease that were to be found in the country, that patriotism could not overcome the aversion. They began to desert in scores until they were told that their destination was San Domingo. Hutchinson did not believe this report as to San Domingo, and therefore anticipating that the Army of France was to land in Egypt afresh, he provided for the stay of Baird's Corps and some other troops, after the departure of the soldiers who had fought under Abercromby and himself.

Hutchinson's departure left behind him some amount of discontent. When Baird came to Rosetta he found the Commander-in-Chief short of money. There was scarcely £10,000 in the hands of the Commissary-General. The subsistence of the army which was in Egypt before the Tenth arrived was already five months in arrear, and now there was the force from India claiming their pay. Hutchinson and Baird were alike irritated by the mismanagement of the authorities at home. In the previous October Abercromby had shown conclusively that he would require at the least a quarter of a million of money for the troops he already had, to say nothing of any that Wellesley

contemplated sending from India. But no money came, and the Government at home, while sending out numerous orders, did not even deign an answer to his reasonable request for the pay of the Officers and men. What did it avail, the men asked, angrily, to get letters declaring that his Majesty thought highly of their meritorious conduct, their discipline, and their courage?

A difficulty arose concerning the Tenth and those other regiments which were under Baird's command. Hutchinson proposed to leave 6,000 men in Egypt, exclusive of those who were in the Army of India, and to give the command to Major-General Lord Cavan, so incorporating the two armies that they should be blended as one. General Baird's name was not mentioned among those General Officers who were ordered to remain in Egypt, and altogether his position was a most uncomfortable one. He was an officer of high standing, holding the chief command of the army from India, whose regulations and internal economy so greatly differed from those of the Army of England; yet his name was quietly passed by, as though he had been in Madras, and under Lord Wellesley's control, with no standing whatever in Egypt.

Baird made his protest, pointing out the difficulties that any officer unaccustomed to Indian native troops would encounter in dealing with them.

The suggestion was made that Baird was displeased at being superseded—compelled to take a subordinate place in an army of which he had had supreme command, with the possibility of his services being dispensed with altogether. He insisted, however, again, that he contended for careful reconsideration of the scheme solely because he believed the proposal to blend the two armies to be impolitic, unnecessary, and likely to lead to embarrassment and confusion.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

CAMPAIGN HONOURS.

1801. GENERAL Baird had discharged his conscience, but his protest and contentions seem to have been treated with something very much like contempt. No letter appears to have been sent to him, but on the 6th of November, 1801, the following General Orders were issued from the Adjutant-General's office at Alexandria :—

Major-General Baird, together with the troops under his immediate command, are henceforth to be considered as forming part of the Army under the command of Major-General the Earl of Cavan.

The Orders on the following day ran thus :—

“Major-General Baird will take the Command of such Troops as are or may be posted on the West side of the Nile, from its mouth, near Fort St. Julian to Giza, and Cairo on the opposite side, including the Camps near Rosetta, and Etko, reporting to Head Quarters.”

These Orders fix the quarters of the Tenth. Some of the men were affected by the General Orders issued at Alexandria on the 15th November :—

“Major-General Baird's Command will extend to, and comprehend the Eastern side of the Black House Ferry, and the Detachment of the 22nd Light Dragoons, now stationed there, will be relieved on Thursday morning next by one consisting of a Subaltern Officer, Serjeant, and twenty Rank and File from the 10th Infantry, under the Orders of Major-General Baird.”

The Tenth remained under the command of Baird, and continued so, as the following Orders indicate, since none were disturbed for a while who had come to Egypt from India.

“Head Quarters. Camp near El Hamed.

“16th Nov^r., 1801.

“GENERAL ORDERS BY MAJOR-GENERAL
BAIRD.

“The General Staff Appointments, formerly made by Major-General Baird, while in the distinct and chief command of the Army from India, having been submitted for His Majesty’s Gracious confirmation, as well as the approbation of His Excellency, the Marquis Wellesley, the Governor-General, they are not to be considered to be done away with until His Majesty’s pleasure is known, although the Officers holding them may have been nominated to other situations.”

While Cavan and Baird were honestly doing their best to see eye to eye in this difficult matter, they were not of one mind with regard to the attitude to be observed towards the Turks, and consequently the Tenth stood at any time likely for war. Baird thought it best to bring matters to an issue; Cavan said that he did not think himself justified in going to war with the Turks. Yet he felt justified in preventing communications with them by keeping them at a distance. Baird took up this position: Suppose orders came from England, sending the army of India home at once; his men would have to go by way of the Red Sea. “We can only march through this country as friends or enemies of the Turks. If enemies, we must of necessity form an alliance with the Mamelukes for mutual support, or we must embark for England.”

Here, therefore, was one difficult point affecting the position of the Tenth. There was, moreover, always the possibility of the return of an army from France to retrieve the disgrace which had come to the French arms by the "incredible mismanagement of the French Commander-in-Chief," to quote Fortescue. What, asked Baird, if the French returned, and the Turks, unfriendly, joined them?

Peace, however, was expected in the midst of this uncertainty, and then the idea held the men of the Tenth that they would shortly return to India. Baird discussed the route with his staff. Would it be by way of Cossier—a march of 700 miles, which Baird declared would take not less than three months? He quite believed that the route by Suez would be impracticable. The prospect of another desert march—longer and more terrible than the first—dismayed the Tenth. Yet Baird began his preparations for it, hoping to get away in time to escape the Plague Season. He was the more anxious because he had already lost a number of his men by the ravages of the dreaded pestilence.

Unexpectedly came the orders for the return of the army to India. It was decided that the Indian troops should return there by way of Suez, and Baird, removing his men by contingents, since the Turks were not likely now to molest them, left Alexandria with the last contingent on the 4th of May, 1802.

The Tenth and other European troops from India remained in Egypt, but they ultimately quitted the country with a suddenness which was almost suggestive of panic. The plague did what no French army could have done. It appears that a Turkish vessel came into port, concealing the fact that some of her crew lay prostrate with this awful scourge. By entering Alexandria thus, the captain was guilty of criminal conduct, and had come

in, in open violation of the law, which excluded any ship that had the plague on board. In this particular case the circumstances were unusually aggravating. Major-General Stuart, who was in command in the city, asked for the necessary powers to enforce the full penalty, and these having been granted, he destroyed the ship and its cargo by fire.

These stringent measures, however, did not prevent the coming of the dreaded visitant. All precautions failed to diminish the fury of its ravages, and so terrible were these in the end, that it was decided to embark the troops without delay. The embarkation began on the 3rd of March, 1803. By the 10th, the whole of the 1803. troops were on board. The Tenth sailed out of the Western Harbour on the 7th, Malta being their destination.

So serious was the position that there was no delay for taking on board anything beyond the soldiers who had been garrisoning the country. General Stuart said in his letter, explaining the urgency, to Lord Hobart:—

“As I have no positive orders for the removal of Military Stores taken from the French, or for the dismantling of any of the works, I have confirmed all the former transfers made by the Earl of Cavan. A few pieces of field ordnance only have been embarked. The horses, mules, camels, Commissary Stores, and other effects of the army, I have delivered over on receipts. For I could obtain specie for nothing. The public tents were so worn, and the danger of infection from them seemed so great, that they were left as altogether unserviceable.”

It was in this manner that the Tenth came away from Egypt. For some time they had been stationed in El Hamed, but on the 4th of December, in 1801, they had

been ordered to go to Alexandria. On the 5th of that month they were quartered outside the famous city, and remained there until the 18th of the month. That day they were sent to Fort Triangular. They had not been there a fortnight before the fort was damaged by an explosion, which killed four men of the Tenth and two Indian soldiers. Ten men of the Tenth, and as many Indians, were also more or less seriously injured by the catastrophe. The regiment was removed to a camp outside the walls of Alexandria, and remained there until General Stuart determined to carry away his army out of the reach of the plague.

Until the 1st of May, the regiment remained on the Indian Establishment, but on that day, while Baird was getting his army across to Suez, *en route* for India, the Tenth were transferred to the British Establishment, English pay counting from that date.

The services of the Army in Egypt were recognised in a letter of thanks, which was written by the Speaker of the House of Commons, and ran as follows:—

“Palace Yard,

“Nov. 14, 1801.

“Sir,

“In obedience to the orders of the House of Commons, I have the honour of transmitting to you their Vote of Thanks to you and to the Officers under your Command, for your Services in Egypt, and their high approbation and acknowledgement of the zeal, discipline, and intrepidity of the Army under your Command. You will signify to the Officers this testimony of the gratitude of their Country, and you will desire the Commanders of the several Corps to thank the Non-Commissioned Officers and Private

Soldiers according to the terms of the resolutions of the House."

This letter was addressed to General Hutchinson.

Again the Army was referred to in eulogistic terms in a letter from Downing Street, dated January the 16th, 1802, when Hutchinson was informed that a peerage was conferred on him. "The well-earned fame of yourself and of the gallant Army under your Command, whose Courage, Discipline, and exemplary Perseverance have drawn upon them the warm Applause of their Sovereign, and the lasting gratitude of their Country," were the terms used in this communication.

A message like this was welcome to the men who had been maintaining the honour of their country under such trying conditions and against such odds. What the Tenth valued most, perhaps, was that which they were made aware of in a letter which came from London some time later.

London, 15th July, 1802.

Sir,

We have the honour to send you herewith a copy of a letter from the Adjutant-General to Lieutenant-General the Honourable Henry Edward Fox, communicating the permission granted by His Majesty to the several Regiments who served in Egypt to assume and wear in their Colours a Badge as a distinguished mark of His Royal approbation.

We have, &c.,

Cox, Greenwood, & Cox.

Officer Commanding
10th Foot,
Alexandria.

The letter to which reference was made ran as follows:

Horse Guards,

July 6th, 1802.

CIRCULAR.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you that His Majesty has been graciously pleased to grant permission to the several regiments of His Army which served during the late campaign in Egypt, to assume and wear in their Colours a Badge as a distinguished mark of His Majesty's Royal approbation, and as a lasting Memorial of the glory acquired by His Majesty's Arms, by the Zeal, Discipline, and Intrepidity of His Majesty's Troops in the arduous and important campaign.

His Royal Highness, the Commander-in-Chief, has directed me to make this communication to you in order that the 10th Regiment of Foot, under your command, may avail itself of the honour hereby conferred by His Majesty, and I am commanded at the same time to apprise you that a pattern of the Badge approved by His Majesty is lodged at the Office of the Comptrollers of Army Accounts there to be had recourse to as circumstances may require.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most Obedient and

Lt.-Genl.

humble Servant,

The Honble. H. E. Fox

HARRY CALVERT,

&c., &c.,

Adjutant-General.

Colonel H.M.'s 10th Infantry.

The Badges, etc., which became the mark of distinction for the Tenth are thus described in the "Dress

Regulations," and may very well find a place in this portion of the Regiment's history:—

Buttons: The Sphinx over the word "Egypt."

Around, a circle, bearing the regimental title, enclosed within a laurel wreath, and surmounted by a crown.

Tunic Collars: The Sphinx over "Egypt," on a bright blue velvet ground, forming the centre of a gilt eight-pointed star, with the regimental title in the circle.

Helmet-plates: The Sphinx over "Egypt," on black velvet, forming the centre of the regulation gilt star and wreath.

Waist-plates: The Sphinx over "Egypt" in silver on dead gold, with the regimental title on the circle.

Forage Caps: The Sphinx over "Egypt," on a bright blue velvet raised ground, forming the centre of a silver eight-pointed star, the circle of which is gilt, and bears the regimental title.*

After the crushing blows dealt against the "Invincible" Army of France in Egypt, a medal was granted on July 31st, 1802. Apparently this was only given to those who came over from India with General Baird, and the contingent which joined him in the Red Sea from the Cape of Good Hope. Carter's description of this medal which, presumably, the Tenth received, runs thus: "Obverse, a Sepoy holding a Union Jack in his right hand, in rear a camp, with an inscription in Persian: 'This medal has been presented in commemoration of the defeat of the French armies in the Kingdom of Egypt, by the bravery and ability of the victorious army of

* The Regulations here quoted are those of a hundred years later than the period dealt with.

England.' Reverse, a ship in full sail, with the Union Jack flying, pyramids and obelisk in the background."

The distribution of medals for services rendered at the seat of war was not generous on the part of the British Government in those days. The coveted honour was denied, whether in a spirit of economy, or of indifference, none could say; but there was much complaining in consequence. Carter shows in his work that "during the reign of Charles the First, and the period of the Commonwealth, the humblest soldier was eligible for a medal, and that for Waterloo is the first since that time which has been conferred by the Crown on both Officers and soldiers." The failure to grant a medal led to much and reasonable criticism, and the Government had no reason to complain when Major Mackie wrote a smart poem which he entitled "Britannia Ingrata." The newspapers of the day opened their columns to soldiers who aired their grievances in this matter, and among the letters written was one which contained this sentence: "It is very vexatious to honourable feelings, when we go into society at home or abroad, to meet foreigners of all nations covered with medals and orders, when we, who have had the pleasure of licking them in every part of the world, have neither orders nor medals."

The Sultan recognised the splendid services of the British Army in Egypt, and the following statement appeared:—

"The distinguished services of the British Army in Egypt, under Abercromby and Hutchinson, and also the valuable assistance rendered by Lord Keith and the Royal Navy under his command, have induced the Sublime Porte to extend this Order"—the Ottoman Order of the Crescent—"much beyond the bounds of its

original institution. It now consists of several grades; has been successively conferred on the Commander-in-Chief and superior Officers, and others, naval and military; in all about eight hundred British officers received it who served in the Egyptian campaign of 1801."

It was a beautiful medal, of large size for General and Field Officers, and of gold, while smaller gold medals of the same pattern were distributed among the captains and subalterns, and were worn with a dark orange-coloured ribbon. The officers of the Tenth were among the recipients, but there was nothing for the non-commissioned officers and the rank and file. The description runs thus:—"Obverse: A crescent and star of eight points, surrounded by an ornamental border. Reverse: the Sultan's cypher, under which is the year 1801. The border is the same on both sides. The ribbon is dark orange, with a gold hook and chain."*

* Tancred: "Historical Record of Medals."

SICILIAN AND SPANISH SERVICE.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

AT GIBRALTAR.

1803. THE Tenth, on leaving Egypt, sailed to Malta, where they entered on garrison duty. In face of the conditions named in the Peace of Amiens, this was a somewhat remarkable movement on the part of the British Government, since, by the Preliminary Treaty, it was stipulated that "Malta should be evacuated by the troops of his Britannic Majesty, and restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem." But who were the Knights of Malta? was a question raised, when all was settled and the Peace was signed. They were in truth a nullity. "The guarantee was to be given for a scattered and bankrupt body, with a traitor as their nominal head, who had betrayed the island to the French." This much is certain, that the island was neither given up to the Knights nor to anyone else, but continued to be garrisoned by English troops. The Tenth, with others, formed the garrison. During their stay in Malta, Bonaparte demanded the fulfilment of the Treaty, while England's response was: "We bound ourselves to surrender it to a known Order, clothed with certain powers, and capable of exerting themselves in consequence of certain revenues. We found no such Order. The men, indeed, and the name we found." In reality, England, having discovered the value of Malta as the key of the Mediterranean, determined

not to part with it, lest France might seize it, and hold the passage to the Far East.

While the diplomatists were busy, the Tenth and their companions were detained in quarantine outside Malta, lest by landing they should introduce the plague into the island. At the end of this wearisome waiting for six long weeks, they were permitted to go on garrison duty. On landing they joined the troops already there in their task of making Malta as strong in its defences as possible; and the orders to "sit tight," which came from home, were obeyed to the letter. England's determination not to evacuate the island brought the peace, which had lasted but one year and six weeks, to an end. On the 18th of May, 1803, war was declared. There was at once an instant necessity for strengthening the garrison at Gibraltar, and the Tenth were selected for this purpose. They arrived at the great stronghold on the 20th of June, and remained there throughout 1803 and the two following years.

Gibraltar was important as the chief base of the British forces in the great inland sea, and with Nelson in command of the fleet of the Mediterranean, it was required by him that Gibraltar should be held strongly and not fail him in his arduous task. Although there was little fighting, those who occupied the fortress were surrounded by danger, and under constant readiness for a call. If in any way Nelson failed—an event not to dreamed of—there might well come to the garrison some of the fiercest fighting that had ever been known in the history of Gibraltar. Hence, while scarcely a shot was fired throughout the long stay of the Tenth on the Rock, there was rarely, if ever, a moment when the men could venture to slacken in their watch.

During the time the regiment were on duty in the fortress, discussion took place as to the measures that should be taken for the defence of the bay. During the previous war

the Spanish gun-boats had done a great amount of damage, and by their frequent raids had succeeded in crippling many frigates that were anchored there, and in doing much towards destroying the trade of the town. The suggestion was made to convert the soldiers of the garrison into boatmen, to co-operate with the Navy whenever necessity might arise. It was pointed out, by some who took part in the discussions, that there was a military establishment of boats at Halifax in North America, and that the garrison had rendered very useful service. The proposal was eventually adopted, and accordingly the men of the Tenth entered on this new and somewhat novel duty.

While the Tenth were at Gibraltar, a pestilential disease raged in the town, and among the garrison. The loss of life was considerable, and the disease for a long time baffled the skill of the medical men. It has been described as similar to that which had wrought such dreadful havoc with the Tenth when they were in the West Indies—the Bulam fever as it was called. It was imported from the coast of Africa to the island of Grenada in the year 1793, and the story of its ravages has been told in the chapters which dealt with the Tenth's experiences in the West Indies.

The doctors in Gibraltar—army and civilian—were not acquainted with the disease, and as, in their ignorance, they declared that it was not contagious, no active steps were taken to prevent its spread. The nature of the disease was sufficient to fill the minds of the soldiers and civilians with terror; for, while it was raging in Malaga, no less than 17,000 persons had succumbed to it, and as many as 100,000 were reported to have died in the various towns and villages of Spain.

There was panic among the townspeople, but one statement is noticeable in a despatch which was forwarded to



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[From a print in Windsor Castle.

LIEUT.-GENERAL THE RIGHT HON. SIR THOMAS MAITLAND, G.C.B., G.C.H.,
COLONEL OF THE TENTH, 1810—1824.

the Home Government: "I must at the same time say that the British regiments in general, particularly the commanding officers of regiments, and officers, have shown the most manly example of attending to their sick, both comrades and men, and never forsaking them, though in the most desperate situation, which I really believe was one great cause of the mortality among the troops being less than among the inhabitants."

But in the midst of it all there was the old story to tell—of inadequate care for the men's welfare on the part of the Government. The Commanding Officer in Gibraltar wrote home in these terms: "I must beg leave again to repeat to your Royal Highness* that there is scarcely camp equipage left in the garrison for 500 men, and as I look upon it as a certainty that the whole of garrison will be obliged to be encamped during the next summer, I feel it my duty again to state the necessity of a supply being sent out."

When one reads the list of the dead, one realises how great were the ravages of this fearful disease among the garrison. The Tenth were encamped on the Grand Parade, near the town, the other troops being quartered in the south part of the Rock, and partly encamped on Windmill Hill. But the pestilence in no sense favoured the troops in either place. One who was visiting Gibraltar at the time had this in his journal concerning the Tenth: "On the 1st of October an officer of the regiment was taken ill, and died on the third day. On the 6th of October two other officers shared the same fate. By the 13th of October seven officers of the regiment had died. The whole number of officers originally present with the regiment was sixteen. Two only of those who had been seized with the fever recovered." Fortunately for the Tenth, they escaped with slight losses compared with other regiments, but their death-roll for four

months had twenty-eight names upon it. That was small against the loss of 196 men in the Royal Artillery, and of 123 in the 13th Foot. The Tenth, after that return was made, had an ominous sick-list, and many of the men succumbed.

While the Tenth were in Gibraltar, a remarkable attempt was made by a person from Algeciras to surprise the garrison. Early one morning in March, 1805, just before two o'clock, a boat was observed by the sentry, coming from a spot towards Catalan Bay, and keeping close in shore. Its approach aroused the soldier's suspicions, and he raised an alarm. The guard was out at once, but while the officer was listening to the sentry's story, he and his soldiers were surprised by the sudden appearance of a number of men, estimated at from 120 to 200, all armed. Some of the guard escaped, since it was impossible to contend with such an overwhelming force, but the officer and a few of the men were overpowered, and carried away as prisoners. Among these prisoners was a man of the Tenth.

The story told by all who were engaged in this strange incident agrees in this—that the men who sprang out on the guard were without muskets, but each man was armed with a pike and a stiletto, and wore the dress of a galley-slave. The prisoners and such plunder as could be quickly obtained were hurried through the lines to the Orange. Their story, which was told later, was to the effect that they were carried to a guard-room in the Spanish camp. If what the lieutenant said were true, and the Spaniards were in the plot, the position was doubly serious. In the course of the morning the prisoners were sent back, excepting the man of the Tenth, who was so badly wounded in the fight before his capture that he could not with safety be removed. The lieutenant brought with him a letter from General Certaros,

declaring that he was in no way concerned in the transaction, and expressing his horror of such a proceeding.

The incident was grave because of its possible consequences. No one could doubt that Spain was under Napoleon's power, and there were many things to arouse suspicion of her unfriendliness towards England in spite of pretensions of friendship. It was supposed that permission had been given for Napoleon's troops to pass through Spain to the fleets at Ferrol and Toulon; but as yet we were at peace; that is to say, there was not as yet any formal declaration of war. In such a case as this raid on Gibraltar, one conceives the possibility of an exchange of shots between the garrison and the Spanish camp, and the deplorable consequences that might arise therefrom when Europe was as it were a huge powder-magazine, only wanting a spark, and then catastrophe.

It transpired that an adventurer—a man with plausible manners and fine address, who had been in the garrison some two or three years before—went to some of the galley-slaves and convicts, and having knocked off their irons, armed them with pikes and stilettos. Whether this was connived at by those who had charge of the convicts is not known, but the fact remained that this man found opportunity to do so much, and to distribute among the liberated galley slaves not only arms, but an increased ration. He promised liberty to every man who would accompany him that night to attack the English. There were no Spanish officers with this marauding force, nor were there any regular soldiers; consequently the complicity of the Spanish Government in these remarkable proceedings could not be traced. The disclaimer of General Certaros being forthcoming, an outbreak of hostilities was for the time being avoided.

War with Spain was, however, inevitable. Napoleon,

who held the Spaniards at his beck and call, was waiting for the opportunity once more to plunge Europe into war. The opportunity was almost immediate. He determined to exclude Great Britain from the Mediterranean, and to make of that sea "a great French lake, by the seizure of Corfu, the Morea, Egypt and Malta." He required the assistance of Spain's fleet, and at the moment when he saw fit to demand that aid, Spain declared war against England. In view of what followed, one may reasonably consider the incident in Gibraltar as an attempt to surprise the place, and gain possession of the entrance to the sea. Spain was subservient to Bonaparte under compulsion, for if Russia and Prussia had resisted France, she herself would have defied the demands of Napoleon. She was forced to repair his warships in her port of Ferrol, and in lieu of a subsidy to him, to provide from 25 to 30 sail of the line. Unable to help herself, she declared war.

Gibraltar from that moment was in constant peril both on the sea and land sides, and the Tenth, whether they saw fighting or not, were always alert for grave possibilities. The monotony of garrison life was relieved by the occasional arrival of the fleet, when Nelson was looking for the ships of the enemy, or calling for news at the rock. It was the business of the troops at Gibraltar, not only to hold the great fortress against all comers, but to report the movements of the hostile fleet; consequently at odd times Nelson, or some of his scouting frigates, put into Gibraltar to make inquiries, and, if possible, to obtain supplies.

While the Tenth were at Gibraltar they were joined by a detachment of the 2nd Battalion, which had been added to the establishment during the previous year, with headquarters at Maldon in Essex. Of the formation of this battalion more will be said in a later chapter. The detachment did duty with the 1st Battalion for the year

which ended on December 24th, 1805. The commissioned officers who were with the new arrivals were Captains Thomas Dent, Edward Massey, and Benjamin Keene. In the following month Captain Hutcheon joined the detachment.

Nelson's remarkable chase of the allied fleets, and the destruction of the enemy at Trafalgar, kept away all assailants from the fortress; and once more life for the Tenth in Gibraltar resolved itself into tedious garrison duty, with little prospect of any fighting to relieve the monotony. The men, however, were always under arms, none knowing "what strange determination might be arrived at by Napoleon."

NOTE.—Just before the Tenth arrived at Gibraltar, a General Order was issued concerning the distribution of Prize Money, and as the regiment had a claim upon such as was available for distribution, the *Table of Shares* was perused with some interest:—

| | Shares. |
|---|---------|
| Privates, Drummers, Trumpeters | 1 |
| Corporals | 1½ |
| Serjeants | 5 |
| Staff-Serjeants | 8 |
| Quartermaster of Dragoons | 12 |
| Second Lieutenants, Cornets, Ensigns, and Quartermasters of Horse having commissions | 16 |
| Lieutenants | 20 |
| Captains | 50 |
| Majors | 80 |
| Lieutenant-Colonels | 100 |
| Colonels | 150 |
| Brigadiers | 300 |

| | Shares. |
|----------------------------|---------|
| Major-Generals | 450 |
| Lieutenant-Generals | 800 |
| Generals | 1200 |
| Field Marshals | 2000 |

This table of Shares was not concerned with recent campaigns, which were defined, but with Prize Money that would have to be dealt with in future.

CHAPTER XXXV.

IN SICILY.

1807. THE Tenth terminated their stay at Gibraltar on the 6th of September, 1807, when they embarked for Messina, a Sicilian city in close proximity to the Italian mainland. When the transports arrived in the harbour, the Tenth were not allowed to go on shore, orders being received by the Commanding Officer to proceed at once to Augusta. Augusta was a fortified seaport on the eastern side of Sicily, about nineteen miles north of Syracuse. The town itself was on an island, but connected with the mainland by a bridge. The Tenth arrived at this important fortress on the 2nd of October.

The explanation as to the Tenth having been sent forward to Augusta is found in a despatch from General Sir John Moore, who wrote as follows: "I have recommended to General Sherbrooke to place a garrison of about 1,200 men at Syracuse, about 1,000 at Augusta, and keeping a strong garrison with himself at Messina, to station whatever is disposable at Milazzo. It is a misfortune to have so many fortresses, but as they exist it would be dangerous not to occupy them."

The presence of the Tenth on the island was due to the action of Napoleon towards the kingdom of Naples. Overburdened in 1805 with the many complications in Europe, the Emperor listened to a proposal from the King of Naples, to the effect that if the French troops were withdrawn from the Neapolitan territories, Naples would observe an absolute neutrality, and would not admit into

the kingdom any forces, naval or military, that were at war with France. Napoleon, anxious to concentrate his army in order to pursue his plans in other parts of Europe, agreed at once, and St. Cyr and his army were ordered to join Masséna on the Adige.

For some time the neutrality was strictly observed, but in November, 1805, the Neapolitan King offered no opposition to the landing of an English and Russian force in Naples, nor did he remonstrate in any way. These foreign troops did not remain many days in Naples, the Russian commander leaving with his troops for Corfu, possibly at the King's request, Sir James Craig, who commanded the English, doing the same and returning to Sicily. Napoleon, who was in Vienna when the news of this breach of the treaty of neutrality reached him, retorted angrily, without so much as asking for an explanation, by a proclamation in the following terms:—

“The Neapolitan dynasty has ceased to reign. Its existence is incompatible with the tranquility of Europe, and the honour of my crown. Soldiers, march! throw into the waves, if they wait for you, the weak battalions of the tyrant of the seas.”

One wonders what would have been the outcome of the conflict if Napoleon had been at the head of his troops, but he entrusted the army that was to advance into Southern Italy to his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, who was accompanied by Masséna. Joseph was on the Neapolitan frontier on the 9th of February, 1806—at Ferentino. There was no Neapolitan army to oppose his progress; and consequently he entered the city of Naples six days later, the garrison capitulating at his summons. The Royal Family had gone, crossing over to Sicily, and taking refuge in Palermo, where the British squadron, under Sir Sidney Smith, was lying, while Sir John Stuart

was in command of the British forces. With the King and Queen came a portion of the Neapolitan army, but the Duke of Calabria—heir-apparent—was with the remainder of the troops in Calabria. The young duke sought to offer a vigorous resistance, but the Neapolitans displayed a spirit so little short of craven, that he had no alternative but to fall back, and suffer the French to overrun the kingdom. The enemy had everything in their favour. The King had forfeited the confidence and loyalty of his subjects, so that on the approach of Joseph Bonaparte the leading families, who might have been expected to assist the sovereign, offered allegiance to the brother of the French Emperor, and Joseph was crowned King of Naples, with the proviso that the crowns of Naples and of France should never be worn by the same person. The nobility of Naples, indeed, welcomed the new sovereign, and readily took the oath of fidelity.

It is said that the dethroned King was a cypher; but the Duke of Calabria and the Queen were not prepared to surrender their powers without a struggle. They could not oppose the French with an army, but their emissaries excited the people of Calabria and Abruzzo to insurrection, and added, in consequence, very considerably to King Joseph's difficulties. So serious was the character of the insurrection that for a time the French lost all control in these provinces, and the *de jure* King of Naples was again proclaimed.

At this juncture the British forces moved to the assistance of the Royal Family, and Admiral Sidney Smith, taking possession of Capri, moved with his ships along the shores of Calabria, encouraging the loyalists. At the same time, Sir John Stuart threw an army of 4,800 men on the mainland, disembarking them in the Gulf of Euphemia, near the northern frontier of Lower Calabria. It was a

direct challenge to General Regnier, whose army was at Maida. Napoleon had told his soldiers in his proclamation that they would, if the English dared to wait for them, throw the weak battalions of the tyrant of the seas into the waves, and Regnier interpreted Stuart's landing as a challenge to make the attempt. Stuart advanced into the interior to meet Regnier, who had just written to Joseph Bonaparte in these terms: "I wished to march immediately on the English to throw them into the sea." Stuart met him at Maida on July 4, fought the French, and drove them back at the point of the bayonet. The consequences of the battle of Maida were disconcerting to France. The Calabrians rose everywhere. Stuart marched his victorious army first to Reggio, and captured it; then to Cortone and other towns; and in a short time had taken forty cannon and an immense quantity of stores which Napoleon had sent to the South, thinking to capture Sicily by a *coup de main*.

Without reinforcements, however, Stuart felt that it was impossible to hold Calabria in face of the constant arrival of French soldiers from the north. He therefore returned to Sicily to secure the safety of that island.

The despatch which drew the Tenth away from Gibraltar was one which apprised the British Government of the critical state of affairs in Sicily, and compelled them to be active if they desired to prevent disaster. "The French as yet make no movement towards us. In Calabria their troops are very unhealthy. It is reported that Marshal Lannes is expected at Naples with 40,000 men, and that a corps which has entered Leghorn is destined against Sardinia." It was all in keeping with the reliable statement that Napoleon was determined to crush Naples at any cost. He wrote to Joseph on the need of keeping a firm hand and punishing Calabrian

rebels, and in one letter said, "shoot three men in every village." Then he went on to write about the conquest of Sicily. Unless he could acquire that island, he could never hope to gain the control of the Mediterranean—"the constant aim of my policy." Only when that great sea had become a French lake could he expect to plant himself in Albania, Thessaly, Greece, Crete, Egypt and Syria."

1808. When the Tenth arrived at Augusta there appears to have followed a somewhat prolonged period of tedious inactivity. Nothing seems to have transpired to break the monotony but the arrival from England on the 5th of April, 1808, of Major J. Otto Beyer, five lieutenants, one ensign, six serjeants, and three hundred and sixty-two rank and file. Their coming, which was welcome in so far as the newly-arrived men brought news from home, was due to the still more serious position which affairs had assumed in Sicily. When Sir John Moore withdrew a considerable British force from the island for service in the Spanish Peninsula, the French instantly realised the weakening of the army, which was left under the command of Stuart. Stuart accordingly wrote home to say that the enemy availed themselves of the opportunity to renew their operations in Calabria, where they had been somewhat quieter of late, and to re-establish themselves in all their former positions upon the coast opposite the Faro, now known as the straits of Messina. "In consequence of this," said the English general, "the navigation of that passage is becoming impracticable even to our men of war." There was much dismay and doubt in the minds of the Sicilians when they discovered this, but the arrival of strong reinforcements for the Tenth and other regiments restored their confidence.

According to an entry found in an old book in the Orderly Room of the regiment, the two flank companies were at this time ordered to be completed to one hundred rank and file each, and to join the composite flank battalion on the island. In the same book is another entry to the effect that in June four companies of the Tenth were sent to reinforce the garrison of Syracuse. They were, however, recalled to Augusta in the month of August, but were sent back again to Syracuse in October, and remained there until the following March.

1809. Watching the course of events in Naples, Stuart was constantly on the alert, and the Tenth were maintained in a state of readiness for any emergency. The French had crushed the insurgents, so that Joseph Bonaparte was in reality King once more. Then came an unexpected change in Naples, at the instance of the Emperor. He sent Joseph to Spain, causing him to be crowned King of that country, and gave the Neapolitan crown to his brother-in-law, Marshal Murat. Stuart's letters to the Government at home at this period showed that the English commander was frequently sending troops across to Italy, and that in the Kingdom of Naples a large mass of the population appeared to be ripe for revolt if there were any promise of British support. To be ready for contingencies Stuart collected, on the side of the island where Milazzo lay, as many of his British troops as he could dare to take from his over-numerous fortresses, and he stated that in the spring he hoped to have an army of not less than 9,000 men concentrated at that spot. The Tenth were called away from Augusta, together with their detachments which had wintered in Syracuse, to join this army.

They first marched to Catania, near to the foot of Etna. The soldiers were charmed with the place when

they halted there a while. Its lava-paved streets, its mansions built of lava and ornamented with marble, the beauties of the neighbourhood, and the tokens of wealth which displayed themselves on every hand—to spend some time in such a city was a delightful change to men who had wearied of Augusta. Ten days after their arrival the Tenth went on their way to Milazzo, the port from whence they expected to embark for some secret expedition. It was the 9th of April when they marched into the camp on the plain outside the town, where Stuart had awaited their arrival. Later, some foreign troops came in, and Stuart found himself in command of 10,000 well-appointed soldiers. He complained, however, of his deficiency in cavalry.

His intention was to create a diversion in favour of the Austrians, who had been badly beaten in Bavaria. Their many serious and heavy reverses seemed to point to their ultimate ruin, and this movement on Stuart's part was the only way of rendering them assistance. In his despatch the General says: "I have formed the resolution of sailing with the whole of the British force now embarked at this place, together with that portion of the troops of this kingdom which his Sicilian Majesty has been pleased to place under my orders." He then set forth his plan for the information of the Home Government.

"The island of Ischia, which is of some extent, will afford a first position of rest and refreshment to the troops, and our perfect command, as well as great facility, of naval means will afford us an opportunity of making such further movements from that point (according to circumstance as information may invite) as cannot fail to produce a material impression not only upon the Kingdom of Naples in particular, but upon Italy in its whole extent."

Stuart drew up his plans with the knowledge that if he landed at certain points on the coast of Italy, he would march through a country occupied by a large, tumultuous and disaffected population, ready to rise against the new and unwelcome King, Murat. But it was essential that he should score a success at Ischia; otherwise, even with the large army at his disposal, the Neapolitans might fail him, if they did not turn against him.

General Stuart was careful not to denude Sicily of troops, great as his need was of every soldier he could find. The defence of the island was left to six battalions of British troops, and to such troops as his Sicilian Majesty had at his disposal. The task was a great one, alike for those who accompanied Stuart, and for those who were left behind. In either case the force—in consideration of the magnitude of the work—was inadequate, and any failure on the part of the commander would mean disaster.

Attached to the Return made by Stuart as to the strength of the army destined for Italy is a note which shows that 600 men of the Tenth and 504 Chasseurs Britanniques, originally intended for service in Italy, were directed to remain at Milazzo. This note was dated June 9, 1809.

A return was made two days later—June 11—which showed the state of Stuart's army when the expedition set sail.

| | | | | R. & F. Horses. | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----|---------------------|-----|-----------------|---|-----|-----------------------|--|
| Advance Corps & Brigade. | { | Cavalry and Mounted | } | 284 | { | 343 | Brig.-Gen. Lumley. | |
| | | Infantry | | | | | | |
| | | 1st Light Infantry | ... | 918 | { | ... | { | Commanding Advance—M. G. Macfarlane. |
| | | 81st Regiment | ... | 656 | | | | |
| | | 2nd Light Infantry | ... | 362 | | | | |
| | | Corsican Rangers... | ... | 442 | | | | |
| Calabrian Free Corps | ... | 416 | { | ... | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | { | | | | |
| | | | | { | | | | |
| | | | | { | | | | |
| | | | | { | | | | |

| | | | | R. & F. | |
|---------------------|---|----------------------------|-----|---------|--------------------|
| Reserve Brigade. | { | Grenadier Battalion | ... | 906 | Brig.-Gen. Oswald, |
| | | 1st Battalion 27th Regt. | ... | 672 | |
| | | 44th Regt., 6 Companies... | | 616 | |

LINE.

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|---|---------------------------|-----|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 1st Brigade. | { | 10th Regiment | ... | 600 | Lt.-Col. Smith, 2/27th Regiment. |
| | | 2nd Battalion, 27th Regt. | | 581 | |
| 2nd Brigade. | { | 58th Regiment | ... | 639 | Col. Airey. |
| | | 62nd Regiment | ... | 583 | |
| 3rd Brigade. | { | 3rd King's German Legn. | | 689 | Col. Kinuber. |
| | | 4th " " " | | 648 | |
| 4th Brigade. | { | 6th K.G.L.... | ... | 668 | Brig.-Gen. Houstedt. |
| | | Watteville's Regiment | ... | 606 | |
| | | Chasseurs Britanniques. | ... | 504 | |

Royal Artillery ... 432 R. and F. 146 horses ... Lt.-Col. Lemoine.

Royal Engineers 48 " ... Lt.-Col. Bryce.

Staff Corps }
and Military } ... 35 " ... Q.-M. General.
Workmen }

TOTAL ... 11,305 R. and F., 489 horses.

J. CAMPBELL, Maj.-Gen.

In the above return are included the 10th Regt. and the Chasseurs Brit., who were sent back to Messina.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

ISCHIA AND SCYLLA.

1809. THE expedition to Ischia was in every particular successful. It was Stuart's aim to capture the city of Naples, while a brigade was to march through Calabria and join him as speedily as possible. This latter body of troops was successful in taking a line of posts, driving out the French, who by their presence there commanded the Straits of Messina. The Tenth formed a part of this brigade, and their doings will be referred to presently.

Meanwhile Stuart sailed with the main body of his troops to Ischia, an island at the north entrance to the Bay of Naples, strongly occupied at the time by the French. It had had its "full share of the vicissitudes that are so characteristic of the history of the Italian towns and provinces"; now it was to experience once more a change of masters. The island was fortified at every accessible point, but Stuart arranged his assault so well that the enemy deserted every battery on the shore, and retired to the Castle. The brilliancy of this achievement has been underrated in view of the important campaign in Spain, but the fighting of the troops under Stuart was of a very high order. They had to make a descent in the face of a formidable chain of batteries, yet in the end they not only achieved all that was purposed, but captured 100 pieces of ordnance, and 1,500 prisoners, with very little loss to themselves. While unable to proceed to Naples, Stuart had the satisfaction of knowing that his intention to create a diversion in favour of Austria was successful. His

expedition so alarmed the French that thousands of their troops were sent into Italy, who otherwise would have taken part in the operations on the Danube.

Whether there were any of the Tenth with this main force is doubtful. Some historians write as though there were, but Stuart's return, quoted in the preceding chapter, shows that the contingent of the Tenth designed for the expedition was ordered back to Messina; consequently their part in the fighting was only that which took place when the line of posts was captured on the Straits. Stuart stormed the castle of Ischia, which surrendered after having been surrounded by his troops for six days.

Meanwhile Naples was placed in a state of defence, and Stuart discovered that his plans could not be carried out unless he could obtain large reinforcements. The French formed and embodied a large corps of National Guards, the people rallying round their conquerors rather than witness the return of an unpopular and dethroned King. The General, in consequence, was compelled to abandon his project. Orders came, however, for an attack to be made by the Tenth and other troops on the castle of Scylla, and the story of the doings of these soldiers has been told in Stuart's despatches. The despatch quoted was dated from Ischia, July 9th, 1809, and was addressed to Viscount Castlereagh. In it the Commander-in-Chief says:—

“In my despatch of the 5th instant I had the honour of stating to your lordship that Lieutenant-Colonel Smith had been detached after our sailing from Milazzo with the Tenth regiment and Chasseurs Britanniques, who were to be joined at the Faro by the 21st Regiment, with orders to occupy and disarm the posts upon the Streight opposite to Messina, upon the late retreat of the enemy at the first appearance of our armament upon the coast of Calabria.

"An attempt to reduce the castle of Scylla was attended in the first instance with disappointment from the sudden reappearance of a large, preponderating force of the enemy, which constrained Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to raise the siege and embark for Messina, a measure which was effected, I am happy to say, on the 28th ultimo, without the smallest loss but that of his besieging train, which necessarily became a sacrifice. It fortunately, however, has proved only a sacrifice of the moment. The official reports of Major-General Mackenzie state to me that on the night of the 2nd instant, the enemy from sudden panic retreated again from the coast, having previously blown up the works of Scylla, and not only left us again our captured stores, but an immense quantity of ordnance and stores of their own, which had been placed there in dépôt. Major-General Mackenzie mentions to me in particular that thirty pieces of brass cannon had been thrown from the rock into the sea, from whence, however, there could be no difficulty in raising them, the water being extremely shallow.

"These stores had been progressively assembling, I am informed, for a considerable time past, as preparatory to the long menaced, and I believe really intended, invasion of the Kingdom of Sicily.

"The conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith during the course of this service, although attended by a momentary reverse, has been reported to me by Major-General Mackenzie in terms of great approbation, with every praise to the zeal and perseverance of the troops employed under his orders."

The 21st Regiment, during the fighting which followed at Palmé, seem to have suffered somewhat heavily, for a captain and a private were killed (the only men killed in the engagement); seven privates were wounded, and 86

officers and men were taken prisoners, while seven were missing. The Tenth, although engaged in the same fight and commended for their gallantry, were fortunate in suffering but slightly, none being wounded, and only two reported as missing.

The attempt on Scylla could scarcely have been expected to turn out successfully, when the force at Smith's disposal is taken into consideration. It was altogether inadequate to the task, since the attempt on the castle involved a march through a difficult bit of country which was strongly held by the enemy. Fighting began almost as soon as the Tenth landed on the promontory, and from first to last they had to contend with heavy odds, while crossing the heights of Jovanni, and wending their way through the defiles of Mela. The troops persisted, notwithstanding their difficulties, and at last, on the heights of Mela, they looked down on the castle they had been ordered to capture. They arrived at this spot on the 14th of June, and here for a fortnight they bivouacked in the presence of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, meanwhile, made all his dispositions for the attack, and proposed to make an assault on the castle on the 29th. Presumably he waited too long, for on that day he saw some French reinforcements coming up the defiles in such overwhelming numbers that he was compelled to retire at once before his retreat was cut off. As it was, he barely escaped being surrounded in the mountains, but by some masterly movements brought off his troops without loss—save that of the besieging train which, in his hurried retreat, he could not bring away.

Stuart's expectations with regard to Scylla were not realised. He anticipated that his attack on Ischia, and then his menace against Naples on the mainland, would draw away the principal part of the French force from Lower Calabria. In such a case Smith would have been sufficiently

strong with the Tenth, the 21st, and the Chasseurs Britanniques. Indeed, Stuart said in one of his despatches : " The recovery of the castle of Scylla, I should hope, will not require any length or difficulty of operation." As the event proved, the Tenth rarely had so dangerous a task set for them as this one of Scylla.

For some time after this there was little more than garrison duty for the Tenth. The fighting ceased in Naples, and Sicily was not molested by the French. Stuart's army became a mere army of observation, while bloody battles were being fought on the Danube, and the war was being carried on with vigour in the Eastern and Southern parts of Spain. The cause of Spanish independence, to secure which England stood committed, seemed desperate and almost hopeless. The French were successful everywhere after the battle of Ocana, and towns and cities threw open their gates to General Sebastiani, who drove the Spanish army before him, and cleared the fastnesses of the mountains. King Joseph, who had given up the throne of Naples for that of Spain, as Napoleon's nominee, bid fair to be master of the country.

The Tenth remained in garrison, in hourly expectation of being called across to Spain, to take part with the British forces there in the endeavour to drive the French out of the Peninsula ; but throughout the remainder of 1809, the whole of 1810, and indeed through 1811 and 1812, the Tenth continued in the Anglo-Sicilian army. When Scylla and the other posts fell into their hands, they returned to Sicily, arriving at Messina on the 8th of July, 1809. That same day they went into camp on the shore close by, and occupied these quarters until the 9th of November, 1810, when they marched into the citadel of Messina, remaining there throughout the whole of the following year.

The position of affairs in Sicily called for a strong British force in the island. The Annual Register of 1812 tells us of the mischief of a divided rule there: "a foreign court on the one hand, and a foreign army on the other, over a native population averse to both." It was impossible that the Tenth or any of their comrades could live on in Sicily in carelessness, or even with the common ease of garrison life, for when Lord William Bentinck came to take over the command, he discovered "a conspiracy of spies and assassins in the interests of France." He arrested the ringleaders, and had them tried at Messina by a military commission, many being condemned. But there were difficulties with the Queen, whose safety depended on the presence of the British troops. She had acquired during 1811 a rooted dislike to the English ascendancy in Sicily, and in spite of all that the British Government had done on her behalf, evinced a partiality for France which was bewildering. This was no new thing. Sir John Moore had had similar difficulties, and in his Journal we find: "The Queen directs the Government, but she is directed by a set of miscreants who, if not in the pay of France, are at any rate enemies of England." Such remarks occur again and again.

The King was mentally incapable of attending to national affairs, and consequently during the stay of the Tenth in the island the British Government acted, by compulsion, drastically. "In order to settle a regular government, correspondent to the views of the British Cabinet," it was decided by the latter "to place this authority in the hands of the nation at large, supported by the English army." Whether the Queen liked it or not, it had to be done, since it would have been ruinous to England to suffer Sicily to fall under French control. The account, therefore, continues: "As a step to this change, the fugitive Barons were

recalled in January (1812), and were welcomed to Palermo by a great escort of nobility, to the high displeasure of the Queen. Lord William Bentinck was declared Captain-General of all the troops in the island." A little later the King formally resigned his authority to his son, and a new constitution for the island was framed, that of Great Britain being taken as the model.

Such were the changes taking place when the Tenth lost their Colonel—General the Hon. Henry Edward Fox—by death. Fox had held the colonelcy since the 28th of June, 1795.

In 1803 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Ireland. But in 1804 he returned to Gibraltar as Lieutenant-Governor. When the Tenth went to Sicily, Fox was in command of the army of the island, and was also ambassador at the Court of Naples. The Court was then, as we have seen, residing in Palermo, having fled from Naples, alike from the French and the populace. Unfortunately, Fox was in ill-health, and Sir John Moore, afterwards the hero of Coruña and Fox's second-in command, took the most onerous of the duties, both military and diplomatic. Hence the frequent appearance of Moore's name in the despatches to the Home Government. The Queen urged Fox to take an army over to Naples, and drive out the French, but he declined. He knew that "Stuart's success was very much due to chance, and that it would be ridiculous for the English to leave the island of Sicily for the mainland, where Murat could soon outnumber them." There was so much friction between Fox and the Queen of Naples, that the Cabinet recalled the General to England, and sent Lord William Bentinck to undertake the supreme military and civil command. Severely determined as Fox was to guard the interests of England, Bentinck was even more so, and

carried matters to a still more drastic issue. Assured, as Fox had been, that it would be madness to carry over his forces to the mainland, he kept his army in Sicily on a constant war-footing. Hence the explanation of the long course of inactivity which marked the stay of the Tenth in Sicily after the capture of Scylla.

The new Colonel of the regiment was Major-General the Honourable Thomas Maitland, whose commission bore the date of July 19th, 1810. He remained Colonel of the Tenth until his death on the 17th of January, 1824.

Maitland had a distinguished career, but he could scarcely be called a popular officer. "Charles Napier, the future conqueror of Scinde, a very shrewd observer and certainly not biassed in favour of Maitland, under whose command he served for six years in the Ionian Islands, described him as 'a rough old despot,' 'with talent, but not of a first-rate order—narrow-minded, seeing many things under false lights,' and 'surrounded by sycophants, who thought him a god because he had more intelligence than they,' but Napier bore emphatic testimony to the sagacity and beneficial results of his policy, a verdict endorsed by Greek writers of recent date." This quotation from the "Dictionary of National Biography" shows the Colonel in his two-sided character. Cannon says that he was greatly beloved and esteemed by the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands when he was Lord High Commissioner there. It was contended that he deserved their love and esteem, for he gave the Greeks "a constitutional Charter, framed on principles of policy and justice, and restored the Greek islands to a high state of commercial prosperity without imposing extra taxes on the people." The author is disposed to discount the adverse criticisms passed on this able soldier, even when one of them is uttered by the illustrious Napier. Maitland may have been arbitrary,

and he may have been eccentric; but the country owed him much for what he accomplished while in her service.

Maitland was one of those who, in accordance with the custom of the time, was designed for the army from his birth. He was born in December, 1759, and during the same month was appointed lieutenant in the Scots 17th Light Dragoons, or Edinburgh Light Horse. His regiment was disbanded when young Maitland was four years old, but the boy drew half-pay at once, and continued to do so until 1778, when he took up his commission in the Seaforth Highlanders. This fact throws some light on the strange methods of Army administration in the 18th century. After serving with distinction in India, fighting against Hyder Ali, he was transferred to the 62nd Foot, and as its Lieutenant-Colonel in 1794, when only 35 years old, he served in St. Domingo. Three years later he was Brigadier-General. In the following year—1798—Maitland was a Brigadier-General in the West Indies, and Colonel of the 10th West India regiment. His principal work in the West Indies seems to have been to deal with the French Royalists in the Islands; they, at this time, giving a considerable amount of trouble. In 1799 he was engaged in a secret expedition to Belle Isle; and, as Major-General, it was his duty to aid the French Royalists on that part of the French coast. The expedition was abandoned ultimately, and Maitland with his troops was sent to the Mediterranean.

From this date his activities were varied. He was colonel of a battalion of the Army of Reserve, was a Commissioner of the Board of Control, a member of Parliament for the Haddington Burghs, and as Major-General commanded a brigade in Sussex. In 1806 he was Commander-in-Chief in Ceylon, and "arrived in that island at a very critical period, immediately after the British disasters in Kandy." While there he drew up a scheme for the reorganisation of

the East India Company's army. Maitland's services to Ceylon—and to the Indian army generally—were distinguished, and he proved himself worthy of promotion. What he attained in the way of rank, he honestly won ; and when he was made Colonel of the Tenth, it was recognised that an officer of exceptional capacity had been appointed to this distinguished regiment. During his colonelcy of the Tenth he was given the position of Governor of Malta, the appointment being made in 1813. At once he was confronted with a dangerous task. The plague was sweeping the island, and by reason of its ravages 5,000 of the people died in the first year of his administration ; but he took such measures that the pestilence was speedily stamped out. In December, 1815, he was Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, and his great and beneficial work while there has been already referred to. In the same year he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean, but Gibraltar was excepted from his jurisdiction. These posts, and that of Colonel of the Tenth, he held until he died in Malta, January 17th, 1824, being then Lieutenant-General and a Privy Councillor.

It was during the colonelcy of Maitland that the Tenth took part in the Peninsular campaigns.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE TENTH AT ALICANTE.

1812. A CONDITION of things which practically amounted to anarchy drew the attention of Napoleon to Spain, and furnished him with a pretext for overturning the dynasty. King Charles had become exceedingly unpopular, and consequently he notified his abdication of the throne. The heir-apparent—the Prince of the Asturias—at once succeeded as Ferdinand VII. On his accession, the new sovereign made known the fact to Napoleon, and expressed the hope that the two nations, France and Spain, would maintain friendly relations.

At that time, however, a great French army had crossed the frontier, and Murat, who had ostensibly entered Spain to put an end to the anarchy which prevailed, was encamped with 80,000 men in the neighbourhood of Vittoria, waiting for orders to march on the capital. On the 23rd of March, 1808, Murat, instructed by Napoleon, who ignored Ferdinand's friendly overtures, entered Madrid, declaring that since there were commotions in some of the provinces, he would remain in the capital until public tranquillity had been restored. On the 24th Ferdinand entered the city, and expected, not merely a welcome from his own people, but French acknowledgment of his title to the crown. This Murat refused, and since the Spanish army was scattered about the country, "in isolated divisions," or "cut up into petty garrisons," the French General was in a position to dictate to the monarch. Murat not only took steps to overawe the

citizens, but declared his intention of maintaining the cause of the old King, who had recently abdicated. Charles, thus reinstated, at once conveyed his rights to Napoleon, whereupon the Emperor gave the Spanish crown to his brother Joseph, at that time King of Naples. Murat was then installed as King of Naples, in the place of Joseph.

The outcome of this action on the part of the Emperor was a general uprising in the Spanish Peninsula. King Joseph fled from the country, Baylen and the French army of 18,000 men within its walls having been captured.

Napoleon now found himself opposed not merely by the people of Portugal and Spain, but also by England, who took this opportunity of frustrating the schemes of the Emperor for the annexation of the Peninsula. The British forces sent to Portugal were under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington. By a succession of brilliant victories Wellesley weakened the tenure of Napoleon in the Peninsula, and meeting his many difficulties by bold and splendidly-conceived measures, drove the French back towards the Pyrenees.

The call for a diversion in Eastern Spain, to relieve Wellesley in some degree, was not met with the readiness that was expected. It was considered at home, and by Wellesley also, that the army of Sicily might readily furnish reinforcements, and that the diversion would hold Marshal Suchet in Catalonia, and thus prevent him from joining his forces to those which were opposing Wellesley so strenuously. Catalonia, a great province on the eastern coast of Spain, had become the theatre of active military operations, and, as Napier puts it, "seemed like some huge carcase, on which all manner of ravenous beasts, all obscene birds, and all reptiles had gathered to feed." If for nothing else, the presence of an army from

Sicily would have been a boon since "individually the people were exposed to all the licentiousness of war, collectively, to the robberies and revenge, of both friends and enemies."

It became known to the men of the Tenth that there was some probability of an army proceeding from Sicily to Eastern Spain, in order to curtail the activities of Suchet, if not to drive him out of the Peninsula. It was common knowledge among the troops, who hoped to form part of this army of diversion, that the capital of the province of Catalonia (Barcelona) and the towns of Figueras, Lerida, Gerona and Tortosa were held by the enemy, but that from time to time these places and others had changed hands, owing to the spirited action of the Catalonian patriots and of the British troops who were there. There followed a more urgent call than before, and the Tenth were told to hold themselves in readiness for embarkation. Marshal Suchet had succeeded in reducing Taragona by storm on the 28th of May, 1811, the entry of the French troops being followed by a horrible massacre. In a message to Napoleon the Marshal intimated that he anticipated that when he should take Taragona it would "set a terrible example, and intimidate for ever Catalonia and Spain by the destruction of a whole city." In his despatch, which was written after Taragona had fallen, he said "The terrible example which I foresaw with regret in my last report to Your Highness has taken place, and will for a long time be recollected in Spain. Four thousand men have been killed in the city; from ten to twelve thousand men endeavoured to make their escape over the walls into the country; one thousand have been sabred or drowned; nearly 10,000, of whom 500 are officers, have been made prisoners, and are setting off for France; nearly 1,000

wounded are in the hospitals in the city, where their lives were respected in the midst of the carnage. Three field-m Marshals and the Governor are among the prisoners; many others among the slain."

After that awful episode Suchet marched into the interior of Catalonia, to disperse the patriots whom the Marquis of Campoverde had organised to avenge in some degree the massacre of Taragona. Later he defeated Blake, and met with further successes, investing Valencia. To save the city from the horrors that had been perpetrated at Taragona, Blake, who commanded in the defence, capitulated after a fearful bombardment. Suchet, now made Duke of Albefura, pursued his successes, and contemplated joining the army that was concentrating at Salamanca.

It became necessary to despatch the troops from Sicily, lest Wellington's position should be rendered more critical, even if disaster did not follow. Lord William Bentinck wrote to the Minister of War to tell him what his intentions were in this regard, Bentinck's brother going to Lord Wellington to ask him what should be the course pursued by the army he was about to send. The letter home was dated from Palermo, May 20th, 1812, and was as follows:—"I have determined to send without loss of time to Mahon, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Maitland (Colonel of the Tenth) all the force I can spare, consisting of about 6,000 infantry with artillery, and 200 Dragoons."

While Bentinck was considering his plans, the Tenth received orders to embark for this special service, but no great energy was displayed by those who had the preparations in hand. The officers and men were eager; the officials were almost criminally negligent, considering the condition of affairs in Spain. The battalion embarked

at Melazzo on the 31st of January, 1812, and sailed round the coast to Palermo. There to the mortification of the troops the order was given to land, and on the 2nd of February the men went into quarters, from which they did not move until the 6th of June.

The army, which left Palermo on the 25th of June, numbered 8,813 men. Lord William had hoped to send at least 10,000. These who embarked consisted of British, Germans, Calabrese, Swiss and Sicilians, the British and Germans only, says Napier, being either morally or militarily well-organised. The Tenth contained, besides their commissioned officers, 44 serjeants, 20 trumpeters and drummers, and 838 rank and file.

The first approach of Maitland's force was towards Palamos in Catalonia, the date of his arrival off the coast being the 31st of July. Maitland was clear as to the obligation of himself and his troops towards Italy, for in a letter reporting his movements to Lord Liverpool he said: "My orders are to remember that the division of the Sicilian Army detached under my Orders has for its first object the safety of Sicily, and that its employment on this coast is temporary, and to prevent the enemy from detaching from the eastern side of Spain to the westward." From the first, therefore, the Tenth and their comrades under Maitland's command considered themselves in no sense a permanent part of the Army of Spain, but only "lent," as it were, to aid Wellington by preventing the eastern army of France from assailing him on that side.

In the margin of this letter to Lord Liverpool, Maitland states to his lordship the composition of his force, thus: "1st, 10th, 58th, 81st, and foreign forces." At Majorca he obtained 4,000 infantry, 250 cavalry and

200 artillery. These were Spanish troops under the command of Major-General Whittingham.

According to Maitland's MS. notes, he entered into communication with Eroles, the Spanish commander, who came on board and urged him to land without delay and proceed, with the forces already in the neighbourhood and his newly-arrived troops, to the attack of Taragona. But other Spanish generals were by no means enthusiastic. Eroles declared that "the fate of Catalonia and his own existence depended" on Maitland's disembarking his forces. In answer to Maitland's inquiries there was no consensus of opinion as to the strength of Marshal Suchet's army. One statement was 18,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Lacy declared that Suchet had not more than 15,000 men; it was estimated by others and declared by deserters, that Suchet had as many as 22,000. It may be assumed that Lacy had some scheme on hand, and did not want Maitland near him. Maitland discussed the situation with his officers, and grave considerations led him to his decision as to landing. The fortifications at Taragona were formidable, and the French force within them too strong to assail. Maitland says candidly in one of his despatches that his decision not to land the troops in Catalonia, but to go further south, was because the enemy were too strong, and possessed all the fortresses along the coast. To attempt the capture of any principal town was, with the troops at his command, beyond his power. "There was the strongest reason to conclude that our division could make a much stronger impression on the enemy's other flank on the side of Valencia. . . . It was feared also that the Toulon fleet might come out and burn the transports at their anchorage during the siege, and thus Wellington's battering-train, and even the safety of the army, would be involved in an enterprise


promising little success." The officers unanimously concluded, at the council of war, that there should be no landing at Palamos.

In response to Maitland's desire, the Admiral in charge of the fleet sailed for Valencia, but during the voyage it was decided to proceed to Alicante, the capital of the province of that name. While on the way, it was pointed out to Maitland by the naval officers that Wellington's plan was that Taragona should be attacked. Maitland replied that Lord William Bentinck thought otherwise, and in view of the fact that his troops were so few, and too ill-composed to venture on the investment of the place, and that Suchet might well be supposed to be able to command the services of thousands of soldiers, it would be madness to attempt the plan.

Maitland's contention, supported by his officers, was borne out by actual facts. At the time when he appeared off Palamos, the French were at hand in force. According to Napier, Decaen and Maurice Mathieu, with some eight thousand disposable men, were then between Montserrat and Barcelona; that is to say, only two marches from Taragona; Lamarque, with from four to five thousand, was between Palamos and Mataro, five marches from Taragona; Quesnel, with a like number, was in the Cerdaña, being about seven marches away; Suchet and Paris could have arrived in less than eight days, and from the minor posts smaller succours might have been drawn; Tortosa alone could have furnished two thousand. But Lacy's division was at Vich, Sarzfield's at Villa Franca, Eroles's divided between Montserrat and Urgel, Milan's in the Grao d'Olot; and they required five days even to assemble. When united they would not have exceeded seven thousand men, and with their disputing captious generals would have been unable to act vigorously, nor



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OLD
COLOURS .
OF THE . .
TENTH . . .

could they have easily joined the Allies without fighting a battle, in which their defeat would have been certain.*

This news warranted Maitland in the course he took, and the responsibility he was prepared to undertake. He knew that before he could begin the siege he would have to meet Decaen and beat him, yet the latter's troops were equal to Maitland's in numbers, and more than equal in capacity, since in his army Maitland had "only 3,000 British and German troops," and possessed none of the requisites for a siege.

When on August 9th, 1812, Maitland's forces arrived off Alicante, and the ships presently entered the half-moon-shaped bay on which the city was built, he found the Spaniards in a desperate condition. They had been beaten back when they made an ill-devised attack upon the posts which General d'Harispe held at Castalla and Ybi in Valencia. General O'Donnel, who commanded the Army of Murcia, was defeated on July 21st, with a loss of 3,500 men.

The Tenth disembarked at once—on the 10th of August—and, with such other troops as had landed, served to protect Alicante from the enemy. The Spaniards did not co-operate with Maitland whole-heartedly. They haggled over the question of supplies, and Maitland had no alternative but to fall in with their terms, and obtain what he could from them. They bound him down to "draw nothing either by purchase or requisition, save wine and straw, from any of these lines, nor from the country between them." Maitland was paralysed in consequence. He had planned to attack Harispe on the 13th of August, but it was the 16th before he could leave Alicante. The date is given thus by Napier, although an old book in the Orderly Room of the Tenth, says that

* Napier: History of the Peninsular War.

on the 14th of August the regiment joined the army on its march, and proceeded to Monforte, where they bivouacked. The date, however, is not a matter of importance. The disheartenment for Maitland and his troops is all-important here, and still more so when the Spaniards, who were to be so greatly benefited by the presence of the Sicilian Army, were so ungenerous. Maitland found himself with a commissariat that was "utterly inefficient, and his field-artillery had been so shamefully ill-prepared in Sicily that it was nearly useless. He had hired mules at great expense for the transport of his guns, and of provisions from Alicante, but the owners of the mules soon declared that they could not fulfil their contract unless they were fed by the British, while many of the muleteers, after receiving their money, deserted with both mules and provisions. On the first day's march a convoy with six days' supply was attacked by armed banditti, called a guerilla, and the convoy was plundered or dispersed, and lost." The Tenth and their comrades discovered at a very early date in their experiences in the Peninsula what was the character of Spanish patriotism.

The position was more serious than had been anticipated, for while the Spaniards were ungenerous in their co-operation, Maitland heard that the French Army of the Centre, under Joseph Bonaparte, after having abandoned Madrid, was retiring on the province of Alicante, to form a junction with Suchet. Wellington sent a messenger in hot haste to Maitland to warn him of the threatening dangers, and to inform him that Bonaparte's army, now falling back on Alicante, numbered from 17,000 to 20,000 men, if not more.

On landing, Maitland had been joined by Major-General Ross, with 700 men of the 67th Regiment and of

De Watteville's, and when the advance was made towards Elda, these formed part of the moving army.

The Tenth were concerned the more because their Colonel, harassed at the outset by those who were to be considered his allies, was seriously ill, and could only attend to his duties by a great effort. They feared, too, when reports came that Maitland was so disgusted, lest he contemplated re-embarking. It was an open question whether the army would not return to Sicily without taking any part whatever in the war.

Maitland at last left Alicante, and proceeded westwards to Monforte, where his troops bivouacked for three or four days. Suchet had fallen back to Xativa, and the Tenth and other troops pushed on to Elda, a town some distance to the north-west. Arriving there on the 17th of August, Maitland heard that King Joseph Bonaparte had effected his junction with Suchet in Valencia, and consequently the British commander found himself in a position of extreme danger. An army of 8,000 men, few of them British, badly equipped, and with short supplies and ill-found artillery, was in no sense able to cope with this great French force under the King and Marshal. Close at hand were 25,000 men, with a large body of effective cavalry. Accordingly, Maitland fell back to Alicante, his only point of support. It was well for him that Suchet was hindered by the arrival of the King, otherwise the Marshal would have pressed Maitland to what might well have been disaster. Once more at Alicante, the Tenth were engaged in fortifying a camp outside the town, expecting the coming of Marshal Soult, who, having abandoned Andalusia, marched through the mountains, and effected a junction with King Joseph and Suchet. But the General of the Allied Forces at Alicante was hampered by the considera-

tion of expense, and was compelled to work at strengthening the place with as little outlay as possible.

Maitland discovered that Wellington's unexampled successes were clearing the north-west, the centre and the south of the Peninsula of the enemy, and resulting in the concentration of the French in Valencia. Consequently, he was compelled to remain on the defensive, knowing that an attack on Alicante would render his position critical. He was weakened because of the necessity of dividing his forces, for before the army retired to Alicante, Ross moved on to Carthagena to provide for its safety, since there was a fear lest Soult, who was close enough to threaten the place, would decide upon an attack.

All this time the heat was excessive, but, fortunately, the health of the troops was reported satisfactory. There was some alarm in Carthagena and Murcia, and in the towns in that direction, lest the fever, which was so prevalent in the country in the autumn, should affect the soldiers. Happily, while it played some havoc with the inhabitants, the precautions of the officers kept the cantonment free.

The perilous position of Maitland's forces became more evident as time went on. The French were in greater strength than had been anticipated. Joseph Bonaparte had joined Suchet on this side of the river Xucar, on the road to Almanza, with no fewer than 20,000 to 30,000 men. Soult, marching from Grenada to join Suchet, had taken the road towards Chincilla, and when scouts came in with their reports, Maitland concluded that the French army could not number less than 60,000 men, of which a great proportion were cavalry.

He accordingly asked Wellington to allow him to withdraw his army to Sicily, pointing out his danger when such overwhelming forces were within striking

distance, but the Commander-in-Chief directed him to hold on, and to make his entrenched camp at Alicante yet stronger. The message placed the Tenth and their comrades in a position of peril which has not been fully appreciated. Maitland did all in his power to strengthen the defences, and called on his men to face the danger with the courage of soldiers. The response from the English section was enthusiastic, though without a doubt they knew what a prolonged defence would mean. The General's trouble was apparent—want of men and want of provisions. His report ran thus: "The place was, and is, so bare of provisions that it was absolutely necessary to purchase, or starve if invested. We had provisions for the British division, but this stock would have gone a very insufficient way if the Spaniards were to share it with us. Our Commissary was therefore directed to purchase a cargo of wheat which was for sale, and a supply of rice and oil. With this we are but badly provided."

Wellington could not fail to appreciate the peril which menaced the army in the east of Spain, and especially when Maitland wound up one of his letters by saying: "I consider our position as very critical. We trust to the operations of Lord Wellington, that they will relieve us." Reviewing the position, Wellington instructed Maitland to embark the troops, both English and Spanish, whenever there was danger that their communication with the sea was likely to be cut off.

Maitland even then considered this course impracticable—that if an attack was seriously and vigorously carried on, he could get away any considerable portion of his troops. He did not think it possible, under the existing conditions, to repeat the masterly and successful retreat of Sir John Moore at Coruña. Happily, reinforcements having arrived from Sicily, he made his decision to

face the danger, and accordingly prepared for an obstinate resistance. Among the reinforcements was the grenadier company of the second battalion of the Tenth, which at once joined the regiment.

Unfortunately, the health of Maitland gave way completely. He was sick when the army arrived at Alicante, but fatigue of body, and the mental strain of preparing for the coming of the enemy in such overwhelming numbers, broke him up to such a degree that he felt himself incompetent to continue the arduous service in which he was engaged. He told Wellington and Bentinck, and asked the latter to relieve him, if such a thing were possible.

STATE OF THE ALLIED ARMY, under Lieutenant-General Maitland at Alicante, 18th September, 1812:—

CAVALRY.

British and Whittingham.

| | | | |
|---------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Officers | ... | ... | 48 |
| Serjeants | ... | ... | 53 |
| Drummers | ... | ... | 16 |
| Rank and file | ... | | 704 |
| <hr/> | | | |
| Total | ... | ... | 821 |

Horses, 526.

ARTILLERY.

British and Portuguese, Whittingham's and Rock's.

| | | | |
|---------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Officers | ... | ... | 37 |
| Serjeants | ... | ... | 39 |
| Drummers | ... | ... | 13 |
| Rank and file | ... | | 924 |

Horses, 363.

ENGINEERS.

British and Portuguese, Whittingham's and Roché's.

| | | | |
|---------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Officers | ... | ... | 14 |
| Serjeants | ... | ... | 13 |
| Drummers | ... | ... | 4 |
| Rank and file | ... | | 279 |

INFANTRY.

| | | | |
|---------------|-----|-----|--------|
| Officers | ... | ... | 491 |
| Serjeants | ... | ... | 554 |
| Drummers | ... | ... | 317 |
| Rank and file | ... | | 12,506 |

GRAND TOTAL.

| | | | |
|---------------|-----|-----|--------|
| Officers | ... | ... | 596 |
| Serjeants | ... | ... | 659 |
| Drummers | ... | ... | 350 |
| Rank and file | ... | | 14,473 |

 16,078

Horses, 889.

(Signed) FREDERICK ADAM,
Colonel & Dy.-Adjt.-General.

N.B.—Of the 458 of Whittingham's Cavalry, only 308 are mounted.

STATEMENT OF THE LIGHT ARTILLERY THAT MOVES WITH THE ARMY.

*Alicante, September 19, 1812.*Brit. Art^y. Whitt^m. Rochés.

| | | | | | |
|-------------------|-----|-----|----|---|---|
| 8-pounders | ... | ... | — | 4 | 2 |
| 6-pounders | ... | ... | 10 | — | — |
| 4-pounders | ... | ... | — | 2 | — |
| 5½-inch howitzers | ... | 2 | | 2 | — |
| Mountain guns, | 4- | | | | |
| pounders | ... | 4 | | — | — |

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

ON THE DEFENSIVE AT ALICANTE.

1812. MAITLAND'S illness being so serious that he returned to Sicily before the arrival of Major-General William Clinton, Major-General Mackenzie was left in temporary command.

Clinton reached Alicante on the 26th of October, 1812, and found that the enemy had made a strong reconnoissance with cavalry, evidently to discover the strength of the Allies in that arm, but Mackenzie had obliged the French to retire after a sharp action. Despatches came for Clinton from Wellington, recommending him to make himself master of the city and kingdom of Valencia, should the enemy march into La Mancha, and should Clinton find himself able to move without risking an action with any superior numbers, especially of cavalry.

Clinton, however, was first anxious to obtain possession of the citadel of Alicante, which was held at the time by the Spanish Governor. This jealous official, says Napier, would not suffer the British to hold even a gate of the town; nay, he sent Elio a large convoy of clothing and other stores with an escort of only twenty men, that he might retain two of that General's battalions to resist the attempt which he believed, or pretended to believe, Clinton would make on the citadel.

Realising the difficulty, Clinton gave up the idea, and prepared to follow out Lord Wellington's instructions. But he foresaw difficulties. He had reason to suppose that Suchet was in his front with 20,000 infantry and

3,000 cavalry. On the 6th of November he prepared to start, in consequence of the proposed march of Suchet with a considerable corps in the direction of Regusia. Then came reliable intelligence which led to a change of plans. It was found that Suchet had returned to Valencia, followed by 10,000 men, with whom he had moved westward, the latter end of the previous month.

Clinton was thus reduced to the mere defensive; but, fortunately, Lord Wellington's instructions were elastic and conditional, recommendatory rather than peremptory. Clinton, on the spot, saw clearly that while the men of the Tenth and the other British troops would follow out his instructions, however full of danger—that, indeed, they would welcome a fight—enterprise under the circumstances was forbidden him.

In his despatch to the Secretary of War, Clinton wrote the following concerning the army in which the Tenth had their place: "I have about 13,000 of all arms. Of these nearly 8,000 are Spaniards of the Division of Major-General Whittingham and Roché, and my total of cavalry is 360, 200 of which only are what may be called British. Of these about 120 of the 20th Light Dragoons, and 70 of a foreign troop attached to that regiment, are principally Germans. I am thus particular in my statement that Your Lordship may be aware that if the army does not act with all the enterprize that might be expected of it, the total want of cavalry is the grand cause." Clinton then went on to state that the country was such that cavalry could act, and that the enemy had a numerous body reported as excellent.

Altogether the position of Clinton was not an enviable one. The drain on the commissariat was as serious as the actual coming of the French army; and if the Spaniards should be driven in, there was considerable

prospect of starvation, or a near approach to it—of manifest hardship to the Tenth and their comrades.

During these anxious months there were many changes in the commandship of the Allied Army in Eastern Spain. Clinton, for some reason, was superseded by Major-General Campbell, who came from Sicily, at Bentinck's orders, and brought with him a welcome reinforcement of "four thousand men, principally British." His coming was a surprise, for he was the "fourth general-in-chief in the same number of months." Campbell and his troops reached Alicante on the 2nd of December, 1812.

From what he saw Campbell concluded that the presence of the army at Alicante effectually prevented Marshal Suchet from turning his attention to Wellington. In that sense the army in which the Tenth were serving was rendering incalculable service to the common cause in Spain, and hampering the French to a most serious extent. These additional soldiers brought by Campbell—4,000 in number—greatly strengthened the force. A sense of confidence sprang up, especially when Campbell said that Lord William Bentinck would himself arrive before long, and bring a strong body of troops with him.

Campbell, like his predecessors, had little reliance on the troops under his command, with the exception of those which were British or German. The army, to his chagrin, was a heterogeneous mass, which he did not care to trust in pitched battle against the "veteran and powerfully constituted army which would be . . . opposed to them." If he had had a few more Tenth! He said in the despatch already quoted: "The two British corps and one German are all that I can or ought to place any reliance upon." Of the others he had brought from Sicily, and of the Spaniards, he had grave doubts. They

could talk and advise, and when Campbell declined to move until he was more sure of the army against which he was to operate, they were discontented, and the Spanish general "dispersed his army for subsistence."

One gains from all this a very clear impression of the unenviable position and experience of the Tenth. A few regiments like their own would have sufficed to keep the French at bay, but this uncertainty as to the conduct and courage of their confederates paralysed all movement.

STRENGTH OF THE TENTH IN JANUARY, 1813.

Effective strength, exclusive of those sent or left at home.

Fit for duty at Headquarters—

| | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Officers | ... | ... | ... | ... | 37 |
| Serjeants, drummers, rank and file | ... | ... | ... | ... | 817 |
| Sick in Spain | ... | ... | ... | ... | 63 |
| Sick left in Sicily | ... | ... | ... | ... | 5 |

On Command—

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|
| On public employ | ... | ... | ... | ... | 7 |
| Garrison Company and maimed | ... | ... | ... | ... | 35 |
| At Palermo, in charge of stores | ... | ... | ... | ... | 6 |
| At the Castle of Alicante | ... | ... | ... | ... | 44 |

Total 1,014

Others, including officers absent, officers and men sick, on furlough, or on recruiting service, or invalids sent home brought up the establishment to the following strength:—

| | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-----|-----|----|------------------|-----|-----|-------|
| Colonel | ... | ... | 1 | Adjutant | ... | ... | 1 |
| Lieut.-Colonel | ... | ... | 1 | Quartermaster | ... | ... | 1 |
| Majors | ... | ... | 2 | Surgeon | ... | ... | 1 |
| Captains | ... | ... | 11 | Assist.-Surgeons | ... | ... | 2 |
| Lieutenants | ... | ... | 24 | Serjeants | ... | ... | 65 |
| Ensigns | ... | ... | 9 | Drummers | ... | ... | 22 |
| Paymaster | ... | ... | 1 | Rank and file | ... | ... | 1,200 |

In spite of all the hardships endured not one was marked as deserted.

List of Officers doing duty with the regiment in January, 1813.

Lieut.-Colonel Travers.

Major J. Otto Beyer (Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel).

Captains Brome, Dent, Kersteman, Allen, Grieve, Brady, Rudsdell, Hicks.

Lieutenants Bloomfield, Tench, Thaine, Robinson, Sims, Campbell, Thompson, Leard, Henderson, Gallie, Windle, Rannie, Jauncey, Tripp, Travers, Baylis, Phibbs, Birch.

Ensigns: Tisdall, Horner, Wrixon, Locke.

Adjutant Mullenger (Lieutenant).

Paymaster Dive.

Quartermaster Whalley.

Surgeon Tucker.

Assistant-Surgeon Pritchard.

Besides these must be considered the List of Officers who are absent on Staff Employ, Recruiting or duty with other Corps.

| <i>Rank and Name.</i> | <i>On what duty.</i> |
|--|--|
| Col. the Hon. T. Maitland (Lieut.-General). | Supposed with H.M.'s leave. |
| Major Octavius Carey. | On duty with Calabrian Free Corps. |
| Capt. James Higginson. | Brig.-Major to Major-General J. Mackenzie. |
| „ Green (Bt.-Major). | With Wellington's army. |
| „ Edward Powell. | Acting Barrack-Master-General at Messina. |
| „ D. T. Carpenter. | Recruiting. |
| Lieut. Thos. Handford. | On duty at Castle of Alicante. |

| <i>Rank and Name.</i> | <i>On what duty.</i> |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Lieut. Will. Holden. | On duty with 2nd Battalion. |
| „ J. W. Bowen. | With Calabrian Free Corps. |
| „ M. Rosengrave. | Recruiting. |
| Ensign W. Mayes. | { On duty with 2nd Battalion. |
| „ Jonas Rudland. | |
| „ W. Sayers. | { Recruiting. |
| „ Henry Salmon. | |
| „ Francis Dickson. | |
| Assist.-Surgeon Ebenezer Black. | On duty with 20th L.D. |

Officers absent without Leave.

| | |
|------------------------|---------------------|
| Captain Stephen White. | Since Oct. 1, 1812. |
| Lieut. Francis Innes. | „ Jan. 24, 1813. |
| „ John Simpson. | „ Nov. 24, 1812. |
| „ R. C. Mansell. | „ Sept. 1, 1812. |

Officers absent with Leave.

Lieut. George Best, and Lieut. James Berry.

List of Officers of the 2nd Battalion doing duty with the Regiment.

Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Cashell.

Major T. T. Trickey.

Captains Thos. Fothergill, Henry Heathcote, Will. Hoar, D'Arcy Kelly, William Mainwaring.

Lieutenants William Holden (belonging to 1st Battalion), H. S. Nixon, A. J. Nowell, Ralph Marshall, James Ferguson, Edward Allen, Will. T. Loftus, Edward Supple, J. A. Henderson, John Peppard.

Ensigns Will. Mayes, Jonas Rudland, Will. Sayers.
(These belonged to the 1st Battalion, doing duty
with the 2nd Battalion).

Adjutant Frederick Foaker (Lieut.)

Paymaster Robert Bluntish.

Quartermaster Thos. Lynch.

Surgeon W. H. Blicke.

Assist.-Surgeon Thos. Rolston.

Officers absent on Staff Employ, or other duty.

Major Hamilton (Bt.-Lt.-

Col.)

Doing duty with the 1st
Battalion.

Capt. Joseph Rudsdell.

Capt. Joseph Hicks.

Capt. Charles Scott (Bt.-
Major).

Recruiting at Langholm.

Lieut. Robert Travers.

„ Thos. Baylis.

„ Rutledge Phibbs.

„ George Birch.

Doing duty with the 1st
Battalion.

Officers absent with Leave.

By whose permission.

Col. the Hon. Thos. Maitland
(Lieut.-General).

By H.M.'s leave.

Capt. H. A. Sutherland.

The Commander of
forces, to proceed
to England.

Lieut. John Ahmuty.

On his way to join
the regiment.

Officers absent without Leave.

Brevet-Major John Carr.

Since Aug. 20, 1812.

Ensign W. R. Bustin.

„ Sept. 3, 1812.

„ Rich. W. Shinkwin.

„ Sept. 10, 1812.

„ Rich. Lane.

„ Oct. 2, 1812.

(Not joined since appointed).

In addition to the foregoing there were the following officers and men at Hull—the quarters of the Regimental Depot :—

| | |
|--|-----|
| Brevet-Major Green's or 1st Dep. Company ... | 95 |
| Capt. Carpenter's or 2nd Dep. Company ... | 105 |
| <hr/> | |
| Total | 210 |
| <hr/> | |

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE BATTLE OF CASTALLA.

1813. SO far the Tenth had formed part of an army that did nothing but stand on the defensive, save when Maitland advanced to Elda. That was all that had been done in the nature of offensive warfare, and Napier, in somewhat drastic terms, declares that the army was badly commanded. If that were so, it was not to be wondered at that the Tenth had no opportunity of distinguishing itself at this time, whereas Wellington's troops were everywhere winning victories which added lustre to the British arms.

It must not be forgotten, however, that it was acknowledged that the Army of the East carried out the designs of Wellington in placing it there. The Tenth played their part, and rendered fine service in assisting to occupy Suchet's attention in front. He was thus not available for service where Wellington was most busy. He was, moreover, obliged "to keep his forces together, instead of hunting down the bands on his communications." That alone was effective service. Still greater things could have been done had it not been that "want, ignorance, dissension and even treachery" were rampant in the army of the Allies.

On the 25th of February, 1813, Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray came from Sicily to assume command of the allied troops, superseding Campbell.

When Murray had reviewed his army, he was discouraged. In his first despatch he expressed his disappointment, and added, "Of the nature of its composition your Lordship is well informed, and as with the exception of the British

and German Details, nothing from every account can be worse, I anxiously hope that the expectations of His Majesty's Government will not be too sanguine."

The arrival of the new commander meant activity for the men, for he not only fought several actions with reconnoitring parties, but drove in the advanced posts of Suchet's army. It was his intention to drive the French from the mountains in his front, and in pursuance of his scheme he recognised the importance of possessing Alcoy. The Tenth were a part of the force to be employed for this purpose—to seize and hold the place. Murray divided his army into four columns, one to move "on the left by Elda, to watch the great Madrid road, one on the right composed of Spanish troops under Colonel Campbell, from Villa Joyosa, to get to Consentayna behind Alcoy; a third, under Lord Frederick Bentinck, issuing by Ibi, was to turn the French right; the fourth was to march from Xixona straight against Alcoy, and to pursue the remainder of Habert's division which was behind the town."*

The Tenth was with the fourth column, which had to travel by a bad road over "a very steep, rugged ridge," and along a narrow pass in the mountains. It was a difficult and dangerous undertaking, but the soldiers, glad to be on the move after such a long spell of inactivity, did their work admirably. Unfortunately, the intended surprise failed, Campbell's men not appearing as arranged. When the French saw the Tenth and their comrades marching down the Sierra, they retired in order to meet the Allies' army in a more favourable position a mile distant from Alcoy. There was, however, some severe fighting which, if Murray had sent more support, might have led to disaster for the French. Eventually Alcoy was occupied. There was

* Napier's History of the Peninsular War.

considerable discontent at Murray's want of vigour, and at Campbell's failure ; for since his column was designed to cut off the enemy's escape and he was not there, the whole scheme missed being as effective as had been hoped. Murray himself said that had Campbell's column arrived a quarter of an hour earlier, not a man of the French would have got away.

The fourth column obtained great credit in spite of the failures elsewhere. The soldiers drove the enemy back six or seven miles after some hard fighting, but their mountain climb so fatigued them that Murray felt he ought not to press the pursuit. This fight took place on March the 7th ; the Spanish troops who were engaged acquitted themselves in a manner which Wellington declared to be "highly creditable." He said that it "shows how much may be expected from Spanish troops under the management of active and intelligent officers." The comment refers to the splendid way in which General Whittingham had organised the Spaniards in his command, in spite of the opposition of General Cuesta.

The troops were daily expecting Bentinck, and knowing the character of that General they were anticipating some vigorous movements, but Murray received a letter dated March 13th, 1813, from Palermo. Bentinck wrote to say that the King of Sicily had suddenly and unexpectedly resumed the reins of government, and that in consequence affairs had assumed so unfavourable and serious an aspect that Bentinck judged it necessary to send an express to Malta to ask for the 44th Regiment to be sent to him. He also told Murray that he must withdraw from Alicante the grenadier and light infantry companies which had been serving in Sicily. The troops which Bentinck specified were the following: the second battalion of the Tenth, the 21st, the 31st, the 62nd, the 75th, the 3rd, 7th, and 8th

battalions of the King's German Legion, and others. He wanted them at once. It meant the loss of 2,000 of Murray's best troops, while among those that remained were many in which that General had no confidence.

Murray was greatly distressed, for all his plans, drawn up with remarkable aptitude, were ruined by this sudden demand. One thing is certain—his position became extremely unpleasant, and the Tenth, like other troops, found the campaign settling down to the monotony of cantonment duty once more.

Suchet's movements broke up this unwelcome monotony. The French General prepared to advance when he saw the fleet sail out of the harbour with the troops for Sicily, and Murray had no alternative but to fall back. On the 18th of March he sent the Tenth across the mountains to Ibithe, and two days later the regiment went on to Castalla, where they entrenched on what has been described as "a rugged sierra ending abruptly above Castalla, which, with its old castle crowning an isolated sugar-loaf hill, closed the right of that wing." And now there were evidences on every hand that the French Marshal was preparing to drive Murray back to his former quarters before Alicante.

Suchet had collected the whole of his disposable force, and by the 10th of April completed his arrangements. On the morning of the 11th he attacked and dislodged, with great loss to himself, a Spanish corps posted by General Elio. This corps threatened his right, while it supported the left flank of the Allies. The loss to the Spaniards was serious, for Habert pressed them so hard in their retreat towards Jumilla that "being pierced in the centre they broke and fled." Elio's troops got into Villena, but when Murray saw Suchet advancing on the morning of the 12th, he requested Elio to bring in his Spanish troops. The Spaniard obstinately refused, and consequently Suchet

coming upon him, fought his way into the town and compelled Elio to surrender "with the best-equipped and finest regiment in the Spanish army."

At noon Suchet began his real attack. Colonel Adam had been ordered to fall back upon Castalla, but to dispute the passage. He did it with the utmost gallantry and skill, although attacked by an infinitely superior force. In this fight the Tenth behaved with conspicuous gallantry, and Lieutenant Thompson, who belonged to that regiment, and who also discharged the duties of Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, was killed by a cannon-shot. The enemy's advanced guard occupied the pass that evening. Here the Tenth had made a determined stand, but the French "swarmed up the steep rocks on either flank with a surprising vigour and agility," and when they had gained the summit, their supporting columns advanced. Overwhelmed by numbers, the Tenth and the 27th, together with two Italian regiments, had no alternative but to fall back, doing so in good order, fighting desperately all the time. Colonel Adam took up ground indicated by Murray, and remained there with his men throughout the night under arms.

At noon on the 13th of April, the Tenth were again engaged, and it was on this day that the battle of Castalla was decided. The enemy's columns of attack were composed of three divisions of infantry, a corps of cavalry some 1,600 strong, and a formidable train of artillery.

Murray's despatch which describes the battle shows that the position of the Allied army was extensive. The left was posted on a strong range of hills occupied by Major-General Whittingham's division of Spanish troops, and the Advance of the Allies under Adam. This range of hills terminates at Castalla. Castalla and the ground to the right were occupied by Major-General Mackenzie's division, and

the 58th. The remainder of the position was covered by a strong ravine, behind which Lieutenant-General Clinton was stationed, supported by three battalions of Roché's division, as a column of Reserve. A few batteries had been constructed in this part of the line, and in front of the Castle of Castalla.

Murray had made his right so strong with entrenchments as to be practically impregnable. Indeed, when Suchet began his attack, he found the strength so great that he advanced on the left, refusing the right. Everything seems to have been in Murray's favour. During the night, as Napier reminds us, although Murray does not lay emphasis on this in his despatches, the English General entrenched the ground he occupied in parts. "His right wing was quite refused, and so well covered by the barranco that nearly all the troops could have been employed as a reserve to the left wing, which was also very strongly posted and presented a front " about two and a half miles in extent.

The first movement Suchet made was to pass a strong body of cavalry along the line, threatening the right; but, as we have shown, that was refused. Of this movement, says Murray, no notice was taken. The ground to which Suchet was pointing was unfavourable to cavalry, and as this movement was foreseen, the necessary precautions had been taken.

When this body of cavalry had passed nearly half of the line of the Allies' infantry, the French Marshal advanced his columns to the foot of the hills, and then the Tenth were in the thick of the fighting. Suchet's troops stormed the whole line two and a half miles in length. It was an attack worthy of the soldiers who were esteemed the finest in the whole of the French Army of Spain; but the defence was so brilliant that the enemy were beaten back at every point. At many places the opposing forces came to such

close quarters that it was a bayonet contest from which at last the French shrank; and they finally retreated, leaving the ground strewn with their slain.

Some fierce fighting took place where Suchet's principal force was thus engaged and overthrown. Napier tells of the contest at that point where the Tenth were engaged, close to the 27th, who were destined to receive the full shock of the attack. "The ground, having an abrupt declination near the top, enabled the French to form a line under cover, close to the British who were lying down, waiting for orders to charge, and while the former were unfolding their masses, a grenadier officer, advancing alone, challenged the captain of the Twenty-seventh grenadiers to single combat. Waldron, an agile, vigorous Irishman, and of boiling courage, instantly sprang forward; the hostile lines looked on without firing a shot, the swords of the champions glittered in the sun, the Frenchman's head was cleft in twain, and the next instant the Twenty-seventh jumping up with a deafening shout, fired a deadly volley at half pistol range, and then charged with such a shock that, maugre their bravery and numbers, the enemy's soldiers were overthrown and the side of the Sierra was covered with the killed and wounded."

The Tenth joined in the pursuit, and after hard fighting drove Suchet back in confusion on his battalions of reserve in the plain. Suchet looked for his cavalry, but they were far away to the left, and "separated from the point of action by the bed of the torrent, a bridge over which was commanded by the Allies." Having united his shattered battalions with those of his Reserve, the French commander now took up a position in the valley.

Murray, realising that it would not be creditable to allow the French Marshal to remain there, quitted his position, leaving his Reserve to hold the heights, and formed the

Allied army on Suchet's front, covering his right flank with cavalry, while his left rested on the hills. The army then advanced a considerable distance, in two lines, to attack Suchet; but that General retreated into the Pass of Biar, along which a day or two before he had driven the Tenth and other regiments. It is said that "he plunged into the pass with his infantry, cavalry and tumbrils in one mass, leaving a rear-guard of three battalions and eight guns to cover the passage."

Mackenzie's men came to blows with this rear-guard, who made a desperate stand, but were beaten back. If Murray had supported this attack vigorously, instead of calling off the troops in the moment of victory, Suchet's defeat would have ended in a huge disaster. As it was, he was able, when he came in haste and disorder to Villena, to reform his army, and he then quietly withdrew to Fuente de la Higuera. The action terminated at dusk with a distant but heavy cannonade.

Murray says that he could take no guns because the enemy had brought none to the heights, and retreated too expeditiously to be overtaken for the capture of trophies. In reality, if he had not been so timid, if he had let slip the Tenth and other regiments in those moments of fierce confusion, he might have gone far towards annihilating the finest army that Napoleon had in the Peninsula. Suchet's guns were posted in the gorge, but Murray says that he did not feel justified in risking the lives of his men to effect their capture.

After the fight the Allies returned to their strong position at Castalla. The outcome of the battle was that Murray had crippled Suchet, and had tarnished the prestige of that fine soldier, whose boast was that his army had never known a check. His loss was admitted to be 2,500 men, while that of the Allies was small.

In sending on his report of the battle to Wellington Sir John Murray said: "I can with truth affirm that there was not an officer or soldier engaged who did not court the glorious termination of an honourable life in the discharge of his duty to his King and his country."

On the following day the Tenth marched to Alcoy, accompanied by other battalions. Murray, in giving the orders for this movement, says that he did so in "the hope, but not the sanguine hope" that he might be able to force the Pass of Albayda, and reach the entrenched position of the enemy at San Felipe before they could bring up their full army.

The battle of Castalla had important results, for it ruined the plans of Suchet. The French General had hoped to beat the Allies, and then to use his troops elsewhere to harass Wellington; he was now obliged to remain in the east of Spain. On the other hand, in spite of his victory, Murray despaired of holding Suchet, in view of the fact that Lord William Bentinck was requiring so many soldiers to be sent back to Sicily. He was satisfied with the Spanish troops—especially those which were under the command of a capable officer like Whittingham—if he were enabled to pursue a defensive policy; but they were not reliable for attack. They were not even reliable so far as obedience to orders was concerned, as we have seen in Elio's blank refusal at Villena. Murray found the Sicilians equally untrustworthy, and these formed more than two-thirds of his force. By the time he had satisfied Bentinck's demands he would not have more than 3,000 or 4,000 British and German troops in his army to oppose to the finest French force then existing. Naturally enough Murray was apprehensive of the result of the campaign in the eastern part of the Peninsula.

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